Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

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JAN. – DEC. 1944

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ADV HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

1404/4/GSI(b)

15 Dec 44

AAI Security Summary No.20 for the month of NOVEMBER 1944

3660 (2 Copies) Copy No 2.

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

1. Counter-intelligence was mainly preoccupied throughout November with the task of preventing, detecting and handling enemy line-crossing agents. These were dispatched on a heavy scale, and, although a large number were arrested, it is known that a proportion escaped detection and completed their missions.

2. Fifty-five enemy agents were arrested in the operational zone in the course of the month, and of these fifty were line-crossers, the remainder having been left behind in the course of the German withdrawal.

The great majority were despatched across the U.S. Sector of the line, mostly on the IV Corps front, and forty-eight out of the month's total were apprehended in Fifth Army area.

Neither missions nor methods contained any really new or significant features. Seventy-five per cent of the agents caught were employed on espionage missions, mostly concerned with short-term tactical information in the forward areas. Several had been instructed to collect intelligence about the ports of LEGHORN, ANCONA and RIMINI, as well as about airfields across the whole width of the peninsula. In LEGHORN a post-occupational W/T agent was arrested who was found to have transmitted a considerable number of messages before his capture.

The fourteen saboteurs who were arrested were all to make use of explosives from small dumps hidden by the enemy in the LUCCA - PISTOIA area before his withdrawal. They had not been instructed to attack specific, individual targets, but rather to exercise their discretion and to destroy any bridges, vehicles, dumps, railway equipment etc that appeared appropriate and feasible. By now, all fifteen students who attended one Abwehr sabotage course, which was held near COMO in October, have been accounted for, having fallen into our hands by two's and three's in the course of several weeks. To celebrate the capture of the fifteenth and last, a group photograph has been taken in the yard of FLORENCE gaol.

3. Three agents were brought to trial during the month, and all three were convicted and sentenced to death. Two executions were carried out.

A further long series of over twenty trials has started in FLORENCE, and it is expected that a large proportion of convictions will be obtained.

The preparation of such cases for trial is proceeding satisfactorily. Fifth Army is assisted by an A.C. Security Officer with wide police and legal

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The preparation of such cases for trial is proceeding satisfactorily. Fifth Army is assisted by an A.C. Security Officer with wide police and legal experience, and Eighth Army now has a special F.S. Legal Detachment.

4. To meet the enemy's powerful line-crossing offensive, great attention has been devoted to improving our counter-measures in the forward areas.

A detailed survey of the whole front has shown that a very comprehensive and elaborate network of security controls is in full operation, and that all concerned, both cmds, troops and security agencies are fully alive to the dangers presented by Frontläufer and to the necessity for enforcing strict counter-measures. In Fifth Army area, approximately one hundred and fifty standing road check posts are maintained, consisting mainly of CC.RR and military police, and supported by a large number of CIC patrols. In Eighth Army, two hundred troops of an Italian Guard Bn and three hundred and fifty CC.RR are employed on check posts under the direct operational control of FSS. In both areas, the principle of control in depth is followed, and, on the average, an agent seeking to cross an Army area would probably have to negotiate four lines of control as well as variable and intermediary snap check points. The R.I.P's were kept busy, that of Fifth Army handling over six thousand persons in the course of the month, among whom fourteen were detected as agents.

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As there was believed to be a considerable amount of unauthorised civilian travel after dark, particularly between dusk and curfew, a special week's drive was organised in the latter part of November, when a large number of additional snap checks during the hours of darkness were made by FSS/CIC throughout AAI territory. The results were reasonably satisfactory in that they showed that there is not in fact a wide-spread disregard of movement regulations in the operational zone. In general, the proportion of infringements was approximately five per-cent of persons checked; the majority of these were in the rear Army, District or Base Section areas: illegal movement in the Corps Areas was almost negligible : in Polish Corps area, for example, over ten thousand persons were checked on the roads after dark during the week, and less than one per cent of these were guilty of contravening the regulations. All serious offenders were prosecuted and the week's campaign will certainly have had a salutary effect on both civilians and military drivers.

5. Partisans have been presenting our forward Security/C.I. agencies with considerable and varying problems. Partisan leaders on both sides of the lines are accustomed to give passes and all kinds of chits to their supporters: many are worthless "scraps of paper", easily transferable and on occasions they have been given to most undeserving and dangerous individuals who had been "patriots" of only a few days standing : it is not easy or politic, however, entirely to ignore all such passes and testimonials.

Other security difficulties arise through the continued operational employment of partisans when they have been overrun by our forces. This complicates both the enforcement of movement control and the collection of arms. Moreover many are found to be wearing British battle-dress delivered to them while they were operating in enemy territory.

Certain steps have already been taken by this HQ which will alleviate some of these difficulties, and further measures are under consideration.

In the RAVENNA area, the Partisans were particularly well organised and disciplined, and they have not only given every assistance but also behaved with unusual correctness. Acting on information supplied by Eighth Army, they rounded up a stay-behind enemy agent in RAVENNA before the arrival of the Allied troops, and they have rendered great help to the Canadian FSS by tendering advice on local personalities instead of following the usual course of taking independent and rather violent action.

6. In the field of sabotage, two attempts were made to damage or derail trains in the Southern area of 1 District, but all were abortive. The perpetrators were not discovered.

Several cases of wilful damage to signal lines were reported, but on the whole the scale of interruption of signal communications from this cause and from theft was slightly below the average.

7. The civil security situation remains reasonably steady and quiet. The Communists are very active in most areas and appear to be steadily increasing their adherents : they are loud in their abuse, but this is directed almost

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7. The civil security situation remains reasonably steady and quiet. The Communists are very active in most areas and appear to be steadily increasing their adherents : they are loud in their abuse, but this is directed almost wholly against Italian rather than Allied individuals, parties and institutions. Vague reports of arms collections and violent intentions continue to be received, but there is no indication of any direct threat to Allied security from this quarter.

No Fascist resistance movement or subversive organisation has come to light, and it is clear that Fascism would find any serious development difficult to maintain in face of the vigilance of Communists and Partisans and of their constant denunciations.

In general, security/C.I. agencies receive satisfactory co-operation from the civil authorities and from the people as a whole.

8. Civil postal services have now been restored as far North as LEGHORN Prov., PISA town, FLORENCE City, AREZZO Prov and ANCONA Prov. Security approval was given to this considerable extension of such services, since experience had proved that they do not in fact involve any serious risk to our security, and since the continued absence of postal facilities over a period of months, particularly in a city like FLORENCE, tends to strangle the economic life of the people.

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Similarly, the security ban on all Italian military leave into the Army areas was relaxed to the extent of allowing personnel of Italian Combat Gruppi to go on leave to their homes as far North as the line all incl LUCCA - PISTOIA - RIMINI. This measure was considered advisable for the sake of morale and of reducing desertions. There is little doubt that it will benefit morale but it remains to be seen whether desertions will appreciably diminish.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) As described elsewhere the period was notable for a heavy influx of enemy agents in the rugged and thinly held IV Corps sector. There is as yet no reason to believe that this latest manoeuvre has achieved any appreciable success. A large number of agents were rounded up but there is little doubt that some have managed to complete their missions and return through the lines.

(ii)Eighth Army reported that the participation of Canadian troops in the attack now in progress appeared to be widely known to civilians in the concentration area. This situation was attributed in part to a weakening in security discipline among the Canadian troops involved as a result of their month's relaxation in rest areas. In order to prevent the possibility of a compromise of the security of the operation very stringent control was imposed on civilian movement in the Canadian Corps area and these measures appear to have proved effective.

(iii)The move of a brigade of 46 Inf Div from IRESINO on 3 Nov also appeared to be widely known among local civilians. There is little doubt that incidents of this nature are largely attributable to the closer relationship of troops with civilians resulting from the occupation of winter billets in populated areas, and considerable attention was devoted to this problem in consequence. Careful attention was also being given throughout the ...I area to the security vetting of all civilians employed by units, Rest Hotels and clubs, railways etc.

(b) Security of Personnel

(i) On 25 Nov in the Polish Corps area propaganda leaflets on the usual anti-Russian lines were dropped by enemy aircraft. Their effect was stated to be negligible.

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(ii)Several incidents between British and Polish troops were reported from the AREZZO area. They appear however to have been cases of drunken brawling and investigation revealed no evidence of subversive activity.

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(c) Security of Material and Installations

(i) No major acts of sabotage were reported during the period, this in spite of the fact that in the Fifth Army area fourteen enemy saboteurs were caught while on missions to blow up vehicles, roads and installations in the River ARNO area between LEGHORN and FLORENCE.

(ii)The situation with respect to interference with signal communications showed little change from the previous month. A number of cases were reported, with petty theft or malicious damage the apparent motive in almost all instances. Only two cases were reported of any significance. The first occurred a few miles SW of RIMINI where the multi-channels communication line connecting the two Armies was cut during the early hours of 17 Nov. One leg of each of two pairs was severed and the loose ends buried in the ground. Between 1830 and 1900 hrs on the same day this line was again cut at four places between RIMINI and the scene of the previous incident. A thorough investigation failed to reveal any trace of the perpetrators. The second case involved a military telephone line in the ESI area (Prov [illegible]).

HEADQUARTERS
18 DEC 1944
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Two cuts had been made about a foot apart at a point where the cable is buried ten inches underground in order to pass under the roadway.

Strong action was taken by AMG PERUGIA at the instigation of FS in order to check a recent outbreak of wire-cutting in the GUALDO TADINO area (S 0205). The commune was made collectively responsible for the security of signal lines in its area, CC.RR were reinforced and 36 Auxiliaries were recruited to patrol the line at night. No further incidents were reported since the introduction of these measures.

(iii)The situation with respect to railway signal communications showed a slight improvement over the previous month. In the Eighth Army area over 2000 railway employees were vetted by FS during the period.

(iv) The security of military railways was in general good, apart from two cases of interference which took place in the southern part of 1 District. On 29 Nov at a point near the railway station at TREVI (A.9675) the line patrol discovered and removed a sleeper which had been placed across the lines. Investigations were without success. At BALANO railway station (A.9059) a case occurred on 30 Nov of interference with points. No damage was caused. One suspect was detained and a further five were being rounded up for interrogation.

(v) On 30 Nov the leather cover of a balance spring on a gun in an AOD Gun Park in 1 District was found to be slashed. Investigations showed that there had been a great deal of dissatisfaction among the civilian workers in the park, on account of the mud and rain and their lack of adequate footwear. It is thought that the slashing was the work of one of these disgruntled workers, most of whom carry sheath knives. In consequence all civilian workers in the park were fined two days pay as a precautionary measure.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastline

(i) Now that PIOMBINO has ceased to be an Allied operated port the control of civilian movement to and from ELBA has been left largely in the hands of the Italian authorities under the general supervision of CRS, to whom all suspicious cases are reported. Commissarios of Public Security at PIOMBINO and ELBA have been given the authority to issue travel permits to civilians travelling between these two places and a daily list of passengers and cargo is submitted to CIC PIOMBINO.

(ii) The physical security of LEGHORN port was further improved during the period by the erection of a new perimeter fence and the reinforcement of guard personnel.

(iii)On the night of 18/19 Nov the port of LEGHORN was made the target of a limpeteer attack carried out by three members of X MAS Flotilla. The party was carried by motor boat from LA SPEZIA to a point just off LEGHORN. From here the three would-be saboteurs, equipped with special rubber suits and breathing apperatus, swam into the harbour towing limpet mines behind them. They were detected and captured by the Royal Naval "mine watchers" patrol [illegible]

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(iv) No incidents were reported from either ANCONA or RIMINO where routine port security controls were working satisfactorily.

(v) SIM/CS special coast watching sections were doing useful work in both Army areas, and military units located along the coast were also giving FS/CIC valuable cooperation.

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2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of Arrests

	For Trial for a Security Offence (Category A)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention pending Investigation (Category C)	Total
Italian Armed Forces	1	5	10	16
Civil Officials and CC.RR	-	34	1	35
Miscellaneous Civilians	317	103	121	541
TOTAL	318	142	132	592

NOTE:- Of the above 41 were ex-Fascist Party Officials
15 were ex-MVSN

(b) Important Individual Cases

(i) Agents

A brief analysis of Agents arrested during the month is included in Part I. Detailed reports on these cases have been forwarded separately to AFHQ.

(ii) Persons arrested, other than Agents

BRESCHI Breschino di Enrico — Member of Fascist Party since Dec 1920. He became a member of the Fascist Directorate in 1925 and was organiser and founder of the Party at CASTELFIORENTINO. BRESCHI led many punitive expeditions against the anti-Fascists, was a member of a Florentine Group called "Desperato" and is accused of several murders. A dangerous propagandist and collaborator. Interned.

GORINI Giuseppe — Segretario del Fascio Repubblicano. Cousin of MUSSOLINI. Interned.

MOSCHI Agostino — Squadrista, Membro del Direttorio Federale (1940). Vice-Segretario del Fascio, MVSN Capo Squadra and nephew of MUSSOLINI. Interned.

ROBERTS Umberto — Squadrista; ex-Deputy; Sottosegretario, Director

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CORINI Giuseppe — Segretario del Fascio Repubblicano. Cousin of MUSSOLINI. Interned.

MOSCHI Agostino — Squadrista, Membro del Direttorio Federale (1940). Vice-Segretario del Fascio, MVSN Capo Squadra and nephew of MUSSOLINI. Interned.

RODINIS Umberto — Squadrista; anti-Marcia; Sciarpa Littorio. Director of the Newspaper "Il Telegrafo" from July 1925 - February 1944. During the Fascist regime he was an intimate friend of Count CIANO who obtained special privileges for the "Telegrafo" as a consequence of which RODINIS amassed a large fortune. The paper which continued publication under the Republic was bitterly anti-allied and pro-German. Interned.

(iii) Suspects

NAPOLI Gabriello — Capitano del Porto LIVO. Subject of a signed statement by twelve fishermen who say he threatened them with arrest because they intended to scuttle their boats at the time of the Armistice to avoid sailing under the Germans. During the occupation he was evidently a ready collaborator and his removal is under consideration.

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VILLOROSI Ezio	Prior to the advent of Fascism was a photographer. Later he was in charge of a "squadra d'azione" became a wealthy landowner and enjoyed personal contact with high party officials and the DUCE. Is accused of serving with OVRA for many years, having travelled widely to many other countries including GERMANY, ROUMANIA, BULGARIA and FRANCE, on duty. He is now alleged to be attempting to form a Liberal Party at CASTELLUCCIO out of former Fascist elements.

(c) Subversive Movements and Political Organisations of Security Interest

(i) According to a reliable No.1 District source there are about three thousand members of the Communist Party active in AREZZO. They are split up in cells of twenty to thirty individuals and receive orders through their leaders from ROME and FLORENCE. The majority of the former Partisans have been absorbed into the party, bringing, it is said, "quantities" of arms with them. Recent activity appears to have been limited to propaganda but the ultimate aim of the branch was reputed to be the assumption, by force if necessary, of all the chief administrative posts when the control of the province passes from AMG to the Italian Government. The situation is being carefully watched by both FS and AMG.

Communism was further stated to be on the increase in the TERNI, MACERATA, PISTOIA and IESI area. In IESI meetings have been held without the approval of AMG who have requested FS to collect the names of the sponsors. It is anticipated that a few convictions will serve to bring these irresponsible elements into line with current regulations. There was no evidence of any anti-Allied trend in the Party's activities and there were indications that the Party was serving to restrain some of the more disgruntled Partisans from a more active expression of their desire for rapid change.

(ii) The fact that typewritten manifestoes containing ostensible Fascist Republican propaganda were distributed in PISTOIA on the night of 13th and 15th November 1944 did not necessarily imply a recrudescence of P.R.F. activity. On this occasion the CNL and the CC.RR were in agreement that the leaflets were bogus, having been distributed by extremist elements with the object of provoking a thorough purge of local Fascists. Previous indications would tend to confirm this conclusion.

(iii) Some difficulty was being experienced in dealing with Partisans once the areas concerned had been occupied. Their aggressive behaviour towards their fellow countrymen has in several cases rendered unnecessarily difficult the task of reorganisation and control and has offset much of their previous good work with forward troops. Cases occurred of women's "haircutting", unauthorised arrests and a certain amount of looting. In some areas also there was evidence of friction between Partisans and members of the CC.RR.

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(iv) A former headquarters of the FALANGE Espanola Tradicionalista was discovered in the SAMBUCA PISTOIESE area (Prov. PISTOIA). Quantities of documents were removed and samples have already been forwarded to AFHQ. Investigations have so far failed to reveal any indication that this organisation is at all active in the AAI area.

(d) Control of Movement

(i) On 25 Nov the Rear Army Security Control Line was moved forward to the line FANO - AREZZO - SIENA - thence as before to CECINA. The 10 kilometer limit was also lifted in that part of FLORENCE Province South of the River ARNO (to include also that part of FLORENCE city North of the river). This relaxation was made at the urgent request of AMG in order to alleviate the food situation in the city of FLORENCE.

(ii) The results of the special night checks on civilian movement revealed comparatively few infringements of the regulations, especially in the more forward areas. The thirty-five check points in Fifth Army, which operated at various times both before and after curfew, reported that civilian movement was almost negligible except in the coastal sector, where large scale evacuations of communities have recently taken place. At VIAREGGIO, on the coast, 1414 travellers were stopped and 129 infringements discovered; at LUCCA the figures were 2379 persons and 42 infringements. Further back, a number of civilians were found out after curfew, mostly returning from late shifts in factories or making their way home on the main highways towards the larger towns. Persons without the required travel authorisation were few- for example, on Highway 67 only 44 out of 731 had no AMG pass, and on Highway 1 only 20 out of 616.

In PBS seven check posts dealt with over a thousand individuals during the week. Twelve of these were found to be breaking the ten-kilometre rule, and two will go before AMG Court for more serious offences. No case of vital security interest was encountered.

Unauthorised movement was on a somewhat heavier scale in No.1 District, mostly in the hours of darkness before 2000 hrs. PBS who enjoyed the valuable cooperation during the drive of CMP and RAF/SP, arrested some 208 persons, of whom two were possible enemy agents; five others were detained for further questioning and the remainder handed over to AMG for trial. In many cases it was noted that service drivers still encourage civilians to break the regulations by giving them lifts.

The general opinion of PB/CIC was that these night checks were having a very salutary effect on the civilian population in general, and they are to be continued.

(iii) Three Italians, ANTOGNOLI Vincenzo, ANTOGNOLI Luigi and CITTADINI Vincenzo were stopped at a TERNI road block on the 29 Nov on their way from ROME to MACERATA. Two of them were found to be carrying ACC Special Police Identity documents, and, conveniently enough, a number of rubber stamps worded "CIVIL AFFAIRS OFFICER", "PROVINCIAL POLICE OFFICER" and the like. During the resultant investigations ANTOGNOLI Luigi evaded CC.RR custody, and is now being sought in ROME and elsewhere. The interrogation of his brother Vincenzo and of CITTADINI is proceeding. An interesting factor in the case is that CITTADINI was found to be carrying a letter addressed to a certain TURCI Merotti of PORTO RECANATI. The name TURCI is that of a known enemy agent, and this aspect of the affair is being examined.

(iv) Increased attention was paid during the month to the problem of illicit civilian movement by rail. Particular efforts were made at points where the railway crosses the Rear Army Security Control Line and it is believed that there has been an overall improvement in this difficult aspect of control of movement.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Italian Armed Forces

In Eighth Army territory a company of an Italian Guard Battalion and CC.RR of the FERRARA and PARMA Groups were employed in the control of civilian

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In Eighth Army territory a company of an Italian Guard Battalion and CC.RR of the FERRARA and PADOVA Groups were engaged in the control of civilian movement in the forward area and particularly along the Forward Control Line. Though certain initial difficulties with regard to administration, clothing and equipment were encountered with these increments morale was generally good and all reports spoke highly of their work.

(b) Civilian Population

(i) Demonstrations by working-class women against the scarcity and dearness of food took place in PIOMBINO and MACERATA during the month. In PIOMBINO, where unemployment has become acute with a resultant increase in Communist influence, nearly two hundred women demonstrated in an orderly fashion before the Mayor's house. At MACERATA a small group of women gathered on 13 Nov outside the PALAZZO DEL GOVERNO to voice their protests and on the following day a crowd of four hundred reassembled, shouting against the Prefect whose kitchen was invaded by unruly elements before the CC.RR could restore order. Though the Prefect was accused of being a Fascist, it is probable that the origins of the trouble, as in so many other cases, were economic rather than political. It has been noticed, for example, at LIVORNO, that discontent amongst the dock labourers has grown as the quantity and quality of the noonday meal provided decreased.

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(c) Rumours

Rumours were many and varied during the month, with no particular trends outstanding. There was widespread speculation concerning the future of the newly formed Combat Gruppi (universally referred to as divisions) the general opinion being that a substantial sector of the front would shortly be taken over by Italian troops.

In the LEGHORN area a recent welter of rumours concerning alleged Allied reverses on the Italian front was ascribed to the lack of a newspaper or any other means of news dissemination in that area. Among civilians and Italian troops generally the belief that Italian forces were about to be despatched for service in the Far East showed no signs of weakening. The following were the more interesting of the rumours reported:

"Fifth Army units are going to be pulled back and the entire front will be taken over by the British Eighth Army. The entire Fifth Army will be shipped to INDIA for refitting before proceeding to CHINA". (US Troops in Fifth Army).

"Civilians will have to hand in all their money and receive on compensation 1000 lire of AMG Currency in return." (Civilians in PIOMBINO Area).

"HITLER is dead and GOERING will soon be Commander of all the German armies". (Civilians in Fifth Army Area).

(d) Other matters of General Security Interest

(i) The MUSSOLINI family villa at PETRANA M 4511 was searched but nothing of interest found. The house belonging to MUSSOLINI's wife in PIEMAPPIO M 3864 was also searched. A number of propaganda films and papers were handed over to PWB but nothing of current security interest was discovered.

(ii) On 9 Nov a small "S" Force (known as "BLACKFORCE") organised by 5 Corps entered FORLI. The force achieved some useful results, including the capture of four enemy agents.

(iii) The Special Legal Security Section with Eighth Army came into full operation on 19 Nov. The section was stated to be functioning most satisfactorily and has already prepared two cases of enemy agents for trial.

(iv) Appreciation of the cooperation and assistance afforded by AMG, Military Police and SIM/CS was expressed in a number of reports received during the month.

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"Civilians will have to [illegible] pensation 1000 lire of AMG Currency in return." (Civilians in PIOMBINO Area).

"HITLER is dead and GOESSELRING will soon be Commander of all the German armies". (Civilians in Fifth Army area).

(d) Other matters of General Security Interest

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(ii) On 5 Nov a small "S" Force (known as "DISHFORCE") organised by 5 Corps entered FORLI. The force achieved some useful results, including the capture of four enemy agents.

(iii)The Special Legal Security Section with Eighth Army came into full operation on 19 Nov. The section was stated to be functioning most satisfactorily and has already prepared two cases of enemy agents for trial.

(iv) Appreciation of the cooperation and assistance afforded by AMG, Military Police and SIB/CS was expressed in a number of reports received during the month.

4. LOCATIONS OF FS SECTIONS AND CIC DETACHMENTS AS AT 31 Oct 44

	Parent Formation	Location
HQ AAI		
16 FSS		SIENA
FIFTH ARMY		
305 CIC Det	HQ Fifth Army	CAVRIGLIE Q 7546
427 FSS	" " "	FLORENCE
92 CIC Det	" " "	VIAREGGIO U 9884
202 CIC Det	HQ 2 Corps	CA'DAL COSTA L 8716
91 CIC Det	91 Div	LOIANO L 8623
501 CIC Det	1 Armd Div	SAN BENEDETTO L 7918
34 CIC Det	34 Div	LOIANO L 8623
85 CIC Det	85 Div	CASTIANO Q 8495.

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	Parent Formation	Location
204 CIC Det	HQ 4 Corps	SAMBUCA L 5905
66 FSS	6 SA Armd Div	CASTIGLIONE L 7310
Brazilian CIC Det	BEF	BRETTA TERRA L 5811
412 FSS	HQ 13 Corps	FLORENCE
88 CIC Det	88 Div	near SASSO LEONE L 9822
406 FSS	8 Ind Div	MARRADI M 0801
56 FSS	6 Brit. Armd Div	CASTIGLIONE L 7269
88 FSS	78 Br. Div.	L 9723
3 FSS	1 Br. Div	VILLA M SASSONERO L 9622

EIGHTH ARMY

263 FSS	Eighth Army	CESENA M 6007
47 FSS	" "	RICCIONE S 9291
411 FSS	" "	GROTTAGLIA B 8898
8 Cdn FS Res Det	" "	PESARO S. 1286
11 Cdn FSS	HQ 1 Cdn Corps	CESENATICO M 7113
9 Cdn FS Res Det	" " " "	" "
10 " " " "	" " " "	" "
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Div	RICCIONE S9291
7 Cdn FSS	7 Cdn Armd Div	CERVIA M 6920
2 Pol Corps FSS	HQ 2 Pol Corps	BISCEGLIA R 2458
5 Kres Div FSS	5 Kres Div	S. SOFIA R 3286
3 Carp Div FSS	3 Carp Div	S. BENEDETTO R 1490
68 FSS	HQ 5 Corps	FORLI M 4317
35 FSS	" " "	FORLI M 4317
2 NZ Div FSS	2 NZ Div	M 4119
407 FSS	10 Ind Inf Div	FORLIMPOPOLI M5013
31 FSS	46 Inf Div	MELDOLA M 4596
278 FSS	HQ 10 Corps	PERUGIA R 6093

1 DISTRICT

12 FSS	IESI S 3938
310 FSS	PERUGIA W 7092
314 FSS	ANCONA S 6050
417 FSS	AREZZO R 2933

FSS

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9 Cdn FS Res Det	" " " "	" "
10 " " " "	" " " "	" "
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Div	RICCIONE S9291
7 Cdn FSS	7 Cdn Armd Div	CERVIA M 6920
2 Pol Corps FSS	HQ 2 Pol Corps	BIBBIENA R 2458
5 Kres Div FSS	5 Kres Div	S. SOFIA R 3286
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31 FSS	46 Inf Div	MELDOLA M 4596
278 FSS	HQ 10 Corps	PERUGIA R 6993

1 DISTRICT

12 FSS	IESI S 3938
310 FSS	PERUGIA W 7092
314 FSS	ANCONA S 6050
417 FSS	AREZZO R 2933

FSS

CIC Dets	PIOMBINO, LIVORNO
85 FSS	LIVORNO.

Brigadier
DCS(I)

SF

DISTRIBUTION:

G-2 (I) AFHQ
A-2 AAF/MTO
A-2 RAF MAAF
Executive Commissioner, AC
Security Branch, AC
SSO (Sy) Med c/o FOWIC.

1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit 2
Liaison Officer HQ SEA/CS FOMC
HQ AAI
DCGS
G(Ops)
Civil Affairs Section.

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Att to Sec Security Par 3527

Security Division
Rec'd 7/11
Book No 30/4
File No 446
Action

SECRET

HQ ALLIED AFMED IN ITALY

1404/4/GSI(b)

15 Nov 44

16 NOV 1944

AAI Security Summary No.19 for the month of OCTOBER 1944

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

1. October was a very ordinary month from the Security and Counter-Intelligence point of view. No unusual problems were encountered and no outstanding incidents occurred. The efforts of C.I. agencies were devoted chiefly to the application and improvement of routine security measures.

2. There was no decrease in the scale of the enemy's espionage activity; he continued to despatch a considerable number of agents across the lines, the present nature of which is conducive to clandestine infiltration.

Twenty three agents were apprehended during the month; fourteen of these had been despatched by the Abwehr and six by the Sicherheitsdienst. The majority actually crossed the lines, but nine of those arrested had been left behind in the course of the enemy's withdrawal. The largest number of arrests were made in the areas of II and IV Corps, the latter's sector being a particularly popular crossing point : only three were arrested on the Eighth Army front, and FLORENCE made a comparatively modest contribution of four.

As regards missions, the great majority of agents were concerned with espionage, only two saboteurs being encountered. The latter had been instructed, somewhat vaguely, to sabotage military vehicles, petrol dumps and railways. The espionage missions were generally of the usual kind, mostly concerned with military information of immediate tactical value : a few were concerned with naval, economic and political information.

Two of the most interesting cases were those of MACIEWICZ and COSTA. The former was recruited by the German Intelligence Service in POLAND, and despatched across the lines with instructions to join the Polish Forces, where he was to gather certain information as to their strength, organisation and equipment etc. and then to desert to the enemy after two months service : he was actually arrested before reaching the Polish Corps area. COSTA is a seventeen year old girl, and one of the toughest agents so far arrested in ITALY. She was arrested on her way back to enemy territory in the course of her third mission. She had received the German Iron Cross (Second Class), and had been received and congratulated by MUSSOLINI : five days of intensive interrogation were necessary before she was finally persuaded to talk.

Three agents were brought to trial during the month and in each case they were convicted and sentenced to death. One death sentence was confirmed, but the execution has not yet been carried out.

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Three agents were brought to trial during the month and in each case they were convicted and sentenced to death. One death sentence was confirmed, but the execution has not yet been carried out.

3. Two positive attempts to sabotage military vehicles were made in Eighth Army area. The two incidents were on the coast near RIMINI, and were almost identical : in each case an explosive charge with delay action device was placed on the front axle of several vehicles parked near the beach, and a number of Teller or S mines were placed on the ground nearby. No damage was done, since in one case the attempt was discovered in time, and in the other the detonator failed to set off the main charge. The perpetrators were not discovered. In one instance there were definite indications that it was the work of a small party landed from the sea, and this is the probable explanation in both cases.

In the second half of the month the situation improved in 1 District in respect of damage to railway signal communications. Throughout AMI territory, however, isolated instances of wilful damage to signal lines continued to be encountered. It is still considered that such damage is the work of local disgruntled elements rather than of agents despatched or inspired by the enemy. The result, however, is the same.

A few cases of minor damage to petrol pipe lines were discovered, but no sabotage appears to have been attempted against them during the month. They remain, however, a vulnerable and profitable target, difficult to guard.

4. Security arrests continued as usual, and it may be of interest to quote here the approximate figures for OCTOBER, a typical quiet month. 277 were arrested for trial for security offences (mostly in connection with civilian movement regulations). 200 were arrested for internment. In addition many persons

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were temporarily detained pending investigation of their case.

On 15 October, a new internment camp was opened at TERNI. This is to receive all persons interned in AAI territory, and is to have a capacity of 2000.

5. The security control of civilian movement occupied much of the time of all FS Sections and CIC Detachments. Special attention was paid to the prevention or control of civilians moving by rail; several weaknesses were discovered, and steps taken to tighten up. Particular attention is now being paid to the question of civilian road traffic at night.

During the month, approximately 750 refugees were interrogated at the RIPs. This figure does not, of course, include all persons who crossed the lines into Allied territory, since many are dealt with by forward FSS/CIC, and some miss or avoid all controls.

6. No subversive movement or activity has recently come to light in AAI territory, and there is no indication that Italians on the whole feel any particular bitterness against the Allies in this area. Although a considerable amount of quiet political activity is carried on, the prohibition or control of such activity in the Army areas tends to prevent feeling from running too high and causing disturbances. The civil population caused little trouble during the month, and in general it can be said that the civil security situation is quiet and satisfactory.

A considerable degree of alarm and despondency and a large crop of anxious rumours were caused by the Italian Government's reference at the end of September to "Italy playing her part with the United Nations.....no limit to the extent of her participation.....Italy can consider herself at war with Japan". As a result of this, many thousands of war weary Italian soldiers visualised themselves being formed into an Expeditionary Force for the Far East.

7. SIM/CS personnel earmarked for Northern ITALY were moved into the operational zone to double up with existing SIM/CS Sections and Centres in this zone. The main object of this arrangement is to train these personnel and to accustom them to working with the Allied C.I. Agencies; it is also achieving the secondary object of increasing our strength in security personnel in these areas where FSS/CIC are thin on the ground.

8. The standard of military security discipline and consciousness displayed by Allied troops remained at a high level.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

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PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) The return to more static conditions on the front produced the inevitable crop of reports from various units telling of civilians suspected of drawing enemy fire on to Allied positions, signalling to the enemy etc. In none of these cases was the suspicion found to be justified but advantage was taken of the state of mind thus created to drive home to troops in the forward areas the importance of routine security measures such as the control of civilian movement.

(ii) There were few troop movements of any magnitude during the period. The moves of 2 Polish Corps and 78 Inf Div were carried out without incident and appear to have occasioned little or no comment.

(iii) Some cases of wire-tapping occurred during the nights of 7/8 and 8/9 Oct 44 on the 2 NZ Div front. Three listening-in devices of an improvised nature were discovered, each consisting of a pair of wires attached to a darning needle stuck through the line connecting Regimental HQ with a Forward squadron. In a fourth case the needle had been pushed through the line and fixed in position with insulation tape but no wires were attached. All four needles had been pushed into the ground thus earthing the line fairly effectively. It is thought that these attempts were the work of enemy patrols and not agents, especially as a patrol was in fact reported in the area during one of the nights in question. Forward units have been alerted against the possibility of further incidents of this nature and the case has also served to give dramatic emphasis to the well-worn security adage that "the telephone is not secure".

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(iv) Special security measures were instituted by 5 Corps in respect of the signals artery passing through CERENA, since the cables were fixed to civilian premises in the town.

(v) Special attention was given by both armies to the question of security-mindedness among troops in contact with civilians. If conditions become more or less static during the coming winter months this aspect of security is likely to present more problems than it did during the period of advance.

(vi) Instructions have now been issued to all Official Unit Photographers under command of both Armies to send their films to the special photographic establishments in NAPLES for processing under the supervision of the Military Photographic Censor.

(vii) The security discipline of Italian troops is still below the level desired in a theatre of operations and reports of indiscretions continued to be all too frequent. A course for Italian unit intelligence officers was recently held under the auspices of MMIA and instruction on security matters was included. The problem of improving the standard of security training of Italian troops is at present under consideration at this headquarters.

(b) Security of Personnel

(i) The situation in this respect was good and no incidents were reported during the period. In spite of the heterogeneous nature of our forces at present in the field relations between troops of varying creeds and countries continued in general to be excellent. There was no evidence of enemy attempts at subversion other than by radio and leaflet (both with negligible results.)

(ii) Polish animosity towards RUSSIA (and Communism in general) has shown signs of intensification of late without, however, in any way weakening the uncompromising attitude of the Poles towards the common enemy.

(c) Security of Material and Installations

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(i) Two cases of attempted sabotage of MT vehicles were reported from the RIMINI area. The first occurred during the night 13/14 Oct 44 when explosive charges fitted with delay-action devices were discovered attached to the front axles of two vehicles parked in a Tank Troops Workshop on the beach outside RIMINI. The charges were discovered and dismantled before they had time to do any damage. Further explosive material and some Tellermines were also found on the beach. Tyre tracks (apparently newly made) ran down from the vehicles to the water's edge and there were also signs that some heavy object had been dragged to or from the sea. The second attempt, strongly resembling the first as regards methods and materials used, took place on the night 18/19 Oct 44 in the case of a Squadron of [illegible] Tank at [illegible]. Similar charges with

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In neither of the two incidents was any damage done. No trace of the would-be saboteurs has been discovered but the evidence available strongly suggests a sea-borne mission.

(ii) Apart from the above cases there were no incidents of any importance or of a nature which would suggest the work of enemy sabotage agents. The situation can therefore be regarded as satisfactory in view of the number of enemy agents captured who have admitted to a sabotage mission.

(iii) The position with respect to wire-cutting showed little change from the previous month. A number of cases were reported, particularly along the railways, with theft or wilful damage as the apparent motive. In two cases only was there evidence of deliberate intent to affect Sp signal communications. At CARPI Railway Station X 0198 a length of copper wire was discovered wrapped round one leg of pair 5 and connected with an electric pylon, producing a short circuit. The second case occurred in the Polish Corps area at MK R 1366 where a fault in an HA operational line was traced

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to a pin inserted in two lines, also causing a short circuit.

In view of the frequent cases of interference with railway signal and telegraph lines in the 1 District area FS are re-vetting all Italian railway employees in addition to such measures as arranging extra patrols of CC.RR along vulnerable stretches of line, posting up "Pena di Morte" notices, increasing informant networks, maintaining close liaison with local signal units etc.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastlines

(i) At the end of the month a detachment of 30 men of the SIM/CS Bn were dispatched to Eighth Army area for employment on coast watching duties. A similar detachment under Fifth Army has already been in position for some weeks. The function of these detachments is to build up a network of informants along the seaward flanks of Armies and to pass to FS/CIC information concerning unauthorised movement of shipping, suspects, suspicious incidents etc. Several parties of refugees from enemy occupied territory landing by boat were intercepted during the month and dispatched to RIF for interrogation.

(ii) The Port Security Section located at ANCONA has obtained a motor-schooner on indefinite loan from IWT and once the necessary arrangements have been made with the Royal Navy, it is planned to use this craft for a security patrol of the northern half of the 1 District coastline.

(iii) The port of PIOMBINO has been closed as an Allied port and is now under Italian control. As a port, therefore, it has lost much of its former security significance, being used mainly by small coasting craft and fishing vessels and occasionally providing an overnight anchorage for convoys on their way to LEGHORN. The port is still covered by CIC, though less rigorously than before and mainly for the enforcement of travel control. A certain amount of traffic takes place between PIOMBINO and the island of ELBA and travel control from the ELBA end was reported to be very effectively enforced.

(iv) Security measures in the port of ANCONA continued to be improved and elaborated. Anti-sabotage already in force were inspected by an Italian ex-saboteur who made recommendations for their improvement. SIM/CS were also placing informers amongst docks personnel.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of arrests

	For trial for a [illegible] offence	For Internment	For Detention Pending

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2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of Arrests

	For trial for a Security offence (Category "A")	For Internment (Category "B")	For Detention Pending Investigation (Category "C")	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	11	13	11	35
Civilian Officials including GC.NR	NIL	20	2	22
Miscellaneous Civilians	266	167	60	493
TOTAL	277	200	73	550

NOTE: Of the above 39 were ex-Fascist Party Officials, and 16 were ex-MVSN.

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(b) Important Individual Cases

(i) Agents

A brief analysis of Agents arrested during the month is included in Part I. Detailed reports on these cases have been forwarded separately to AFHQ.

(ii) Persons arrested, other than Agents

ALESSANDRINI Alberto — Squadrista, Marcia su Roma, Sciarpa Littoria; 1932-3 Componente del Direttorio della Federazione of ANCONA. 1939-40 Ispettore Federale di Zona. Arrested ANCONA 21 Oct for internment.

MACCHINI Carmigiani Renato di Angelo — Sciarpa Littoria and Grand 'Ufficiale della Corona d'Italia 1924-26 - Deputy: 1927-43 National Councillor. During this period re-wrote Italian civil code on Fascist lines. Close friend of Count CASTANZO CIANO, father of former Foreign Minister. Senator of the Realm. Arrested 2 Oct for internment.

MARUCCI Mario fu Tommaso — Squadrista, Marcia su Roma, Sciarpa Littoria. Rabid propagandist who was founder, organiser and member of Triumvirate of the Republican Fascist Party in POGGIBONSI. In Dec 43 enrolled in Guardia Repubblicana of SIENA, helped in seizure of Italian youths and assisted at massacre of partisans at MONTEMAGGIO on 28 March 1944. Arrested 3 Oct for internment.

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PARLATI Ceder — 1930-41 Segretario Amministrativo del Fascio. 1941-2 Segretario Politico di URBANO. 1942-3 Ispettore Federale di Zona. Director of the Fascist newspaper "URBINO FASCISTA". Arrested 21 Oct for internment.

PODALIRI Guido fu Raffaele — Lawyer. Rabid Fascist who instituted several pogroms in IESI. Journalist. Director of Fascist newspaper "CORRIERE ADRIATICO" of ANCONA in which he made violent attacks on British, Americans and Jews. Arrested for internment.

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	of former Foreign Minister. Senator of the Realm. Arrested 2 Oct for internment.
MARRUCCI Mario fu Tomaso	Squadrista, Marcia su Roma, Sciarpa Littorio. Rabid propagandist who was founder, organiser and member of Triumvirate of the Republican Fascist Party in POGGIBONSI. In Dec 43 enrolled in Guardia Repubblicana of SIENA, helped in seizure of Italian youths and assisted at massacre of partisans at MONTE-MAGGIO on 28 March 1944. Arrested 3 Oct for internment.
PARENTI Ader	1930-41 Segretario Amministrativo del Fascio. 1941-2 Segretario Politico di URBANO. 1942-3 Ispettore Federale di Zona. Director of the Fascist newspaper "URBINO FASCISTA". Arrested 21 Oct for internment.
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(iii) Suspects

ACERI Antonio	Director of Civil Prison at AREZZO. SIM report states that he held the same position under the Republican Fascists and was a close collaborator with VECCLI, Emilio, Director of the UPI in AREZZO. Believed to be concerned in slaughter of five political prisoners in an underground cell on 15 Jan 44. PPSO AREZZO Province has been asked to remove him from his present position while further enquiries are made.

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(iii) Suspects - (Cont'd).

GUIDOTTI MORI Guido — Present prefect of AREZZO Province. Subject of hostile leaflets distributed on the night of 13/14 Sept in AREZZO, alleging his corruption and incompetence. SIS declare he was the second Fascist Podesta of AREZZO and as head of the Ufficio Alimentazione for the Republican Fascists until Dec 43 behaved so harshly towards the poor that the Prefect RAO had to arrest him. Subject is now trying to convince the people that the arrest was due to political differences. Investigations continue.

(c) Subversive Movements and Political Organisations of Security Interest

(i) SCUOLA DI MISTICA-FASCISTA

From documents recently captured, it appears that a sub-centre of this movement existed in CORTONA. The MISTICA appears to have been another league of young fascist fanatics which aimed at purifying the party and in this case enjoyed the personal favour of MUSSOLINI. The organisation is no longer active and the documents have been forwarded to P.W.B. as possible material for propaganda.

(ii) The Tenente of CC.RR at CORTONA reported to FS that all CC.RR Officers in the Province of AREZZO were summoned to a meeting at their headquarters where they were told that the Italian authorities expect civil disturbances instigated by the Communists and that all CC.RR stations were to be sandbagged as a precautionary measure. There have been signs that Communist activity and propaganda in the AREZZO area have been increasing in intensity. Many copies of three new pamphlets have been imported from FLORENCE and it is believed that large stocks of propaganda material are being built up against the time when a greater measure of political freedom is allowed. No anti-Allied trends were discernible.

(d) Control of Movement

(i) Careful attention continued to be given by FS/CIC to the operation of the Forward and Rear Army Control Lines. Fifth Army were making use of roving patrols of security personnel to pick up civilians moving northwards who may have managed to by-pass check points, in collaboration with the military police and the local police services. In the same area numerous Italians were apprehended for blatant violations of the ten kilometre restriction on civilian movement. Some were discovered to have crossed from SICILY to the mainland and thence northwards

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(ii) Partisans continued to be among the worst offenders in violating restrictions on civilian travel. Membership of a particular partisan group or CLN, or possession of a certificate from a Partisan Leader were frequently being used by ex-partisans as an authority to travel and these documents appear to have been issued widely and indiscriminately by a number of partisan authorities. In this connection the CLN of SAN MINIATO issued to a 'Partisan Lieutenant', almost completely unknown in that town, a letter describing him as a member of the Committee and asking that he be facilitated as far as ROME. He was in fact an enemy agent. In

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another instance two young men who were intercepted at a road block presented documents from the CLN of TOSCANO stating they had been in SIGNA (Province of FLORENCE) from 8 Sept 42 till Sept this year. They had in fact left SIGNA during February 44 and in the ensuing months had enrolled in the Republican Fascist Army, and served for some while in a German AA unit. Such documents are not of course regarded as valid travel permits by either the Allied or Italian authorities.

(iii) A more rigid control of civilian movement by rail into the Army area has been established during the month. The Allied military railway authorities have been highly cooperative in the establishment of train controls and the assistance of Railway Military Police, CC.RR, R.O's and Train Guards has been enlisted. In the 1 District area five check posts were being manned night and day at points where the two military lines cross the Rear Army Control Line. During October 32 arrests for unauthorised travel by train (i.e. no AMG yellow pass) were made at the CAMUCIA check point alone.

A security survey of the railway AREZZO-ORTE-RIMINI was recently carried out by an NCO of 16 FS Section attached to this headquarters to review the problem of the control of movement by rail. The survey revealed that in spite of the measures already in force, such movement, at any rate in between stops, would still present little difficulty to a determined individual, although in actual fact no wide spread infraction of movement regulations was evident. It further brought to light certain ways in which control could be rendered more effective and appropriate action is now being taken by this headquarters.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

00052

(a) Civil Population

(i) Civilians continued to be much pre-occupied with hardships occasioned by unemployment, shortage of food etc. In some parts there was also the fear of uncontrolled Partisan activity and in others resentment was expressed at the displacement of civilians in order to provide Allied troops with winter quarters.

(ii) In AREZZO relations between civilians and the recently arrived POLISH troops appeared cordial. An unfortunate incident however occurred on Highway 75 when a truckload of civilians on their way to a Communist meeting at PERUGIA was fired on by passing POLISH troops, presumably because red scarves were being worn.

(iii) A generally unfavourable impression has been made by negro troops in the LEGHORN area and a number of incidents were reported.

(iv) In GROSSETO province the demand was frequently expressed for the epuration of former Fascists in addition to the action already taken by the Italian authorities. A few cases of violence and menaces against former officials etc were reported. A certain amount of mutual distrust and jealousy between the ex-Partisans and the CC.RR was also evident.

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(b) Rumours.

The most widespread rumours amongst Italian troops and civilians concerned the employment of Italian troops against the Japanese (see Part I.). At CORTONA it was rumoured that two Italian warships had left NAPLES with 20,000 volunteers on board. Another version gave the number of Italian troops involved as six divisions. Otherwise few rumours of any interest were recorded but the following are perhaps worthy of mention.

"Field Marshal MONTGOMERY has returned to ITALY to direct the offensive in the PO Valley" (Polish troops during last week of October).

"Very soon all Italian PW will be repatriated". (Carabinieri in PSG Fwd Sch).

"American troops have been chosen for the Army of occupation of ITALY, British troops for WESTERN GERMANY, AUSTRIA and HUNGARY and Russian troops for BERLIN and EASTERN GERMANY". (Civilian origin, URBINO, 13 Oct).

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4. LOCATIONS OF FS SECTIONS AND CIC DETACHMENTS AS AT 31 OCT 44

HQ AAI

16 F.S.S.

FIFTH ARMY

	Parent Formation	SIENA Location	
305 CIC Det	HQ Fifth Army	TAVERNELLE	Q 7348
427 FSS	" "	FLORENCE	
92 CIC Det	92 Div	VIAREGGIO	V 9884
204 CIC Det	HQ 4 Corps	LUCCA	Q 195788
66 FSS	6 SA Armd Div	CASTIGLIORE	L 7310
Brazilian CIC Det	B.E.F.	PONTE A MORIANO	Q 2286
202 CIC Det	HQ 2 Corps	CA'DEL COSTA	L 875165
91 " "	91 Div	LOLANO	L 864237
501 " "	1 Armd Div	SAN BENEDETTO	L 795104
34 " "	34 Div	BISANO	L 916236
85 " "	85 Div	SAN BENEDETTO DI QUERCETO	L 906218
412 FSS	HQ 13 Corps	FLORENCE	
88 CIC Det	88 Div	SASSO LECNE	L 987222
406 FSS	6 Armd Div	MARRADI	M 0807
55 "	6 Br Armd Div	SCARPERIA	L 8893
88 "	78 Br Div		L 9917
3 "	1 Div	PALAZZVOLO	R 0405

EIGHTH ARMY

263 FSS	HQ Eighth Army	SAN MARINO	
47 FSS	" "	RICCIONE	R 9291
2 NZ FSS	" "	GUBBIO	R 8519
35 "	" "	MACERATA	S 5611
11 Cdn FS Res Det		PESARO	S 1281
2 polcorps FS	HQ 2 POLCORPS	BIBBIENA	R 2459
278 FSS	" "	SAN SEPOLCRO	R 5045
411 "	" "	SARSINA	R 5182
3 Camp Div FSS	3 Camp Div	AREZZO	
5 Kreas Div FSS	5 Kreas Div	S. SOFIA	R 3286
68 FSS	HQ 5 Corps	CESENA	R 6106
5 "	4 Div	FORLIMPOPOLI	R 5012
	46 Div	MORCIANO	R 9182
		[illegible]	R 5788

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412 FSS
88 CIC Det
406 FSS
55 "
86 "
3 "

EIGHTH ARMY

263 FSS
47 FSS
2 NZ FSS
35 "
11 Cdn FS Res Det

2 Polcorps FS
278 FSS
411 "
3 Carp Div FSS
5 Kres Div FSS

63 FSS
5 "
31 "
407 "

11 Cdn FSS
8 Cdn Res Det
1 Cdn FSS
7 Cdn "

1 DIS/BRIGT

12 FSS
310 "
314 "
417 "

Hq 13 Corps
88 Div
8 Ind Div
6 Br Armd Div
78 Br Div
1 Div

Hq Eighth Army
" "
" "
" "
" "

Hq 2 POLCORPS
" "
" "
3 Carp Div
5 Kres Div

Hq 5 Corps
4 Div
46 Div
10 Ind Div

Hq 1 Cdn Corps
" "
1 Cdn Div.
7 Cdn Armd Div

FLORENCE
SASSO LEONE L 987222
MARRADI M 0807
SCARPERIA L 3893
L 2917
PALAZZVOLO R 0405

SAN MARINO
RICCIONE R 9291
GUBBIO R 8519
MACERATA S 5614
PESARO S 1281

BIBBIENA R 2459
SAN SEPOLCRO R 5045
SARSINA R 5182
AREZZO
S. SOFIA R 3286

CESENA M 6106
FORLIMPOPOLI M 5012
MORCIANO R 9182
MERCATO R 5783

CESANATICO M 7213
S.ARCANGELO R 7598
Area CESENA M 6106
CERVIA M 6820

IESI S 3938
PERUGIA W 7092
ANCONA S 6050
CORTONA R 3612

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PRS	Parent formation	Location
CIC Dets #5 FSS		PIOMBINO, LIVORNO LIVORNO

[redacted]
Brigadier,
GGS(I).

DISTRIBUTION

G-2 (CI) AFHQ
A-2 AAF/MTO
A-2 RAF MAAF
Executive Commissioner, AC
Security Branch AC
SSO(SY) Med c/o FCWIT
1 SOI Unit
SOI Unit 2
Liaison Office HQ SIS/CS ROME
HQ AAI
DCGS
G(Ops)
Civil Affairs Section

00081

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Security Pt 1835

SECRET

SUBJECT: A.A.I. Security Summary No. 18

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FIELFOT ADV 79

1404/4/GSI(b)

15 Oct 44

AC of S G-2 AFHQ

(19)

Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No. 18 covering the month of SEPTEMBER 1944.

W. D Gibbon & Co
for Brigadier
BGS(I)

Copy to: A-2 AAF/AFHQ
A-2 MAF, MAAF
Executive Commissioner, SC
Security Bureau, ACC
Civil Affairs Section, A.I.
SCO (Sy) Med c/o ROME
1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit 2
HQ AAI
DCGS
G(Ops)

00360

Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NNN No. 785016

SF

Copy to: A-2 AAF/CTO
A-2 AAF, AAF
Executive Commissioner, ACC
Security Branch, ACC
Civil Affairs Section, AAI.
SSO (Sy) MTO c/o POWTI
1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit Z
MIS AAI
DCGS
G(Ops)

for Brigadier
DCS(I)

03060

Security Division
Rec'd 19/10
Book No 2440
File No 6446
Action

HEADQUARTERS
18 OCT 1944
A. C. S.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

A.A.I. SECURITY SUMMARY No. 18
covering SEPTEMBER 1944.

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

1. On 10 September this HQ relinquished responsibility for security in S. ITALY (incl ROME), SICILY and SARDINIA ; all relevant records and pending cases etc were turned over to AFHQ.

This relief has enabled us to concentrate our attention on the forward areas and to render greater assistance to Armies than has been possible hitherto. It has also greatly facilitated our consideration of plans for N. ITALY and further afield.

2. In other respects, September was a very normal month from the counter-intelligence point of view, and contained no features of special interest, apart from SAN MARINO which provided a certain comic opera relief.

3. The enemy continued his espionage activities on a fairly heavy scale, and eighteen agents were arrested during the month. Fourteen of these were Abwehr agents and the remainder were despatched by Ic. It is noticeable that none were employed directly by the Sicherheitsdienst, but as the latter is now thought to have virtually assumed control of the Abwehr in ITALY, there is no longer any very clear or important distinction between Abwehr and SD agents.

Eleven of these arrested agents had crossed the lines, and seven had been left behind on the German withdrawal. All had been given espionage missions, mostly in the forward areas. FLORENCE remained the most popular area of enemy espionage activity, but LEGHORN, PISA, PISTOIA and RIMINI, as well as rear areas, also received a share of the enemy's attention in this respect.

The missions presented no unusual features, and were for the most part concerned with military identifications. It is noticeable that this type of agent is more often required to give general information on what he sees rather than to obtain the answers to specific questionnaires.

It is of interest that four of the FLORENCE agents were traced through a check on the issue of ration cards, and three others were arrested through road control posts.

Seven agents were brought to trial during the month ; of these, three were sentenced to death and four to terms of imprisonment. The death sentences are still awaiting confirmation.

4. In the general area of 1 District, fairly widespread incidents of damage to signal communications, particularly those serving railways, were reported. Several cases could be definitely classified as wilful damage or sabotage rather than theft, but it is not known whether they were inspired by the enemy or the work of local anti-Allied elements. The latter is considered the more likely alternative.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785014

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Energetic and comprehensive measures are being taken to reduce the number of such incidents, as these have on occasions affected the efficiency of the Railway Service.

It is believed that minor damage which was inflicted on the petrol pipe 000.4 at one point North of ANCONA was the result of sabotage, but no clue as to the perpetrator was discovered. It is quite possible that this may have been the work of an enemy saboteur, as some months ago a SD sabotage party was intercepted on its way to blow up a sector of pipe line.

The enemy has displayed considerable interest in our shipping at ANCONA, and has despatched by sea several small parties of Naval Special Service personnel to employ various devices against the ships in the port.. Very close security control of the port area is therefore being maintained on the landward side, as it is not improbable that the enemy may seek to infiltrate overland some "limpeteers" or other Naval saboteurs.

5. No subversive movements of any significance have been discovered.

The arrest and internment of prominent and die-hard Fascists continues on a steady and fairly heavy scale ; approximately three hundred were interned in AAI territory during September.

The influence and efficiency of the Communist Party is commented upon from all quarters, and there seems little doubt that Communism has achieved a firmer grip than any other party on its adherents. Occasional reports are received of a possible resort to violence by the Communists, but such reports are seldom

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well substantiated, and it is not thought that any major coup or disturbance is at all imminent.

Considerable difficulty is experienced in persuading Partisans to give up their arms when overrun by the Allied Forces, and it is apparent that a fairly large number of arms are concealed about the area. There is, however, no reason to suppose that they are ever destined for use against the Allies.

Occasional minor disturbances and demonstrations have occurred, mostly concerned with unpopular officials remaining in office, but such incidents are usually between Italians and Italians, rather than directed against the Allied authorities.

6. Following the issue of a letter by this HQ on the danger of Frontläufer, both Armies devoted considerable attention to tightening up their front line control measures, designed (a) to prevent all civilian movement Northwards across the line and (b) to detect and check all persons crossing the line Southwards.

Along the whole front there is an elaborate system of control in depth, i.e., several echelons of check posts from the front line to the Rear Army Control Line. Similarly, along the coast-line, a network of observation posts, patrols and informers has been organised to prevent persons landing from small craft undetected.

It is believed that these forward controls are now as effective as can be expected with the resources available, and, although it cannot be claimed that they are water-tight, it is felt that they present a very real obstacle to the passage of enemy agents.

7. The Security situation with regard to SAN MARINO is satisfactory. A Field Security Section is installed in the capital, and the FS Officer, having been introduced to the Regents by G.O.C. 4 Ind Div, has established friendly relations with the police authorities of the State.

The Government has agreed that persons, other than SAN MARINO Nationals, who are deemed to present a security danger to the Allied Forces may be arrested and removed from the State, and several arrests of Italian Fascists etc have been made. The Government's agreement to such action appears to have been influenced to some extent by their reluctance to break their record in respect of the State Jail, which has had no customers for sixteen years.

In general, the SAN MARINO authorities have proved co-operative and pro-Allied, and it is not considered that the enemy has sought to exploit the slight possibilities presented by the existence of this independent State in the operational zone.

8. The standard of military security has maintained a high level, and it appears that the great majority of troops are distinctly security conscious.

It is believed that P/W discipline may have been subject to occasional weaknesses, and a drive has been initiated to tighten up this most important aspect of security.

Eighth Army has commented particularly favourably on the security awareness recently displayed by the Canadian Forces.

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Eighth Army has commented particularly favourably on the security keenness recently displayed by the Canadian Forces.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) The security of operations presented no outstanding problems during the period under survey, the regrouping program having already been completed and the assault begun on the Gothic Line. FSC/CIC devoted considerable attention to routine civil security measures and controls. In particular, counter-measures directed against the activities of enemy agents, especially Frontlaufer, were intensified in both Army areas. Consequent upon the grounding of the GAF, the enemy is now being hard put to it to obtain any timely and accurate indication of our intentions, dispositions etc, and has been forced to resort to the very uncertain expedient of sending numerous poor quality short-term tactical agents across the lines in an effort to augment his slender resources of intelligence.

(ii) It is of interest to note that the stringent security measures imposed by Eighth Army last month to cover the build-up on the Adriatic coast have had more than a passing effect on the troops concerned, and a high degree of security-mindedness continued to be noticeable throughout the Army area, particularly among the Canadians.

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(iii) Reports of illicit carriage of mail by civilians continued to be received. The practice was reported as particularly prevalent among refugees moving south from the forward areas. At FLORENCE, for instance, Security personnel screening refugees prior to their evacuation seized several hundred such letters. The contents were invariably of a purely personal nature and it is considered that in general no deliberate evasion of censorship is intended. This practice is mainly resorted to by or for persons living in forward areas, where civil postal services have not yet been reopened. Thus the recent extension of postal facilities to the provinces of ASCOLI, MACERATA, TERNI, VITERBO and GROSSETO and the institution of a special post-card service between FLORENCE and the "postal area" should serve to reduce considerably the number of these clandestine communications.

(iv) FS checks carried out on approved photographic shops in 1 District Area revealed no breaches of regulations by either troops or photographers. The Military Photographic Censor is now accepting Official Unit Photographers' Films from all the Corps under Eighth Army for processing and censorship at KODAK's, NAPLES. The scheme appears to be working smoothly and a number of expressions of appreciation were received from units taking advantage of these facilities.

(b) Security of Personnel

1 District reported a series of small incidents unimportant in themselves but tending in aggregate to indicate a certain deterioration in the relations between British and Polish troops. There were occasional rumours of a nature likely to impair the excellent understanding which existed between the two forces when the Poles were in the line. For instance it was recently rumoured that the Poles in the GIULIANOVA (TERAMO) area had told the local inhabitants that all war materials used by the British in ITALY were supplied by the Poles! This fantastic piece of gossip was of course promptly retailed by certain ignorant civilians to the British. Rumours were also current of British units applying for petrol or stores to Polish units and being kept waiting hours while the Poles had their lunch.

While the situation is by no means regarded with anxiety, it is nevertheless being carefully watched, in case any evidence of enemy inspired subversion should be forthcoming. There is no reason to believe that such petty misunderstandings as have so far been reported are directly attributable in any significant measure to the enemy's propaganda effort, though such conditions, if permitted to develop, would undoubtedly provide good material for the Germans' well-known policy of "divide and destroy".

A more probable explanation is the language difficulty, combined with the violent anti-Russian views of the Poles, which do not go down well with the majority of British troops. It is confidently expected that reports of this nature will cease now that the Polish Corps is moving up into the line.

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00058

(c) Security of Material and Installations

(i) Several cases of wirecutting with theft as the probable motive were reported from the Eighth Army area, and some arrests were made. In one case (near PESARO) sabotage was suspected, since the wire was severed in one place only, apparently by hammering it on a rail with an iron plate. One case was reported by Fifth Army in which four porcelain insulators on an overhead high tension wire were damaged, apparently by throwing stones or shooting at them. 1 District noted a slight increase in the incidents of wire cutting, particularly in the ANCONA area, the motive apparently varying between theft and wilful damage. 1 District also reported one case of deliberate tampering with military signal lines: this occurred at AVIGLIE (Prov MACERATA) on 23 Sep 44, and concerned a telephone line used by 2 Air Formation Signals: a short circuit had been produced by a piece of wire which had been connected across the pair of lines: in order to reach the lines the perpetrator would have had to climb a telegraph pole to a height of about ten feet above ground level. Cases of damage to railway telephone and telegraph cables were reported by both FBS and 1 District, 2 Railway Telegraph Coy (1 District) being a frequent sufferer. Comprehensive measures have been taken to improve the situation in the most affected areas. Such measures include the vetting of railway employees, the posting of "TENA DI MORTE" notices, and the organisation of CC.RR patrols.

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(ii) An incident reported by Eighth Army illustrates the dangers of leaving vehicles and mechanical equipment unattended. A bulldozer which had been parked during the night of 2/3 Sept at a farmhouse near S. EUFEMIA R.9258 broke down within half an hour of leaving on the following morning. The cause of the trouble was not discovered until the lubricating system was stripped down, when it was found to contain about 2-lbs of sand.

(iii) Two cases were reported by Eighth Army of damage to the petrol pipe line running along the Adriatic coast. The first occurred on 2 Sep and was apparently due to an explosion. A civilian labourer, who was himself slightly injured by the explosion, was arrested by FS in connection with the incident. This man freely admitted that he had picked up a wooden box-mine which he had found lying on a bridge above the pipe line, with the intention of emptying it and taking home the wooden container for domestic uses. His story was that an explosion occurred as he knocked out the contents over the side of the bridge. Engineers' reports, on the other hand, were emphatic that the damage to the pipe line could not have been caused solely by the explosion of the box-mine in this manner. After detailed interrogation by security and engineer personnel, the conclusion was reached that the labourer's story was genuine and he was released. As sabotage by some other agency appeared probable further investigations were subsequently carried out but without result. A further incident took place on the outskirts of SENIGALLIA on 9 Sep when petrol was found to be escaping from a joint in the pipe which appeared to have been deliberately loosened. The following day a civilian was observed by an RE patrol in the act of loosening the same joint, but made off before he could be intercepted or identified. Theft appeared to be the probable motive in this case.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastline

(i) Security control of the ports of LEGHORN, PIOMBINO, ANCONA and PESARO was effectively enforced. It is not expected that any great use will be made by the Allies of RIMINI which is at present heavily mined and suitable only for light craft.

(ii) In view of the marked attention given by enemy light naval craft to shipping in ANCONA port, security controls were tightened up in the area to counter the possibility of any enemy attempts at sabotage from the landward side. In particular a very rigorous control of civilian movement was enforced at the approaches to ANCONA.

(iii) The coast watching was very largely in the hands of the Guardia di Finanza, who were organised into roving patrols and fixed posts along both strips of coast working under FS/CIC supervision. These GG.FF were on the whole doing good work in controlling fishing and ensuring that all persons landing along the coast were immediately turned over to FSP/CIC for questioning and disposal. On the Fifth Army coast-line, 175 persons during the month landed by small boat on the strip between PISA and LEGHORN.

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2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of Arrests

	For Trial for a Security Offence (Category A)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention Pending Investigation (Category C)	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	NIL	55	6	61
Civilian Officials including CC.RR	NIL	28	4	32
Miscellaneous civilians	583	277	51	911
TOTAL	583	360	61	1004

NOTE: Of the above 57 were ex-Fascist Party Officials, and 51 were ex-MVSN.

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(b.) Important Individual Cases

(i) Agents

A brief analysis of agents arrested during the month is included in Part I. Detailed reports on these cases have been forwarded separately to AFHQ.

(ii) Persons arrested, other than Agents

BACHINI Giuseppi	Squadrista, Marcia su Roma. Held many important offices in the Fascist movement since 1922. PRF. Inspector of Italian Workers in the REICH, Jun 42 - May 44. Had contacts with many leading Fascists including MUSSOLINI. Returned to ITALY to live at CASTELFRANCO May 44. Arrested 15 Sep and interned.
BALICCHI Clotario	Squadrista, Marcia su Roma. Sciupa Littorio. Ex-Political Secretary of FALCONARA. Volunteered for service in YUGOSLAVIA and carried out numerous punitive expeditions against patriots. Arrested at ANCONA on 11 Sep and interned.
GALARDINI Pietro	Squadrista, Vice Federale of FLORENCE, PRF. Member of the Discipline Commission of the Fascist Federation of FLORENCE. Collaborator of PAVOLINI (Ministerial Secretary of PRF). Interned 22 Aug 44.
GUGLIELMI Vincenzo	Italian consul to S. MARINO Republic until 21 Sep 44. Had represented Fascism in the most violent form and conspired to maintain MUSSOLINI's influence in the Republic. On several occasions since the Armistice he attempted to call into S.MARINO Italian S.S. troops to restore his waning influence. Removed by arrangement with S. MARINO Government and handed over to AMG Provincial HQ URBINO for disposal.
ROTI Vincenzo	Joined PNF 1921; Squadrista: Segretaro del Fascio 1921 & 1923-25: Ispettore di Zona

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	carried out numerous punitive expeditions against patriots. Arrested at ANCONA on 11 Sep and interned.
CALDERINI Pietro	Squadrista, Vice Federale of FLORENCE, PRF. Member of the Discipline Commission of the Fascist Federation of FLORENCE. Collaborator of P.VOLPI (Ministerial Secretary of PRF). Interned 22 Aug 44.
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ROTI Vincenzo	Joined PNF 1921; Squadrista: Segretario del Fascio 1921 & 1923-25: Ispettore di Zona for PNF and PRF 1938-44. Collaborated with Germans in Anti-Fascist persecution. Interned 31 Aug 44.
SANGUINETTI Renato	For many years a most prominent Fascist in PERUGIA with over 20 administrative posts to his discredit. 1933-34 was appointed Administrative Federal Secretary, member of the Directorate of the PERUGIA Fascio and member of the Federal Disciplinary Commission and Finance Commission. After Armistice joined the PRF. Interned 16 Aug 44.
SPAZZI Luigi	For many years director of a PNF newspaper published in ANCONA, which subsequently became official PRF newspaper for the whole of the MARCHE Department. Indulged in many pro-NAZI articles, and violent abuse of the "Anglo-assissini". Arrested 18 Sep 44 for interment.

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(iii) Suspects

GUTTLAN Iszaak, alias GARABELLI Giacomo — Arrested 2 Aug by 3 Carpathian Div FSS and held in MACERATA. Later sent to ANCONA on advice of 2 SCI Unit. Latter believes he may be post-occupational agent with mission in ANCONA. Being interrogated.

LAURO Mario, Avvocato of QUERCIANELLA.

Attorney for Col Tullio NICOLARDI recently interned. Though a naturalised U.S. citizen in 1929, he renounced his citizenship in September 39 and returned to ITALY. He is reliably reported to have been a member of the Fascio All'Estero in the U.S.A., and to have criticised his adopted country most bitterly on his final return to ITALY. A report on his unsatisfactory record as a renegade citizen of the U.S. has been forwarded through channels to the U.S. State Department.

PACINI Luigi Captain — Formerly with SIM and alleged to have served with SID (Republican Fascist counterpart of SIM), was discovered at BIENTINA attempting to interest Allied personnel in helping him to obtain a position with the Allies. He was detained and is being interrogated concerning his SID activities.

(c) Subversive Movements and Political Organisations of Security Interest.

(i) Several reports have been received in 1 District that Communist elements of the Patriot Forces have retained their arms. In TRILA (S 4414) where the Ex-Sindaco was shot on 24 Sep and four ex-members of the Fascist Militia assaulted, the blame (or praise) is locally attributed to such elements. In TERAMO Province patriots appear to have committed virtual acts of banditry, extorting money, animals, transport from civilians under threats of violence. On 5 Sep an organised drive by AMG, FS and CC.RR resulted in the arrest of ten suspects, and the sequestration of 2 rifles, 30 rounds of ammunition and one serviceable machine gun. The local prestige of the Questura and CC.RR has been much increased as a result, as the public was in general feeling alarmed at the misuse to which weapons furnished for their country's liberation were being put.

(ii) It has been reported that, towards the end of August, two delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in ROME visited LEGHORN, with instructions which they claimed had been transmitted directly from the Russian Government. A great propaganda drive was ordered to increase membership quickly

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(ii) It has been reported that, towards the end of August, two delegates of the Central Committee of the Communist Party in EMME visited LEGHORN, with instructions which they claimed had been transmitted directly from the Russian Government. A great propaganda drive was ordered to increase membership quickly to several thousands : although members were to give every impression of moderation, all plans for taking the city by violence were still in effect (!), and to this end it was recommended that a systematic penetration of all branches of the Administration be carried out : anti-Allied propaganda amongst the peasants was to be intensified and was to be directed primarily against the American troops, since it was felt that after the war ENGLAND would be less powerful than the U.S.A. Further information on this rather sensational report is being sought, particularly with regard to the source and its reliability.

(iii) Investigation of reports that Fascist meetings were being held in VOLTERRA in the homes of two former members of the PNF revealed no evidence of subversive activity. A strong warning was however issued to the two men concerned and a CC.RR surveillance was placed on their activities.

(d) Control of Movement

(i) During a month of essentially humdrum security work, FS/CIC were able to give top priority to the control of civilian movement. Particular emphasis was laid on this aspect of security in the forward areas where control was stepped up to a considerable pitch in order to counter the use of short-range line-crossers by the enemy. The efforts of both Armies in this direction

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were handicapped in no small measure by the uneven spread of security personnel in their areas, resulting from the concentration of divisions on the Adriatic coast and in the BOLOGNA sector. Further problems were presented by the mountainous nature of a great part of the country, where evasion of the road controls was often very difficult to detect. These difficulties were overcome as far as was possible by the transfer of security personnel to areas thinly covered and by making the maximum use of all available CC.RR, Guardia di Finenza, Italian Auxiliary Police, etc.

(ii) Two main lines of control were operated, the Forward Control Line set up by the two Armies and running continuously across the peninsula near the front line, and the Rear Army Security Control Line. In the Fifth Army area a very elaborate system of control in depth was established. This consisted of the two lines already mentioned, a third running through the Corps area and a fourth following the South bank of the ARNO. In addition a network of 16 control posts manned by CC.RR was set up around the city of FLORENCE with the primary intention of preventing illicit movement Northwards from the city. A particularly thorough check was also made on hotels, hospitals, asylums, clinics etc in FLORENCE, and new arrivals were carefully sifted. Eighth Army also established numerous check posts between the two main lines of control.

(iii) The carriage of unauthorised passengers in WD transport continued to give Fifth Army security personnel a certain amount of trouble, particularly in areas where military police were not stationed and where CC.RR in consequence had difficulty in taking appropriate action. In the Eighth Army area, on the other hand, the situation in this respect appeared to improve. On the coastal road, for instance, it was reported that road movement by civilians was negligible, and this improvement was attributed largely to the thoroughness with which CMP had carried out its campaign against illicit civilian travel in WD vehicles.

(iv) Cases were reported of irregular entry into the Army areas by rail. Although no civilian rail services are operating in the Mal area, and although train guards have specific orders prohibiting the carriage of unauthorised civilians on military trains at all times, it was nevertheless apparent that illicit movement by rail was still going on, although not on any large scale. The most serious problem was presented by refugee trains, since at crowded rail-heads it is extremely difficult to separate bona fide refugees from other civilians on the look-out for a free trip to the South. The whole problem is at present being carefully examined at this Headquarters with a view to sealing off this loophole in our system of security controls.

(v) A heavy influx of refugees seeking to return to their homes in the narrow coastal belt in the Canadian Corps sector presented a problem of major proportions to Eighth Army Security personnel, since the heavy damage suffered by the coastal towns of RIMINI, RICCIONE and VISERBA made their disposal extremely

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(iv) Cases were reported of irregular entry into the Army areas by rail. Although no civilian rail services are operating in the AAI area, and although train guards have specific orders prohibiting the carriage of unauthorised civilians on military trains at all times, it was nevertheless apparent that illicit movement by rail was still going on, although not on any large scale. The most serious problem was presented by refugee trains, since at crowded rail-heads it is extremely difficult to separate bona fide refugees from other civilians on the look-out for a free trip to the South. The whole problem is at present being carefully examined at this Headquarters with a view to sealing off this loophole in our system of security controls.

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(vi) 5 Corps was similarly embarrassed by the presence of some 25,000 refugees in the Republic of SAN MARINO. As was anticipated, the arrival of the first British patrol was the signal for a general exodus. Representations were made to the Regent and to the Colonel of the Milizia Cittadina that no refugees should leave the confines of the Republic unless officially authorised by AMG. A system of controls was planned around the limits of the city, but unfortunately the fifty CC.RR allotted by AMG to assist in manning them arrived only after a delay of two days. Prompt action by AMG HQ 46 Div, however, prevented numbers of refugees from moving out of the territory and the situation was soon got under control. CC.RR personnel are manning check posts at the frontier and SAN MARINO Militia patrol between these posts.

Among these refugees there are no doubt numbers who have taken refuge in the Republic to avoid the consequences of their past record, in the belief that the Republic as a "neutral" state would provide them with a safe "hideout". The task of locating these has, however, been of necessity a slow one, although useful information has been obtained from the CNL of RIMINI and from contacts in the surrounding area.

(vii) A combined mobile road-block consisting of CMP, FS and CC.RR has been organised by DAPM 7 Sub-area to operate in PERUGIA Province. Snap checks on hotel and boarding house registers in this province have produced a number of civilians without travel permits or identity documents, all of whom were handed

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3. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Italian Armed Forces

(i) Eighth Army FS reports spoke highly of the work being done by Italian officers of the CSI(CL) attached to formations. Consistently good reports are also received on the work of the detachments of the mixed Company, 2nd Bn of the 514 (It.) Regiment employed on movement control duties.

(ii) FS apprehended a Petty Officer in the Italian Navy North of FLORENCE who revealed himself as a member of a party consisting of a Naval Captain and two NCOs based in that city. This party had been despatched to the mainland by the Italian Naval Command in SARDINIA with orders to contact families of sailors stationed on the island and to return with letters and news. These sorties have now been vetoed by AAI through the Naval Sub-Commission ACC in respect of the area North of the Rear Army Control Line.

(b) Civil Population

(i) Relations between Allied troops and civilians were in the main normal, though Greek troops with Eighth Army were inclined to express their hatred of Italians in various violent ways.

(ii) In FLORENCE, the strain imposed by the NAZI occupation has considerably dissipated. Feeling still runs high concerning the Allied treatment of Fascists: the general opinion is that the Allies are too generous, and anti-Fascists seem to favour the adoption of Fascist methods for dealing with Fascists. Several people have disappeared, and at least one murdered, reputedly by the Communists, though naturally this is hotly denied by them. In PERUGIA, Communist patriots have expressed dissatisfaction with the slowness of the Epurazione and threatened to initiate measures on their own.

(c) Rumours

Surprisingly few rumours were noted during the past month particularly among the troops. Among civilians a number of rumours were current concerning the nature of GERMANY's new "secret weapon", it being described variously as a death ray, a freezing agency capable of producing a temperature of minus 70° Centigrade over a wide area, and a remote controlled balloon loaded with explosive. The following are representative of other rumours of civilian origin.

"That an Armistice was signed between the Allies and GERMANY on the 25th August and that it will not be announced until certain dispositions have been taken in GERMANY."

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hatred of Italians [illegible]

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"That an Armistice was signed between the Allies and GERMANY on the 25th August and that it will not be announced until certain dispositions have been taken in GERMANY."

"That the imposed Armistice terms reveal ITALY stripped of her colonies, SICILY and SARDINIA as protectorates of the Allies or autonomous states, ports such as NAPLES, LEGHORN and GENOA supervised indefinitely by the Allied Navies, and Allied troops occupying ITALY for many years." (Fifth Army area).

"That British troops upon occupying a town are given four days leave to plunder and otherwise disport themselves."(General among the MONDLNO (PESARO) population).

"That MUSSOLINI has assembled a large number of Fascists (one version states 250,000) and is preparing to march on ROME." (PERUGIA)

4. LOCATIONS OF FS SECTIONS AND CIC DETACHMENTS AS AT 30 SEP 44

Attached to	Location
HQ AAI	
16 FSS	Q 8817, dot at SIENA

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	Attached to	Location	
FIFTH ARMY			
306 CIC Det	HQ Fifth Army	RAVERNELLE	Q 7348
427 FSS	" "	FLORENCE	
204 CIC Det	HQ 4 Corps	ALTOPASSO	Q 325750
501 " "	1 Armd Div	SESTO	Q 7576
66 FSS	6 S.A. Armd Div	PISTOIA	Q 5387
202 CIC Det	HQ 2 Corps	TRAVESSA	L 826057
88 CIC "	88 Div		L 995112
34 " "	34 "	LA CALCINARA	L 775115
85 " "	85 "	RACELLA	L 866086
91 " "	91 "	LA POSTA	L 868145
412 FSS	HQ 13 Corps	FLORENCE	
3 FSS	1 Div	CASAGLIA	R 019973
55 "	6 Armd Div.		R 005801
406 FSS	8 Ind Div	BIFORCO	M 071001
EIGHTH ARMY			
263 FSS	HQ Eighth Army	URBINO	R 9060
47 FSS	"	FANO	S 2075
88 FSS	78 Div	FANO	S 2075
411 FSS	1 Armd Div	MACERATA	S 5313
68 FSS	HQ 5 Corps	CORNOLO	R 780943
5 FSS	4 Div	S. LORENZO	R 860912
31 FSS	46 Div	SCORTICATA	R 7090
55 FSS	56 Div	SANT'ARCANGELO	R 7998
290 FSS	4 Ind Div	SAN MARINO	
407 FSS	10 Ind Div	MORCIANO	R 9288
278 FSS	HQ 10 Corps	AREZZO	
8 Cdn FSS Res Det	"	Moving.	
11 Cdn FSS Res Det		"	
11 Cdn FSS	HQ 1 Cdn Corps	VISERBA	M 8200
2 NZ Div FSS	2 NZ Div	"	
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Div	RICCIONE	R 9290
7 Cdn FSS	5 Cdn Armd Div	SAN VITO DI RIMINI	M 7600

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Eighth Army.

263 FSS	HQ Eighth Army	URBINO	R 9060
47 FSS	"	FANO	S 2075
80 FSS	78 Div	FANO	S 2075
411 FSS	1 Armd Div	MACERATA	S 5513
68 FSS	HQ 5 Corps	CORPOLO	R 780943
5 FSS	4 Div	S. LORENZO	R 860912
31 FSS	46 Div	SCORTICATA	R 7090
55 FSS	56 Div	SANT'ARCANGELO	R 7598
290 FSS	4 Ind Div	SAN MARINO	
407 FSS	10 Ind Div	MORCIANO	R 9288
278 FSS	HQ 10 Corps	AREZZO	
8 Cdn FSS Res Det	"	Moving.	
11 Cdn FSS Res Det		"	
11 Cdn FSS	HQ 1 Cdn Corps	VISMARA	M 8200
2 NZ Div FSS	2 NZ Div	"	
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Div	RICCIONE	R 9290
7 Cdn FSS	5 Cdn Armd Div	SAN VITO DI RIMINI	M 7600
2 Polcorps FSS	HQ 2 Polish Corps	Resting area	
5 Kres Div FSS	5 Kres Div	PORTO RECANATI	S 7030
3 Carp Div FSS	3 Carp Div		

1 DISTRICT

12 FSS	JESI	S 3958
310 FSS	PERUGIA	M 7092
314 FSS	ANCONA	S 6050
417 FSS	CORTONA	Q 3612

FBS

CIC Det	PICCININO
85 FSS	LIVORNO.

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Security Dn. 9772

SECRET

SUBJECT: Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FULPOT ADV 79

1404/20/GSI(b)

29 Sep 44

To: See Distribution

The attached Notes on Counter-Intelligence in ITALY are forwarded for distribution down to Divisions, FS Sections and CIC Detachments.

W.D. Glenn 11-Oct
for Brigadier
DCS(I)

(18)

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HEADQUARTERS
7 OCT 1944
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HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

Tel:- FIELD AAV 79

140/20/GSI(b)

29 Sep 44.

NOTES ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY

1. SECURITY BALANCE

For those engaged in security work, both on the staff and in the field, it is interesting and instructive to recall the development and adjustment of security doctrine or principles over these five years of war; to compare them with those current in ITALY to-day and to consider the changes which will be involved in this Theatre when organised German resistance ceases.

One of the more important conclusions to be drawn, or lessons to be learnt, from a consideration of this subject, is that security can never be regarded as absolute, but only as relative. It is not an end in itself, but only a means to an end. Thus there can be no absolute standards, principles or measures of security, which can or should be applied to every situation : we should only attempt to apply them in relation to other factors in the situation and as far as other, possibly overriding, considerations permit.

Every day we encounter situations in ITALY, in which the requirements of security conflict with the demands of operational or administrative expediency, and in which it is necessary to adjust our security measures or recommendations so as to ensure that they achieve the maximum effectiveness with the minimum interference with other interests.

One of the classic examples of this conflict is the controversy which has raged for years over the wearing of divisional signs. There is probably no single measure which could contribute more handsomely to our security than the total abolition of all Divisional signs : but the advantages of these signs - from the point of view of morale, esprit de Corps (or de Division ?), traffic control and discipline - are considered to outweigh their detrimental effect on security, and so these signs remain.

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This and many other such conflicts are between security and morale, and into this category fall the numerous problems of censorship regulations and relaxations (e.g. those concerning picture postcards), but almost as frequent are those conflicts which arise between security and the need for speed : the marking of routes to facilitate important operational moves, the chalking of railway trucks to assist their rapid marshalling, the use of the telephone to transmit secret but urgent instructions or information, the employment of certain civilians before the completion of "vetting", these are typical cases where security must sometimes give way to operational urgency.

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This and many other such conflicts are between security and morale, and into this category fall the numerous problems of censorship regulations and relaxations (e.g. those concerning picture postcards), but almost as frequent are those conflicts which arise between security and the need for speed : the marking of routes so as to facilitate important operational moves, the chalking of railway trucks to assist their rapid marshalling, the use of the telephone to transmit secret but urgent instructions or information, the employment of certain civilians before the completion of "vetting", these are typical cases where security must sometimes give way to operational urgency.

It is also common to find that our security measures and requirements run counter to the needs of the civil population and to the efforts of AMG. In such cases it is essential to distinguish between the needs and the convenience of the population. The demands of military security should NOT give way to civilian convenience, but must occasionally be modified to meet the real needs of the people, particularly in respect of food, health, and the restoration of essential industries. It is considerations of this nature which must be taken into account when dealing with the enforcement of civil movement regulations, the issue of curfew passes, and, perhaps most important and common of all, the internment of officials whose administrative efficiency is as high as their security integrity is low.

Not only do we encounter such conflicts between security and other interests, but also occasional cases in which security is divided against itself. For instance, the prohibition of civil mail services in the forward areas, which is principally a security measure designed to prevent leakage of information, tends to increase the extent of illicit travel between the rear and forward areas, since many persons in these areas are determined, for family or business reasons, to make contact with each other in any way they find possible. Similarly, if security control regul-

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ctions are so strict as to be considered unreasonably irksome, they will cause discontent, which in its turn will lead to subversive activities against the Allied forces. This, in extreme form is exemplified by the fact that the savagery of the German occupying forces, (the shooting of hostages etc), has probably tended to increase rather than to subdue the Partisan activity on their L of C. Thus one security measure is liable to detract from another, and the problem of priorities must be solved by a careful consideration of the relative dangers which the two measures are designed to combat.

Priorities will alter radically as soon as German resistance comes to an end. It is not proposed to examine here all the changes which must be made at that time in our security policy and in the application of security principles, but two major adjustments stand out as obvious : on the military security side, those precautions which are concerned with the security of information can be greatly modified ; sufficient must be retained to deny to J.A.P. knowledge of our strategic plans and moves, but many revisions can and should be made, particularly those which would help to sustain morale during a difficult period. On the civil security side, counter-subversive and counter-sabotage work will clearly assume ascendency over counter-espionage. Security officers will be able to think of many other aspects of their work which will have to be reorientated under the conditions prevailing after a German armistice, and it will be no waste of time if they begin to consider now, in their spare moments, some of the many ways in which their present conception of their duties will have to be adjusted to meet the new circumstances.

Thus past, present and future combine to point the same moral. Those engaged on security work need much more than tenacity of purpose; it must be combined with flexibility of method and approach. A didactic attitude which seeks to apply absolute laws of security doctrine can only lead to disaster or ridicule. It is essential that counter-intelligence personnel should be clear as to their object; their immediate object is security, but the object of security is to assist in the defeat of the German army, and this latter is therefore the real and ultimate object of security personnel. Thus they must not allow security to clog the machine which is designed for and engaged in the enemy's destruction. They must judge when to insist on security requirements as a first priority, i.e. when it will make for the greater efficiency of the machine, and they must judge when to modify such requirements in the light of other factors of equal or greater significance, i.e., when some course of action would be desirable if security were an end in itself, but would cause a breakdown or serious loss of efficiency in the working of the machine as a whole.

At this stage of the campaign in ITALY, we are fortunate in being in a position to base these judgements on fact rather than theory. Owing to the very large number of enemy agents who have fallen into our hands, and to our consequent examination of the many missions for which they were briefed, we have been able to obtain a clear picture of the objectives and methods of the German [illegible]. For example, part of the saboteurs who have been arrested

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to meet the new circumstances.

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2. GERMAN INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES

General

It is becoming more and more apparent that the S.D. is gradually acquiring control of the Abwehr, and that there no longer remains the clear-cut division of direction that used to exist between the two organisations.

Nevertheless, the nature of recent espionage and sabotage missions, some of them apparently rather pointless, indicates that this new control has not yet become fully effective in achieving proper co-ordination and economy of effort.

One trend that has been noted is that the S.D. appears to be assuming greater responsibility for military sabotage, but in the main it seems that the Abwehr has been allowed to continue its operations very much according to the old pattern, though an analysis of past failures should have convinced a disinterested critic that many of these operations would stand little chance of success.

Both Abwehr and I(c) were active in despatching line-crossers on short-term tactical missions.

Of the Abwehr Kommandos, No.150 appears to direct Abwehr espionage activities in ITALY, while No. 190 seems to act largely as a general despatching agency. Both are thought to be located in the area of Lake GARDA.

Their recent operations have contributed little to our knowledge concerning them, except that some have illustrated an apparent lack of close relationship between the Abwehr effort and the military situation, and an absence of security among their agents.

Finally mention should be made of the very successful and valuable penetration of the GERMAN S.D. Sabotage Group by four young members of the Partito d'Azione, which, itself, was responsible for the arrest of several members of the Group, and for handing the bodies over to the Allied Security Authorities.

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Recent Operations

During the last month rather more than thirty enemy agents were apprehended. Of this number approximately fifty percent crossed the lines, and with the exception of three agents who were dropped by parachute, the balance remained behind after the enemy withdrawal.

Of the three parachute agents, two were dropped in SARDINIA and one in Southern ITALY. SARDINIA still appears to interest the enemy, although we expected that after the landing in Southern FRANCE, he would have tended to lose interest in this area.

The Forward CIC/FSS played an important part in the apprehension of agents

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Of the Abwehr Commandos, No.130 appears to direct Abwehr espionage activities in Italy, while No. 190 seems to act largely as a general despatching agency. Both are thought to be located in the area of Lake Garda.

Their recent operations have contributed little to our knowledge concerning them, except that some have illustrated an apparent lack of close relationship between the Abwehr effort and the military situation, and an absence of security among their agents.

Special mention should be made of the very successful and valuable penetration of the [redacted] S.D. Sabotage Group by four young members of the Partito d'Azione, Waldy, himself, was responsible for the arrest of several members of the group, and for handing the bodies over to the Allied Security Authorities.

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The forward CIC/FSS played an important part in the apprehension of agents during the period, being directly responsible for the arrest of eight.

For communications the enemy relied strongly on W/T, eight of the agents captured being equipped with sets. Another case of secret ink writing was seized similar to that described in our previous summary. The short-range agents (line-crossers) were, as usual, all instructed to communicate the information by re-crossing the lines after a few days stay in our forward areas.

D. ENEMY ESPIONAGE METHODS

One-Way Passes

A German document was recently captured which afforded us considerable pleasure.

This document, which, incidentally, contained an instruction that it was to be destroyed immediately after perusal, was in the form of a warning to a forward German unit of the anticipated return of six agents. The agents' covernames

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which were unfamiliar to us, were listed together with their passwords or identification numbers. The latter took the form, in every case, of the word "HERO" followed by a number. Now, this word HERO, together with a variety of different numbers, had been cropping up in agents' interrogation reports for some months past, and had been recorded, although its significance was at first somewhat obscure. It was indeed satisfying, therefore, to find that the possessor of every "HERO" number listed in the German document was safely in the bag and to know that the Germans would await their return in vain.

The object of this paragraph is not to give ourselves a pat on the back, but to illustrate two points: (1) Instructions to destroy documents after perusal should be obeyed promptly and (2) The old moral still holds good - every piece of intelligence, however small, is of value.

A new cover-story

Among the agents captured during the month was a medical student who, before he decided to exchange the ward and scalpel for the cloak and dagger, had reached his ninth year of medical studies. His experience, however, was turned to good advantage in the following manner:

He was to act as a collecting point for agents' information and, for this purpose, was to set himself up as a doctor. After the arrival of the Allies, agents who would be unknown to him would call on him professionally, saying that they had been sent by a certain doctor 'X'. When asked the nature of their complaint, they would quote a disease which would not be a code or password and which would vary according to the day of the month. Thus, on the 12th of August, agent 'Alpha' would be suffering from gastric ulcers, while on Christmas Day they might be suffering from jaundice. This was to act as a verification check against any attempts at penetration.

The idea certainly has a touch of brilliance about it, as we could normally dispose of the many and varied callers who ring a doctor's door-bell.

More Cloak and Dagger

The carrying of poison by agents was mentioned in the last issue of these Notes and the explanation has now come to light. A number of agents have definitely stated that the Germans gave them small phials of cyanide of potassium to be swallowed in case of capture by the Allies.

In one particular instance, the poison was contained in an elaborately painted ring.

To date, the fervency of agents for the enemy cause has not been such as to lead them to take advantage of this merciful escape from a fate worse than death at the hands of the Allies, but the point is worth watching.

Unbowing Resistance

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[illegible] sent by a dentish doctor [illegible]. When [illegible] they would quote a disease which would not as a code or password and which would vary according to the day of the month. Thus, on the 12th of August, agents suffering from Gastric ulcers, while on Christmas Day they might be suffering from Jaundice. This was to act as a verification check and to [illegible] penetration.

The last certainly has a touch of brilliance about it, as no one would normally suspect the wary and varied sufferers who ring a doctor's door-bell.

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Sabotage Equipment

A child was injured at AREZZO on 14 Aug 44 by a device camouflaged as a pencil for writing ink. This is in the form of a tube, approximately 5" long, ½" diameter made of wood, with hexagonal milled-edged cap. Round the closed end of the tube in a narrow band of purple: the remainder is black, with lettering and ridges metal in white. The wording on the tube is:-

"[illegible] MOCHIN HAIR-PENCIL.

[illegible] artistically covers white and grey hair at the roots, temples, and hair parting.

Non-greasy. Harmless. To apply, moisten tip.
At your local store, or post paid 1.00.
Made by E.F.MILLER, 269 East 161st Street, New York, N.Y., U.S.A."

It would appear likely that the "hair pencil" is used as a camouflage for [illegible]-bore.

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Front Line Counter-Intelligence

An alert FS NCO was responsible for capturing an Ic agent in the forward area early in September.

He had witnessed the Ia/CI interrogation of a civilian who had crossed the lines. This civilian had volunteered certain military information concerning the enemy.

When the interrogator asked him the calibre of a gun which he had described, he replied that he did not know much about artillery because he had served in the Italian Navy, a point that the FS NCO noted.

Upon the completion of the operational intelligence interrogation, the FS NCO subjected the civilian to an I(b)/CI interrogation and the following irregularities were noted:

(a) He stated that he had served at STALINGRAD (rather unusual for a sailor)

(b) He had in his possession an identity card issued in ITALY on 18 Dec 43, whereas during his interrogation he had previously stated that he was in GERMANY in December 1943.

(c) The same card was new and clean in spite of the fact that it was supposed to have been carried for nine months.

When the foregoing irregularities and inconsistencies were pointed out to him, he broke down and confessed to having been dispatched on a short range military espionage mission.

It will be seen that the agent attempted to establish a cover for himself by offering certain limited tactical information, in the hope of being able to win the confidence of the Allied authorities.

This particular case also emphasizes the need for careful scrutinizing of all identity cards and documents.

His case is being prepared for trial.

00051

Miscellany:

Travelling by agents on military vehicles may be on the decrease. Only one case is on record during the past month.

Two agents recently captured stated that, before starting out on their mission, they had been given carbon typewritten on cloth and signed by [illegible],

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Miscellany

Travelling by agents on military vehicles may be on the decrease. Only one case is on record during the past month.

Two agents recently captured stated that, before starting out on their mission, they had been given passes type-written on cloth and signed by MASS, a high official of the SD. These were only to be produced if the agents got into difficulties on their return through the German lines.

To disarm suspicion and avoid awkward questions, agents in training and before leaving on missions have been passed off by the Germans as members of the Todt organisation.

Routine checking of hotel registers has again paid dividends, adding three agents to the bag in the last four weeks.

The Germans seem anxious to obtain quantities of Allied military currency.

4. MILITARY AND CIVIL SECURITY

Security SE North Wales

Reports from Northern Planet show that as a result of the grounding of the CAF and the long time experienced by German agents in the UK, the opportunities afforded to the enemy for obtaining information concerning our plans for the so-called Second Front and the actual conduct of the operation were very considerably restricted. The information gained from wireless interception, the

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interception and captured documents proved entirely inadequate to the situation, with the result that the German High Command completely failed to appreciate Allied intentions in the West. The more or less complete state of confusion and uncertainty produced in the minds of the German Staffs concerning our very next move is so said to have contributed in no small measure to the speed with which the Allied advance was carried out.

Tapping of Signal Lines

The first known case of attempted tapping of a military telephone line since the beginning of the campaign has been reported by PBS. The line in question connected the Gun Operations Room of a British unit with one of its batteries. A repairman investigating a reported breach in this line, which had been laid only the day before, came across what appeared to be a wire-tapping device still in position on the line. The apparatus consisted of three thin rubber-covered wires spliced to a split porcelain radio plug of the civilian type. One wire was spliced to an exposed section of the line, the second fastened to a 2-inch nail which served as an "earth" while the third wire was free. It appeared that the plug had almost certainly been intended to fit a headset or head-phone, though no such instruments were found. No explanation could be given of the presence of the third (free) wire.

A similar incident has also been reported by MAAF. An effort was apparently made in early August to tap a newly installed signal line leading to the villa of the Commanding General 15th AGF. In this case, however, the only evidence discovered consisted of two wires leading from this line to a ditch at the side of the road.

It is considered that these would-be tappers were probably local Italians, unconnected with enemy intelligence, and that their motive was probably either personal interest, or espionage on behalf of some political group, or some vague idea of supplying the information obtained to the enemy if opportunity should offer.

These conclusions are based on the amateurish nature of the operation, and on the fact that no enemy agent so far apprehended had been instructed to collect information by this method.

Interception of Morse Passes

[illegible] The following translation of an instruction issued by A.O.K. 19 (XIX, PZGRUP), to its counter-intelligence section concerns a number of useful hints on the interception of Morse passes. This instruction, dated 26 Jul 44, was captured in St. [illegible] by Seventh Army.

"The detection of agents is obviously easier if one knows the art of sending Morse. Therefore the following usual methods of sending are only

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A similar incident has also been reported by XXIV. An effort was apparently made in great haste to lay a newly installed signal line leading to the villa of the Commanding General 15th ARMY. In this case, however, the only evidence discovered consisted of two wires leading from this line to a ditch at the side of the road.

It is considered that these would-be tappers were probably local Italians, unconnected with enemy intelligence, and that their motive was probably either personal interest, or espionage on behalf of some Fascist group, or some vague idea of supplying the information obtained to the enemy if opportunity should offer.

These conclusions are based on the amateurish nature of the operations, and on the fact that no enemy agent so far apprehended had been instructed to collect information by this method.

Detection of Forged Passes

The following translation of an instruction issued by [redacted] HQ, FRANCE, to its counter-intelligence agencies contains a number of useful hints on the recognition of forged passes. This instruction, dated 26 Jul 43, was captured in SICILY by Seventh Army.

"The detection of agents is obviously easier if one knows the art of forging a pass. Therefore the following usual methods of forging identity cards, passes etc., are cited:-

(a) Papers with a long expired date of issue stand out by their appearance of newness since normally personal identity cards or passes are well thumbed through constant use and carrying on the person.

(b) Entries which are completed in the same ink and with the same pen although they refer to different places of issue and were made in different places, are conspicuous.

(c) Genuine passes are frequently used by other than the original holder. In this case the photograph of the real holder is removed and replaced by a photograph of the new owner. The stamp which is standing in the centre of the photograph is reproduced in copying ink. This forgery is detectable easy to recognise on close examination.

(d) Since the agents of the Russian Intelligence Service are placed to every desired areas in the occupied territory, definite persons will be entered in the pass as alleged relations. If these areas in the enemy's hand have been made subsequently, it is comparatively easy to discover through the different form of the signatures.

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(c) Passes are frequently produced in which several pages have been replaced by newly inserted sheets. Such passes are suspicious from the start. Sometimes certain figures on the top edge of passes are cut off so that certain entries will not come to light."

Control of Movement

On 19 Sep 44, the Rear Army Security Control Line was advanced to the following position:

PIETRASANTA S 4951 - IESI - FABRIANO S 1217 - FOSSATO R 9912 - PERUGIA - MARTIGNA W 5396 - thence North of Lake TRASIMENO to SINALUNGA R 1605 - SIENA - VOLTERRA - CECINA.

The check-line is sited just North of the towns of PERUGIA and SIENA.

Civilian movement regulations were recently published in Italian newspapers and over the Italian radio by arrangement with PWB. This should go far to clear up any confusion which may have existed in the minds of the Italian population in this regard.

A case occurred of a civilian truck being stopped by MPs at a road check-post for the driver's papers to be checked; these were found to be in order and the truck was permitted to proceed. No questions whatsoever were asked concerning the 45 unauthorised civilian passengers sitting in the back. The need for close and continuous liaison with the Military Police is perhaps too obvious to be mentioned, but its importance cannot be too highly stressed.

Miscellaneous Items

Prior to the landings in the South of FRANCE convoys of troops passed through the centre of ROME wearing inflatable lifebelts, thus indicating the probability of their imminent participation in a sea-borne operation, and in any case setting innumerable tongues wagging.

Lorry jumping for the purpose of stealing WD stores was reported to be prevalent in the NAPLES and NAPLES areas. These thefts are usually perpetrated at bends or on rough stretches of road where lorries are forced to slow down, enabling pilferers to jump on to the back and throw goods off the truck.

Several cases have recently been reported of Italian troops sending prohibited messages (particularly locations) to their families by writing under the postage stamp on an ordinary letter.

5. ITALIAN INFORMATION

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Several cases have recently been reported of Indian troops sending prohibited messages (particularly lotteries) to their families by writing under the postage stamp on an ordinary letter.

5. ITALIAN INFORMATION

Servizio Informazione Difesa

The first issue of these Notes contained a short description of the Servizio Informazione Difesa. Since then a German document has been captured in FRANCE which throws a glaring light on the Germans' cynical mistrust of this organisation of their brothers-in-arms. The following unflattering comments are extracted from a memo issued by the FORTE Kommandantur of the Frontier police to its agencies on the Franco-Italian border.

"The German view is that the Command of the SID is not reliable. It is intended to make the SID a useful instrument of the German Abwehr,..... Connections with the SID are undesirable for the time being. Where they already exist, information may be accepted; but no assignments are to be given, nor is any help whatever to be afforded..... The text of this letter must in no circumstances be communicated to, or taken at, to the agents of the SID".

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Centuria Del Fascio Crociata

This organisation, which was originally the brain-child of Col. DAVID, the notorious recruiter for the Abwehr, has been coming increasingly to notice of late, in that several of its recruits are now in our hands. The organisation, aimed in DAVID, was founded in Oct or Nov 43 and DAVID was assisted in its formation by a certain Renato PERICONE who became its Second-in-Command. PERICONE, however, sharply criticised DAVID's other organisations because of the recruitment of women for solely sexual reasons and, as a result, DAVID soon relinquished his position in the C.F.C. and PERICONE took over sole control.

Under PERICONE the C.F.C., in addition to serving as a central reservoir for the GIS, attempted to become an intra-Party political police agency. Personnel were, and still are, largely drawn from 10 Flotilla MAS. Members continued to serve in the units to which they were regularly attached or, if non-military, resided in private quarters elsewhere. The C.F.C. provided no type of special schooling or technical training; those recruited from 10 Flotilla MAS, it may be presumed, would have had such training, and the men supplied to the GIS went through the regular GIS agents' training.

By mid-April '44, PERICONE had gathered a group of some twenty followers. At this time the Group was called together and told that each man was to be ready to cross the lines on either espionage or sabotage missions for the Germans. Shortly after, various members were supplied to the GIS at the request of a certain civilian, Corrado TIEVO who acted as liaison officer between the GIS and PERICONE.

At this point, PERICONE seems to have developed a violent mistrust of the Republican Fascist Party to such an extent that he endeavoured to break away from it altogether and ally himself and his organisation more closely to the Germans. This plan, however, got no further as PERICONE was denounced to the Party Secretary, PAVOLINI, and arrested.

After various further disputes, the Centuria was reorganised by the Prefect of VENICE on PAVOLINI's order. PAVOLINI came to an understanding with Dr. RAHN of the Embassy that the C.F.C. would continue to serve as a reservoir for GIS agents and that, while it would depend financially on the Republican Fascist Party, the men drawn from it by the GIS would be paid by the Germans.

When detailed information was last available on the Centuria, it had over 100 members, a number of whom have now crossed the lines and fallen into our hands.

Movimento Ideale Giovani Repubblicani

At Appendix "A" is a description of this Movement, which was formed on [illegible], showing its development and significance.

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When detailed information was last available on the Centuria, it had over 100 members, a number of which have now crossed the lines and fallen into our hands.

Movimento dei Giovani Italiani Republicani

At Appendix "A" is a description of this Movement, which was centred on FLORENCE, showing its development and significance.

Partisan Movement

At Appendix "B" is an account of the evolution and organisation of the Partisan Movement in Northern ITALY. It is thought that this may prove useful background information for CIC/FSS destined for the North.

SIM/CS

Hitherto the SIM/CS organisation has been devoting its energies mainly to special counter-espionage duties, rather at the expense of normal civil security work or the more routine forms of Ib/CI activity.

In the middle of September, however, an I(b) Liaison Officer, Capt R.H. STANDRIGHT, was attached to the SIM/CS HQ in addition to the SCI liaison officer already working there. The appointment of this officer should result in increased attention being paid by SIM/CS to more general I(b)/CI matters and should also assist materially in solving the many administrative difficulties of that organisation.

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Appendix "A" to
NOTES ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY
dated Sept 43

MOVIMENTO PER L'INDIPENDENZA ITALIANA REPUBBLICANA

Preamble

The interrogation of a number of espionage and sabotage agents recently captured has disclosed connections with a certain Italian movement known as the "Movimento per l'Indipendenza Italiana Repubblicana". Our knowledge of this movement is still incomplete, but the following is an account of its origins and developments based on information, some of it conflicting, which has so far been obtained.

Origins

The movement appears to have been founded in FLORENCE in Oct 41 by a certain Luciano ST.ANGELLINI with the object of prosecuting the original Fascist doctrines of M.MUSSOLINI. ST.ANGELLINI, a young Florentine who had been an enthusiastic member of the Fascist Youth Movement since 1927, came to the conclusion that the inept and corrupt "Fascist Old Guard" were to blame for Italian disasters in CRIMEA and in AFRICA, and that the Fascist idea was in need of young stalwarts, whose energy and enthusiasm would save the country from either Allied or German domination.

ST.ANGELLINI wrote several pamphlets on this "purist" theme, notably, "L'ITALIA NUOVA" and "LA RIVOLUZIONE DEVE CONTINUARE" and gathered about him as "Young Squads" or "SQUADRISTI" a band of adherents, including Argento SACCOCCI, Luigi BICHIERI and his brother Mario, Romano CASSINIS, Vincenzo RAFANELLI and for a while a certain Mario MENICHI. Their motto at this early stage was "Cut with the Foreigners from ITALY", a doctrine by no means palatable to the Germans.

The old guard, no doubt with German backing, objected strongly to this type of propaganda, and in April 42, following a denunciation by an O/R. agent, arrested a number of ANGELLINI members. Dr. CHIARINI of the FLORENCE Questura completed the enquiry which ended with the expulsion of both ST.ANGELLINI and SACCOCCI from the Military Academy at MODENA, whilst RAFANELLI, an Italian air force officer, was despatched in disgrace to the FOGGIA airfield, and another member was banished to PADOVA. The authorities reported details of the purge to the Germans and considered the movement crushed. Subsequently owing to the personal intervention of certain influential Fascists, these members were pardoned. ST.ANGELLINI and SACCOCCI being reinstated in the Academy. The former was killed on the Eastern Front in November 42.

How Formed as an Independent Movement

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Development as an independent movement

Though it is possible that the idea of the Movement spread amongst the young men of the northern cities, the organised body disappeared until the upheavals of 8 Sep, when the time seemed ripe for a renaissance in FLORENCE. Late in the month, ...CCOCCI, then a colonel of the Alpini, arrived home from FRANCE and sought out ST...CHELLINI and his old comrades. His experiences in the period immediately following the armistice had made him rabidly anti-German. In an attempt to gain some official backing for the movement, the group contacted ...SCIULLI, a Florentine lawyer and President of the War Veterans Association, (...ter Gordon in MI...), and a propagandist, ...ranco SORICE but without any definite results. The next move was a visit paid by ...CCOCCI, ST...LLINI, BIONDO and CALVI (of ...ATA FASCISTA) to ROME, where they were given recognition by Party Secretary ...MICHELINI as the first members of the so-called Social Republican Party of Sept-...mber 43". In Sep 43, ...CCOCCI announced a public manifestation in FLORENCE, place being the city with posters bearing the words "VIVA L'ITALIA.". Subsequently and was formed at this meeting, since members of the Fascist armed forces wishing to attend were requested not to carry arms. There was also discord amongst those present, particularly when the "Old Guard" fascists and "GIOVANEZZA" ...

against the "LINO DI MACOLI" of the Sponsors. When the MSIR speaker, Captain Alberti [illegible] of MILAN declared that the attack on FRANCE had been a cowardly act, the German representative called on the District Commander of the CC.RR to disperse the gathering, whereupon the speaker and [illegible] sought and obtained protection from the Prefect, and the meeting broke up.

In spite of this setback individual members appear to have continued to spread their "purist" ideas as far as they could on their own. In November 43, [illegible] whose cours had moved to MILAN attempted unsuccessfully to secure to the GUF (Fascist University Group) from the local Fascist federation, but did indeed persuade them to issue proclamations omitting any reference to Gentile.

By this time a new political leader of the MSIR had emerged in [illegible], namely Gino [illegible], a twenty-year old artillery Sergeant of C.S.[illegible] (LIVORNO), who as a student of Economics in 1942 had been attracted to the event. Some funds must have been available, for by December 43, four broadsheets were being printed on a private press, and published as follows:- "[illegible]" in FLORENCE, "CAMPO" in SIENA, "TRICOLORE" in PISTOIA and "FRONTE UNICO" in VENICE. At first, these papers were authorised by the prefects of the different provinces but later in December they were suppressed, with the exception of "TRICOLORE".

Early in January 44, [illegible] invited members of the MSIR to join his Youth Action Group (G.A.), organised at that time as an extension of the GUF for Fascist Youth also. This offer was rejected. [illegible], in an interview with [illegible], is said to have stressed the necessity for an enlightened opposition to the official Fascist party, but failed to gain his point!

The O.S.S. takes a hand

Early in January 44, [illegible] was working on what was called Plan "[illegible]", designed to overthrow the Fascist Republican Government. From MILAN he wrote a letter to the FLORENCE group suggesting that an offer of assistance to the Partito be made to the Committee of National Liberation - but this was merely to gain the confidence of the Committee and possibly funds. At the same time arrangements were to be made with members, including [illegible], head of the FLORENCE Centre, to go over to the G.A.S.

It seems, however, that the German Intelligence Service had its own plans for taking over the MSIR. In the same month (January), [illegible], he had been posted to VARESE, met in TURIN a Bersaglieri corporal named as GIFFRE, who professed to be a moderate nationalist interested in the MSIR. [illegible] introduced him to Dr. [illegible], a leader of German propaganda, but nothing definite came of this contact. In March, however, [illegible] spent his leave in FLORENCE where he was introduced by a MSIR member Nello [illegible], to Major [illegible] Von [illegible], of Abwehr II. Von [illegible] professed to be of Austrian subject and to have a strong anti-German. He also claimed the friendship of Prince [illegible] [illegible] of the 10th [illegible] in order to make contact with

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with [illegible] SOLARI a C.I.G.NO, to ask to talk to him about the necessity for an anti-fascist opposition to the official Fascist party, but failed to gain his point!

The C.I.G. Takes a Hand

Early in January 44, SOLARI was working on what was called Plan "A", designed to overthrow the Fascist Republican Government. From MILAN he wrote a letter to the FLORENCE group suggesting that an offer of assistance to the Partisans be made to the Committee of National Liberation - but this was merely to gain the confidence of the Committee and possibly funds. At the same time arrangements were [illegible] for some members, including [illegible]RUNI, head of the FLORENCE Centre, to penetrate the C.I.G.

It seems, however, that the German Intelligence Service had its own plans for taking over the M.I.R. In the same month (January), SOLARI, who had been posted to VARESE, met in TURIN a Bersaglieri corporal named DE CHIFFRE, who professed to be a moderate nationalist interested in the M.I.R. DE CHIFFRE introduced Him to Dr. [illegible]MENS, a leader of German press and propaganda, but nothing definite came of this contact. In March, however, SOLARI spent his leave in FLORENCE where he was introduced by a M.I.R. member Nello PAGLIATTI, to Major TUN VON [illegible]STEIN, of Abwehr II. Von HOHENSTEIN professed to be an Austrian subject, and to some extent anti-German. He also claimed the friendship of Prince [illegible] of the 10th M.S. in whose ranks many M.I.R. sympathisers were now to be found. The Major proposed sending SOLARI through the lines ostensibly as a saboteur but in fact (according to Von HOHENSTEIN) to give SOLARI an opportunity to see conditions in Allied occupied territory and to evaluate the possibilities of a broader movement there. At the same time it appears that contact had been established by an SS Recruiting Agent, and the double game worked for the C.I.G. By the middle of the month Von HOHENSTEIN had met SOLARI and [illegible]I in MILAN, and, though he pretended that it was against orders from BERLIN to have contact with an "anti-fascist organisation", he spent some days with SOLARI, and introduced PAGLIATTI, who was now definitely working for the C.I.G., to [illegible], and introduced [illegible] and SOLARI to the Abwehr Sabotage School at [illegible]. However, they were not accepted as recruits by Lt. [illegible]ITTER, the officer in charge, and they therefore returned to FLORENCE, where they were joined by [illegible].

By now the approchement with the C.I.G. appears well under way, and in [illegible] SOLARI and [illegible] met Dr. [illegible]S to exchange views on how their movement could work alongside the C.I.G. In June [illegible] was stationed at [illegible] where he found a sympathiser in the CO of a nearby establishment for training

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Italian pilots and parachutists. At this time he received a request from a Colonel B.SSI of the Arditi to suggest suitable persons to cross the lines. It is known that Colonel B.SSI had spoken already to Dr. ...NS and probably the position of the MGIR had been discussed. M.LLINI himself undertook to go to Southern ITALY and gave the names of other MGIR members, though he was warned by a friend that B.SSI was acting for the German rather than for the Italian cause.

At the end of the month (June), it became evident that the movement was virtually lost as an independent political concern, for a certain COLPO, connected with German sabotage, boasted in FLORENCE that the MGIR was working for him, and it is also known that he was employing a liaison officer with them.

In July, STEFANI in MILAN called on BECCUCCI and MARELLI to give priority to Plan "A" rather than to "informative missions to the South", but training for these missions continued. Lt. BISCONCINI, a friend of MARELLI's in the movement, was trained as a sabotage agent by the SD in VERONA, and here too MARELLI, SERRATI, ENGIL and others received instruction. Their missions in Southern ITALY were monitored by the Germans to obtain political information of use to the GIS as well as of interest to the MGIR. MARELLI, SERRATI and SERRA are now in Allied hands. MARELLI crossed the lines and arrived in FLORENCE on the 6th August. From here he sent a message back to STEFANI stating that the Germans had "behaved very badly", and that their influence must be eliminated. He asked STEFANI to get in touch with Admiral GARIONI to enlist his sympathies in an "ITALIAN AGAINST GERMANY DI TUTTI" drive but the appeal has a ring of despair.

Conclusions

Evidence so far obtained gives no indication that the MGIR, which centred on FLORENCE, is part of a widespread movement, since no trace has yet been discovered of its existence elsewhere in an organised form. There is however no doubt that its founders, a group of young, ambitious and somewhat irresponsible enthusiasts, visualised the MGIR as a movement for the regeneration and salvation of Italian Fascism as a whole by an uncompromising return to first principles and the rejection of German influence and control. This reformist zeal appealed to the frustration of numbers of young Fascists smarting under the disgrace and humiliation into which the Italian State had fallen, for which the "old guard" was held largely responsible. Inadequate funds, distrust by the established Republican Party, and the lack of any solid backing or organising ability at the top doomed these idealist aspirations to failure and made the movement an easy prey for the GIS, ever on the look-out for likely material to pervert to its own uses. This lack of solidity and cohesion led the sponsors of the movement to seek political support in the most surprising places, including the Committee of National Liberation (although the MGIR was never anti-Fascist in the real sense of the term, and certainly not pro-Ally), and the Fascist Republican Party (in spite of its repudiation of the Party's policy of collaboration with the Germans). These flourish manoeuvres proved abortive, with the result that the MGIR in FLORENCE inevitably fell a prey to the machinations of the GIS.

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Conclusions

Evidence so far obtained gives no indication that the MCIR, which centred on FIORENCE, is part of a widespread movement, since no three have yet been discovered of its existence elsewhere in an organised form. There is however no doubt that its founders, a group of young, ambitious and somewhat irresponsible enthusiasts, visualised the MCIR as a movement for the regeneration and salvation of Italian Fascism as a whole by an uncompromising return to first principles and the rejection of German influence and control. This reformist zeal appealed to the imagination of numbers of young Fascists smarting under the disgrace and degradation into which the Italian State had fallen, for which the "old guard" were held largely responsible. Inadequate funds, distrust by the re-established Republican Party, and the lack of any solid backing or organising ability at the top doomed these idealist aspirations to failure and made the movement an easy prey for the SIS, ever on the look-out for likely material to convert to its own uses. The kernel of solidity and cohesion led the sponsors of the movement to seek and find support in the most surprising places, including the Committee of National Liberation (although the MCIR was never anti-Fascist in the real sense of the term, and certainly not pro-Ally), and the Fascist Republican Party (in spite of its total opposition of the Party's policy of collaboration with the Germans). These tactical manoeuvres proved abortive, with the result that the MCIR in FLORENCE inevitably fell a prey to the machinations of the SIS. The latter had little difficulty in persuading MCIR members to accept so-called informative missions into Allied territory in the pretence that these would be to the benefit of the movement.

Although it would appear that the MCIR was of local significance only, a study of its development and activity is nevertheless justified as being representative of similar movements, possibly under different names, likely to be encountered in other large towns further North. In this particular instance the movement is interesting mainly for the use to which it was put by the SIS, its political significance being negligible. It may well be that further North such manifestations of youthful Fascist enthusiasm may be met with in more highly organised forms capable of dangerous independent action against the Allies. In any case, it can be taken for granted that the SIS in its own cynical way, will make every effort to suborn such movements to its own devices, and in this nefarious work it will be materially assisted by the lessons it has learnt from the FIORENCE episode.

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Appendix "B" to
NOTES ON COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE IN ITALY
dated 29 Sep 44

ORGANISATION OF THE PARTISAN MOVEMENT IN ITALY

1. From information received in the last few weeks it is possible to give a somewhat clearer picture of the internal organisation of the Partisan movement in ITALY.

2. The "HQ" of the movement, as has of course long been known, is in MILAN. This is the logical result of three main causes:-

MILAN is the natural centre of German occupied ITALY.

As ITALY's principal industrial town it has a large working population which has, in the past, proved a fertile field for anti-Fascist organisation.

As a result of the latter the Committee of National Liberation in MILAN had a firm foundation of well organised underground activity which parties of the left had established and maintained throughout the Fascist regime. The CLN was thus able to be in the evolution of an active central organisation at a time when Partisan activity in the rest of ITALY was sporadic and entirely un-coordinated. The Committee has gradually increased the extent of its influence until at present it is believed that it is recognised by the great majority of the Partisans.

3. In essence the CLN aims to coordinate the activities of all resistance elements which are prepared to act against Germans and Fascists, and to eliminate friction arising both from the wide variety of causes which have induced Italians to join resistance groups, and from the tendency of a large number of political parties to attempt to capitalise on the resistance movement.

4. The sources from which the Partisan movement derives almost all its active strength are five-fold:-

Members of the Italian Army before the Armistice, who for various reasons later refused to throw in their lot with the Germans and Fascists. Their political views appear to be predominantly Monarchist and it is probable that the majority of these bands which remained independent of the CLN derived from these sources.

Communists.

Action Party members.

Socialists.

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Communists.

Action Party members.

Socialists.

Christian Democrats.

The rigidity of this classification should however be qualified. Operating with the Partisans is a large and heterogeneous body of Italians of no, or only the loosest political allegiance, together with an unknown number of Russian, Polish, Czech, Slovak, and even German deserters from the Wehrmacht, Slovenes, and a considerable number of Allied ex-PW.

5. When it became clear that the CLN in MILAN had achieved a real authority over this complex movement, and had in fact been recognised by the Italian Government, it was decided to send a distinguished Italian officer, with a thoroughly democratic background, as a representative of A.M.I. to the CLN. He will be referred to as "Colonel X". What follows is based in the main on reports from this officer.

The General Command of the MILAN CLN consists of five members, one from each of the five principal resistance elements, and a military adviser.

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
The Operations section of the Command virtually rules the CLN and consists of the Communist and Action Party representatives and the Military Advisor.

Colonel X was welcomed by all parties and was nominated President of the Committee. This however raised a difficulty in that the three parties of the left could not agree as to the allocation of the secondary posts. He therefore refused the Presidency and has taken up the appointment of Military Advisor with its ex officio seat in the Operations section, a task for which his capabilities make him eminently suitable.

7. The Committee has achieved a creditable degree of cooperation between all the political parties, but it is certain that the Communists are by far the most influential single element. They provide most of the Committee's administrative and liaison personnel, and in passing it is pointed out that where communications consist chiefly of couriers on foot, bicycle, or occasionally motor car, liaison duties assume a very great significance.

8. The lack of communications and the clandestine nature of the organisation have made close control of military operations, particularly in the case of distant bands, out of the question. The Committee therefore contents itself with broad operational policy and concentrates mainly on organisation. ....I. therefore maintain their direct operational control of the bands by means of an increasing network of British, American and Italian liaison officers, and a considerable wireless organisation.


9. The CLN has under its direct command the MILAN city command, and has divided the remainder of enemy occupied N.I.I. into five regional commands. Each of these regional commands has a number of zones, that of PIEDMONTE having the TURIN town command in addition. The bands acknowledging the CLN come directly under the respective zones. The following table shows the position in graphic form:-



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The present position is considered to be satisfactory from the point of view of the Allied armies, in that whilst the CLN achieves a large measure of political unity and common policy, the control of operations remains with HQ ...I, acting through its British and American operating Agencies. The presence of Colonel X with the MILAN CLN will it is hoped do much to ensure that the Committee's activities are directly related to the furtherance of Allied military operations.

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Security Br.
Entry

SECRET

SUBJECT: ...I. Security Summary No. 17

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...I. Security Summary No. 17 ...

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Security Branch
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Book No. 3125.
File No. 646.
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HEADQUARTERS
18 SEP 1954
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SECRET

A.A.I. SECURITY SUMMARY No.17
covering AUGUST 1944

PART I.

GENERAL SURVEY

1. The main security feature of August was the application of measures to conceal the large scale operational moves of formations in connection with both the mounting of DRAGOON and the regrouping of Eighth Army on the ADRIATIC Sector.

The former continued to reveal serious weaknesses in security discipline, and there is no doubt that it was widely known in Southern ITALY that the French Corps was about to embark on operations against Southern FRANCE. Fortunately, however, the German Intelligence Service proved ineffective in taking advantage of such weaknesses, and it appears that the enemy did not obtain particulars of the exact objective and date of the operation.

Elaborate and comprehensive security measures were taken to conceal the concentration of Eighth Army formations on the ADRIATIC Sector. Greater attention was paid to detail than ever before during this campaign, and the results were excellent. Not only was the enemy kept in ignorance of the regrouping programme, but also local civilians and even those of our own forces not directly involved were generally ignorant of the significance of such activity as was noted.

2. The arrest or surrender of enemy agents continued on a heavy scale, fifty-two falling into our hands during the month, of which eighty per cent were accounted for in FLORENCE or ROME. Fifteen were S.D., twenty-one Abwehr, and sixteen miscellaneous (Ic or Fascist Republican). Ten were saboteurs and the remainder spies. Five were dropped by parachute, eleven crossed the lines, and the remainder were stay-behind agents.

No significant new trends were noted in the quality of agents or the type of missions. A few were of a high-grade and determined calibre, but the majority, as usual, were made of "poor stuff". In the earlier part of the month, the most usual mission was connected with indications of amphibious operations, but all aspects of military naval, air and political espionage were covered. Sabotage missions were vague. One point of interest was revealed by an Abwehr agent who stated that his organisation was anxious to collect Mediterranean shipping information for the Japanese.

Eleven enemy agents were brought to trial during the month, but the results were disappointing. All were convicted, but sometimes of lesser offences than those of conspiracy to commit espionage or sabotage. Only three were sentenced to death, and eight to various terms of imprisonment. One was executed.

3. FLORENCE had been for some time an important German Intelligence centre, and it was anticipated that its capture might well lead to the acquisition of much valuable information. A strong counter-intelligence team was therefore concentrated under No. 1 I.S.U., and a fairly thorough "comb-out" of the city was carried through. The piece-meal nature of the capture of FLORENCE,

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It was found that the Partito d'Azione had set up quite an effective little counter-intelligence organisation: it had compiled a card-index of prominent Fascist Republicans, SS collaborators etc, and had arrested a number of German agents which it handed over to our own security agencies on the latter's arrival. It proved definitely co-operative, and its connections in the North are likely to prove of considerable value in the future.

Over twenty enemy agents were arrested in FLORENCE, and this undoubtedly accounts for the great majority and the most important of the post-occupational network left behind in the City; it is probable, however, that there are still one or two who have not yet been apprehended.

A new Fascist organisation called the Movimento Giovane Repubblicani made its first appearance in FLORENCE. A small group belonging to this movement was involved in plans for sabotage against the Allies.

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4. The increasing significance of Communism in ITALY was characterised by several reports received from ROME on this subject. Two of these alleged that plans were being made for an "Armed Communist Coup d'etat", one report indicating as D Day 15 August, and the other the date "when the Russians reach the 'ADRIATIC'". Although it is considered unlikely that any violent action on the part of the Communists is imminent, since it is hard to see how this could possibly benefit their cause at the present time, it does appear that discussions and plans on these lines to meet certain contingencies are being carried on in Communist circles.

Other reports have been received concerning the increasing number of recently liberated officers and men of the Italian Army who are entering the Communist ranks as a result of the unsatisfactory treatment which they claim to be receiving from the Italian military authorities.

Reports from other parts of the country also refer to the considerable influence and efficiency of Communist elements.

There seems little doubt that Communism in ITALY is making substantial strides both in organising itself and in increasing its adherents, but there are no solid grounds for believing that it presents any definite threat to our military security.

5. During the period under review the Italian epuration and denazification programme got into its stride, and really reached the stage of taking action rather than making threats. So far it appears to be operating on a reasonably sound basis and that it may well achieve satisfactory results. It is, however, as yet too early to judge whether it will prove a genuine instrument of justice or whether it will deteriorate into a "racket" of personal intrigue. For the present we can give it the benefit of the doubt, and it is being afforded by the Allied security authorities such assistance and co-operation as it requires.

It is evident that fascism is by no means dead, as in Southern ITALY and SICILY Fascist groups are still being uncovered and liquidated, and the ever increasing clientele of the internment camp continues to include new customers from among Fascist elements in territory which has now been in Allied hands for a year.

6. In ROME the "honeymoon period" is over, and the Romans are viewing their liberators through more critical eyes. Very little that is done or left undone by the Allies fails to evoke criticism from some influential quarter or other, and it is clear that ROME will always present our counter-intelligence agencies with Security problems and tasks of considerable magnitude.

7. No definite sabotage incidents have been reported, though one series of accidents suffered by the 15 Air Force may have been due to saboteurs. A few cases of cut signal lines were probably the result of sabotage or malicious damage, but it is of interest to note that, out of the very large number of enemy saboteurs dropped throughout this war, not one had been given the

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however, as yet too early to judge whether it will prove a genuine movement of justice or whether it will deteriorate into a "racket" of personal intrigue. For the present we can give it the benefit of the doubt, and it is being afforded by the Allied security authorities such assistance and co-operation as it requires.

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8. A tendency has been noted in recently occupied areas for the local patriot groups, whether Communist, Partito d'Azione or others, to take into their own hands such matters as the arrest of prominent Fascists etc for some time after the arrival of the Allies. Not unfrequently, minor disturbances have resulted from such action. The practice is discouraged, and the persons concerned are persuaded tactfully that co-operation is welcomed but independent action is not.

9. The overall security picture remains much the same as usual. It would be useless to pretend that the Italians love the Allies; they do not, and they never will; they will always find many reasons for complaining and criticising, and there will always be elements which would like to "do us down" and which will try to do so, if given a sporting chance of succeeding undetected. Any Security complacency would soon lead to trouble, but the security situation should remain steady if the present counter-intelligence principles and measures continue to be applied with energy and thoroughness.

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PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) Elaborate and detailed security precautions were instituted by Eighth Army to cover the move of Army HQ and a large part of Eighth Army forces to the Adriatic sector in preparation for the attack on the Gothic Line. These measures included the removal of formation signs from clothing, vehicles, sign-posts, etc, security "pep" talks to all ranks, the evacuation of civilians from certain concentration areas and very strict control of civilian movement in the Army area. The regrouping programme was carried through with a maximum of secrecy as was demonstrated by the tactical surprise achieved on the launching of the offensive.

Particular keenness was shown by Canadian troops in the enforcement of every possible security precaution, careful attention being given even to such details as the distinctive brands of cigarettes smoked by Canadians. On the other hand Italian troops serving under 2 Polish Corps gave free rein to speculation concerning the assault on the Gothic Line, despite frequent warnings.

(ii) A private soldier attached to FWD Eighth Army wrote a letter to a civilian girl friend in CASERTA telling her of his impending move over to the ADRIATIC. His note-paper was headed "Main HQ Eighth Army". The letter was dispatched in an official envelope via ELS to a friend of his at Main HQ AAI which he believed to be at CASERTA. This friend was to deliver the letter to the girl. Fortunately the letter was intercepted at the ELO and strong disciplinary action is being taken.

(iii) During the first half of the month the impending invasion of the South of FRANCE was a common topic of conversation among both troops and civilians in Southern ITALY, and the abnormal concentration of troops and shipping in the NAPLES and TARANTO areas made it fairly obvious in any case that a sea-borne operation of some description was imminent. However, no compromise of the vital details of the plan appears to have occurred.

(iv) A report was received by P.B.S. from a British A.A. Regt that the telephone line connecting the Gun Operations Room with one of the batteries had been tapped. On investigation, the wire tapping apparatus was discovered still in position on the wire. No further information is available as yet, but investigations are proceeding. P.B.S. has been asked to provide further particulars regarding the apparatus.

(v) An increase in civilian photography was noted in 3 District

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(v) An increase in civilian photography was noted in 3 District area, due largely to the influx of photographic materials from ROME. The inevitable consequence was an increase in the photography by civilians of forbidden subjects.

(b) Security of Personnel

(i) The enemy propaganda effort varied little from that of the previous month. Against British troops accounts of the devastating effects of V-1 had little or no effect in view of the fact that the launching sites in N. FRANCE were steadily being overrun by Allied Forces. Propaganda against the Poles was based on the same well-worn themes with negligible results. Anxiety in the minds of Polish troops regarding Russian intentions in Eastern EUROPE is nevertheless very apparent, though MR. CHURCHILL's recent visit to Polish troops is reported to have had a reassuring effect in this connection.

/ (ii).....

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(ii) A Fascist propaganda film "The pirate of MALAY" featured in the programme at a RIEFI cinema on the evenings of 6 and 7 Aug. This film, which was impounded by PS, was directed against British administration of INDIA and was intended to show how Indian troops could drive the British aggressors out of the country. A company of SIKH Engineers was stationed in the area at the time. P.W.B. this HQ are taking appropriate action to ensure a more careful censorship of films rented from ROME depots, as it appears that the film in question was licensed by P.W.B. for public exhibition. The owner of the cinema is under investigation by PS.

(iii) Several sources reported cases of Italian civilians playing off the Allies one against another. There is no indication of subversive intention behind this behaviour, the most likely explanation being that such tactics are employed (mistakenly) as a means of ingratiation.

(c) Security of Material and Installations

(i) 99 Bomber Group, 15th Air Force reported four aircraft lost on 15 Aug under suspicious circumstances, all four crashes occurring within an hour, during the take-off. The first bomber swerved and crashed into some Italian planes on the ground, another apparently failed to gain height, struck the roof of a nearby house and caught fire in mid-air, the third also crashed on taking off, and yet another exploded after becoming airborne. Sabotage is suspected and the SIB are investigating.

(ii) F.B.S. noted an increase in wire cutting; otherwise the situation in this respect was satisfactory. CS.RR and CS.IT gave valuable assistance in patrolling vulnerable lines, investigating cases etc.

(iii) Several cases were reported by FBS of tampering with railway lines. Small obstacles such as stones, pieces of iron etc have been discovered on the rails, resulting in one case in a minor derailment. No evidence of deliberate sabotage was disclosed, but it cannot be excluded; it is possible, however, [illegible] incidents were the work either of mischievous children or of [illegible] against the Italian railway authorities.

(iv) Serious losses by pilfering of military stores from RSD 557 BOE NAPLES were reported during the period. This depot employs 4,000 civilians but investigation indicated that the searchers (male and female) were carrying out their duties satisfactorily. The Italian sentries were kept under special observation since they would have excellent opportunities for passing stores across the fence during the hours of darkness.

(v) Pilfering from 19 Ord Amn Depot SYRACUSE is reported to have ceased since guard duties were taken over by Indian troops. The depot area [illegible] 2000 - 0600 hrs.

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Italian planes on the ground, [illegible] the roof of a nearby house and caught fire in mid-air, the third also crashed on taking off, and yet another exploded after becoming airborne. Sabotage is suspected and the SIS are investigating.

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(v) Pilfering from 19 Gd Ammn Depot SARNESE is reported to have ceased since guard duties were taken over by Indian troops. The depot area has been declared a military zone and curfew is enforced from 2000 - 0600 hrs.

(vi) Lorry jumping for the purpose of stealing military stores was reported as prevalent in the ROME and NAPLES areas.

(d) Security of ports and coastline

(i) Security controls in the ports of LEGHORN and ANCONA continued to be improved during the period. Elsewhere port security proceeded smoothly on well established lines.

(ii) The physical security coverage of the coastline is largely in the hands of CC.IR, CC.FT, SIS.CS agents and the Italian civil police, under the supervision and direction of FSP/CIC. Special attention was paid to coastal security in the forward zone. No incidents of any importance were recorded.

/ (iii).....

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(iii) The Cargo Security officer of a US merchant ship who removed from his ship at the request of the Master and turned over to the Port Commandant NAPLES, on the grounds that he had indulged in indiscreet talk concerning the ship's cargo and prospective passengers of high military rank.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of Arrests

	For trial for a security offence (Category 'A')	For internment (Category B)	For detention pending further investigation (Category C)	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	15	13	8	36
Civilian officials including CC.RR	5	45	1	47
Mrs. Civilians	377	410	111	906
TOTAL	395	476	120	991

NOTE:- Of the above 35 were ex-Fascist party officials
72 were ex-PW.

(b) Important Individual Cases

(i) Agents

A brief analysis of agents arrested during the month is included in Part I. Detailed reports on these cases have been forwarded separately to AFHQ.

(ii) Persons arrested, other than agents.

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AIATO Salvatore — Close friend of father of Count CIANO. Squadrista, Inspector of Port Labour and President of Dopolavoro in LIVORNO. Denounced by partisans in LARI. Interned.

GEORGETTI Elia di Dario — Joined PNF 1923; Federal Secretary for provinces of GROSSETO (1930-40) SIENA, LIVORNO (1940-43) and PESCARA (1943)

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NOTE:- Of the above 85 were ex-Fascist Party Officials
72 were ex-MVSN

(b) Important Individual Cases

(i) Agents

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GEORGETTI Elia di Dario — Joined PNF 1923; Federal Secretary for provinces of GROSSETO (1938-40) MESURATA, LIBYA (1940-43) and PISTOIA (1943)

GIANELLI Fernando — Joined PNF 1920. Took part in March on ROME. Awarded Sciarpa Littorio. Member of the Directorate of the PNF for SIENA 1921-26, Federal Inspector 1937-40. Interned.

PRILLI Ugo — Arrested at COLLETTINO and suspected of having organised Fascio Combattente dell 'Ombre in CALAIS area. Stated to have delivered important documents to the Fascist Minister for Foreign Affairs when he (PRILLI) returned from FRANCE in Oct 39. Further enquiries proceeding.

TUDISCO Michele — Federal Secretary for the province of AVELLINO for the past ten years. Continued to show Fascist sympathies after the Allied occupation. Interned for the duration.

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SERRINI Angelo CATALDI Pietrina MACCHITELLI Enrico	- Informants for SS at Via Tasso, ROME. Investigations are being made with a view to charging them as war criminals, as a certain IOPPI whom they denounced and who suffered particularly barbarous torture, is still alive.

(iii) Suspects

PERRER Sgt. Paul.	Stated by one MONICHI (Ring of PISA to have landed by parachute near PISA on 24 Jul 44 and gone to MONICHI's house stating that his plane had been hit and that he had been wounded. Slept at the house of MONICHI and left at 0500 hrs next morning, leaving two addresses - (i) Sgt Paul PERRER, 41 Pt. Bomb Grupo, ASN 6513457 c/o NEW YORK, N.Y. and (ii) Paul PERRER, 2020 Middlestar St. LOS ANGELES, California. The spelling of the first address aroused suspicion. There is no 41st Bomb Gp in this theatre. Check is being made with US records and with OSS. Meanwhile PERRER has not been discovered.
LOMBARDO (alias LABITI) Domenico RUSSO Salvatore	Arrested at CATANIA as suspected members of 10 Flotilla M.S, possibly on a mission. Claimed to be Tunisians trying to return to TUNIS. Being held pending further investigation.

(c) Subversive Movements or Political Organisations of Security Interest

(i) The subversive Fascist organisation in NAPLES reported in Local Security Summary No 16 Part II 2(c)(i) is still under investigation. Eight of the persons arrested have now been released including Col. CHIANI of Comando Supremo, ROME; although, on instigation of the leader the Colonel does not appear to have taken any active part in the conspiracy.

From the examination so far conducted it has been established that a part in Dr. PICCINNI controlled the organisation which was to be used for sabotage and other subversive activity and had succeeded in connecting this group with a similar group in PALERMO whose leaders are being arrested.

One member of the group, DE MARSI, is believed to have been in touch with a man in NAPLES from whom financial support and political directions were received.

(ii) A few copies of a clandestine Fascist newspaper "[illegible]" have been found in circulation in ROME. This paper is published in NAPLES at

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LOMBARDO (alias LABITI) Domenico
RUSSO Salvatore — Arrested by C.I.M. as suspected members of 10 Flotilla M.S, possibly on a mission. Claimed to be Tunisians trying to return to TUNIS. Being held pending further investigation.

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(i) The subversive Fascist organisation in ROME reported in Security Summary No 16 Part II 2(c)(i) is still under investigation. Eight of the persons arrested have now been released including Col. CHITI of Comando F.F.A., M.RI; although in an interview with the leader the Colonel does not appear to have taken any active part in the conspiracy.

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One member of the group, D. [illegible], is believed to have been in touch with a man in NAPLES from whom financial support and political directions were expected.

(ii) A few copies of a clandestine Fascist newspaper "[illegible]" have been found in circulation in ROME. This paper is published in NAPLES & printed in the Via delle Convertite and the latter has been reported to PBS.

(iii) It has been established that there is at least one Fascist underground organisation in ROME and investigations are being made into its activities. Up to the present, several meetings have been held, each in a different place, but no subversive activity has yet been discovered.

(iv) The following is a translation of a poster of which a single typed copy was found affixed to a wall in ROME on 2 Aug.

"ATTENTION
Comrades - The enemy has invaded our land, to mark no stopping to prevent the butcherians from plundering our country and Allied Country to destruction.
Remember the cities martyred, VILLAINOUS [illegible] BOMBED, the churches, the hospitals destroyed, the people massacred in shelters, the women violated by the coward thieving Anglo-Americans!!!
Italians, Black-Shirts, Fascists, rise up against the enemy and drive him out.
[illegible] COMB PLANT COLLEGE
[illegible] - [illegible]
[illegible] COLLEGE "

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(v) In the Province of CATANZARO the activities of an influential group of residents with Fascist sympathies seriously affecting the communal life of the province. Six internments were authorised and the situation is now satisfactory.

(vi) There were indications of a recrudescence of MAFIA activity in SICILY. Reports of brigandage were received from several areas and the local CC.RR have requested reinforcements.

(vii) The Separatist Movement in SICILY continued to hold meetings, and its leader FINOCCHIARO APRILE makes no secret of the fact that he is opposed to the formation of "Governi del Popolo". While expressing pro-Allied sentiments, FINOCCHIARO may be a potential trouble-maker on the island.

(viii) Early in February 43, the existence of a secret movement known as the Movimento Nazionale Italiano was reported in SICILY. At one point prior to the establishment of a Fascist Republic and in order to provincial organisation was developed by the leaders of this group. The aims of the members of the MNI appear to have been mixed, directed towards spreading discontent against the Allies, Communism and inciting Italian Military personnel to desert and join the movement. Recent strikes and students' broils are also believed to have been instigated by this organisation. Nine of the ringleaders of the MNI have been interned, one for murder, and it is believed that this will put an end to the career of the movement.

(ix) MOVIMENTO INSURREZIONALE PATRIOTTICO (M.I.P.)

This movement was found operating in the area of RAGUSA, (Prov. RAGUSA), its object being to resist the Allies by active and passive resistance prior to the arrival of Allied troops and by complete collaboration subsequently. The M.I.P. worked in collaboration with the local Comitato di Liberazione and included representatives of all political parties. The Communists seemed to hold this organisation together and were acting in a very level-headed manner. On 24 July he was involved at RAGUSA in a copy of GARIBALDI's instructions to the effect that the spreading of Communist doctrines was less important at present than the need for cooperation with the Allies. The M.I.P. has not been encountered in any other area and it would seem to be rather a localised organisation.

(c) Control of Movement

(i) Immediately after the entry of Allied troops into LICATA, and then PACHINO, large numbers of refugees began to leave these cities and move southwards; beyond this, there were no notable movements of civilians.

However, the organisation for controlling movement is such that very large numbers could be dealt with at very short notice. The forward Security Control line is constantly adjusted by Allied to conform with the Allied situation while the Rear Army Security Control line was advanced during the month to the line ICARO CIVITANOVA - TOLENTINO - FABRIANO - GUBBIO.

The [illegible]

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[illegible] by the organisation. [illegible] the [illegible] information on the question, and it is believed that this will put an end to the career of the movement.

(ii) REPORT ON THE PARTITO D'AZIONE (P.d'A)

This movement was found operating in the area of ROCCOL. (Prov. PIACENZA), the object being to assist the Allies by active and passive resistance prior to the arrival of Allied troops and by complete collaboration subsequently. The C.P. worked in collaboration with the local Comitato di Liberazione and included representatives of all political parties. The Communists wanted to hold this organisation together and were acting in a very loyal manner. On 24 July we received at ROCCOL a copy of TOGLIATTI's instructions to the effect that the spreading of Communist doctrines was less important at present than the urgent need for cooperation with the Allies. The C.P. has not been encountered in any other area and it would seem to be rather a localised organisation.

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(c) Control of Movement

(i) Immediately after the entry of Allied troops into LODI, and then PIACENZA, large numbers of refugees began to leave these cities and move southwards; beyond this, there were no notable movements of civilians.

However, the organisation for controlling movement in such circumstances could be dealt with at very short notice. The Allied Security Control line is constantly adjusted by Allies to conform with the tactical situation while the Rear Army Security Control Line was extended westwards to the Italian FRONTIER CHECK POST - TOLENTINO - TODI - NARNI - CANTERO and Rome. The arrival of Italian troops trained in security duties to assist in the manning of the Rear Army Security Control line has helped to improve the efficiency of the control.

(ii) The presence of Italian soldiers on leave in the Rear Army area, particularly on the line immediately preceding the Control on the part the border of the Trieste line, gave rise to some anxiety, as it was plain that a revolutionary movement of the most dangerous kind was being fostered among the Italian troops. The matter has been taken up strongly throughout.

(iii) An agent acting under instructions from F.S., made a trip from NAPLES to ROME and back using an authorised pass. On each journey, documents, all of which had been compiled from, were carried. On the journey to ROME the driver's documents were examined at the Control Point by Allied Police but no attention was paid to the passengers, who made the trip unquestioned. Similarly on the return journey, the road blocks were passed without incident. The driver and his assistants were arrested and handed over to CC for trial. [illegible]

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section [illegible] with regard to the attendance at the check-posts.

(iv) In addition [illegible] there existed [illegible] on [illegible] desiring [illegible] wished to leave SICILY for N. [illegible] by [illegible] than the recovery of [illegible] documents [illegible] their passage. Several [illegible] have now been withdrawn [illegible] continuing.

3. Morale Issue.

(a) Re-integrated Troops

[illegible] of these [illegible] mainly from Indian troops, attended [illegible] and the cumulative effect of long years of service [illegible] conditions. [illegible] reports [illegible] a down [illegible] civilian [illegible] natural [illegible] the number [illegible] action with [illegible] officers.

(b) Civil Population

(i) [illegible] favourable impression which recent [illegible] generally [illegible] and been somewhat marred by their anxiety over

(a) the food situation which has become [illegible] the continued high cost of living, lack of public [illegible] and the necessity of supporting the black [illegible] in order to obtain [illegible] necessities of life.

(b) [illegible] talk concerning [illegible] conditions [illegible] will be imposed by the Allies.

(c) Reports

Recent [illegible] troops have been, for the most part, confined [illegible] operational [illegible] especially [illegible] additional [illegible] of the [illegible] information. [illegible] reports [illegible] forthcoming [illegible] steadily increased.

[illegible] civilians, [illegible] the [illegible] have to [illegible] found [illegible] for the most part [illegible] forthcoming. Owing to the Allied [illegible] Sicily, of the Italian [illegible] now, as in Italy [illegible] and ports [illegible] up to 20 [illegible] only [illegible]; on lower [illegible] there [illegible] a [illegible] disarrangement of [illegible] and [illegible], STOLL [illegible] [illegible] G.H.Q., [illegible] and COMMC. to [illegible], [illegible] [illegible] no

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[illegible] cost of living, lack of public transport and the necessity of supporting the black market in order to obtain [illegible] supplies of fuel.

(b) [illegible] talk concerning [illegible] conditions did will be agreed by the Allies.

(c) Rumours

Rumours [illegible] have been, for the most part, confined to [illegible] of future operations and movements, apparently inspired more [illegible] deliberate creation of the right attitude than by leakage of information. [illegible] tion, however, is noted among [illegible] troops [illegible] the [illegible] rumours [illegible] ding forthcoming operations proved substantially correct.

[illegible] civilians, rumours on the Armistice terms as [illegible] found [illegible] for the most part [illegible] gloom forebodings. Centred by the Allies [illegible] itself, of the Italian Army and Navy, of Italian railways and ports [illegible] up to 90 years hard labour while acceptance; on Italian public, there [illegible] of partial dismemberment of Italy and her Empire, SICILY going [illegible] the U.S.A., SARDINIA and CORSICA to FRANCE, MALTA to BRITAIN and the Colonies in AFRICA to BRITAIN. Speculation on this subject was limited to [illegible] by censorship.

The following rumours current during the period under report.

(i) Italian troops will [illegible] to BALKANS to be demobilised (Yugoslavia troops).

(ii) Security troops [illegible] been set up over Fifth and Seventh Armies: General CLARK is in command: the Armies will [illegible] up in the mid Fourteen of July. (Fifth Army troops).

(iii) Conditions

(i) ITALY will become a Russian zone of influence after the war (RUSSIA).

(ii) ITALY will be under the political control of the Allies for 20 years to prevent the spread of Russian influence. (FRANCE).

(iii) Mr. CHURCHILL's visit was really connected with forthcoming changes in the Italian Government, important among which will be the replacement of BADOGLIO by GEN. ROMMEL. (C.E.).

(d) Other aids of Communist Power by interest

(i) The decision to [illegible] PARRI, who had been pressed on a decree of collaboration with the Germans, has been received favorably by the Left Opposition in the PLUS area. The fear was frequently expressed that this action might undermine the authority of the Italian Government, or illusions [illegible] and favorable to the Left & the Allied authorities, particularly the PARRI [illegible] wealthy and influential.

(ii) Reports in general showed an increasing activity by the Communist Party, and in the army areas, although the Communists do not have an independent [illegible], they seem to have [illegible] influence on local Committees of Liberation.

(iii) The Partisans [illegible] their Garibaldi regiments in Rome and also [illegible]. They [illegible] their solidly organized "Red Zones" [illegible] and [illegible] duly [illegible] of [illegible]. [illegible] illegal business and the profits [illegible]. [illegible] part play of the Communist [illegible] already given [illegible] the Partisans during the occupation. From other sources [illegible] there [illegible] thought to be the nucleus of partisans by the time of withdrawal [illegible] to be created a [illegible] for future political [illegible]. [illegible] Rome, at least to some degree from Communist [illegible] the Italian Socialists.

(iv) [illegible] reported [illegible] their confidence in the work of the [illegible] (G-2, AFHQ) with the result that [illegible] frequent liaison on security matters.

4. [illegible]

Attached to	Location
II Corps	
16 FBG	
1 AGF Hq	
45 FBG	II Corps Hq
47 FBG	"
2 BG (H)	"
1 FBG	II Corps Sub-8
47 FBG	"
2 BG	4 Div
1 FBG	45 Div

1 GSI/
Gen Sec AFHQ

[illegible]
[illegible]
HQ 2 NZ Div

[illegible]
G-2 [illegible]
[illegible]

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(b) [illegible] report [illegible] confidence in the work of [illegible] (CSA/CS) [illegible] result [illegible] [illegible] suspect [illegible] sources.

4. [illegible]

	Attached to	Location
II. --I.		
14 FSS		[illegible]
[illegible]		
443 FSS	II. [illegible]	[illegible]
87 FSS	"	[illegible]
2 [illegible] FSS	"	HQ 2 [illegible] Div
[illegible] FSS	HQ 5 Corps	[illegible]
[illegible] FSS		G.[illegible] R 0242
5 FSS	4 Div	[illegible]
31 FSS	46 Div	[illegible]
35 FSS	56 Div	[illegible]
200 FSS	4 Ind Div.	[illegible]
211 FSS	1 Br Armd Div	HQ 1 Br Armd Div.
[illegible] FSS	HQ 10 Corps	[illegible]
[illegible] FSS	10 Ind Div.	[illegible]
17 Con FSS 6 Gun FS Res Det	HQ 1 Can Corps	[illegible]
1 Can [illegible] 6 Gun FS Res Det	1 Can Div	[illegible]
7 Can FSS	5 Can Armd Div	[illegible]
2 Polish Corps FSS	HQ 2 Polish Corps	[illegible]
3 Cav Div FSS	3 Cav Div	[illegible]
5 Kresowa Div FSS	5 Kresowa Div	[illegible]

	Attached to	Location
14 Cam FSS	No 1 District	[illegible] 9040
310 FSS	"	[illegible] W 7092
314 FSS		[illegible] S 6050
417 FSS		[illegible] S 5017
FIFTH ARMY		
305 CIC Det	H. Fifth Army	NOVIGLIO Q 1129
65 FSS	"	LIVORNO Q 5145
204 CIC Det	HQ 4 Corps	[illegible] Q 2643
34 CIC Det	34 Div	" "
85 CIC Det	85 Div	FLNO Q 6748
91 CIC Det	91 Div	ULIGLNO Q 5051
501 CIC Det	1 Armd Div	MONTELTO Q 3054
66 FSS	6 Armd Div	BURGOLI Q 5424
292 CIC Det	HQ 2 Corps	MONTE CARVOLO Q 7951
66 CIC Det	88 Div	[illegible] Q 7566
412 FSS	HQ 13 Corps	FL[illegible] Q 8070
3 FAD	1 Div	Q 0568
55 FSS	6 Armd Div	Q 9662
405 FSS	3 Inf Div	Q 9466
2 ADVANCE SECT		
315 FSS		[illegible]
407 FSS		CHIERI C 1516
413 FSS		TORINO
419 FSS		LECCE
3[illegible] FSS		[illegible]
91 FSS		[illegible]
2 BASE SECT		
37 CIC		BARI
212 FSS		NAPLES
411 FSS		MARINO Q 5736
21 FSS		[illegible]

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2 DISTRICT

315 MPS
439 MPS
410 PSS
[illegible] PSS
[illegible] PSS
21 PSS

2 DISTRICT

[illegible] PSS
3121 PSS
[illegible] PSS
21 PSS

P.S.S.

CIC [illegible]

ALLIED [illegible] AGENCY

[illegible] CIC Det

CO., ALLIED R... COMMAND

[illegible] PSS
[illegible] PSS
1 S.I.L. & C PSS

ARI
CHIEF C 1510
PALMERO
LECCE
BARI
BRINDISI

SALERNO
NAPLES
CAPRIO G 5738
CASERTA

NAPLES

CAGLIARI

ROME AREA
"
"

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

10

Security Br NACB

7002

SUBJECT: A.A.I Security Summary No. 16.

Adv. HQ, Allied Armies in Italy

S E C R E T

AAI/1A04/4/CSI(b)

TO: A.C. of S., G-2, AFHQ. 16 August 1944

Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No. 16 covering the month of JULY 1944.

W D Gibson Lt Col
for Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I).

16

HEADQUARTERS
18 AUG 1944
A. C. C.

Copy to:

A-2, AAF/MTO
A-2, RAF, MAAF
Executive Commissioner, ACC
Security Branch, ACC
1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit 2
HQ, A.A.I.
D.C.G.S.
G (Ops).

7020

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Brigadier,
B.C.S.(I).

16

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18 AUG 1944
A. C. C.

Copy to:

A-2, AAF/ATO
A-2, RAF, MAAF
Executive Commissioner, ACC
Security Branch, ACC
1 SCI Unit
SCI Unit Z
HQ, A.A.I.
D.C.G.S.
G (Ops).

Security
Branch
Rec'd 18/8
Book No. 1738
File No. 646
Action File
C.I.F.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

SECRET

A.A.I. SECURITY BULLETIN No.16
covering JULY 1944

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

1. July was characterised by a reconstitution of our security structure and controls, and by a return to normality after the dislocation caused by our rapid advance and capture of ROME during the preceding month.

In the counter-intelligence sphere, attention was mainly devoted to following up leads and tying up loose ends in respect of the numerous espionage and sabotage groups discovered during June.

2. Thirty-two enemy agents fell into our hands during July. Of these, fourteen espionage and five sabotage agents were apprehended in ROME, and twelve espionage and one sabotage agent in other parts of ITALY. Outside ROME the most favoured areas were the southern half of 2 District (BARI - LECCE - TARANTO), and the vicinity of NAPLES and SALERNO. It was noticeable that the majority of the ROME agents were employed by the SICHERHEITSDIENST, and all those arrested elsewhere were employed by the ABWEHR. Their methods of infiltration were similar to those of last month : five dropped by parachute, eleven crossed the lines, and sixteen were left behind to be overrun by our Forces : it is notable that none have arrived by sea during the last few months, due no doubt to the enemy's healthy respect for our coastal security control. Four of the above agents were equipped with W/T sets. The nature of the espionage missions followed the usual pattern and showed no new features. As previously, a number of the agents dispatched by the enemy gave themselves up voluntarily.

3. There was no sabotage reported during the period. Our continued immunity from any serious sabotage is particularly remarkable in view of the very large quantities of sabotage material which have been discovered, and the steady stream of saboteurs falling into our hands : most of the latter were given only vague and general missions, and most showed little inclination or determination to carry them out.

00039

4. Five enemy agents were brought to trial during the month : all were convicted ; only one was sentenced to death, the remainder to long terms of imprisonment. A great deal of attention was devoted during the month to the preparation of other cases for trial, and considerable progress was made : a long series of trials was begun on the ninth of this month (August).

A special section was set up to deal with the security implications of the pres-

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5. Careful consideration was given to the security implications of the presence in ROME of Axis and Neutral diplomatic missions to the Vatican and Quirinal, and steps were taken to apply appropriate security safeguards.

In the middle of JULY all Axis diplomats in ROME were moved either into the Vatican or to SICILY, the latter pending repatriation.

Neutral Missions to the Quirinal were instructed that they must not make use of W/T communications, and such censorship restrictions as were deemed practicable were applied to the Axis and Neutral Missions to the Vatican.

No Axis or neutral diplomat is permitted to move beyond the confines of ROME Area without first obtaining authority from the A.C.C.

It is believed that the German Minister, who is NOT a "good Nazi", is NOT making any serious effort to collect and pass to his Government Allied military information.

6. In other respects, too, the security situation in ROME tended to settle down and to develop satisfactorily during the month.

A large number of suspects were detained for investigation, and a number of persons were interned, whose record, associations or sympathies gave grounds for their being regarded as dangerous to our security. Preventive measures, such as vetting of persons seeking employment with the Allied Forces, continued on an extensive scale.

Progress was made towards the better co-ordination by G-2 A.C. of the various counter-intelligence agencies (approx seven) operating in the City.

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7. No security incidents attended the visit of H.M. the King to the Allied Armies. Proper security precautions were taken, including the temporary confinement of over three hundred doubtful elements.

8. The moves of formations during the month were carried out with varying degrees of security. Many cases of indiscreet talk and out-spoken speculation were reported in respect of the move of the French Corps from the front to the Naol ports, and the persons who knew, or believed that they knew, that the French Divisions were going to land in Southern France, were far too numerous, among both troops and civilians.

It appears, however, that the regrouping and concentration of Divisions for the next offensive in ITALY were carried out with a reasonably good standard of security.

9. Towards the end of the month there were several serious incidents of clashes and disturbances between French troops on the one hand, and Italian Service and civilian personnel on the other in the BRINDISI and TARANTO areas. In the course of these clashes, arms were used and grenades thrown, and a number of casualties were caused to both sides.

Starting with isolated drunken brawls, feeling seen ran high, and the incidents soon developed into reprisals and counter-reprisals. However, appropriate measures were taken by the Area and District Headquarters concerned, and the situation did not get out of hand.

It is NOT thought that these disturbances were caused by any subversive organisation or pre-meditated activities against the Allied Forces on the part of the Italians. It is evident, however, that Italian Service personnel were far too free in the use of arms, and steps are being taken drastically to restrict the carrying of arms and the issue of ammunition in respect of the Italian armed Forces.

10. Subversive movements continue to require careful watching and investigation. A fairly important Fascist Group has been rounded up in BARI : it concerned itself mainly with initiating and assisting the despatch of persons to enemy occupied territory. Minor Fascist groups have been liquidated in SICILY. Occasional reports are received of sinister plans, involving the collection of arms, being made by groups of extreme Communists, but such reports are usually vague and unsubstantial. Various movements with doubtful intentions are beginning to show their hand in ROME, and these are being watched and investigated as far as our security resources permit.

11. The Italian Partisans continue to feature prominently in the security picture, and it is now common to find, on our liberating a town or village, that they have already locked up and are ready to hand over to our security services those who have been most intimately

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11. The Italian Partisans continue to feature prominently in the security picture, and it is now common to find, on our liberating a town or village, that they have already locked up and are ready to hand over to our security agencies those persons who have been most intimately connected with Fascism and the Germans. Their views on this subject are not always reliable, as they are sometimes tinged by local prejudice and other motives, but on the whole the assistance of the Partisans has been of real value to our counter-intelligence organisation.

12. The security-mindedness of the Italian Armed Forces appears to have improved. Recent censorship reports have indicated a better understanding of the elements of security, and there have been fewer cases of Italian officers being discovered deliberately evading or inciting others to evade the various Allied Security regulations and restrictions.

Their morale appears to be satisfactory, though the regular fighting troops tend to feel that their feats of arms are outshone as regards publicity by the activities of the Partisans.

13. Discussions were held with the A.C.C. with a view to tightening up the control of civilian movement, and measures were taken to render the existing security controls more effective. In this, as in other aspects of counter-intelligence work, satisfactory co-operation was received from the Italian police and security services.

...../Part II.

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PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) Security discipline in the Army areas continued on a high level and no incidents of any seriousness were noted, apart from one reported by Eighth Army. This concerned the loss of a unit operation order, stated to have been stolen with the clothing of an officer, and containing reference to the movement of the parent formation. Disciplinary action has been taken.

In rear areas the situation was less satisfactory, particularly in large centres like ROME and NAPLES. Speculation regarding future operations was rife among both troops and civilians, and several instances of careless talk by personnel of units withdrawn from the line were reported. An article published in the "Stars and Stripes" entitled "Keep your Trap Shut" concerning a court-martial for a breach of security resulted in some improvement, and quantities of security posters have also been distributed.

(ii) Special attention was given by FS to the supervision of civilian photographic shops rear of the Army areas. Authorisation posters are at present in process of being distributed for display by approved shops, and AOC is co-operating to ensure that non approved shops do not accept films from Allied troops.

Arrangements were satisfactorily completed for films exposed by official unit photographers in Army areas to be processed at a special photographic establishment in NAPLES, supervised by a photographic censorship officer. In the first instance films were accepted from one Corps only, but as the scheme was reported to be working smoothly, it has recently been extended to include a second Corps.

In general an improvement has been noted in the observance by troops of photographic regulations, but the situation cannot yet be regarded as secure.

(iii) Initial reports on the censorship of Yugoslav mail passing between BARI and VIS indicated that the scheme was working satisfactorily.

(iv) An improvement in security has been noted among Italian troops but the situation still leaves much to be desired. This improvement has been particularly marked in the case of private mail of Italian units in the forward areas, where censorship breaches have steadily decreased.

(b) Security of Personnel

The situation continued to be good.

No new trends were noted in the enemy propaganda [illegible]

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00038

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The situation continued to be good.

No new trends were noted in the enemy propaganda effort through radio and leaflet. The main theme for Polish troops continued to be the Russian "bogey", while leaflets for British troops gave prominence to the alleged havoc created by flying bombs. No attempts at subversion from within Allied occupied territory were reported.

(c) Security of Material and Installations

(i) No cases of sabotage were recorded during the period.

(ii) Sporadic cases of wire cutting were reported but on a minor scale only. Some arrests were made and in general the situation was well under control.

(iii) There were indications of an improvement in the security of ordnance and ammunition dumps and depots but cases of pilfering continued to be reported, notably from SYRACUSE and ANZIO. There was no evidence of subversive intent, but investigations are proceeding in view of the possible leakage to disaffected elements of the population.

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(d) Security of Ports and Coastline

(i) CIC Port Security Sub-Sections were operating in the ports of CIVITAVECCHIA and PIOMBINO. 85 Port Security Section was installed in LEGHORN under the command of Fifth Army, and 314 PS Section assumed security responsibility for the port of ANCONA. Normal port security measures were satisfactorily enforced, although demolitions and bomb damage presented considerable obstacles.

(ii) Jugoslav refugees continued to land on the Adriatic seaboard in large numbers. 1638 such refugees were handled by Port Security at BARI during the past month.

(iii) Useful cooperation was received by Port Security from the special SIM(CS) coast-watching organisation operating along the coast of the heel of ITALY, the GARGANO peninsular, northern SARDINIA and the NAPLES area.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of arrests

	For trial for a Security offence (Category A)	For internment (Category B)	For detention pending further investigations (Category C)	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	3	32	7	42
Civil Officials including CC.RR	3	88	10	101
Miscellaneous civilians	129	755	196	1080
TOTAL	135	875	213	1223

NOTE:- Of the above 120 were ex-Fascist Party Officials
130 were ex-MVSN

(b) Important Individual Cases

Persons Arrested

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(b) Important Individual Cases

Persons arrested

CHINCI Col.

After the arrest of the members of a subversive group in B.RI (see para 2(c)(i) below), Col. CHINCI, O.C., Comando T.PP., B.RI, was found to be an associate of the Group. He was placed under house arrest pending further investigations.

C.PIEVANI Rosa Sollo

Reference this HQ Security Summary No.15, Part II, Para 2(c)(ii), this woman was arrested and interrogated on 29 Jun. Her interrogation was not conclusive and she is being held for further questioning.

GRIGORIEFF

Had been posing as a Russian Air Force Lieutenant in B.RI for two months, claiming to be a White Russian. Enlisted in the French Colonial Army in 1939 and was ejected by a Vichy decree. Having been once arrested in ALGIERS as a suspicious foreigner, he joined the British Army as a MESS driver. After a spell in hospital, he tried to obtain Soviet citizenship. He was

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CARNEVALI Rosa Solle

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GRIGORIEFF (Cont'd)	sent to ITALY and become friendly with the Russian Mission, one of whom, Capt. G.TIEV, connived at his latest masquerade. Enquiries are continuing to establish whether he is a deserter from the French or the British Army.
G.SERRI Alberto	President of Fascist Advocates Syndicate 1927-34. Joined P.R.F. Nov 43. GERMAN Collaborator. Interned.
LECCISSO Avv. Pietro.	President of Christian Democrat Party in LECCE. Was aware that an agent was to be dropped in the area but failed to pass on the information. Suspected of being part of a group harbouring agents. Further enquiries are being made.
MARCHISVILI Michele (Priest)	Obtained the Pope's blessing (by misrepresentation) on a villa which he had bought at the instigation of the SICHERHEITSDIENST to house Georgian priests, but in which a room was reserved for post-occupational W/T transmissions by enemy agents. A special report is being forwarded to AFHQ on this case.
VERRI Leonardo	Ex-Secretary of the Fascist Commission for Action in TUNISIA and member of the disciplinary Council of the G.U.F. Was arrested at PALERMO while negotiating for the purchase of a transmitting set. Investigations proceeding.
AGOSTINO Filiberto	Member of Direttorio of P.N.F. 1937-40. Commandant of G.I.L. Centurion 115 Legion. Former Mayor of TARQUINIA. Active collaborator. Interned.
BICOI Enzo	Joined P.N.F. in 1922, and P.R.F. in Sep 43. Federal Inspector of the P.R.F. for the Communes of CIVITAVECCHIA and FOLLONICA. Active propagandist and collaborator with the Germans. Interned.
CAVALLARI Ferdinando	Squadrista, Sciarpa Littorio, Centurion MVSN. Federal Inspector of Youth organisations in PITIGLIANO (Prov.GROSSETO). Director of Dopo-

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CAVALLARI Ferdinando

Squadrista, Sciarpa Littorio, Centurion MVSN. Federal Inspector of Youth organisations in PITIGLIANO (Prov.GROSSETO). Director of Dopolavoro. Member of Provincial Directorate of P.N.F. 1923, and of Provincial Council of Corporations for Agriculture. Interned.

BARBI Apollonio

Prosecutor at Extraordinary Provincial Tribunal, SIENA. Squadrista. Lt.Col. MVSN and G.N.R. Member of Polizia Federale, VITERBO. Outstanding collaborator in VITERBO. Interned.

(c) Subversive Movements or Political Organisations of Security Interest

(i) Fascist Organisation in BARI

A subversive Fascist organisation whose object was to pass persons over our lines into enemy occupied territory was revealed by SIM(CS), who cooperated with 315 FSS in producing sufficient evidence for the arrest of eighteen of its Fascist members on the night of 24/25 Jul 44.

Associated with the group was the C.C. Comando TAPPA, BARI, Col. CHIENI who is at present under house arrest until such time as the nature of his association with the movement is clarified.

Interrogations and investigations are proceeding.

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(iii) Fascist Groups in SICILY

Investigations have confirmed the existence of Fascist Groups in the University of PALERMO and at PORTO EMPEDOCLE (Agrigento Prov.). Similar organisations, in which students are mainly implicated, are being watched in MESSINA and REGGIO CALABRIA.

The Circolo della Liberta (ex Circolo Sportivo) at BARCELLONA (Messina Prov.) is suspected of having a connection with these resurgent Fascist cells.

On the recommendation of FSS several internments will shortly be made.

(iii)On 9 Jul 44 at about 2200 hrs a shower of leaflets were dropped from an upper window in the Via VARESE, ROME. The leaflet read as follows:-

"FRONTE DI RESISTENZA FASCISTA.
ROMA non dimenticate che furono gli Anglo-Americani a distruggere ROMA. HEIL HITLER. VV il Duce."

A search was conducted without result. Investigations are proceeding.

(iv) Partisans

Reports show that the Partisans continue to be of particular value in their co-operation with the Allies in newly liberated communities, where our advancing troops have found Committees of Liberation, which had already appointed responsible provisional local governments, and had effected the detention of Fascist and undesirable elements.

The title of "partisan" has, however, been assumed in many cases as a cover by persons with known Fascist or anti-Allied records, and it has been found necessary that partisans, who come forward with offers of assistance or information, should be vetted by FSS/CIC or by the Italian L.O's attached to formations.

(d) Control of Movement

Civilian movement in the forward areas decreased appreciably during the month, except in the Adriatic Coast Sector where a considerable number of refugees continued to be encountered. Similarly, the volume of traffic returning to ROME diminished considerably, although there was some illicit travel on vehicles transporting food supplies from NAPLES to the Capital. Steps were taken to eliminate this.

Posters prohibiting movement without a pass across the Rear Army Security Control Line have been printed and distributed to FSS/CIC who have been instructed to display them at prominent points along the Control Line.

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It has been noted that Partisans in newly liberated areas consider themselves entitled to wander about at liberty and some tact has been necessary to persuade them to conform with the regulations.

Very strict control of movement is in operation in the Eighth Army concentration area BEVAGNA - FOLIGNO.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Italian Armed Forces

(i) C.I.L.

2 Polish Corps reported unfavourably on the morale and behaviour of the C.I.L. It appears that the civilian population view them with suspicion, accusing the officers of being Fascist or of Royalist sympathies, which are deprecated in that area. It appears that there are many disorderly elements in the MMIC Group, and there have been frequent incidents between the latter and

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local inhabitants. Representations by the CHIEFTI Provincial Commissioner to the Italian Chief of Staff have been followed by a marked improvement.

(ii) CC.RR

It appears that in areas overrun by Polish Corps, experiences with the local CC.RR forces have not been particularly happy. The favourable view which is normally expressed has not been borne out by Polish Corps reports. CC.RR encountered in LANCIANO were said to be apathetic towards the Allies and indifferent whether they served with the Allies or the Germans. Towards the partisans, however, they displayed much animosity, probably because of the traditional hostility towards elements invariably labelled as Communists by the ex-Fascist government. However no other adverse reports on the CC.RR have been received.

(iii) Clashes with French troops and Italian Armed forces

A series of clashes occurred at the end of July between French troops and Italian Armed Forces in the T.R.NTO and BRINDISI areas. In each case the incidents were started by drunken brawls which developed into exchanges of small-arms fire and the use of hand-grenades. It is reported that six persons were killed and others wounded as a result of these fracas, the main causes of which would appear to be the fundemental resentment of the French against the Italians for the "stab in the back" which they are loath to forget, combined with the lack of discipline with arms and ammunition among Italian troops.

The prohibition by A.C.C. of the carrying of arms by Italian armed Forces when not on duty has considerably eased the situation, but in view of the incidents reported above, further steps are being taken in this direction to prevent a repetition of such clashes.

(iv) In SARDINIA the Italian troop morale has improved considerably and good discipline is maintained generally, although here again there was a certain amount of resentment expressed against the alleged acts of French arrogance.

(b) Civil Population

(i) Reports showed a steady rise in morale, attributable for the most part to the recent Allied successes on all fronts; and speculations on an early end to the war were widespread.

(ii) Public opinion was chiefly preoccupied with the fate of ITALY after the War. General disapproval was expressed of the lack of Italian Governmental authority and of the confusion existing in Italian politics. The opinion that ITALY can only be saved from chaos and anarchy by a fairly prolonged control by the Allies was widely expressed.

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(iii) In ROME the behaviour of French coloured troops caused bitter comment. An exaggerated account of a series of assaults made by Moroccan troops, which was published in a ROME newspaper, gave rise to considerable adverse criticism. The matter was investigated and taken up with the French authorities.

(iv) Shortage of food, low salaries and high black market prices were a common grievance in the ROME area.

(c) Rumours

(i) The favourite subject for rumour and speculation among both troops and civilians was without doubt impending operations. The prevailing opinion was that large scale landings would shortly be effected on the south coast of FRANCE, but in 2 District speculation appeared to be confined mainly to possible future operations across the Adriatic. There were indications that in the case of the landings in S. FRANCE, intelligent anticipation has been seasoned with a certain amount of careless talk on the part of troops earmarked for the operation. There was, however, no reason to suspect a compromise of either date or exact objectives. An interesting feature of rumours noted among Eighth Army troops was

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the apparent general belief that the campaign in ITALY would end with the fall of FLORENCE and that the main Mediterranean front would then be transferred to either S. FRANCE or the BALKANS.

(ii) Considerable apprehension was noted among the civilian population concerning the rumoured severity of the final armistice terms for ITALY.

(iii) The following were typical of the more prevalent rumours during the period.

Among Troops

That 3 and 45 U.S. Divisions plus French troops based in CORSICA as part of Seventh Army, will launch an amphibious operation on the south coast of FRANCE, probably near MARSEILLE (Troops of 3 U.S. Division).

That C.B.S. (Continental Base Section) has been activated and will operate in MARSEILLE. General Wilson will take command. (P.B.S. troops).

That 5 Corps will move to SARDINIA in preparation for a landing in FRANCE. (Troops of 13 Corps and 2 Polish Corps)

Among Civilians

That an Allied landing will be made in FRANCE by Seventh Army (General among civilians in P.B.S.).

That the concentration of troops in the BRINDISI area is for an invasion of either GREECE or ALBANIA and JUGOSLAVIA (BRINDISI).

That the Allies are about to stage a landing in TRIESTE and that the 80 ships now in TARANTO are to transport troops for this operation (TARANTO).

That the Commune of NAPLES has remained under AMG because the Allies are preparing a landing in GREECE. 100,000 Allied troops are in CYPRUS ready for this landing (General among civilians in P.B.S.).

That on the insistance of FRANCE, GREECE and JUGOSLAVIA the Allies have agreed to the imposition on ITALY of certain stringent armistice terms. (ROME area).

(d) Other matters of General Security Interest

(i) Fifth Army received many reports of German soldiers hiding well within the Army area. In many instances these soldiers turned out to be deserters from the German Army, of Russian or Central European extraction; other instances proved upon investigation that the reports had been without foundation.

(ii) The trial of General MARTINI and his fellow-conspirators is still in progress in SARDINIA. One of the many causes for delay is the present illness of the chief handwriting expert who is required as a witness.

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among Civilians

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That the Allies are about to stage a landing in TRIESTE and that the 80 ships now in T.R.N.T.O are to transport troops for this operation (T.R.N.T.O).

That the Commune of NAPLES has remained under MAC because the Allies are preparing a landing in GREECE. 100,000 Allied troops are in CYPRUS ready for this landing (General among civilians in P.B.S.).

That on the insistance of FRANCE, GREECE and JUGOSLAVIA the Allies have agreed to the imposition on ITALY of certain stringent armistice terms. (ROME Area).

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(iii) After a very full investigation, it has been decided not to bring the Prince and Princess PIGNATELLI to trial, as it is considered that there would be very little chance of obtaining a conviction on any major charge, owing to certain peculiar circumstances of the case which would offer excellent opportunities to the Defending Counsel. A fuller report on this matter will be forwarded to A.F.H.Q. shortly.

4. LOCATIONS OF FS SECTIONS AND CIC DETACHMENTS AS AT 31 JUL 44

Attached to	Location
HQ AAI	Q 8614 det at SIENA
16 FS Sec	

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	Attached to	Location
EIGHTH ARMY		
263 FSS	HQ Eighth Army	Q 7227
47 FSS	"	"
85 FSS		LIVORNO W 0243
412 FSS	HQ 13 Corps	Concentrated with 1 ICU
2 NZ Div FSS	2 NZ Div	S.DONATO Q 7643
5 FS Sec	4 Div	MONTEVARCHI (R 0446)
55 FS Sec	6 Br Armd Div	AREZZO (R 3033)
66 S. FS Sec	6 SA Armd Div	RADDA (Q 8737)
406 FS Sec	8 Ind Div	POGGIBONSI (Q 7035)
478 FSS	HQ 10 Corps	PERUGIA (W 7092)
290 FSS	4 Ind Div.	PALAZZO (W 8390)
407 FSS	10 Ind Div	CITTA DI CASTELLO (R 5360)
1 Cdn FS Sec	HQ 1 Cdn Corps	CASTELLIONE DEL LAGO (W 4195)
7 Cdn FS Sec		ASCILA (B 5018)
11 Cdn FS Sec		TIVOLI (B 0075)
5 Cdn Res FS Det		TERNI (A 9046)
11 Cdn Res FS Det.		PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE (H 3005)
2 Polish Corps FSS	HQ 2 Polish Corps	MACERATA (S 0515)
3 Carp Div FSS	3 Carp Div.	RECANATI (S 6423)
5 Kres. Div FSS	5 Kres Div.	MONTEFANO (S 5525)
FIFTH ARMY		
6792/3/4 CIC Dets	HQ Fifth Army	GROSSETO (E 6367)
6760 CIC Det	HQ II Corps	PECCIOLI Q 3545
6777 CIC Det	85 Inf Div	Q 5535
6778 CIC Det	88 Inf Div	VOLTERRA Q 4629
6756 CIC Det.	91 Inf Div	PISA Q 3951.
6799 CIC Det	HQ IV Corps	BAGUIDI Q 2543
6774 CIC Det	34 Inf Div.	ROSIGNANO Q 1129
6779 CIC Det	1 Armd Div	CASTIGLIONETO Q 2402.

5 CORPS

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2 Polish Corps FSS	HQ 2 Polish Corps	LANCIANO (S 5513)
3 Carp Div FSS	3 Carp Div.	RECANATI (S 6423)
5 Kres. Div FSS	5 Kres Div.	MONTEFANO (S 5525)

FIFTH ARMY

6792/3/4 CIC Dets	HQ Fifth Army	GROSSETO (S 6367)
6780 CIC Det	HQ II Corps	PECCIOLI Q 3545
6777 CIC Det	85 Inf Div	Q 5535
6778 CIC Det	88 Inf Div	VOLTERRA Q 4629
6756 CIC Det.	91 Inf Div	PALLIA Q 5951.
6799 CIC Det	HQ IV Corps	S.GUIDI Q 2543
6774 CIC Det	34 Inf Div.	ROSIGNANO Q 1129
6779 CIC Det	1 Armd Div	CASTAGNETO Q 2402.

5 CORPS

68 FSS	HQ 5 Corps	CAMPOBASSO C 5529
411 FSS	1 Br Armd Div	ALTAMURA P 1551

1 DISTRICT

310 FSS	RIETI B 0625
317 FSS	TERAMO B 7752
314 FSS	ANCONA B 6158

2 DISTRICTS

315 FSS	BARI
409 FSS	BRINDISI
419 FSS	LECCE
427 FSS	CHIETI
58 FSS	BARI
91 FSS	SANTA MARIA APRILA
410 FSS	TARANTO

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	Location
3 DISTRICT	
312 FSS	N.PLES
37 FSS	SALERNO
418 FSS	AVELLINO
51 FSS	PALERMO
21 FGS	CATANIA
P.B.S.	
CIC Det	N.PLES
Allied Garrison SARDINIA	
6790 CIC Det.	CAGLIARI
MTOU Allied Area Command	
97 FSS	ROME Area
276 FSS	
1 GA L of C FSS.	

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Security Br Hist

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Subject:- A.A.I. Security Summary No.15. HQ ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY

SECRET

AF/14.04/4/GSI(b)

17 Jul 44.

A.C. of S., G-2, AFHQ.

Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No.15 covering the month of JUNE 1944.

W. D. Gibson Brig
for Brigadier,
M.G.S.(I).

SF.

Copy to:- G-2, ROME Allied Area Command.
A-2, AAF/MTO
A-2, RAF, MAAF.
Executive Commissioner, ACC.
Security Branch, ACC
1 SCI Unit.
OSS X2 Detachment.

15

HEADQUARTERS
18 JUL 1944
C.

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

A-2, AAF/MDO
A-2, RAF, MAF.
Executive Commissioner, ACC.
Security Branch, ACC
1 SCI Unit.
OSS M2 Detachment.

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HEADQUARTERS
18 JUL 1944
A. C. C.

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SECRET

A.A.I. SECURITY SUMMARY No.15

Covering JUNE 1944

PART I

GENERAL SURVEY

1. June was an outstanding month from the counter-intelligence as from the general military point of view. It included the capture of ROME, the arrest of a record number of enemy agents, and the occupation of a very large area of Fascist Republican territory.

2. One hundred enemy agents were arrested or gave themselves up during the month. Of these, ROME accounted for seventy-five, made up as follows : twenty-eight S.D. espionage, fourteen S.D. sabotage agents, twenty-three Abwehr, and ten miscellaneous agents. Thirteen of the above were equipped with W/T sets, and numerous hidden dumps of sabotage devices and explosives were discovered.

The remainder of ITALY produced twenty-five agents, of which fourteen were Abwehr espionage and nine Abwehr sabotage agents. Six were supplied with W/T sets and the saboteurs were equipped with the usual material. Various methods were used by the enemy to introduce these agents : fifteen were left behind to be overrun by our forces, five were despatched across the lines, and five were dropped by parachute. The most favoured areas were Polish Corps, 2 District, and the vicinity of NAPLES.

3. The capture of ROME presented many major security problems and tasks, many of which had to be tackled immediately, and others which were of a more long term nature. The formation of S Force was of the greatest assistance in dealing with the former, and on the whole the long laid plans of this Force worked out smoothly. It handled the early arrest of a large number of agents, suspects and leading Fascists, and organised the search of former enemy intelligence H.Q's and similar buildings, some of which provided us with documents of considerable counter-intelligence interest.

The interrogation of those arrested in the early days of our occupation produced numerous leads involving further enquiries and investigations, and further arrests : this work is still continuing at high pressure.

Consideration was given to the security measures to be imposed in respect of Axis and neutral diplomatic missions to the Vatican and of neutral missions to the Quirinal. During June, virtually no communication facilities were

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Consideration was given to the security measures to be imposed in respect of Axis and neutral diplomatic missions to the Vatican and of neutral missions to the Quirinal. During June, virtually no communication facilities were available to such missions.

The internment of prominent Fascists and others deemed to present a danger to our security has proceeded slowly. Considerable caution has been necessary in this work as innumerable and biassed denunciations have, of course, been made, and almost every arrest is liable to give rise to strong and unfavourable reactions in some influential quarter of ROME society or officialdom. Considerable importance is, however, attached to this aspect of security work, and it is being pursued in close conjunction with the A.C.C. Security Branch.

A thorough purge and reorganisation of the Italian Police Forces and S.I.M.(C.S.) in ROME have been carried through, and excellent co-operation has been received from these sources.

4. The extent and rapidity of the advance entailed certain new factors having a considerable bearing on the security situation.

The proper security control of civilian movement was extremely difficult, and at times impossible. Although the framework and principles of such control remains unchanged, the net had a very wide mesh and many large holes ; throughout the month it could never be regarded as really effective, and, though

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considerable efforts were devoted to this work by FSP/CIC, there is no doubt that many undesirables slipped through undetected. Similarly, the time factor prevented a thorough "clean-up" of each town as it was occupied, and there is much work still to be done in this direction in the territory overrun during the month.

It is of interest to note that Eighth Army R.I.P. handled well over 4,000 refugees during the month.

Another unfavourable factor was that, generally speaking, little reliance could be placed on the sympathies, integrity and assistance of the Italian officials, since these had been for some months personae gratae with the Fascist Republican authorities. This disadvantage was, however, to some extent counter-balanced by the valuable advice and assistance which was obtained from the Partisan leaders in the areas concerned : these proved themselves well informed and co-operative, and, though their information was not always reliable and unbiassed, their help has been of real value.

The number of internments in the Army areas rose sharply, as was to be expected.

5. In spite of the despatch by the enemy of a number of saboteurs, and the discovery of dumps of sabotage explosives in territory recently overrun, no reports of sabotage incidents of any significance have been received from any part of Southern ITALY, SICILY or SARDINIA. Among the sabotage material which has come into our hands, no new devices of particular interest have been noted, though it may be mentioned that the dumps found in ROME included a large number of altitude bombs designed for the sabotage of aircraft.

6. No major subversive movements were uncovered during the period, but several small Fascist groups were rounded up in 2 District, and it is evident that Fascist activity is still a factor to be reckoned with in that area. In the rarrinder of the territory under command, however, the situation was quiet and uneventful from the security point of view.

7. It appears that the influence of Communism is becoming more pronounced, but there is no indication that it is likely to present any threat to Allied military security.

8. Reports have revealed an improvement in the morale and security of the Italian Armed Forces.

The relations between the Allied Forces and the Italian population

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8. Reports have revealed an improvement in the morale and security of the Italian Armed Forces.

The relations between the Allied Forces and the Italian population were in general satisfactory, and somewhat improved as the result of our successes, but many reports have referred to the serious detrimental effect created by the behaviour of Moroccan troops.

9. The S.I.M.(C.S.) organisation may be said to have entered a new phase following the fall of ROME, where they have been given most important work to do on our behalf, and where they have been taken into our confidence more fully than hitherto. They have reacted favourably to this treatment, and it is evident that their assistance is becoming and will continue to become ever more valuable and whole-hearted.

10. There have been widespread rumours concerning the future role of Fifth Army in general, and of the French Corps in particular. Such rumours have mostly been concerned with the probable employment of these forces in FRANCE. It is thought that they have arisen mainly as a result of intelligent speculation.

11. In general, security discipline among troops was satisfactory, and military security measures were effectively applied and properly enforced.

12.

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12. In conclusion, it can fairly be said that June was a satisfactory month in the counter-intelligence as in other spheres.

There is no doubt that the enemy's ambitious plans for post-occupational espionage and sabotage in ROME have been very largely neutralised, and it appears that his covert activities directed against other parts of ITALY have met with no more success. At the same time, we cannot claim to have rounded up all his agents, and it is believed that there are still several at large who are actively operating against us.

The Security situation reacted sharply and most favourably to the Allied successes, in that a vast number of Italians, whose sympathies were previously doubtful and half-hearted, have now finally decided which horse is going to win and which one it is therefore most profitable to back. It is felt that no single factor could have contributed more positively to the improvement in the Allied security situation in ITALY, than has the capture of ROME.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) The period was essentially one of rapid Allied advances and frequent changes in troop dispositions. The indications were that these changes were effected with a high degree of secrecy. No security breaches of any importance were reported. The security discipline of troops continued to be of a high order.

(ii) F.S. supervision of civilian photographic shops (both approved and non-approved) was tightened during the month as a result of reports received that photographs of military subjects were being handed in to civilian dealers for developing and printing. Arrangements were also made in NAPLES for the processing of a limited number of films taken by Army Authorised Unit Photographers. Locally requisitioned photographic materials are to be used pending the release of supplies from Army resources, and processing will be carried out under the supervision of the Military Photographic Censor recently appointed for the purpose.

(b) Security of Personnel

No evidence of enemy inspired subversive attempts against the morale or fighting spirit of Allied troops was reported during the period, apart from routine leaflet and radio broadcast activity, and the situation with respect to security of personnel continued to be good. Leaflets were dropped over

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(c) Security of Material and Installations

(i) No cases of sabotage or suspected sabotage of any significance were noted. 3 District reported a marked decrease in the theft of explosives from 16 B.A.D. where earlier in the year losses threatened to assume serious proportions.

(ii) Cases of wire-cutting also showed a noticeable decrease on the whole, compared with previous months. Most of the incidents reported occurred in and around the larger towns such as NAPLES and PALERMO.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastline

(i) No incidents of any importance were recorded. Routine port security controls continued to be carried out with satisfactory results.

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(ii) Consequent upon the departure of C.I.C. from L.B.S. territory, the responsibility for the security of the port of PALERMO was handed over to 51 P.S. Section.

(iii) The two most important ports overrun during the recent advance were CIVITAVECCHIA and PIOMBINO. The former passed under the control of P.B.S. and is covered by a C.I.C. sub-section which has the assistance of patrol craft provided by the Royal Navy. PIOMBINO was covered by C.I.C. personnel from IV Corps.

(iv) Valuable cooperation in the security control of the coastline was received by P.S.P/C.I.C. from the special plain clothes agents of S.I.M.

(v) The Port Security Section commanded by Capt. McCULLEN has joined the Naval Port Party which is waiting to take over LEGHORN, and this Section will be responsible for the security of this port, working under the direction of P.B.S.

2. CIVIL SECURITY

(a) Analysis of Arrests

	For trial for a Security offence (Category A)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention pending further investigation (Category C)	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	1	22	-	23
Civil Officials including CC.RR	10	60	-	70
Miscellaneous Civilians	94	516	204	614
TOTAL	105	598	204	707

(b) Enemy Agents

General facts and figures regarding enemy agents who fell into our hands during the month are shown in Part I of this Summary.

Reports on individual agents have been forwarded to A.F.H.Q., and will continue to be forwarded as they become available.

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	For trial for a Security offence (Category A)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention pending further investigation (Category C)	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces	1	22	-	23
Civil Officials including CC.RR	10	60	-	70
Miscellaneous Civilians	94	316	204	614
TOTAL	105	398	204	707

(b) Enemy Agents

General facts and figures regarding enemy agents who fall into our hands during the month are shown in Part I of this Summary.

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(c) Other individual cases

(i) Persons arrested

A number of high-placed Fascists were arrested in ROME in the early days of our occupation and have been interned. Following are the names and brief details of thirteen of the more important personalities:-

DUDAN Senatore Conte	Personal friend of MUSSOLINI. Member of the Fascist Grand Council.
MERAVIGLIA Maurizio	Member of Fascist Grand Council
SOLMI Marcello	Important Fascist and Assistant Minister of Propaganda.
BORRA Carlo Enrico	Long and prominent record in Fascist Party.
CALZABINI Alberto	Prominent Fascist. Took part in March on ROME. Active career in Party.

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CONSOLI Agapito	Member of original Partito Nazionale. Served in MVSN. Active career in Party.
DEL GIUDICE Riccardo	Squadrista and Prominent Fascist. Co-founder of Fascio of LUCERA. Held various posts in Fascist Party.
GIGLIOLI Giulio	Prominent Fascist. Long and prominent record in Fascist Party.
GOGLIA Antonio Carlo	Founder of Fascio in NAPLES and BENEVENTO.
MARTINI Giuseppe	GRAZIANI's A.D.C. Member of Fascist Party.
MASTROGIOVANNI Tasca (Prince of CUTO)	Suspected of collaborating with the Germans and of having been an agent in the U.S.A.
RAVASINI Giuseppe	Squadrista - Founded the PARMA Fascio.
SLOCOVICH Ettore	Worked for Germans in Propaganda Department.
GUARINI Duca Battista. FEDELE Oronzo, Squadrista (2 District).	It had been reported that the Duke was financing an organisation known as the Fascist Revolutionary Committee. GUARINI admitted handing over large sums of money to FEDELE for transmission, as he thought, to a German General WOLF in ROT through the intermediary of an Italian Duchess. FEDELE is to be tried for extortion, since the Italian Duchess was a mere fiction of his imagination and he was misappropriating the money. GUARINI is to be tried by an Italian Military Court.
IACOMELLI Bonatello MINA Giovanni PEROTTI Domenico COLLARINI Domenico DEL CAMPO Ferd. SCARONE Franco	These men were arrested in BARLETTA while trying to escape to ROT. They were carrying a sheet of violently anti-Allied propaganda and plans for one of the party to return bringing "precise orders". Both MINA and COLLARINI had been arrested by the French and interned three months previously, but had been released at the end of their recommended period of internment. They have been sent back to 371 PW Camp along with the other four delinquents.
MARTINESE ex-General, MVSN	At the request of SIM, MARTINESE's internment [illegible] ordered. He had been

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FEDELE Orenzo, Squadrista (2 District).	ing an organization known as the Revolutionary Committee. GUARINI admitted handing over large sums of money to FEDELE for transmission, as he thought, to a German General WOLF in EGT through the intermediary of an Italian Duchess. FEDELE is to be tried for extortion, since the Italian Duchess was a mere fiction of his imagination and he was misappropriating the money. GUARINI is to be tried by an Italian Military Court.
IACONELLI Benatello NINA Giovanni PEROTTI Domenico COLLARINI Domenico DEL CAMPO Ferd. SCARONE Franco	These men were arrested in BARLETTA while trying to escape to EGT. They were carrying a sheet of violently anti-Allied propaganda and plans for one of the party to return bringing "precise orders". Both NINA and COLLARINI had been arrested by the French and interned three months previously, but had been released at the end of their recommended period of internment. They have been sent back to 371 PW Camp along with the other four delinquents.
MARTINESE ex-General, MVSN	At the request of SIM, MARTINESE's internment for the duration has been ordered. He had been mentioned as a possible military leader by the Fascist Group at BRINDISI.
Lt-Col Cyril ROCKE, retired British officer	Was arrested in ROME on 26 Jul 44 on the count of past activity prejudicial to the interests of the Allies, in particular broadcasting on behalf of the Fascist Government. The case has now been investigated, and a full report forwarded to A.F.H.Q.
CASTELLI Vincenzo	Was arrested in TRAPANI on information received from SCS MARSALA. He appeared on First Army's Arrest List for TUNIS in May 43. He had been, prior to the Tunisian campaign, condemned by the French authorities to 20 years' imprisonment for espionage, but had been released by the Axis Powers on their occupation of TUNISIA. It has been recommended that he be handed over to the French authorities to complete his term of imprisonment.

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CARUSO Pietro — Questore of ROME. While heading northwards from ROME prior to the Allied occupation of the city he was involved in a car accident in which he and one of his three companions, an MVSN Lt. FRUZZETTI Enrico, were injured. They were taken to BAGNO-REGIO where they were found by Eighth Army. They were evacuated on 22 Jun 44 to ROME and handed over to ACC for disposal.

(ii) Suspects

CARNEVALI Mrs Rosa Sollo — A Czech who crossed from EGT on 30 May. She claimed to have helped Allied PW to escape, and is reported to have been employed in various German offices in ITALY. She was released to go to the Czech Mission in BARI. SCI think her story disconnected and odd, and orders have been given that she is to be traced and fully interrogated.

(d) Subversive Movements or Political Organisations of Security Interest

(i) An underground organisation founded in ROME prior to the arrival of the Allies has now come into the open. It is called the Committee for German Liberation. Dr. NIX and Dr. WINGELMANN, both of whom claim to have been persecuted by the Nazis, are the heads of this organisation, which may be described as a sort of "Free German Movement". It is being watched for possible subversive activities.

(ii) Another group of Fascists in Southern ITALY has been under observation in BARI for some time. The leaders are ANGRISANI, ex-Commander of Milizia Contraerea; PICCINI; D'ALESSANDRO, ex-Judge of the Tribunale Speciale; GIULIANI and Avv. SCARDIA.

ANGRISANI has a permanent pass to travel between BARI and NAPLES, being in the theatrical business. He is reported as being in contact with similar organisations in NAPLES. SCARDIA is known to have arranged for people to cross the lines.

There is evidence that they have been using clubs around the countryside to band Fascist elements together with the usual motives of sabotage, helping the Germans in the event of a setback, etc.

The group will shortly be arrested and fully interrogated.

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The group will shortly be arrested and fully interrogated.

(iii) A Fascist organisation in SICILY known as the "LEGA ITALICA" has been discovered in CALTANISETTA. Four youths revealed its existence under interrogation when captured on 2 Jun 44 at MESSINA while preparing to cross over to the Mainland. They had been encouraged and financed in their venture by this organisation. It has now been dissolved and its more active members are being dealt with.

(iv) Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale and the Partisans

The advance of our armies is bringing to light the anti-Fascist underground movement of this name whose organisation was encouraged after the Armistice by radio broadcasts from Benedetto CROCE, Carlo SFORZA and the BBC. At FROSINONE, for example, the PSP found a ready-made pro-Allied administration prepared to take over the Commune. PSP found also that an underground police force had been formed to assume power as soon as the Allies arrived.

The number of partisans encountered increases as our troops advance. In some cases they have been formed by enthusiastic pro-Allies independently of the Comitato; in most cases they have been organised by, and were in contact with, ROME. Reports from all sources speak of the excellent assistance rendered to PS in separating the Fascists from the pro-Allied elements among refugees.

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Sometimes assistance has been over-zealous and has had to be tempered. Sometimes, too, strong persuasion has had to be exercised to induce them to part with their weapons and arms. It is evident that goodwill has not been lacking in most areas.

(e) Control of Movement

(i) The Rear Army Security Control Line has been moved forward to the lateral road running from PESCARA through POPOLI, DAIANO, CASTELVECCHIO, AVEZZANO to TIVOLI, and thence along the North boundary of ROME Allied Area Command to the sea on the West Coast. Control Posts are operated along this line 24 hours a day.

(ii) With the liberation of ROME, there has been a sharp rise in the number of civilians attempting to make their way homewards along the roads leading to and out of the capital, and strenuous efforts are being made to cope with the problem of preventing unauthorised travel on the roads. In the early part of the month, the numbers of refugees passing through the Army RIP's were trebled, and rapid improvised measures had to be instituted to divert to side roads those people whose return from the hills to their homes in ROME and other populated areas threatened to block the main roads to movements of troops northwards. It was inevitable that in a number of cases civilians should have attempted to evade the controls and fend for themselves, but on the whole an extremely difficult situation was satisfactorily handled.

3. MISCELLANEOUS

(a) Italian Armed Forces

(i) Morale of Italian troops in the Army areas is generally reported to be high. The NEMBO Div left LECCE area, with high enthusiasm, for VASTO area, though it was revealed that their notions of security were rudimentary. Information concerning their move and the troops they were relieving was freely bandied about VASTO by members of the Div. Signal wires of operational importance were cut on four different occasions, and the wire used for the purpose of fastening up tents. MMLA have been asked to take strong action to improve this lax security discipline.

(ii) At TARANTO on 25 Jun Commandante CUSSMTE refused to sail his destroyer ELLESO, objecting to the new oath of loyalty to the State instead of to the King. He was arrested, but his arrest was followed by a demonstration in his favour by a number of sailors outside the Ministry of Marine in TARANTO, and an Italian admiral had to make a public appeal to them before they would disperse. Clashes occurred later between the sailors and Communists in which three people were injured and one arrest made.

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(iii) CC.RR It is reported that our advancing troops almost invariably find the CC.RR to be strongly anti-German. During the enemy's occupation they either went into hiding in the hills or remained at their posts to attempt to obstruct the Germans' orders as much as possible, whilst outwardly maintaining an attitude of seeming co-operation.

00030

(iv) Voluntari Della Revoluzione

The existence of this organisation is reported from 2 District. Its aims are to liquidate senior Italian officers of German sympathies and to enlist a number of armed men who, when peace is signed, will arrest all Fascists in the Army and try them before a special tribunal. The organisation is said to be in contact with Italian patriots in EOT, and Italian military circles in 2 District are stated to be alarmed. Investigations are being carried out and the CC.RR have been warned.

(b) Civil population

The morale of the civil population has naturally risen considerably as a result of the successful course of operations in recent weeks. In particular, those Italians who were undecided as to the final issue of the War - and there

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were large numbers of them - have now veered round to support of the Allies, for the prospects of a speedy return to peaceful conditions of living, round which centre their main aspirations, have never been more favourable. The general feeling may be described as one of relief rather than elation. Relations between troops and civilians are on the whole cordial.

(c) Rumours

There are no significant trends of rumours to report other than those already indicated in Part I.

(d) Other matters of security interest

Royalist Yugoslavs

It is reported by 2 District that a serious disturbance broke out at ATESANO on 15 Jun 44 when Yugoslavs failed to pay proper respect to a religious procession. Fighting broke out, one Italian was stabbed to death, one Yugoslav is dying, and another is seriously injured. ACC have given orders for the Yugoslav camp to be moved from ATESANO to another area.

4. LOCATION OF F.S. SECTIONS AND C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 30 JUN 44

	Attached to	Location	
A.A.I.			
16 F.S.S.	H.Q., A.A.I.		
FIFTH ARMY			
6792 C.I.C. Det.	H.Q., Fifth Army	GROSETTO	E 0466
6795 " "	H.Q. Fifth Army	"	"
6794 " "	1 Armd Div	TRAVALE	Q 5702
6756 " "	91 Inf Div	MONTALTO	A 0019
6774 " "	34 Inf Div	DIECINA	Q 2314
6775 " "	36 Inf Div	MALAGROTTA	F 6265
6780 " "	II Corps	ORBETELLO	E 7029
6777 " "	85 Inf Div	OSTIA	F 5952
6799 " "	IV Corps	CASTELNUOVO	Q 4805
		[illegible]	[illegible]

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4. LOCATION OF F.S. SECTIONS AND C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 30 JUN 44

	Attached to	Location	
A.A.I.			
16 F.S.S.	H.Q., A.A.I.		
FIFTH ARMY			
6792 C.I.C. Det.	H.Q., Fifth Army	GROSETTO	E 6466
6793 " "	H.Q. Fifth Army	"	"
6794 " "	1 Armd Div	TRAVALE	Q 5702
6756 " "	91 Inf Div	MONTALTO	A 0019
6774 " "	34 Inf Div	RIBECNA	Q 2314
6775 " "	36 Inf Div	MALAGROTTA	F 6265
6780 " "	II Corps	ORBETELLO	E 7029
6777 " "	85 Inf Div	OSTIA	F 5952
6799 " "	IV Corps	CASTELNUOVO	Q 4805
6778 " "	88 Inf Div	TARQUINIA	A 1508
D.S.A.	E.E.C.	CASTEL DEL PINO	9979
D.S.A.	2 D.I.M.	ALTESI	V 9592
D.S.A.	3 D.I.A.	GRETTI	Q 8206
D.S.A.	4 D.M.M.	LAMA	V 7792
EIGHTH ARMY			
47 P.S.S.	H.Q., Eighth Army	TERNI	A 9040
263 F.S.S.		ORVIETO	A 4560
2 N.Z. Div F.S.S.		ARCE	G 0432
11 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Corps	ATPINO	G 6738
8 Cdn F.S.S. Res Det.		ISERNIA	H 1952
11 Cdn F.S.S. Res Det.		VENAFRO	H 0420
1 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Inf Div	CERASSANO	G 1459
7 Cdn F.S.S.	5 Cdn Armd Div	AVAGNI	G 2949
	2 Polish Corps		

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	Attached to	Location	
	10 Corps		
278 F.S.S.	6 Armd Div	TODI	A 7065
55 F.S.S.	8 Ind Inf Div	PERUGIA	W 7092
406 F.S.S.	10 Ind Inf Div	ASSISI	W 8788
407 F.S.S.			W 7185
	13 Corps		
412 F.S.S.	4 Brit Inf Div	FICULLE	A 4172
5 F.S.S.	78 Inf Div	CITTA DELLA PIEVE	A 3785
88 F.S.S.	6 S.A. Armd Div.	PIEGARO	A 4387
6 S.A. Armd Div F.S.S.		CHIUSI	W 3383
5 CORPS			
	H.Q. 5 Corps	CAMPOBASSO	
68 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div	OSTIA	F 5952
3 F.S.S.			
2 DISTRICT			
		BARI	
315 F.S.S.		BRINDISI	
409 F.S.S.		LECCE	
419 F.S.S.		CAMPOBASSO	
427 F.S.S.		BARI	
38 P.S.S.		BARLETTA	
85 P.S.S.		SERRACAPRIOLA	
91 P.S.S.		TARANTO	
410 P.S.S.			
3 DISTRICT			
		NAPLES	
312 F.S.S.		SALERNO	
37 F.S.S.		AVELLINO	
418 F.S.S.		PALERMO	
51 F.S.S.		SIRACUSE	
21 P.S.S.		CAPUA	
14 Cdn F.S.S.		MESSINA (moving to CAPUA)	
310 F.S.S.			
P.B.S.			
		P.B.S. area	
C.I.C. Det			
ALLIED GARRISON SARDINIA			
		CAGLIARI	
6790 C.I.C. Det.			
ROME ALLIED AREA COMMAND			

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409 F.S.S.
419 F.S.S.
427 F.S.S.
58 P.S.S.
85 P.S.S.
91 P.S.S.
410 P.S.S.

3 DISTRICT

312 F.S.S.
37 F.S.S.
418 F.S.S.
51 F.S.S.
21 P.S.S.
14 Cdn F.S.S.
310 F.S.S.

P.D.S.

C.I.C. Det

ALLIED GARRISON SARDINIA

6790 C.I.C. Det.

ROME ALLIED AREA COMMAND

276 F.S.S.
47 P.S.S.
C.I.C. Det.

CAPODASSO
BARI
BARLETTA
SERRACAPRIOLA
TARANTO

NAPLES
SALERNO
AVELLINO
PALERMO
SIRACUSE
CAPUA
MESSINA (moving to CAPUA)

P.D.S. area

CAGLIARI

ROME area.

00029

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Security Branch

S.2773

Subject:- A.A.I. Security Summary No.14.

HQ ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY

14

SECRET.

A.A.I/1404/4/GSI(b).

16 May 44.

A.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q.

Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No.14 covering the month of April 1944.

HEADQUARTERS
17 MAY 1944
A. C. C.

(J.) C. Gibbon-Hill
Brigadier,
D.C.S.(I).

GF

Copy to:- A-2 MAAF.
A-2, RAF MAAF.
Security Intelligence, A.C.C.
Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.C.
1 S.C.I. Unit.
O.S.S., X-2, A.A.I.

00028

SECRET.

A.A.I. Security Summary for APRIL 1944.

PART I.

GENERAL SURVEY.

1. The security situation during April was, in general, very similar to that prevailing in March and no significant developments were apparent, except that some increase was noted in Fascist and other subversive activity.

2. Ten enemy agents were captured, all of which had been dispatched by the ABWEHR on espionage missions. Four were equipped with W/T sets and of these one was intended for FOGGIA, one for NAPLES, and two for SICILY.

3. Twelve agents were brought to trial during the month, nine of whom were convicted. Six were executed, and full publicity was given to this fact by radio, press and leaflet.

4. Sabotage continued on a very minor scale. Of the many incidents reported of damage to military material, only a small proportion showed signs of wilful sabotage. The most interesting case was in Polish Corps area where the cutting of signal lines at two points was combined with the preparation of booby traps.

5. Reports of widespread theft of Allied war material, particularly arms and explosives from roadside dumps, have been received from all three Districts. Such thefts have reached fairly serious proportions, not only from the point of view of loss, but from that of possession by civilians of such dangerous material. Measures to combat these thefts include stricter curfew, increased patrols and the display of threatening notices.

6. Two major Fascist subversive organisations were rounded up during the month, one at BARLETTA, involving twenty arrests, and the other centred on BARI and SQUINZANO (near LECCE) involving twelve arrests. 1 District is investigating a fairly widespread Fascist movement in SICILY which is thought to concern itself mainly with propaganda and the organisation of parties to cross the lines to N. ITALY: it is expected that arrests will be made in the near future. Six dangerous Fascists in CALABRIA were interned. In NAPLES six persons of some standing were arrested for giving assistance to a stool pigeon posing as an enemy agent.

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7. The most important individual case of the month was the escape of the Prince and Princess PIGNATELLI. The latter travelled from NAPLES to ROME and back, and she has admitted under interrogation that she contacted the German Intelligence and Fascist Republican authorities, and that she gave them a certain amount of military and political information. It is believed that her action was inspired mainly by political scheming. Interrogation and investigations are proceeding.

8. The final moves and preparations for our May offensive were accompanied by a high standard of security discipline.

9. Control of civilian movement was tightened still further. Although the new restrictions and pass system in ALG territory did not become operative until the beginning of May, the month of April saw the organisation of a widespread system of snap road checks throughout S.ITALY. The security of the coast line was further improved. P.B.3. has organised a very efficient security control of transients in NAPLES town and neighbourhood. A less satisfactory feature has been the improper entry of Italian military personnel on leave into the Army and Corps areas, carrying either a brown pass, which should not have been issued, or a bogus duty pass.

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10. In SARDINIA the security situation should improve now that a new CIC Detachment has been allotted to the Island, raising the number of CIC personnel from three to eleven, and now that the NEMBO Division has been moved to the mainland.

11. Our relations with the SIM(CS) organisation and the co-operation which they have afforded to us developed considerably during the month. The clear directive which was issued, laying down the principles of co-operation and of the provision of information, was of considerable value to both parties. They have continued to do excellent work in 2 District in connection with the subversive movements; for the first time 1 District has commented very favourably on their assistance, and they have done good work in the PIGNATELLI case; they are proving useful in the forward areas.

12. No very significant trends were noted last month in connection with rumours; many were concerned, as might be expected, with the opening of other fronts - in N.W. EUROPE, S. FRANCE, and BALKANS; in Fifth Army area several rumours circulated regarding gas warfare.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information

(i) A number of formation moves were carried out during the period as part of the regrouping programme preparatory to the Allied offensive. No breaches of security were reported.

(ii) On 29 Apr 44 two bags of official mail were stolen from an E.L.S. truck in the town of BUSCHETTE (Prov. BARI). Included in this mail was a TOP SECRET document on German Medium Grade Balkan Cipher Traffic, the possible compromise of which must be regarded as a serious matter. Every effort has been and is still being made to trace these bags. The services of military and civil authorities in the area were enlisted in the search and rewards have been offered. Five small children believed to be involved in the case were rounded up and their fathers were also placed under arrest. Evidence so far available indicates negligence or dereliction of duty on the part of the signals personnel in charge of the truck. Both driver and guard have been put under close

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On 2 May 44 a second attempt was made by three civilians to interfere with an E.L.S. truck on the same run, just outside BARLETTA. One man was caught by the guard. The remaining two escaped.

(iii) The loss was also reported of a bag of non-secret official mail somewhere in the area between TORRE ANNUNZIATA and GRAGNANO (3 District). In this case the bag appears to have fallen out. No serious leakage of security was involved in this case, but disciplinary action was taken against the orderly who should have been in the back of the truck with the mail.

(iv) Certain units in rear areas have shown laxity in the handling and disposal of classified documents prior to moving. Appropriate corrective action was taken in each case.

(b).....

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(b) Security of Personnel

Nothing of particular interest was noted during the period apart from an intensification of the enemy leaflet campaign on the Fifth Army front. The German propaganda machine continued to peg away against Polish troops but with little success, as instanced by the following extract from one of the "WANDA" programmes (translation from Polish):-

> "Although for some time I have been reading to you letters and messages from home, not one of you has taken advantage of the opportunities afforded to establish contact through me. Take my advice. Write at least a few words to your beloved ones who are sick with fear and anxiety on your behalf."

(c) Security of Material and Installations.

(i) Pilfering of military stores in rear areas was reported to be on the increase and in certain areas reached considerable proportions. Most serious from the security standpoint was the loss of ammunition from ordnance dumps, notably 6 O.B.D. in the BITONTO area (Prov. BARI), 16 B.A.D. centred on NOLA (Prov. NAPLES) and 25 A.A.D. (SICILY). During one period of seven days 6 O.B.D. reported the disappearance of nearly 5000 hand grenades, 378 2" mortar bombs and 1650 lbs of gelignite. House searches in the neighbourhood resulted in the recovery of a large part of these stores and one arrest was made. Fixed ops were taken by the Area H.Q. concerned to combat what was developing into an alarming situation. The number of guards was increased, and the system of patrols reorganised. As a result, no further cases of pilfering from this depot were reported for the first fortnight in May.

The indications are that these thefts are perpetrated from purely domestic motives, the explosives being useful as fuel or for dynamiting fish. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some of these materials are in fact finding their way into the hands of undesirable or subversive elements among the civilian population, and the situation is being carefully watched. The principal difficulty has been, and presumably always will be, inadequate resources of manpower for the establishment of a really efficient system of guards and patrols.

(ii) Reports from Armies and 5 Corps indicated that wirecutting was generally well under control in those areas. Four cases were however reported from the 10 Corps area during the last five days of the month; all bore indications of wilful damage, since in no case was wire [illegible]

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WO 204/10026

16 B.A.D. centred on NOLA (Prov. Naples) [illegible] one period of seven days 6 O.B.D. reported the disappearance of nearly 5000 hand grenades, 378 2" mortar bombs and 1650 lbs of gelignite. House searches in the neighbourhood resulted in the recovery of a large part of these stores and one arrest was made. Firm steps were taken by the Area H.Q. concerned to combat what was developing into an alarming situation. The number of guards was increased, and the system of patrols reorganised. As a result, no further cases of pilfering from this depot were reported for the first fortnight in May.

The indications are that these thefts are perpetrated from purely domestic motives, the explosives being useful as fuel or for dynamiting fish. However, the possibility cannot be ruled out that some of these materials are in fact finding their way into the hands of undesirable or subversive elements among the civilian population, and the situation is being carefully watched. The principal difficulty has been, and presumably always will be, inadequate resources of manpower for the establishment of a really efficient system of guards and patrols.

(ii) Reports from Armies and 5 Corps indicated that wirecutting was generally well under control in these areas. Four cases were however reported from the 10 Corps area during the last five days of the month; all bore indications of wilful damage, since in no case was wire removed although two of the lines concerned were cut in several places. In four areas where Allied troops are much thinner on the ground, cases of wire-cutting were considerably more frequent, without reaching alarming proportions. The largest number of cases reported came from SICILY, where the total was 38. (24 from 1 District, 14 from L.B.S.) In many of these cases theft was definitely established as the motive. Several arrests were made and at the special request of C.C.C. 1 District one of these cases will be tried by special Allied Military Court.

(iii) Two separate cases were reported by 2 Polish Corps in which an attempt had been made to "booby trap" signal lines in such a way as to cause an explosion when a linesman handled the wire. This case has been made the subject of a special report to A.F.H.Q. and a further report will be forwarded when further details are obtained.

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(iv) On the night of 1/2 Apr 44 a sulphur candle was discovered in the P.W.B. Propaganda Shop at PALERMO. An unsuccessful attempt had apparently been made to ignite the candle, but no damage was done. Early in the morning of 30 Apr 44 a P.W.B. propaganda kiosk in the same town was burned to the ground. No indication as to cause or motive was discovered.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastline.

(i) The security situation in ports was reported to be generally satisfactory.

(ii) Those stretches of the coast line flanking the Fifth Army and 5 Corps areas were being adequately safeguarded largely through the disposition of Allied troops located there. Outside those areas Allied security personnel have of necessity been relying mainly on Italian troops, naval coast guards and local Italian security, customs and police agencies for coastal security control. This service is in many districts by no means sufficient or efficient and will in the near future be reinforced by a special service of S.I.M. C.S. agents. The latter will build up a system of informants and keep local F.S.P./C.I.C. informed on all matters of security interest. Due to limitations on the supply of suitably trained personnel this system can be put into operation only in those areas where the need is greatest i.e. those strips of the coastline most favourable for the movement of enemy agents in and out of the country. The areas chosen are the GARGANO Peninsula (Lake LESINA - TORRE DI RIVOLI). "Heel" of ITALY (MONOPOLI - S. MARIA DI LEUCA). Gulf of NAPLES (MONTORNO - P.CAMPANELLA) and NW coast of SARDINIA(Gulf of ASINARA - Gulf of OROSEI). This service is already in operation in the Gulf of NAPLES where it is intended shortly to double the number of C.S. agents employed.

(iii) Reports continued to be received of illicit ferry services across the Straits of MESSINA but the CC.RR and the Guardia di Finanza appear now to be making more effort to stop this traffic. Three motor launches for the Guardia di Finanza are in course of repair and NOIC has been asked to provide two naval patrol boats for the Straits.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

(a) Analysis of Arrests.

	For trial for a Security Offence (Category A.)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention pending further investigation. (Category C).	TOTAL.
Italian Armed Forces.	Nil.	6	4	10

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(a) Analysis of Arrests.

	For trial for a Security Offence (Category A.)	For Internment (Category B)	For Detention Pending further Investigation. (Category C).	TOTAL.
Italian Armed Forces.	Nil.	6	4	10
Civil Officials including CC.RR	1	5	Nil.	6
Miscellaneous civilians.	219	64	43	326
TOTAL	220	75	47	342

NOTE:- Of the above (a) 8 were ex-Fascist Party Officials.
(b) 11 were ex-M.V.S.N.

It will be noted that the number of persons arrested for security offences was comparatively high : most of the offences were concerned with movement.

(b) Agents.

Ten agents were captured during the month, four by Fifth Army, four by 5 Corps and two by 10 Corps.

All these agents were despatched by the SWEHR, and four were equipped with W/T sets. In contrast with the previous month's bag, there were no saboteurs among them.

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Special reports have been despatched to A.F.H.Q. on these cases.

During this period, twelve agents were tried, of whom nine were convicted. The remaining three were acquitted and have been interned. Six agents were executed in the course of the month, namely DOMENI Domenico, SERASSI LUCILLI Giulio, CAMPO Alfredo, TAPOLI Giorgio, TRESCO Vincenzo and SCHIERI Franco.

At the beginning of May, in an effort to discourage Italians from undertaking espionage for the Germans, leaflets totalling some 420,000 were dropped over ROME, FLORENCE and GENOA. These leaflets carried photographs of agents recently executed, with brief personal particulars of each, and a warning that a similar fate awaited all who crossed the Allied lines on espionage missions for the Germans. A copy of this has been sent to A.F.H.Q.

(c) Other Individual Cases.

(i) Persons arrested.

DOMENI Domenico
[illegible] Giuseppe
[illegible] Diego

These three civilians have been the subject of a special report to A.F.H.Q. All of CICOL PALERO, Sicily, they were arrested on 16 Apr 44 for being in possession of an Italian W/T transmitter, the existence of which they were attempting to conceal. It has not yet been established if they had been using or intending to use the set for espionage purposes. Another accomplice, GUIFFRE Giuseppe, is being sought in connection with the affair. Also implicated are two [illegible] of the Guardia di Finanza and of the P.S. at PALMI, CAPPELLA Francesco and GIORDANO Filippo respectively. Interrogations and investigations are proceeding.

Major ELIAS.

One of the Vigili Fuoco of SARDINIA was arrested 28 April along with four persons while attempting to leave SARDINIA by boat for enemy-occupied ITALY. An enemy radio transmitter was discovered belonging to the party. Further investigations are in progress to locate other persons allegedly involved in this case, and A.C.S. has been instructed to forward further particulars to this H.Q.

TA[illegible] Dr. [illegible], Angiola)
[illegible] Claudia.
[illegible] Dr. Monroe.
[illegible] Dr. Antonio.
[illegible] Dr. Martini.
[illegible] Dr. Giuseppe.

as a result of information obtained by interrogation of a captured enemy agent (SCHIERI) these six persons, all of NAPLES, were arrested for having assisted and given military information to an agent provocateur posing as SCHIERI.

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MIGLIORI Domenico
[illegible] Giuseppe
[illegible] Diego

These three civilians have been the subject of a special report to AFHQ. All of PIOL. TAURO, Sicily, they were arrested on 16 Apr 44 for being in possession of an Italian W/T transmitter, the existence of which they were attempting to conceal. It has not yet been established if they had been using or intending to use the set for espionage purposes. Another accomplice, GUIFFRE Giuseppe, is being sought in connection with the affair. Also implicated are two Brigadieri of the Guardia di Finanza and of the P.S. at PALMI, CAMELLA Francesco and GIORDANO Filippo respectively. Interrogations and investigations are proceeding.

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[illegible] nee [illegible]SELBERG, Angiola
[illegible] Claudia.
RICCARDI Dr. Monaco.
[illegible] Dr. Antonio.
[illegible] Dr. Martini.
GONZI Dr. Giuseppe.

Report of interrogation obtained by interrogation of a captured enemy agent (CAPPIERI) these six persons, all of NAPLES, were arrested for having assisted and given military information to an agent provocateur posing as CAPPIERI.

The first four are to be brought to trial; the last two mentioned are not thought to be guilty of this offence, but having been discovered to be escaped PW from SICILY, they are being handed over to the Italian military authorities for disposal.

(ii) Suspects.

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PIANCERI Count Ugo.

Director General of the Società Esercizi Telefonici of Southern ITALY, Fascist Party member since 1924; was on excellent terms with prominent Fascists such as FARINACCI; was a director of the NAPLES Chamber of Commerce and connected with other Fascist organizations. In 1938 was awarded the Germanic Eagle. By his personality and technical proficiency he has been able to retain his position in NAPLES but his retention is having an adverse effect on public opinion as well as on employees. It is believed that he should be replaced and the complete file on his case has been handed to A.C.C. for their consideration.

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RONCO Col. Francesco.

C.O. Italian Troops in CARIANO (LECCE). Reported as fomenting Fascist ideals amongst his officers and men. Reported to M.M.I.A.

(c) Subversive Movements and Political Organisations of Security Interest.

(i) Fascist Organisation in LECCE.

Reference AAI Security Summary No.13 of 15 April, Part II, 2(d) (i). Interrogation of the 38 members of the organisation who have now been arrested reveals details concerning the formation, strength, aims and aims of the movement, the attempt of one of its members to carry considerable information of military importance to German Occupied ITALY, and the text of messages which were intended for transmission to Republican ITALY.

The 38 arrested individuals are to be tried by an Allied Military Court in LECCE on 17 May 44.

(ii) Fascist Organisation in S[illegible]NZANO.

Reference AAI Security Summary No.13 of 15 April Part II 2 (d)(ii). FILO and 11 other men believed to include the leaders of this group were arrested on 2 May. Interrogations and investigations are proceeding.

(iii) Fascist Organisation in B[illegible]ETTA.

Reference AAI Security Summary No. 13 of 15 April Part II 2 (d)(iii). This Fascist group at BARLETTA was liquidated during the night 13/14 April and it is thought that sufficient documentary evidence was obtained during the house search that followed the arrests to secure a conviction. 20 men are now held in custody, and many more are known to have attended meetings although their names do not figure among the records. This case is being prepared for handing over to Chief Legal Officer, AFHQ.

(iv) Fascist activity is being closely watched in other areas too. No.1 District reports a fairly widespread organisation known, according to fairly reliable sources, as the Movimento Unitario Italiano (in C[illegible]TELL.) which appears to concentrate on propaganda and the organising of parties to cross the lines into N. ITALY. The latter, to judge from the types that have been caught, would seem to be composed of the student class of youths. Concerning the organisers of the movement, more information is expected to be received shortly which will enable arrests to be made. C.S. has penetrated the organisation in certain places and hopes to include one of its men in a party attempting to make its way through our forward lines.

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(iii)Fascist Organisation in [redacted].

Reference AAI Security Summary No. 13 of 15 April Part II 2 (d)(iii). This Fascist group at [redacted] was liquidated during the night 13/14 April and it is thought that sufficient documentary evidence was obtained during the house search that followed the arrests to secure a conviction. 20 men are now held in custody, and many more are known to have attended meetings although their names do not figure among the records. This case is being prepared for handing over to Chief Legal Officer, MCC.

(iv) Fascist activity is being closely watched in other areas too. No.1 District reports a fairly widespread organisation known, according to fairly reliable sources, as the Movimento Unitario Italiano (in CAMPANIA) which appears to concentrate on propaganda and the organising of parties to cross the lines into N. ITALY. The latter, to judge from the types that have been caught, would seem to be composed of the student class of youths. Concerning the organisers of the movement, more information is expected to be received shortly which will enable arrests to be made. C.S. has penetrated the organisation in certain places and hopes to include one of its men in a party attempting to make its way through our forward lines.

(d) Control of Movement.

(i) As a measure to combat the enemy's increasing efforts to infiltrate espionage and sabotage agents into S. ITALY, it was decided to introduce a wider and more effective system of control of civilian movement, movements of civilians being rendered correspondingly more restricted according to whether they are in Italian administered territory, territory under A.M.G. or Army and Corps areas. The actual instructions to the civil population were not issued until the beginning of May, but a widespread system of 'snap' check posts was organised by Armies, Corps, Districts and Base Sections.

(ii) The question of the registration of persons staying in Hotels and Boarding Houses was taken up with the Italian Civil Authorities, and the Ministry of the Interior issued an instruction to Prefects emphasising the necessity for strict enforcement of the regulations on this subject.

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3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Italian Armed Forces.

(i) Reports on the morale of the Italian Armed Forces vary considerably over all areas. In general, no improvement is noticeable. Desertions are reported from several parts of the country, as much among those employed in an active role in the Army areas as among troops in the L. of C.

(ii) 56 desertions among soldiers of Slav origin in the SARAUDA division took place in April. Allegations, which would appear to be not entirely unfounded that these are provoked by representatives of the Yugoslav N.L.A.Y., are being investigated.

(iii)G.S.I.(b), 13 Corps considers that the morale of 202 Italian Pioneer Coy is so low that it is a danger to Security and has requested that this unit be withdrawn from the area.

(iv) NEMBO Division.

There has been in the past considerable anxiety with regard to this division in SARDINIA; also one bn has previously been reported as a continual source of incidents in 2 District. When assigned to General UTILI's motorised Gp, however, this bn has proved to be one of his best units and no case of desertion has been reported. It is expected that the morale of this division and its behaviour will show a marked improvement now that it is being moved to the mainland. In the opinion of the S.I.M.,G.S., dangerous elements gradually having been weeded out, this division is capable of rendering good and reliable service as a fighting unit.

(v) Italian Navy.

Among Italian deserters arrested in the Eighth Army area, a high percentage is from the Italian Navy. Most of them have their families living in enemy-occupied territory and this fact, in conjunction with the alleged very poor living conditions in the Italian Navy, bad food, hard duties, etc., and bad treatment by their officers, is said to be the cause of the desertions. Nevertheless there may be some organisation behind these desertions since two recently captured deserters from the Navy state that there is some wilful demoralisation in Apulian ports and give a description of the man who they allege induced them to desert. Navy Sub-Commission, A.C.C. has been asked to make enquiries, and to inform this Headquarters of any indications of subversive activities or personalities at work.

(vi) Italian military personnel working with F.S. on control of movement receive general praise for their keenness and enthusiasm for their work. No.1 District commends Allied personnel also good work during the past month.

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(vi) Italian military personnel working with F.S. on control of movement receive general praise for their keenness and enthusiasm for their work. No.1 District commends SM/CS for particularly good work during the past month.

00024

(b) Civil Population.

(i) The forming of the new Italian Government seems to have provoked no strong reactions in either direction. The food situation remains the primary cause of civil disturbances, which are much more prevalent in Districts than in Army and Corps areas. The morale is described as fairly good. In SICILY alone there were 21 food disturbances, eleven of which were a series of a rather significant nature, due to shortage of flour in MESSINA province. The situation was of course exploited by the propaganda of ill-intentioned elements, but vigorous action was taken, including the arrest of 67 of the demonstrators, imposition of a curfew and a ban on meetings, and the situation is well in hand.

(ii) A serious clash, in which two civilians were killed, ten wounded and ten French soldiers wounded, took place at XETTA near TRAPANI on 9 Apr 44. It started from a minor incident which, fostered by the bitter animosity which seems to exist between the tps of the French 1 Para Regt and local civilians, quickly assumed unpleasant proportions.

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(iii) In No.2 District a decline is noted in Civil unrest, and strikes have been less frequent; the decline is attributed to the new coalition government. A marked improvement is observed in SARDINIA and is explained by the improved food situation and the evacuation of Italian soldiers from SARDINIA. The blame for a deterioration in relations between troops and civilians in 3 District is laid upon the troops, whose behaviour has not been exemplary, especially during the Easter period.

(c) Rumours.

No over-all significant trend is apparent in the rumours which have been circulating freely, although in Fifth Army area the sinister mention of the use of gas by the enemy is noted in rumours current among both civilians and troops. Elsewhere speculation as to the opening of the Allied second front was rife and glibly disembarked tps anywhere from NORWAY round the coast of Europe to S.FRANCE, GREECE and the BALKANS. The South of FRANCE was the most favoured landing-place.

Rumour continues to play off RUSSIA against her Allies:-

"RUSSIA and GERMANY are discussing peace terms".
(Eighth Army, also 5 Corps. German-inspired radio?)
"BRITAIN and U.S.A. are contemplating peace negotiations, with GERMANY in order to check the Russian advance." (F.B.S. - Italian Military and Political circles).

There was the usual crop of rumours attempting to analyse the reasons behind tp movements.

There was a singular lack of rumours concerning the return of tps to their homeland.

(d) Other Matters of Security Interest.

9.11

(i) On 1 Apr 44 a mailbag was jolted out of the Sardinia plane in an air-pocket over C.I.BRIL. The plane left from LECCE. The bag, a blue school as carried by Italian A.F. personnel, contained 2 ACC packages, 2 Italian official packages and 6 uncensored private letters. Of the last mentioned three were brought from C.I.BRIL. and the name of an Italian Colonel appears in them, a Colonel PI.ZZA., who seems to have been arranging letter-carrying. He left LECCE airport for C.I.BRIL. on 21 Mar 44, returning 31 Mar, on a mission for the Italian Ministry of War.

The matter was taken up with A.C.C. with the request that the Colonel be interrogated in the subject of his letter-carrying activities.

(Sgd) P.PI.

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(a) Other Matters of Security Interest.

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The matter has been taken up with A.C.C. with the request that the Colonel be interrogated in the subject of his letter-carrying activities.

(ii) German Parachute found at BISCEGLIE (North of B.RI).

Information was received at 2 District H.Q. on 21 Apr 44 that a German parachute had been found in a vineyard outside BISCEGLIE. Along with the parachute were German webbing equipment, an Italian grenade belt with 6 Italian red personnel type grenades, an Italian 2/Lieut's uniform and an Italian paratrooper's helmet.

An Italian peasant, RUBBLLRO Angelo, Corte Belvedere 10, BISCEGLIE, found this material at 0915 hrs on 21 Apr 44 and immediately informed the CC.RR who at once informed the nearest British unit.

On enquiries being made it was revealed that RUBBLLRO's cousin, Donato, had seen a man, at 0400 hrs on 19 Apr 44, in the vicinity of the vineyard. The man asked what time the train went to B.RI and said he had come from BUVO. He apparently offered RUGGIERI a cigarette, which was observed by the latter to be a German brand, and German cartridges.

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Following is RUGGIERO's description of the man:-

"About 25 yrs. old, about 1m80 tall (roughly 6'), high colour, brown hair, a long face, black eyes, straight nose, American clipped moustache, well dressed in a brown "Lacoste" jersey, no jacket nor hat, dark grey striped trousers, black lace shoes. Set off towards the MOLFETTA road."

The railway official on duty at BISCEGLIE did not recollect anyone answering this description but this is not surprising since normally 500 people travel on the early train to BARI.

Strenuous efforts are still being made to trace the man.

4. LOCATION OF F.S.SECTIONS AND C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 30 APR 44.

A.A.I.	Attached to	Location
16 F.S.S.	HQ, A.A.I.	CASERTA.
FIFTH ARMY.		
6792 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE
6793 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE
6794 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE.
6780 C.I.C. Det.	II Corps.	PIEDMONTE RIVOLI M 923
6775 C.I.C. Det.	36 Inf Div.	MONTORE M 6347
6777 C.I.C. Det.	85 Inf Div.	CELLOLE M 8889
6778 C.I.C. Det.	88 Inf Div.	CARANO M 9389.
6799 C.I.C. Det.	IV Corps.	LAGO D'AVERNO N 0648
6781 C.I.C. Det.	VI Corps.	NETTUNO.
6779 C.I.C. Det.	1 Armd Div.	F 8923
6773 C.I.C. Det.	3 Inf Div.	F 9824
6774 C.I.C. Det.	34 Inf Div.	CERRETO F 9421
6776 C.I.C. Det.	45 Inf Div.	F 9120
3 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div.	F 8421
17 F.S.S.	5 Inf Div.	F 8125

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	Attached to	Location
16 F.S.S.	HQ, A.A.I.	CASERTA.

FIFTH ARMY.

6792 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE
6793 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE
6794 C.I.C. Det.	HQ, Fifth Army.	SPARANISE.
6780 C.I.C. Det.	II Corps.	PIEDIMONTE RIVOLI M 938
6775 C.I.C. Det.	36 Inf Div.	MONTORE M 6347
6777 C.I.C. Det.	85 Inf Div.	CELLOLE M 8889
6778 C.I.C. Det.	88 Inf Div.	CARANO M 9389.
6799 C.I.C. Det.	IV Corps.	LAGO D'AVERNO N 0648
6704 C.I.C. Det.	VI Corps.	NETTUNO.
6779 C.I.C. Det.	1 Armd Div.	F 8923
6773 C.I.C. Det.	3 Inf Div.	F 9824
6774 C.I.C. Det.	34 Inf Div.	CERRETO F 9421
6776 C.I.C. Det.	45 Inf Div.	F 9120
3 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div.	F 8421
17 F.S.S.	5 Inf Div.	F 8125
B.S.A.	F.B.C.	SESSA AURUNCA M 9492.
B.S.A.	1 D.M.I.	ALBANOVA N 1167.
B.S.A.	2 D.I.M.	G 9904.
B.S.A.	3 D.I.A.	CASALE N 0191.
B.S.A.	4 D.M.M.	CECHESTO G 9400

EIGHTH ARMY.

263 F.S.S.	H.Q. Eighth Army.	CAMPOBASSO
47 F.S.S.	H.Q. Eighth Army.	PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE M 93
66 S.A. F.S.S.	6 S.A. Armd Div.	ALTAMURA.
11 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Corps.	GUARDIA N 5096
1 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Inf Div.	VINCHIATURO H 5022.
7 Cdn F.S.S.	5 Cdn Armd Div.	S. ANGELO DEI COSTI F 97.
2 Polish Corps F.S.S.	2 Polish Corps.	VENAFRO H 0320.
2 Carpathian Div F.S.S.	3 Carpathian Inf Div.	S. VITTORE G 9418.
5 Kresowa Div F.S.S.	5 Kresowa Inf Div.	G 9425.

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	Attached to	Location.
EIGHTH ARMY (Cont'd).		
278 F.S.S.	10 Corps.	ISERNIA H 1933
2 N.Z. F.S.S.	2 N.Z. Div.	AQUAFONDATA G 9627
412 F.S.S.	13 Corps.	VAIRANO H 0903.
5 F.S.S.	4 Brit. Inf Div.	PIETRAVAIRANO H 1403
55 F.S.S.	6 Armd Div.	PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE H 3005
406 F.S.S.	8 Ind Inf Div.	MIGNANO G 9812
68 F.S.S.	78 Inf Div.	PIANA N 2885
5 CORPS.		
68 F.S.S.	HQ 5 Corps.	ATESSA H 3685
290 F.S.S.	4 Ind Inf Div.	CASOLI H 2490
407 F.S.S.	10 Ind Inf Div.	S. VITO C 3611
No.1 DISTRICT.		
21 P.S.S.		CATANIA.
51 F.S.S.		AGRIGENTO
310 F.S.S.		MESSINA.
314 P.S.S.		SIRACUSA.
No.2 DISTRICT.		
38 P.S.S.		BARI
85 P.S.S.		BARLETTA
91 P.S.S.		BRINDISI
315 P.S.S.		BARI
409 P.S.S.		LECCE.
410 P.S.S.		TARANTO
427 F.S.S.		TERMOLI
2 N.Z.E.F. F.S.S. (N.Z. L. of C.)		BARI.
No.3 DISTRICT.		
57 F.S.S.		CASTELLAMARE.
97 P.S.S.		NAPLES.
376 F.S.S.		SALERNO.
512 F.S.S.		NAPLES.
14 Cdn. F.S.S. (Cdn L. of C.)		AVELLINO.

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21 P.S.S.	CATANIA.
51 F.S.S.	AGRIGENTO
310 F.S.S.	MESSINA.
314 P.S.S.	SIRACUSA.

No.2 DISTRICT.

38 P.S.S.	BARI
85 P.S.S.	BARLETTA
91 P.S.S.	BRINDISI
315 P.S.S.	BARI
409 P.S.S.	LECCE.
410 P.S.S.	TARANTO
427 F.S.S.	TERMOLI
2 N.Z.E.F. F.S.S. (N.Z. L. of C.)	BARI.

No.3 DISTRICT.

37 F.S.S.	CASERTA AREA.
97 P.S.S.	NAPLES.
276 F.S.S.	SALERNO.
312 F.S.S.	NAPLES.
14 Cdn. F.S.S. (Cdn L. of C.)	AVELLINO.

P.B.S.

6784 C.I.C. Det.	
6785 C.I.C. Det.	
6786 C.I.C. Det.	
6787 C.I.C. Det.	

I.B.S.

6768 C.I.C. Det.	PALERMO.

ALLIED GARRISON SARDINIA.

6790 C.I.C. Det.	CAGLIARI.

CITY ADMINISTRATION SECTION.

6788 C.I.C. Det.	NAPLES
6789 C.I.C. Det.	NAPLES
6791 C.I.C. Det.	NAPLES.

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Security Br.

SUBJECT: A.A.I. Security Summary No. 13

Hq, Allied Armies in Italy

SECRET

AAI/1401/4/G(Ib)

15 Apr 1944

(3)

A.C. of S., G-2, A.F.H.Q.

Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No. 13 covering the month of March 1944.

W. D. Gibson Lt. Col
Brigadier,
B.G.S.(I),
A.A.I.

Copy to:

A-2 MAAF
A-2, RAF MAAF
Security Intelligence, A.C.C.
Public Safety Sub-Commission, A.C.C.
1 S.C.I. Unit

00022

SECRET.

A.A.I. Security Summary for MARCH 1943.

PART I.

GENERAL SURVEY.

1. Previous Security Summaries compiled by this Headquarters have been concerned only with security in the Army areas. At the end of February, however, H.Q., A.A.I. assumed security responsibility for the whole of the Italian theatre of operations including SICILY and SARDINIA. Commencing with this summary, therefore, security in this whole theatre will be reviewed.

2. One of the major features affecting security during March was the re-grouping of our forces, involving a large number of operational moves. These appear to have been accompanied by adequate security precautions, and no serious breaches or leakages were reported. This re-grouping necessitated a considerable re-organisation of the security control of refugees and civilian movement in the forward areas.

3. The enemy continued to despatch large numbers of agents to Southern ITALY during the month, and many arrests were made. During the first 20 days of March no fewer than 24 agents were apprehended : the majority had crossed the lines, but two parties landed on the coast by small boat. Most of them were young, inexperienced and of moderate quality, but a few were of a more determined type than usual. During the period the enemy was clearly relying on quantity rather than quality, and appeared to be working on the principle of sending large numbers in the hope that at least a proportion would produce results.

4. Thirteen agents were brought to trial during the month : one was acquitted, and the remainder were convicted, ten being sentenced to death and two to 20 years. In the middle of March special machinery was set up whereby all agents, wherever captured, were tried by a form of special standing court sitting at S.F.H.Q. near C.SERT.. The preparation of cases for trial was greatly facilitated by the assistance of two experienced Police Officers provided by the A.C.C., one being attached to each Army for the purpose.

5. Several cases of probable or attempted sabotage were reported, but none of great significance or serious consequences. One noteworthy incident reported was the placing of a ½-lb block of TNT against a railway line at AVERSA under an ammunition truck, but it is probable that this was the effort of an amateur, and enemy inspiration is not suspected. The other incidents reported were, as usual, concerned with signals communications.

6. There was a recrudescence of Fascist subversive activity in the SOUTH of ITALY, and particularly in 2 District. Among civilians, three Fascist conspiracies, organisation or groups were discovered at LECCE, SQUINZANO and BARLETTA. The first has now been investigated and has revealed a plot involving contact with the Fascist Republican authorities, supply of information to the enemy, and collection of arms about 30 arrests have been made, and it is

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6. There was a recrudescence of Fascist subversive activity in the SOUTH of ITALY, and particularly in 2 District. Among civilians, three Fascist conspiracies, organisation or groups were discovered at LECCE, SANREMO and BARLETTA.. The first has now been investigated and has revealed a plot involving contact with the Fascist Republican authorities, supply of information to the enemy, and collection of arms for possible use against the Allies : about 20 arrests have been made, and it is proposed to hold the trial shortly: the organisation centres in SANREMO is of a similar nature, though possibly of greater significance and importance: this case and that at BARLETTA are still under investigation. Among the Italian forces, various pro-Fascist incidents and disturbances have been reported, particularly in the "heel" of ITALY: these were mainly of an anti-communist nature: steps are being taken to ensure that sufficiently strong disciplinary action is taken in such cases to discourage further trouble of this nature.

00021

7. The security situation in SARDINIA appears to be under control but must be carefully watched. The very large number of Italian troops located in the island, compared with the small Allied garrison, the war-weariness and inactivity of the former, the presence of unstable and troublesome elements such as the Nembo Division and other "Arditi" troops, are among the factors which tend to create a potentially dangerous security situation, which might well be exploited by the enemy. Hitherto reliance has had to be placed almost entirely on the Italian police and security agencies as regards counter-intelligence work in the Island, but steps are now being taken to increase the number of C.I.C. so as to enable the latter to provide a reasonable territorial security coverage.

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8. The procedure for handling internees developed further during the month with the attachment to 371 P.o.W. Camp of two officers of the A.C.C. Security Intelligence Branch, who have assisted in the sorting and reviewing of cases. A certain number of releases were effected, and it is thought that the arrangements made for dealing with this complicated security problem are now satisfactory and should work smoothly.

9. The security control of refugees had to be reorganised as a result of the re-grouping programme, but it has continued to function efficiently. There is no doubt that this control plays the most vital part in our security, and this is recognised by all concerned. 5 Corps has established its own R.I.P., and Eighth Army has been moved to the Western side of the Peninsula. Accommodation is now available in transit camps near NAPLES and BARI for the internation of suspect refugees evacuated by the R.I.P's. A very effective system of coast watching and control on the Fifth Army sea flank is in operation.

10. Co-operation with the Italian Counter-intelligence organisation (S.I.M.,C.S.), has been patchy. They have done some good work, notably in 2 District in connection with Fascist subversive activity, and they have proved of some value in the Army areas : on the other hand doubts are sometimes expressed as to their competence and reliability. The main obstacle to satisfactory co-operation has been uncertainty as to how far they should be trusted.

11. Out of a mass of current rumours, two types were particularly prominent : one type involved references to increasing Russian influence in Italian affairs, and the arrival of Russian Divisions, and the other involved stories of Allied withdrawals or German breaks-through.

12. In general, the security situation may be described as normal. If preventive security controls continue to be strictly enforced, we should be able to neutralise the enemy's espionage and sabotage efforts. If we are alert to the danger of Fascist subversive activity, and if strong measures are taken when it is encountered, we should be able to avoid any trouble of a really serious or significant nature from that quarter.

NOTE: This summary contains little reference to SICILY, as no monthly report has been received from 1 District.

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

(a) Security of Information.

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PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

(a) Security of Information.

The period was marked by a regrouping of the Allied armies on a considerable scale. Reports indicated that this programme was being effected with a high degree of security. F.S. checks at key points on the convoy routes revealed that in general the moves were exciting little attention or curiosity among the civilian population.

During the first part of the month a certain amount of speculation existed among U.S. and N.Z. troops concerning projected air and tank offensives in the CASSINO sector. This appeared to have been occasioned by the briefing of officers several days before the operation took place, coupled with the withdrawal of troops immediately prior to the air attack. Careful investigation showed that this type of gossip was confined to military personnel and [illegible] no leakage of information to civilians had occurred.

In general security discipline observed by troops in the combat zone continued to be of a high order. In rear areas, however, there were some reports of laxity on minor points, a situation which presented security problems of some magnitude when taken in conjunction with the large numbers of Italian civilians employed with troops in the L. of C. Thus the source of leakage of information concerning British military activities in JUGOSLAVIA was traced to a civilian employed in the Officers' Mess of Navy House, MANFREDONIA.

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Reports have been received of illicit channels of communication with ALEXANDRIA. Under interrogation, an Italian Air Force pilot admitted that on 15 Feb and 14 Mar he had taken 500 uncensored letters to ALEXANDRIA whilst on operational duty.

Rumours in T.E.F.TO regarding the time and date of convoy sailings proved to be remarkably accurate. These rumours have been traced to Jugoslav personnel concentrated in T.R.U.K.O area prior to disembarkation for the Middle East, and efforts are being made to establish the source of leakage.

On 15 Mar, a message giving in detail the stocks of British ammunition held in depots in ITALY, SICILY and N. AFRICA was sent from FLAMBO to the U.K. by cable in clear. Investigation proved that the fault was due partly to the originator who had omitted to preface the message "SECRET" and partly to a misinterpretation of signals instructions on the part of C.S.O., L. of C.

(b) Security of Personnel.

The enemy has recently passed to the offensive in the realm of propaganda directed against our troops through the medium of radio and leaflet.

The enemy-controlled radio station known as "WERWOLF" has been transmitting for the special benefit of the Poles urging them not to fight in a foreign land for the British but to return home to POLAND where conditions under German occupation are put in a most favourable light. The Polish Corps I(b) Staff estimated the effect of this type of propaganda on Polish troops as negligible. For U.S. troops there is the "Sally and George" radio programme, also enemy controlled.

U.S., British and Polish troops have also been assailed with enemy propaganda leaflets designed to remind them of the joys of home life and urging them to desert as the quickest possible means of regaining these joys. There is no reason to believe that any of these insidious attacks is having any appreciable effect on the morale of Allied troops.

(c) Security of Material and Installations.

No sabotage incidents of any magnitude were reported, and no evidence was forthcoming of any enemy-organised or enemy-inspired sabotage in Allied occupied territory.

Two apparent attempts at railway sabotage by person or persons unknown were recorded. On the State railway in the vicinity of TELNO (Fifth Army area) a piece of rail was discovered inserted between the track rail and guard rail in such a position that intended sabotage appeared evident. The attempt was discovered in time to avert a disaster, but subsequent investigations proved [illegible]. The second case of a more serious nature, occurred on 17 Mar at

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13

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Two apparent attempts at railway sabotage by person or persons unknown were recorded. On the State railway in the vicinity of ULMO (Fifth Army area) a piece of rail was discovered inserted between the track rail and guard rail in such a position that intended sabotage appeared evident. The attempt was discovered in time to avert a disaster, but subsequent investigations proved fruitless. The second case, of a more serious nature, occurred on 17 June at AVELAS when a half pound block of TNT was found firmly lodged against the inside rail under a box car loaded with 155 mm ammunition. This attempt appeared to be the work of some ignorant, ill-disposed individual acting in the mistaken belief that when the car was moved an explosion would take place. The possibility cannot however be ruled out that it was a serious attempt to cut the rail and that the would-be saboteur had been disturbed before he had time to finish his work.

Wirecutting continued to occur on a minor scale, and arrests were made in a few of the cases. In one instance in the 5 Corps area the wires had been neatly rejoined thus causing a short circuit. The greatest number of cases (five) reported during the month from any one area came from I.B.S. In all cases lengths of wire, (in several cases heavy cable), were removed and in one instance the perpetrator(s) went so far as to saw down three telephone poles.

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In 2 and 3 Districts, pilfering on a considerable scale was reported from the ammunition dumps centred on BITONTO and NOLA respectively. Such pilfering was generally confined to the removal of cordite, detonators and ballistite cartridges, thereby rendering considerable quantities of ammunition useless. In order to compensate for the shortage of guards, Districts have been advised to arrange for the display of suitable posters warning civilians against tampering with war materials on pain of severe punishment. This method has already produced appreciable results in the Army areas in connection with wire cutting.

(d) Security of Ports and Coastline.

Careful attention was given by Fifth Army and 5 Corps to the coast-line flanking their areas. From the main Fifth Army front line to the VOLTURNO coastal observation posts manned by troops of 88 Inf Div were located at intervals of about one kilometer and linked by telephone. Arrangements were made for this work to be continued by the incoming division relieving 88 Inf Div.

All normal port security controls and precautions were enforced satisfactorily in the ports within this command and valuable advice and assistance was being received from Forward Counter-Intelligence in the specialised spheres of travel control and port security. It is recommended that Forward C.I. should extend its activities to SICILY where at present some uncertainty exists as regards procedure.

The situation in CAPRI harbour was causing some uneasiness. Control of access by civilians to the quayside was considered inadequate in view of the fact that the harbour was being used by Allied warships and merchant vessels. Since the island is now a P.B.S. responsibility it was decided to establish a C.I.C. sub-section there.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

(a) Analysis of Arrests.

	For trial for a Security offence (Category A).	For Internment. (Category B).	For Detention pending further investigation. (Category C).	T.O.T.L
Italian Armed Forces.	1	4	2	7
Civil Officials including CC.RR	-	3	1	4

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(a) Analysis of Arrests.

	For trial for a Security Offence (Category A).	For Internment. (Category B).	For Detention pending further investigation. (Category C).	TOTAL
Italian Armed Forces.	1	4	2	7
Civil Officials including CC.RR	-	3	1	4
Miscellaneous civilians	88	67	6	161
TOTAL	89	74	9	172

NOTE: Of the above (a) 14 were ex-Fascist Party Officials
(b) 16 were ex-NVSN.

(b) Agents.

The total number of agents captured during the month was 24. Of these 10 were intercepted by Eighth Army (all by the Polish Corps); 11 by Fifth Army (including 2 at NZIO and 1 by the French Expeditionary Corps); 2 by 5 Corps, and 1 by P.W.B. The explanation of the fact that all Eighth Army arrests were on the Polish Corps front seems to be twofold: in the first place the main routes of infiltration appear to lie through this sector; in the second, Polish troops are said to be very "spy conscious", and thorough in the rounding-up of refugees and suspect civilians.

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Agents were predominantly of the Abwehr type, of which there were 15. The two intercepted on the bridgehead were S.D. Five were of the short range 1c type and two have not yet been identified as belonging to any particular organisation.

One party of agents brought W/T sets with them.

Examination of their mission revealed nothing outstanding or unusual, though there is evidence of an increase in attention being paid to sabotage, which was the mission of five of these agents.

During the month, 13 were brought up for trial, and 12 convictions were secured. The thirteenth was acquitted but has been interned.

(c) Other Individual Cases.

(i) Persons Arrested.

FRANCESCONI Gilberto.

Arrested on 10 Feb 44 by CC.RR. at RUVO di PUGLIA on suspicion of theft of a W/T set (belonging to N Section "A" Force). He stated that, with the assistance of an alleged accomplice, BARTINI, (who is also in custody), he intended making contact with the Germans and transmitting information by means of the stolen set. He further claimed to have been dropped by parachute in FOGGIA Province. Expert opinion, however, considers that transmission under the circumstances and with the set in question would be impossible. His interrogation by S.C.I. and C.S.D.I.C. has presented exceptional difficulties owing to the fact that he is such an accomplished and fortile liar. He has made several long and detailed statements which, however, he has later admitted to be false. It is still impossible to decide whether or not he was sent on a mission by the Germans. Interrogation is continuing.

VALENTA alias O'BRIEN (etc).

Had been working for S.O.E. but was dismissed as unsuitable. On 24 Jan 44 he was arrested in the vicinity of VENAFRO. It was thought he was possibly planning to cross over to the enemy side of the lines and he was recommended for internment. While detained for interrogation by CSDIC, NAPLES, he escaped from custody and was once more arrested in a forward area while actually making enquiries as to how he might make his way through the lines. VALENTA has a prodigious memory for names and has certain fairly detailed knowledge of Allied

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General BERTINI.

00019

Was chief figure in a Republican Fascist plot in SARDINIA which culminated in his attempted visit to German-occupied ITALY and his subsequent arrest on 4 Dec 43. He is still awaiting trial by Italian Military Tribunal. Nine teen other persons who were implicated in the plot are also to be tried. The delay in the trial has been due partly to an air accident in which the Prosecuting Officer, was killed and many documents in the case destroyed, but it is expected that the trial will be held shortly. Meanwhile, we have called for a full report on the case.

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CONT.PILS Guido.

Director of the Bank of NAPLES at CAMPOBASSO, arrested 25 Mar 44 for internment as an active Fascist of many years standing. Was on intimate terms with the high-ranking Fascist officials of the province. His present activities and sentiments are pro-German and anti-Allied. His presence in the area was causing dis-satisfaction among pro-Allied elements and his removal will not interfere with the functioning of the Bank.

[illegible]ESSOG Ahmed.

Recognised by a CSDIC officer in BARI as an alleged [illegible]ESSORO agent whose exploits are recounted in a book published in the Middle East. Investigations and enquiries are proceeding.

(ii) Suspects.

FORTI Lieut-Col. Nicola.

Now serving with an Alpine Bn at F.S.N.O ([illegible]RENOBLE). Ex-Federal Secretary at [illegible]ERMO, reported as being anti-Allied. His son is still in [illegible]ERMO and is reported to be actively engaged in espionage for the Germans. Investigations proceeding (2 District).

De R[illegible]S Octavio.

Has worked for the Allies as an agent but is suspected of playing a double game. Investigations are now in progress (3 District).

VICARI Fortunato.

Ex-Federale of [illegible]NCONA 1943. Reported seen in [illegible]OMA. Now a captain in the Italian Army. Being investigated by 2 District.

(d) Subversive Movements.

(i) Fascist Organisation in LECCE.

Information came to light of a Fascist organisation centered round LECCE. Interrogations of arrested members of the group have established that the organisation was set up with a view to passing military information to the Fascist Republican Authorities and to organising uprisings in the event of a German success. No connection has been established with the S.O.E./NO Group (see

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It is though that this might be a suitable case for trial by an Allied Military Court, but a decision has not yet been reached on this point.

Special reports on this case have been forwarded to [redacted].

(ii) Fascist Organisation in [redacted].

This was at first thought to be part of the LECCE organisation. More thorough investigation, however, has shown that it is independent and probably more serious; members are older, more respectable and possess considerable means. This group is known to have been connected with F.TO Francesco, one of the leading Fascists in [redacted] and a friend of [redacted], (arrested by S.I.M. on 11 Oct 43, subsequently released and still being sought). It is reported to possess a considerable quantity of arms, though the figures mentioned - 5,000

rifles and 1,000 automatics - are considered to greatly exaggerated.

Investigations continue and it is hoped in the course of the next week or so to have sufficient evidence for arrests and prosecution.

(iii) Fascist Group in BARLETTA.

This group meets in a garage, is 50 - 60 strong, and is reported to have about 300 sympathisers. The leaders are DE FEO Ottavio, BARULLI Gino, SAVELLI Salvatore and RUTIGLIANO Cosimo who are said to be interested in railway sabotage. An effort is being made to introduce a SIM agent into the party in order to penetrate the group.

(c) Control of Movement.

(i) The interrogation and registration of refugees from across the Adriatic became better organised. Arrangements were made for an interrogation team to operate in the D.A. Camp near BARI, but before this team could effectively perform its function, suitable accommodation had to be provided and wired off, so that persons requiring detailed interrogation can be safely confined. In addition it is necessary to evacuate a large number of refugees who have made the camp their home and are carrying on their business from it. Steps are being taken to arrange for the removal of these persons, but it is not proving simple.

(ii) 5 Corps has established its own R.I.P. on the ADRIATIC Sector and the Eighth Army R.I.P. has moved to the west of the mountains. There are therefore now three R.I.P.'s, and all are functioning properly.

(iii) In spite of the improvement that was noted in A.A.I. Security Summary No. 12, reports continue to come in of Italian military personnel being granted passes by their unit commanders to enable them to travel home on leave to places within the Army areas. This irregularity has already been taken up with the A.A.I.A. whenever specific instances have come to light.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Italian Armed Forces.

00018

(i) Following serious case of security indiscipline has been reported by Eighth Army:

ANDREUCCI Ernesto, Caporale-Maggiore of the CC.RR. attached to 9 Italian Corps, BARI, dressed in civilian clothes, was apprehended in CASTEL DI SANGRO (AQUILA) and found to be in possession of a number of notes intended for delivery to persons in enemy-occupied ITALY. The notes were examined and

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and Area Cdr, so that persons requiring [illegible] confined. In addition it is necessary to evacuate a large number of refugees who have made the camp their home and are carrying on their businesses from it. Steps are being taken to arrange for the removal of these persons, but it is not proving simple.

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(a) Italian Armed Forces.

(i) Following serious case of security indiscipline has been reported by Eighth Army:

ANDREUCCI Ernesto, Caporale-Maggiore of the CC.RR. attached to 9 Italian Corps BARI, dressed in civilian clothes, was apprehended in CASTEL DI SANGRO (AQUILA) and found to be in possession of a number of notes intended for delivery to persons in enemy-occupied ITALY. The notes were examined and appeared harmless. According to his statement, several high-ranking officers of the Italian Army, including General MARICI, CADERA, GRASSO and UTILI, had given him intelligence missions to perform or family messages to deliver. His orders, he stated, were given him by General MARICI, G.O.C. 9 Italian Corps. The intelligence missions were concerned with the location of enemy forces, and the cooperation accorded to the Germans by Italian officials. The case has been taken up strongly direct with Gen. UTILI (G.O.C. Italian Motorised Group with Eighth Army) and through A.C.C. It has been made clear that no intelligence mission may be dispatched by the Italians without reference to the appropriate Allied authority, and that the organising by high-ranking Italian officers of such illicit methods of communication is considered a serious matter, in view of the strenuous efforts being made to suppress illicit courier services.

(ii) Several incidents of rowdy behaviour are reported from 2 District.

Troops of the Scottish Battalion were involved in several fracas. On 24 Mar 44 three sailors of the Unit provoked a row by drinking to the return of Fascism and the downfall of the Allies. Troops of the same unit sacked the Communist HQ in CALLIPOLI at the end of February.

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On [illegible] Mar, parachutists in LECCE were enlisted by a certain Sergeant CANELLA of their number to "keep order among the refugees". This consisted in singing Fascist songs and attacking communists. The same performance was repeated two nights later.

The 3 SQUADRONE ESPLORATORI was involved in a communist disturbance at CALPI (LECCE) on 27 Feb, attempting to break up a communist meeting. The Captain of this unit had to intervene to restore order. CC.RR report that several officers and N.C.O's. of this unit have shown Fascist sympathies.

The A.C.C. has been asked to ensure that sufficiently strong disciplinary action is taken in such cases to discourage further incidents and trouble of this nature.

(b) Civil Population.

There is little change to report in the attitude of the population.

Unrest is reported from 2 District and SICILY where there have been demonstrations in several localities. These demonstrations were primarily caused by food difficulties, though once again the Allies are given credit for bringing food to the country, whereas the Italian officials are accused of failure to distribute it properly. Nor does the accusation appear to be devoid of foundation.

The month witnessed several similar demonstrations in SARDINIA also.

In other areas the trend of relations between Allied troops and civilians seemed to be towards improvement, although there was trouble at CASTELLANETA (TARANTO) on 1 Mar 44 when some Polish troops took exception to the red flag which was being flown at the communist meeting and which they threw down. Two Polish soldiers received knife wounds; eight Italians were arrested. The Italians comment on the openly-expressed anti-Russian views of the Poles.

(c) Rumours.

Two main currents of rumour appeared during the past month.

(i) From several areas came rumours of the imminent arrival of Russian troops on the Italian front, and of greater Russian influence in Italian affairs. Some typical examples were:

> "... Russian forces have arrived in NAPLES to fight on the Italian Front."
>
> "Two Russian divisions are waiting in BARI to be sent to the CASSINO front and more are expected arrive shortly."

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to distribute it properly. Nor does the conduction [illegible] dation.

The month witnessed several similar demonstrations in CASSINO also.

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(c) **Rumours.**

Two main currents of rumour appeared during the past month.

(i) From several areas came rumours of the imminent appearance of Russian troops on the Italian front, and of greater Russian influence in Italian affairs. Some typical examples were:

> "A Russian force has arrived in NAPLES to fight on the Italian Front."
>
> "Two Russian divisions are waiting in RAM to be sent to the CASSINO front and more are expected arrive shortly."
>
> "Eighteen Russian divisions have disembarked at RAM."

(ii) There was a noticeable tendency on the part of the civilians to spread rumours of a defeatist nature regarding the fighting in Italy. Such were:

> "The Germans have broken through at CASSINO and are approaching the VOLTURNO."
>
> "CIVITA is under fire and S. ELIA is being evacuated."
>
> "The Germans have received huge reinforcements from abroad."

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(d) Matters of General Security Interest.

(i) Courier Service.

S.I.M. in TARANTO arrested three men who were collecting letters from civilians with a view to taking them to German-occupied ITALY. Their names are: ALESSANDRI Enjo (employed in Italian censorship), FERRETTI Catalde (unemployed), FERRETTI Egidio (unemployed).

Enquiries are still proceeding but it appears that these men are the heads of a group engaged in this traffic. It is noteworthy that careful instructions were issued in the form of "Rules of Correspondence"; eg senders were instructed not to discuss politics, military matters, etc. The organisers referred to it as "a humanitarian scheme at reasonable cost."

4. LOCATION OF F.S. SECTIONS and C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 31 Mar 44.

	Attached to.	Location.
A.A.I.		
16 F.S.S.	H.Q. A.A.I.	CASERTA.
FIFTH ARMY		
305 C.I.C.	H.Q. Fifth Army.	SPARANISE N 0887.
202 C.I.C.	II Corps.	PIETRAMELLASICANO N 9267.
136 C.I.C.	36 Inf Div	MADDALONI N 3271
185 C.I.C.	88 Inf Div	NAPLES.
188 C.I.C.	34 Inf Div	CARANO N 9390
204 C.I.C.	IV Corps.	NAPLES.
206 C.I.C.	VI Corps.	NETTUNO.
103 C.I.C.	3 Inf Div.	
134 C.I.C.	34 Inf Div.	
145 C.I.C.	45 Inf Div.	
151 C.I.C.	1 Armd Div.	Borchhead.
3 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div.	
17 F.S.S.	5 Inf Div.	
EIGHTH ARMY.		
263 F.S.S.	H.Q. Eighth Army.	CAPOBASSO
11 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Corps.	GUARDIA N 5096
7 Cdn F.S.S.	5 Cdn Armd Div.	CASTELNUOVO N 9332.

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16 F.S.S.

FIFTH ARMY

305 C.I.C.

202 C.I.C.

136 C.I.C.
185 C.I.C.
188 C.I.C.

204 C.I.C.

206 C.I.C.
103 C.I.C.
134 C.I.C.
145 C.I.C.
151 C.I.C.
3 F.S.S.
17 F.S.S.

EIGHTH ARMY.

263 F.S.S.

11 Cdn F.S.S.
7 Cdn F.S.S.

2 Polish Corps F.S.S.
3 Carpathian Div F.S.S.
5 Krosowa Inf Div F.S.S.

278 F.S.S.

442 F.S.S.
2 N.Z. F.S.S.
5 F.S.S.
55 F.S.S.

88 F.S.S.

H.Q., Fifth Army.

II Corps.

36 Inf Div
Inf Div
Inf Div

IV Corps.

VI Corps.
3 Inf Div.
34 Inf Div.
45 Inf Div.
1 Armd Div.
1 Inf Div.
5 Inf Div.

H.Q. Eighth Army.

1 Cdn Corps.
5 Cdn Armd Div.

2 Polish Corps.
3 Carpathian Inf Div.
5 Krosowa Inf Div.

10 Corps.

13 Corps.
2 N.Z. Div.
4 Brit. Inf Div.
6 Armd Div.

78 Inf Div.

SPARNISE N 0887.

PIEMONTE PASSO NO
N 9287.
MADDALONI N 3271
NAPLES.
C.R.NO N 9390

N.PLES.

NETTUNO.

Beachhead.

C. POSARSO

GAIRDL. N 5096
C.STELMUOVO H 9332.

C.NTARPO H 3224
C.RPINONE H 2732
MONT.QUILL. H 0929

C.STELFR.NCO H 3000

VEN.FRO H 0320.
G 9713
ACQUAFONDATA G 9696.
PIEDMONTE D'ALIFE
H 3005.
CERVARO G 9319.

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	Attached to.	Location.
5 CORPS.		
68 F.S.S.	H.Q., 5 Corps.	ATESA. H 3665.
1 Cdn F.S.S.	1 Cdn Inf Div	S. VITO C 3611.
290 F.S.S.	4 Ind Inf Div.	HQ 4 Ind Inf Div (In transit).
406 F.S.S.	8 Ind Inf Div.	C.SOLI H 2490.
407 F.S.S.	10 Ind Inf Div.	HQ 10 Ind Inf Div (In transit).
No.1 DISTRICT.		
21 P.S.S.		CATANIA
51 F.S.S.		AGRIGENTO
310 F.S.S.		MESSINA
314 P.S.S.		SIRACUSA.
No.2 DISTRICT.		
38 P.S.S.		BARI
47 P.S.S.		VASTO
85 P.S.S.		BARLETTA.
91 P.S.S.		BRINDISI
315 P.S.S.		BARI
409 P.S.S.		LECCE
410 P.S.S.		TARANTO
417 F.S.S.		TERMOLI
2 N.Z.E.F. F.S.S.		BARI
M.....F. Dets C.I.C.		FOGGIA. BARI LECCE
No.3 DISTRICT.		
37 F.S.S.		CASTELLAMARE
97 P.S.S.		NAPLES
276 F.S.S.		SALERNO
312 F.S.S.		NAPLES
14 Cdn P.S.S.		AVELLINO
P.B.S.		
C.I.C. Dets (P.B.S.)		NAPLES SALERNO

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38 P.S.S.	VASTO
47 P.S.S.	BARLETTA
85 P.S.S.	BRINDISI
91 P.S.S.	BARI
315 P.S.S.	LECCE
409 P.S.S.	TARANTO
410 P.S.S.	TERMOLI
417 P.S.S.	BARI
2 N.Z.E.F. P.S.S.	FOGGIA
M.....F. Dets C.I.C.	BARI
	LECCE

No.3 DISTRICT.

37 P.S.S.	CASTELLAMARE
97 P.S.S.	NAPLES
276 F.S.S.	SALERNO
312 F.S.S.	NAPLES
14 Cdn F.S.S.	AVELLINO

P.B.S.

C.I.C. Dets (P.B.S.)	NAPLES
	SALERNO
C.I.C. Det (M.....F.)	NAPLES.

I.B.S.

C.I.C. Det	PALERMO

ALLIED GARRISON SARDINIA.

C.I.C. Det.	CAGLIARI.

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785016

Information S.774

Subject:- A.A.I. Security Summary No.12. H.Q. ALLIED FORCES IN ITALY.

SECRET.

AAI/1404/4/G(Ib).

19 Mar 44.

A.G. of S., G-2., A.F.H.Q.

(2)

1. Herewith A.A.I. Security Summary No. 12 for the month of February 1944.

2. This summary covers the Fifth and Eighth Army areas only.

W.D. Gibson Lt-Col
for Brigadier,
D.C.S.(I).

Copy to:-

2 District
P.B.S.
A.C.C. (Security Intelligence).
R.A.F. Security Officer.
2 S.I.(b) Unit.
3 S.I.(b) Unit.

00016

20/740 LS

1A.

A.A.I. SECURITY SUMMARY No. 12. SECRET.

Covering Army Areas during February 1944.

PART I.

12.

1. GENERAL SURVEY.

(a) During February conditions were fairly static on both Army fronts and in the beach-head. This had a direct bearing on the security situation, since it enabled most of the civilians dangerous to security in the forward areas to be removed.

(b) This situation also facilitated the spotting of newcomers to the area, such as refugees coming through the lines, or civilians moving Northward. A large number of persons were detained for interrogation, and, amongst these, nine enemy agents were caught.

(c) Control of civil movement within the Army areas was again strictly enforced, and led to a number of cases being handed over to AMG for trial for infringement of the movement regulations.

(d) An interrogation centre was established in NAPLES to check all refugees evacuated from the Beach-head area. This worked smoothly, and a number of cases were passed on to CSDIC for further interrogation. No enemy agents have so far been found amongst these refugees.

(e) Considerable re-organisation and troop movement took place during the month. This called for a high degree of security discipline, and the energetic enforcement of numerous security precautions. In general, satisfactory results were achieved.

(f) The arrival of Polish Forces in the Eighth Army area created several new problems. Although their military security is of a high order, and they have established good relations with the civil population, these were marred to some extent by expressions of sentiments hostile to the Russians. To assist the Polish Forces to understand the various security measures in force, one Field Security Officer was temporarily attached to HQ Polish Corps, and one to 3 Carpathian Div. They acted as security advisers and assisted Polish personnel to assimilate our security routine. Certain specially selected F.S. N.C.O's were also lent to the two Polish F.S. Sections to act in a similar capacity.

(g) An internment camp for civilians was established at PADULA in POTENZA province. This camp can accommodate up to 3,000 persons, and will be the central camp to which all internment cases will be sent. Cases will be reviewed from time to time and releases effected as necessary. Officers experienced in this kind of work are being attached to the camp for this purpose.

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(d) [illegible] refugees evacuated from the Beach-head [illegible] of cases were passed on to CSDIC for further interrogation. No enemy [illegible] have so far been found amongst these refugees.

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(h) F.S./C.I.C. personnel and others who had been assigned to S Force, and had thus been prevented from carrying on their ordinary duties, were released to normal duty again. They are at four days notice, ready to concentrate again when necessary.

(i) Several cases were reported of signal lines being cut, but in no case was there evidence of intent to sabotage. Damage was caused on several occasions at night in the NAPLES area to U.S. Army petrol pipe-lines; as a preventative measure an additional number of Carabinieri were obtained to patrol these pipe-lines.

(j) During the month, 130 persons were arrested, of which 80 were for internment and 50 for trial for security offences.

(k) CC.MR. continued loyally to assist the security agencies, and somewhat closer co-operation was achieved between the latter and the S.I.M. C.S. detachments.

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PART II.

1. MILITARY SECURITY.

(a) Security of Information.

(i) Instances continued to be reported of traffic in illicit mail within Allied occupied ITALY involving both Italian civilians and officials. When intercepted this mail invariably proved to be harmless in content and addressed to places in forward areas where civil postal facilities had not yet been re-opened. It is not considered that this practice constitutes any grave threat to our security but it is a situation which needs to be watched and discouraged. Several arrests of these unofficial couriers were made for contravention of movement regulations.

(ii) Classified documents emanating from this Headquarters were among those in a mail bag stolen from the back of a truck in CATANIA on 29 Feb 44. A search was immediately instituted and a pile of charred papers, identified as part of the contents of the bag, was later discovered. Investigations showed that the bag was stolen by two Italian youths in the hope that it contained foodstuffs or valuables, and that when this was proved not to be the case the contents were burned as incriminating evidence. The two Italian youths concerned were traced and arrested. In the opinion of G.S.I. No.1 District it was fairly well established that no security compromise had occurred.

(b) Security of Personnel.

Nothing to report.

(c) Security of Material and Installations.

A security survey of the U.S. Army petrol pipeline running from the outskirts of NAPLES to the RADIO River revealed that an average of three breaks a week had occurred during the period. These happened for the most part during the night and were made by civilians for the purpose of obtaining petrol by puncturing holes into the pipes, or, more often, by loosening the coupling of the pipe joints. In several cases after the line had been broken the escaping petrol had been set on fire. This unsatisfactory situation was due entirely to a lack of adequate guards and immediate steps were taken to remedy this deficiency. One hundred and seventy five Carabinieri have since been assigned to patrol the line from NAPLES to the TORA rail-head, and a marked improvement in the situation is anticipated in the future.

(d) Security of Ports and Coast Line.

(i) No ports of any size were located in the Army areas.

(ii) On the west coast SIM/CS has posted members of the Guardia di Finanza

NO

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arrested. In the opinion of C.S.I. No.1 District [illegible] that no security compromise had occurred.

(b) Security of Personnel.

Nothing to report.

(c) Security of Material and Installation.

A security survey of the U.S. Army petrol pipeline running from the outskirts of NAPLES to the VOLTURNO River revealed that an average of three breaks a week had occurred during the period. These happened for the most part during the night and were made by civilians for the purpose of obtaining petrol by puncturing holes into the pipes, or, more often, by loosening the coupling of the pipe joints. In several cases after the line had been broken the escaping petrol had been set on fire. This unsatisfactory situation was due entirely to a lack of adequate guards and immediate steps were taken to remedy this deficiency. One hundred and seventy five Carabinieri have since been assigned to patrol the line from NAPLES to the TORA rail-head, and a marked improvement in the situation is anticipated in the future.

(d) Security of Ports and Coast Line.

(i) No ports of any size were located in the Army areas.

(ii) On the west coast SIM.CS has posted members of the Guardia di Finanza at strategic points along the coastline and on the neighbouring islands as far north as MONTE GONA; their duty is to organise a network of informants among the local population for the purpose of reporting unauthorised landings and other suspicious incidents. This organisation is under the control of the SIM.CS "Centro" at NAPLES. A similar system is to be organised on the east coast, with particular reference to the GARGANO Peninsular, to be directed from BARI (Centro) via FOGGIA (Settocentro).

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

(a) Analysis of Arrests.

Following is a tabulated summary of arrests made during February in the Army Area:-

	For trial for a Security Offence (Category B).	For Internment (Category A).	For Detention pending Further Investigation. (Category C).	TOTAL.
Italian Armed Forces.	1	6	-	7
Civil Officials including CC.RR.	6	4	-	10
Miscellaneous civilians.	43	70	-	113
TOTAL	50	80	-	130

NOTE:- Of the above (a) 5 were ex-Fascist Party Officials.
(b) 7 were ex-M.V.S.N.

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(b) Important Individual Cases.

(i) Enemy Agents.

Separate reports have been forwarded on the enemy agents captured during the month.

(ii) SERVELLO Cesare Federico

Console Generale M.V.S.N. 1936 to 1941. Had been living in retirement at M.P.A.L.E. (Prov CAMPOBASSO) but his presence in Army area was considered undesirable, since he had been for some years President of the "Tribunale Speciale per la difesa dello Stato". He was given the option of presenting himself for service with the Italian Forces or being interned. He elected the former and left for BRINDISI on 23 Feb 44.

(iii) CAPPELLO Raffaele fu Pietro.

Lieutenant of the MVSN. Ex-Segretario of CV... (PNF). Friend of the Germans, with whom he collaborated closely. Interned.

(iv) CARBONE Mgr, Luigi.

Vicar-General of ORTONA. (Prov Chieti). Arrested 6 Feb 44 for persistent anti-Allied propaganda after the Armistice. He has been placed under the care of a high ecclesiastical dignitary in No.2 District.

(v) CIPRIANI Giuseppe.

Officer of the Ufficio Informazione with Italian Army in RIMINI until 9 September 1943. Volunteered for service with the blackshirts in BERLIN and ADDISABEBA. Considered dangerous and adventurous, and consequently interned.

(vi) CAVALIERI Domenico
MINI. Giovanni
MEGRONI Arnaldo.

Active members of the MVSN for many years. Left CAMPOBASSO to cross into enemy territory carrying MVSN officers' ration cards. Interned.

(vii) CARUSO Pietro fu Francesco Paolo.

Was appointed Podesta of MISTERBIANCO by the German Military Authorities. According to reliable information, he collaborated with the Germans

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Lieutenant of the Navy. [illegible] Germans, with whom he collaborated closely. Interned.

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(v) CIPRIANI Giuseppe.

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(vi) [illegible]DI Domenico
MIN. Giovanni
NERONI Arnaldo.

Active members of the MVSN for many years. Left CAMPOBASSO to cross into enemy territory carrying MVSN officers' ration cards. Interned.

(vii) [illegible]NI Pietro fu Francesco Paolo.

Was appointed Podesta of MINTURNO by the German Military Authorities. According to reliable information, he collaborated with the Germans during his three months tenure of office far beyond the minimum required of him by his position. After entering British occupied territory he made in the presence of witness remarks derogatory to the Allied Forces and to the Allied cause. Interned.

(viii) MASCETTI Domenik.

Connected with German parachute company, apparently voluntarily. Possible connection with German counter-intelligence. Worked with German battery near ANZIO. Partly dressed in German uniform, when arrested in Bridgehead. Interned.

2. (c) Political Organisations.

At Appendix "A" is a short account of the former Ufficio Politico Investigativo, security organisation of the M.V.S.N., compiled by Eighth Army.

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(d) Control of Movement.

(i) Movement from enemy territory decreased noticeably during the latter half of February, except in the C.SOLI (Prov. CHIETI) sector; there, large numbers of refugees came through our lines, principally evacuees from CHIETI town. That such movement is deliberately encouraged by the Germans is doubtful, however. One account tells of refugees filing past a German control point and making some gift to the Germans such as a watch, gold ring or money to secure a passage to our lines. A woman who acted as a guide (for a consideration) to such refugees is alleged to have been shot by the Germans. (Two other such guides have been apprehended by F.S.P.).

(ii) While control of entry into Army areas still absorbs the greater part of the time of F.S.P., an improvement is noticeable as regards Italian Military Personnel entering the Army areas on leave, further steps having been taken to make known the regulations restricting access into Army areas.

(iii) In view of the large number of enemy agents already sent through our lines and the probable continuation of such activity on a large scale, a check is now being made of civilians crossing the control line from North-West to South-East as well as in the opposite direction. The object of this additional check is to detect any persons who have crossed our lines from the enemy side and have been missed by the forward controls, thus voiding the R.I.'s. Check points, particularly in the mountainous control region, are being reinforced.

3. MISCELLANEOUS.

(a) Italian Armed Forces.

The morale of the Italian troops appears to be low at the moment. The reason for this is said to be the political dissension which is at present so widespread and which tends to confuse and bewilder the troops as to what, if anything, they are fighting for. Another contributory cause is the apparent lack of trust the soldiers have in their officers.

(b) Civil Population.

(i) Dissatisfaction among the civilian population continues, but blame as regards food, prices and other difficulties seems to be directed against the Italian authorities rather than to the Allies.

(ii) Civil reaction to the bombing of the C.SSINO Monastery is overwhelmingly of the belief that the action was a military necessity, and blame is placed squarely on the shoulders of the German command which countenanced the use of the Monastery as a military institution. The consensus is that the most important present interest of the Italian is the ending of the war rather than the preservation of artistic

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(i) Dissatisfaction among the civilian population continues, but blame as regards food, prices and other difficulties seems to be directed against the Italian authorities rather than to the Allies.

(ii) Civil reaction to the bombing of the CASSINO Monastery is overwhelmingly of the belief that the action was a military necessity, and blame is placed squarely on the shoulders of the German command which countenanced the use of the Monastery as a military institution. The consensus is that the most important present interest of the Italian is the ending of the war rather than the preservation of artistic monuments.

(c) Rumours.

(i) Among Troops.

Most rumours current during this period centred round forthcoming operations, but it is not considered that any leakage of information was involved. They were a natural outcome of the large scale movement of formations which took place. Typical examples are:-

British troops stated that 10 Corps was returning to ENGLAND soon to participate in the "Second Front".

Four percent of U.S. combat troops with 18 months or over in foreign service, two percent of non-combat troops with the same length of service, and one percent combat troops with from 12 to 18 months foreign service will be returned to the U.S.

Fifth Army's command will be limited to the Bridgehead. Fifth Army is to command a Franco-American invasion of SOUTHERN FRANCE, is going to ENGLAND as a reserve army, is going to INDIA.

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Eighth Army will shortly invade YUGOSLAVIA. (Current among troops in CASERTA area but becoming general).

- Fresh landing North of ORTONA will be made shortly. (General among troops of Eighth Army).

1 Cdn Div will shortly be returning to U.K. as General MONTGOMERY has stated he wishes this Div to be under him for the Second Front (1 Cdn Div).

(ii) Among Civilians.

The following is a selection of rumours current among civilians:-

Enthusiasm for the Russian battle successes has resulted in the rumour that Russian troops are soon to be brought to ITALY to lend a hand in the fighting at CASSINO.

The Germans are too strong for the Allies in CASSINO and a strong allied defence line has been established while awaiting relief from the bridge-head.

The increase of the bread and vermicelli ration already granted by the Allied Government, and future increases which are to be granted are only the results of the diplomatic pressure of Russia upon the American and British Governments on behalf of the liberated population.

The Germans have re-occupied ORTONA and the Allies are evacuating via TERMOLI. (CAMPOBASSO town 6 Feb 44).

4. LOCATION OF F.S. SECTIONS AND C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 29 FEB 44.

	Attached to.	Location.
A.A.I.		
16 F.S.S.	H.Q.A.A.I.	CASERTA.
FIFTH ARMY.		
305 C.I.C.	H.Q. Fifth Army.	CASERTA.
202 C.A.C.	II Corps.	RAVISCANINA (H 180068).
134 C.I.C.	34 Inf Div	ALIFE (H 206054).
136 C.I.C.	36 Inf Div	RAVISCANINA (H 180068).
206 C.I.C.	VI Corps.	NETTUNO.
3 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div	Beachhead.
35 F.S.S.	56 Inf Div.	
103 C.I.C.	3 Inf Div.	
145 C.I.C.	45 Inf Div.	
151 C.I.C.	1 Armd Div.	
278 F.S.S.	10 Corps.	ROCCA MARINA (M 9592).
17 F.S.S.	5 Inf Div	CASILINO (M 9289).
31 F.S.S.	46 Inf Div	PONTE (M 9597).
138 C.I.C.	88 Inf Div.	PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE (H 3105).

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4. LOCATION OF F.S. SECTIONS AND C.I.C. DETACHMENTS AS ON 29 FEB 44.

	Attached to.	Location.
.....		
16 F.S.S.	H.Q. A.A.I.	CASERTA.
FIFTH ARMY.		
305 C.I.C.	H.Q. Fifth Army.	CASERTA.
202 C. .C.	II Corps.	RAVISCANINA (H 100068).
134 C.I.C.	34 Inf Div	ALIFE (H 206054).
136 C.I.C.	36 Inf Div	RAVISCANINA (H 100068).
206 C.I.C.	VI Corps.	NETTUNO.
3 F.S.S.	1 Inf Div	
35 F.S.S.	56 Inf Div.	Beachhead.
103 C.I.C.	3 Inf Div.	
145 C.I.C.	45 Inf Div.	
151 C.I.C.	1 Armd Div.	
278 F.S.S.	10 Corps.	SESSA AURUNCA (M 9592).
17 F.S.S.	5 Inf Div	CARINO (M 9289).
31 F.S.S.	46 Inf Div	PONTE (M 9597).
188 C.I.C.	88 Inf Div.	PIEDIMONTE D'ALIFE (H 3105).
	N.Z. Corps.	
2 N.Z. F.S.S.	2 N.Z. Div.	S. VITTORE (H 945180).
88 F.S.S.	78 Inf Div.	CALVI.
350 F.S.S.	4 Inf Div.	CERVARO (G 9220).
C.C. "B" C.I.C.	C.C. "B".	MIGLIO (G 9714).
EIGHTH ARMY.		
47 F.S.S.	H.Q. Eighth Army.	VASTO.
253 F.S.S.	H.Q. Eighth Army.	CAMPOBASSO.
11 Cdn F. .S.	1 Cdn Corps.	TORINO DI SANGRO.
1 Cdn F. .S.	1 Cdn Inf Div.	S. VITO CHIETINO.
7 Cdn F.S.S.	5 Cdn Armd Div.	SANT' APOLLINARE
68 F.S. .	5 Corps.	ATESSA.

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412 F.S.S.	13 Corps.	ATESSA.
406 F.S.S.	8 Ind Inf Div.	CASOLI
2 Polish Corps F.S.S.	2 Polish Corps.	VINCHIATURO.
3 Corp. Div F.S.S.	3 Carpathian Inf Div.	CARPINONE.

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APPENDIX "A".

UFFICIO POLITICO INVESTIGATIVO (U.P.I).

1. OBJECT.

The object was primarily the supression of anti-Fascism, but also the reporting of the general political reactions of all people.

2. ORGANISATION.

Each Comando Legione della Milizia had an U.P.I. office. Although the Legione organisation was directly under the control of the Console, the U.P.I. branch was usually sub-allotted to a junior officer (often a Centurione) who worked with a small office staff. Selected members of the Milizia, operating in accordance with instructions from the U.P.I. office, formed the active "elementi fiduciari". These "elementi" were dispersed throughout the subordinate units of the Legione.

3. REPORT SYSTEM.

The U.P.I. at Legione H.Q. corresponded directly with the "elementi fiduciari". The Legione collated a report to the Ufficio Centrale dell 'U.P.I. Comando Generale della Milizia. Copies of this report were sent to the Prefetto and the Segretario Federale. A copy was also usually sent to the Commando di Zona whose jurisdiction was inter-provincial. The ordinary postal service was frequently used for correspondence.

4. METHODS. Members of the U.P.I. operated secretly and often in plain clothes. A file for each informer was kept at Legione HQ, and also records of suspected persons. Special reports were rendered, in response to HQ instructions, regarding any particular suspect, but routine reports were written on a pro-forma basis. The subjects of these routine reports were as follows:-

(a) Morale of the population.
(b) The Political and Economic situation.
(c) The behaviour of Government and Fascist officials.

As a result of investigations action could be taken by the M.V.S.N. or the matter could be referred to the Prefetto for advice. Arrested persons were imprisoned and the case submitted to the Commissione Provinciale per i provvedimenti di polizia. In very important cases the Capo di Stato Maggiore della Milizia had contact with MUSSOLINI (Commandante Generale and Caporale d'Onore).

3. [redacted]

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5. RESULTS.

The results of this Political espionage system were about as effective as those of the Organizzazione Capillare, and the U.P.I. was overshadowed by the Political Organs of the P.S. It may well be, however, that this comparison is superficial in view of the fact that the P.S. was always the main executive of anti-Fascist supression and thereby claimed the public attention.

(Source:- Eighth Army. The reliability of the information is graded "A").

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BR MOST SECRET EQUALS US SECRET

Copy No.....

A.C.M.L. SECURITY SUMMARY No. 11

Period covered 16 Jan to 31 Jan 44.

(1)

PART I.

GENERAL SURVEY.

A feature of the period under review was the movement of several formations in connection with operations on the Fifth Army front and on the ANZIO beachhead. Special security precautions were enforced to conceal these moves and there has been no indication to date that any leakage of information to the enemy has occurred.

The departure of certain formations from the Eighth Army area necessitated a complicated hand-over to incoming F.S. Sections and detachments, a process which becomes more lengthy and detailed as the network of control posts and mobile patrols is elaborated and perfected. In the Fifth Army area VI Corps security personnel were occupied mainly in ensuring the secrecy of operations in the staging areas. All but a small portion of the Fifth Army HQ CIC Detachment was confined to a concentration area with "G" Force.

In spite of these complications, however, the security situation continued to be good. A further eight enemy agents were captured during the period, all in the Eighth Army area. Of these, three had been given a sabotage mission, but this was not carried out.

No sabotage incidents were reported during the period. There were two cases only of wire cutting, in both of which the culprit was caught and handed over to A.C.C. for trial.

The employment of Auxiliary Police in the Eighth Army area, mentioned in Part I of the last report, has not proved an unqualified success. FSP were in general agreement that a reasonable standard of efficiency and usefulness could be obtained, but ACC found the problem of payment and general administration too difficult to contend with. MMLA has since arranged for the work to be undertaken by Italian troops. As soon as the latter are made available the Auxiliary Police will be disbanded.

The control of movement continued to be attended in the [illegible] areas and particular attention was being given by Eighth Army to the movement of Italian military personnel. Detailed instructions were issued to ensure that only Ital-

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patrols is elaborated and perfected. [illegible]
personnel were occupied mainly in ensuring the secrecy of operations in the staging areas. All but a small portion of the Fifth Army HQ CIC Detachment was confined to a concentration area with "S" Force.

In spite of these complications, however, the security situation continued to be good. A further eight enemy agents were captured during the period, all in the Eighth Army area. Of these, three had been given a sabotage mission, but this was not carried out.

No sabotage incidents were reported during the period. There were two cases only of wire cutting, in both of which the culprit was caught red handed over to A.C.C. for trial.

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The control of movement continued to be tightened in the Army areas and, particular attention was being given by Eighth Army to the movement of Italian military personnel. Detailed instructions were issued to ensure that only Italian troops genuinely on duty and in possession of the proper [illegible] pass countersigned by a competent Allied military authority be permitted to enter the Army area. The problem of displaced persons in the Fifth Army area, reported in Part I of the previous summary, continued to be a considerable one, particularly in view of the drain of security personnel in that area to "S" Force and Operation SHINGLE. Large numbers of civilians were left behind by the enemy in evacuated localities, all of whom had to be given at least a brief sifting in view of the efforts of the enemy to send agents through the lines. At times this problem reached considerable proportions, but reports indicated that PSP/CIC were keeping the situation well in hand. There were indications that the controls along the VOLTURNO-CALORE Rivers (Army Rear Control Line) were not functioning entirely satisfactorily. Reports were received of certain illicit ferry services across the river and even of Military Police and Carabinieri allowing civilians to cross without the necessary ACC Pass. Corrective measures were taken.

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Minor civil disturbances were reported in one or two villages and small towns in CAMPOBASSO Province (See Part II, Para 3(b)(ii) below). In all cases whose manifestations were directed against the local civil administration and constituted no immediate threat to the security of Allied military operations.

A small Detention Centre has been set up recently by this Headquarters in the vicinity of CASERTA for the temporary and isolated confinement of enemy agents captured in the Fifth Army area, pending interrogation and investigation by S.I.(b). This Centre is under the control and supervision of 16 F.S. Section attached to this Headquarters.

11. 4. 2062

PART II

1. MILITARY SECURITY

(a) Security of Information.

(i) During the first week of the period rumours continued to be reported concerning the prospects and destination of an Allied amphibious operation, but no definite leakage concerning time or place was discovered. Security personnel located in the planning rooms were constantly on the alert for security breaches, and I.S.P./C.I.C. generally were instructed to investigate and report any rumours prevalent among civilians. Special measures were enforced to ensure secrecy of the movements of formations and results appear to have been satisfactory.

(ii) A secret document concerning the departure of a French convoy from North Africa a month ago was found in possession of an Italian soldier. The information on the case so far has been nebulous, but an investigation is being carried out by the Sécurité Militaire in NAPLES.

(b) Security of Material and Installations.

(i) The sabotage situation continued to be favourable and no cases were reported. Two instances of wire cutting occurred in Province CAMPOBASSO, and in both cases the culprits were caught and handed over to ACC for trial. In the Fifth Army area two cases of alleged wire cutting were traced to carelessness on the part of truck drivers who had broken the wires turning their vehicles round.

(c) Security of Access to Military Establishments.

(i) Special attention was paid by Fifth Army security personnel to the control of access to the planning areas, and a system of War Room passes worked satisfactorily. Security personnel were on duty in these areas at all times.

(ii) There were reports that a great many units in the II Corps area were continuing to issue U.S. Army regulation clothing to Italian civilians employed on various odd jobs, contrary to existing instructions. In many cases the workers were indistinguishable from [illegible]

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(ii) There were reports that a (Post Army units in the II Corps area were continuing to issue U.S. Army regulation clothing to Italian civilians employed on various odd jobs, contrary to existing instructions. In many cases the workers were indistinguishable from [illegible] of the unit. Efforts were made to bring this unsatisfactory situation under control, and Fifth Army intend to circulate again the Army Order on this subject.

(iii) The French Expeditionary Corps has taken the additional precaution of enclosing its headquarters with a barbed wire fence.

(d) Security of Personnel.

Attached at Appendix "C" (A.F.H.Q. only) is a specimen of the enemy propaganda leaflet "Xmas in ROME". Copies of this leaflet were dropped in the LANGLAND area on 13 Jan 44 and in CASTEL DI SANGRO on 27 Jan 44.

2. CIVIL SECURITY.

(a) Individual Suspects.

(i) During the period, eight enemy agents were captured, all on the Eighth Army front. These agents had been instructed to obtain information on troop identifications and movements, shipping, air force organisations, morale and relations between troops and civilians. Three had attended a sabotage course and had been sent across

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to destroy with delayed action incendiary bombs a petrol dump in the Eighth Army area, a mission which was not carried out. Of the agents whose capture was reported previously, two are to be interned, and seven are awaiting trial. Two have been released, one since he was actually working for "I" Section, and the other since he was a former inmate of a lunatic asylum, and had no intention of carrying out the mission assigned to him. In the remaining cases, interrogation and investigation by S.I.(b) and CSDIC are proceeding. Separate reports on these cases have been submitted to AFHQ.

(ii) A noticeable improvement has been achieved in the spotting of suspects among refugees in the Fifth Army area, by sheltering and feeding such persons temporarily in the Corps areas as far as possible, rather than evacuating them directly to the rear. In this way Corps security personnel have more time to carry out security checks, thus reducing the burden which was formerly placed on the R.I.P.

(iii) Arrests reported during the period totalled 114, of which 20 were for trial on a specific charge, 77 for internment and 17 for detention pending further investigation. Cases for internment were authorised by Armies after consultation with Army CCG. Details are shown at Appendix "B".

(iv) The following general analysis gives an indication of the various types of persons arrested:-

Public Officials

Municipal Officials.....	4
CC.RR. and Police	2

Party Officials

M.V.S.N.	5
Minor Fascist Officials (Incl.Squadristi)	9

Miscellaneous

Italian Civilians.	88
Italian Armed Forces....	5
German Nationals..	1
	114

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(b) Subversive Movements and Organisations

No evidence of the existence of any subversive movements was reported from the Army areas.

3. (a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Relations between troops and civilians were reported to be generally

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Public Officials

Municipal Officials.....	4
CC.RR. and Police	2

Party Officials

M.V.S.N.	5
Minor Fascist Officials (Incl.Squadristi)	9

Miscellaneous

Italian Civilians.	88
Italian Armed Forces....	15
German Nationals..	1
	114

00010

(b) Subversive Movements and Organisations

No evidence of the existence of any subversive movements was reported from the Army areas.

3. (a) Relations between Troops and Civilians.

Relations between troops and civilians were reported to be generally good. The population as a whole regards coloured troops with apprehension, but the good behaviour of Indian troops in the area CASTELFRANCO is stated to have made a favourable impression.

(b) Civilian Morale and Reactions.

(i) The landing south of ROME caused a great deal of excitement among the civilian population. Fundamentally however civilian morale remains very much as it was, and there is generally little interest or enthusiasm for the war.

(ii) Reports were received of minor riots in three different localities in the Province of CASERTA. Two of these were directed against the Municipio and in particular the Tax-Collector's office, the main object apparently being to burn tax records. In the third case the CC.RR. barracks were attacked by the villagers armed with hand-grenades and stones. The Carabinieri fired 15 rounds and the rioters dispersed. The Carabinieri themselves considered that the real reason for this attack also was the general dissatisfaction with the taxes levied

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and the regulations governing the "Ammasso". Several arrests were made and the cases are to be tried by ACC. Common to all these disturbances appears to be the absence of Allied troops and ACC in the area, and the continuance in office of administrators of the former regime. Eighth Army considers that similar developments may possibly arise in LANCIANO also, and the matter is being discussed with the provincial ACC authorities in order to remove the possibility of any future excesses of this nature.

(c) Rumours.

(i) Among Troops.

Speculation concerning the possible return of certain formations to the U.K. continued to be prevalent among Eighth Army troops, with 5 Corps, 13 Corps and 78 Div frequently mentioned. The rumour was persistent among Eighth Army personnel that all British troops in ITALY would be replaced by Dominion Forces. The last fortnight produced a somewhat more varied crop of rumours than usual, of which the following are typical:

That BARI is the assembly area for the invasion of YUGOSLAVIA (TERMOLI and VASTO areas).

That RIBBENTROP is discussing peace terms with British representatives in SPAIN. (CAMPOBASSO. The official British denial of this rumour was thought to be a possible bluff, as a similar denial was given during the discussions which preceded ITALY's Armistice).

That the Allies have invaded South of FRANCE. (CAMPOBASSO. Found to have originated from the wireless reports of R.A.F. raids on the South of FRANCE preceding our landing in ITALY. "SOUTH OF FRANCE" appears to have been confused with "SOUTH OF ROME").

That the American Seventh Army has landed at BARI. (13 Corps troops).

That American troops are to take over from Eighth Army. (8 Ind. Div).

That RIBBENTROP has broadcast to England appealing for a union with GERMANY to fight RUSSIA. (13 Corps).

(ii) Among Civilians.

That two Italian Divisions will shortly be moving into the line. (CASA BORDENO, Prov. CHIETI).

That a Russian division has landed in ITALY and will shortly be in action on Eighth Army front (LANCIANO, Prov. CHIETI).

That Mr. CHURCHILL attended the BARI conference (CAMPOBASSO).

That the Italian Army is to be completely disbanded (CAMPOBASSO and RICCIA Prov. CAMPOBASSO).

(d) Other Matters of General Security Interest.

(i) Considerable number of Italian military personnel were found to be [illegible] without proper authority, and the cases were reported

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That the American Seventh Army has landed at BARI. (13 Corps troops).
That American troops are to take over from Eighth Army. (8 Ind. Div).
That RIBBENTROP has broadcast to England appealing for a union with GERMANY to fight RUSSIA. (13 Corps).

(ii) Army Civilians.

That two Italian Divisions will shortly be moving into the line. (CASALE BORDENO, Prov. CREMONA).

That a Russian division has landed in ITALY and will shortly be in action on Eighth Army front (LANCIANO, Prov. CHIETI).

That Mr. CHURCHILL attended the BARI conference (CAMPOBASSO).

That the Italian Army is to be completely disbanded (CAMPOBASSO and RIOCIA Prov. CAMPOBASSO).

(d) Other Matters of General Security Interest.

(i) Considerable number of Italian military personnel were found to be entering the Eighth Army area without proper authority, and the cases were reported to MMLA. In future, no Italian soldiers will be permitted to enter the Army areas unless on bona fide duty and in possession of a duty pass countersigned by an Allied officer of the A.C.C., MMLA, or CSI. It is already forbidden for Italian military personnel to enter the Army area on leave.

(ii) A number of Italian civilians employed by 39 Railway Construction Coy South African Engineers, on the railway between ROCCA SAN GIOVANNI and S. VITO CHIETINI, were intercepted by FSP. The reason for leaving was in almost all cases poor living conditions at the camp. Enquiry was made into this allegation by FSP and the living conditions at the camp did not appear to be altogether inadequate. However, in order to avoid any further infractions of movement regulation, which these desertions inevitably cause, the unit undertook to escort any Italian workmen desiring to be discharged from the camp direct to FS or ACC for disposal.

(iii) In most forward areas on the Eighth Army front "Security Parties" of reliable civilians have been formed either in key positions or in towns normally unoccupied by Allied troops. The duties of such parties are:-

To notify the nearest troops or FSP of the arrival of any strangers.
To visit outlying farms and instruct the occupants to notify them of any strangers seeking food or shelter.

This system has already been employed in certain localities and appears to be producing useful results.

(iv) At Appendix "A" is a location list of F.S. Sections and C.I.C. Detachments under command this headquarters.

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~~TOP SECRET~~ EQUALS US SECRET

Appendix "A" to A.C.M.F.
Security Summary No. 11.

LOCATION LIST OF F.S. SECTIONS AND CIC
DETACHMENTS AS ON 31 JANUARY 44.

	Attached to.	Location.
A.C.M.F.		
16 FSS	H.Q., A.C.M.F.	CASERTA
305 CIC	H.Q., FIFTH ARMY	CASERTA
35 FSS	56 Inf Div	LAURO (M 969956)
202 CIC	II Corps	CEPRAGNA (M 017182)
134 CIC	34 Inf Div	CERVARO (G 904204)
136 CIC	36 Inf Div	MIGNANO (G 985135)
CIC Det.	C C "B"	MIGNANO (")
206 CIC	VI Corps	NETTUNO
3 FSS	1 Inf Div	F 895225
103 CIC	3 Inf Div	F 923141
145 CIC	45 Inf Div	Enroute ANZIO area
151 CIC	1 Armd Div	F 882237
270 FSS	X Corps	SESSA AURUNCA (M 950922)
17 FSS	5 Inf Div	CARANO (M 927890)
31 FSS	46 Inf Div	PONTE (M 947946)
FSA	French Expeditionary Corps	VITERBO (M 0430)
FSA	2 D I M	CIVITA CASTELLANA (M 022944)
FSA	3 D I A	VALLEROTONDA (G 9426)
47 FSS	HQ EIGHTH ARMY	VASTO
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Inf Div	S VITO
7 Cdn FSS	5 Cdn Armd Div	GISSI
68 FSS.	5 Corps	TORINO DI SANGRO
		ATESSA

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266 CIC	VI Corps	
3 FSS	1 Inf Div	F 838225
103 CIC	3 Inf Div	F 923181
145 CIC	45 Inf Div	Enroute ANZIO area
151 CIC	1 Armd Div	F 882237
278 FSS	X Corps	SESSAAURUNCA (M 950922)
17 FSS	5 Inf Div	CARANO (M 927890)
31 FSS	46 Inf Div	PONTE (M 947946)
BSA	French Expeditionary Corps	VENAFRO (H 0430)
BSA	2 D I M	CERASUOLO (H 020914)
BSA	3 D I A	VALLEROTONDA (G 9436)
47 FSS	HQ EIGHTH ARMY	VASTO
1 Cdn FSS	1 Cdn Inf Div	S VITO
7 Cdn FSS	5 Cdn Armd Div	CISSI
68 FSS.	5 Corps	TORINO DI SANGRO
412 FSS	13 Corps	ATESSA
88 FSS	78 Ind Div	CASOLI
406 FSS	8 Ind Inf Div	LANCIANO
2 Polish Corps FSS	2 Polish Corps	VINCHIATURO
3 Carpathian Div FSS	3 Carpathian Inf Div	CAROVILLI
263 FSS	Eighth Army	CAMPOBASSO

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Declassified E.O. 12356 Sec. 3.3/NND No. 785016

APPENDIX "B" to A.C.M.F.
Security Summary No.11
16-31 January 1944.

Fifth Army Area.

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NOTE:

Category A: Arrest for trial for a specific offence
Category B: Arrest with view to internment.
Category C: Detention pending further investigation.

NAME	ADDRESS	EMPLOYMENT.	DATE OF ARREST	DISPOSAL	CATEGORY
ANTINORI Daza fu Luigi	Via Tiburtina 140, ROME.	Nurse	22 Jan 44.	Internment Camp No. 37.	

Followed fwd tps from SICILY. Declared intention of attempting to proceed through lines to her home in ROME. Interned until occupation of ROME by Allied tps.

BEATO Fausto	78 Via Latina, SANTA MARIA C.V.	Labourer.	11 Nov 43.	P.W. enclosure No. 326.	

Squadrista. Reported destroyed documents at Fascio, SANTA MARIA. Continued pro-German propaganda after arrival of Allies. Reported to have been on intimate relations with the Germans during occupation. Intern for duration of War.

BERNIERI Enrico	Palazzo Reale, CASERTA.	Custodian of Royal Palace.	4 Nov 43.	P.W. enclosure No. 326.	

Squadrista. March on ROME. Member of Fascist party since 1923. Close friend of MELLONE, reputed OVRA agent, also interned. Informer of CAPILLARE organization. Listed by two official sources as one of nine most dangerous Squadrista in CASERTA. Interned for Duration of War.

BERTUZZI Achille	19 Via Chiusa, MILANO.	Mechanic.	15 Jan 44.	P.W. enclosure No. 326.	

Infringement of movement regulations. Internment 30 days.

CANALE Attilio	1 Via Umberto, CERVARO	Shoemaker	20 Jan 44.	P.W. enclosure No. 326.	

Served term for manslaughter in SARDINIA 1935-37. Employed as interpreter by Germans during which time his activities seem to have been quite pro-German. Internment Duration of War.

CANALE Fortunato	33 Via Chiusa, CERVARO		19 Jan 44.	P.W. enclosure No. 326.	

Fascist who "requisitioned" animals for the Germans and worked for them. Interned, but if no further evidence is secured, should be released in 30 days.

CAPUTO	Vena	Peasant.	9 Jan 44.	P.W. Enclosure	

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Squadrista. Reported [illegible] propaganda after arrival of Allies. Reported to have been [illegible] Germans during occupation. Intern for duration of War.

BERNIERI Errico — Palazzo Reale, CASERTA. — Custodian of Royal Palace. — 4 Nov 43. — P.W. enclosure No. 326.

Squadrista. March on ROME. Member of Fascist party since 1923. Close friend of MELLONE, reputed OVRA agent, also interned. Informer of CAPILLARE organization. Listed by two off'cial sources as one of nine most dangerous Squadrista in CASERTA. Interned for Duration of War.

BERTUZZI Achille — 19 Via Chiuso, MILANO. — Mechanic. — 15 Jan 44. — P.W. enclosure No. 326.

Infringement of movement regulations. Internment 30 days.

CANALE Attilio — 1 Via Umberto, CERVARO — Shoemaker — 26 Jan 44. — P.W. enclosure No. 326.

Served term for manslaughter in SARDINIA 1935-37. Employed as interpreter by Germans during which time his activities seem to have been quite pro-German. Internment Duration of War.

CANALE Fortunato — 33 Via Chiusa, CERVARO — 19 Jan 44. — P.W. enclosure No. 326.

Fascist who "requisitioned" animals for the Germans and worked for them. Interned, but if no further evidence is secured, should be released in 90 days.

CITINO Pietro — None — Peasant. — 9 Jan 44. — P.W. Enclosure No. 326.

ACCADIA DI SENTINELLA

Crossed from enemy territory about 9 Jan. During interrogation by R.I.P. related one story which later denied. Consequently held for short period, because no means of checking activities exist. Internment for Sixty Days.

[illegible] Orazio — Via Conte Torino No. 258, CATANIA. — Bracciante. — 10 Jan 44. — P.W. Enclosure No. 326.

Crossed lines from enemy side near PRESENZANO under suspicious circumstances on or about 9 Jan 44. Interrogation failed to reveal anything of importance, but was formerly travelling with SCALISE, who originally lied about his activities. Consequently COLACRITI held for short period since no means of accurately checking activities prior to capture. Thirty Days.

CONTU Efisio — 50 Via Indipendenza, CAGLIARI. — Labourer. — 7 Jan 44. — P.W. Enclosure No. 326.

Arrested while attempting to proceed towards his home in enemy occupied territory after having once previously been evacuated from fwd area on 24 Dec (NB This man was evacuated to PW Camp 371 before opportunity to return him to AMG for trial. Recommended he be held for sixty days and then released.

CORSI Paulo — MILANO — CC.NR — 8 Jan 44. — P.W. Enclosure No. 326.

Crossed lines from enemy territory. Turned over by CC.NR of TELESE to U.S. M.Ps. Upon interrogation by RIP first told one story, which he later admitted to be false. Was been referred to AMG Fifth Army in view of his CC.NR status. Interned Sixty Days.

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
GRECO	9 Vico T[illegible]ri	Cinemato graph	22.1.44	POW # 3[illegible]	
Pasquale	Minturno	Operater			

Taken by Germans in Sept 43 to FONDI to work, but escaped after three days back to Minturno. Owing to lack of food he decided to help the Germans and visits having assisted them to requisition goods, and having himself robbed and dance ced persons hiding from them. This information is corraborated by other residents of Minturno.

Six Months

D'ERMO		Postmaster	22.1.44	POW # 326	B
Giovanni	Mignano				

Joined Fascist Party 1922, applied for membership in Squadrista, but was refused. ording to investigation of CIC, confirmed by SIM investigation, subject was active after the dissolution of the party and collaborated with Germans during their occupa of Mignano. Subject lied continually during interrogations, and is reputed to be an opportunist and man without conviction. He is considered a potential threat to the security of operations. 90 Days

DE MASSIMO	Via Moreno, 5.	Soldier	10.1.44	POW # 326	B
Giulio	Rocca D'Evandro				

Security arrest in forward area. Suspected to be communicating with the enemy by means of visual signalling, of which he had some knowledge. Investigation has failed to prove the charge, but he should be removed from forward areas as a precaution. Sixty Days

DE SIMONE	Via Bixio 22	Fisherman	22.1.44	POW # 326	B
Gino di Luigi	Minturno				

Volunteered for service with the Germans after the armistice and aided them in looting receiving money and food for his services. He is suspected of rendering them wholehearted cooperation. His presence in a forward area is not desirable as he may make effort to rejoin his former employers. Three months.

DE SIMONE	Via Bixio 26	Fisherman	22.1.44	POW # 326	B
Luigi fu Giorgio	Minturno				

Volunteered for service with the Germans after the armistice and aided them in looting receiving money and food for his services. He is suspected of rendering them wholehearted cooperation. His presence in a forward area is not desirable as he may make effort to rejoin his former employers. Three months.

D'INFERNO	Via San Marciano 55			POW # 326	B
Raffaele	Attilio	Mechanic			

Initially stated that he had crossed from enemy territory after being made to work for the Germans loading and unloading supplies. Later admitted that the story was a fabrication and that he had not been in enemy territory. Story similar to that of other who have come from Rapido attempting to cross to the enemy, and consequently the man is to be interned. Recently member of GIL. Gave false tactical information. Lied during interrogation. Duration of War

DI BENEDETTO	Via Vittorio Emanuel		30.12.43	POW # 326	B
Virginio	No. 90 Pizzone	Cultivator			

Was arrested in an evacuated village because he had in his possession a receiver-sender radio. Radio did not function, and his story that he had picked this up in an abandoned [illegible]

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r ceiving money and food for his services. [illegible] is not desirable as he may render
hearted cooperation. His presence in a forward area is not desirable as he may render
effort to rejoin his former employers. Three months.

DE SILVIO Via Bixio 26 Fisherman 22.1.44 POW # 326 B
Luigi fu Giorgio Mondragone
Volunteered for service with the Germans after the armistice and aided them in looting
receiving money and food for his services. He is suspected of rendering them whole-
hearted cooperation. His presence in a forward area is not desirable as he may render
effort to rejoin his former employers. Three months.

POW # 326 B

DI TERLIZZO Via San Marcellino 55 Mechanic
Raffaele Aprile
Initially stated that he had crossed from enemy territory after being made to work for
the Germans loading and unloading supplies. Later admitted that the story was a fab-
ication and that he had not been in enemy territory. Story similar to that of other men
have come from NAPLI attempting to cross to the enemy, and consequently the man is to
be interned. Recently member of GIL. Gave false tactical information. Lied during
interrogation. Duration of War

30.12.43 POW # 326 B

DI BENEDETTO Via Vittorio Emanuel Cultivator
Virginio No. 90 Pizzone
Was arrested in an evacuated village because he had in his possession a receiver-sender
radio. Radio did not function, and his story that he had picked this up in an abandoned
radio at MAN POLO on his way home after deserting at the time of the Armistice has not
accepted as probably true. Insufficient evidence for trial. Held for 30 days till
locality no longer in occupation territory.

26.11.43 POW 326 B

DI CAPRIO Via Antiteatro 72 Clerk
Federico
Squadrista. Sciarpa Littorio. Pro German. Strongly anti-Allied, and was rulin'ly re-
sted to be partly responsible for the anti-British rumours which finally led to the
clean up of all leading South Latin fascist. Duration of War

DI SPIRITO 2 Via Capitolo Student 21.11.43 POW # B
Antonio Cerbaloncw di Sessa
Was arrested for acting suspiciously and asking questions concerning troop movements, ef-
fectiveness of shelling etc. Statements contradictory and suspici under interro-
Considered a danger to the security of operations Duration of War.

EMILIOZZA 154 Via Milazzo 26.1.44 POW # 326 B
Ugo Cassino
Was attempted twice to cross into forward areas. After the first attempt was sent
Capua, Naples, from where he again proceeded north despite warnings. Not sufficient
evidence available to this office for his trial. To be held until ROME is taken

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	
FELICE Salvatore di Giuseppe e fu/ Gioia Tauro Angela Mateffari	Via Solferino 25	Merchant Seaman	27.1.44	# 326	B

Volunteered for work with the Germans after the Armistice, looted with the Germans at CASTELFORTE and also looted on his own account whilst with the Germans, all this on his own admission. Refugees from CASTELFORTE have given information confirming his guilt in this respect. His presence is extremely undesirable in forward area.

FERRITTI Rinaldo	Via Guglielmo Massie Workmen Sanitary Roma Installations		7.2.44	# 326	Six Months B

Italian soldier, left Trieste the 11 Sept 43 and since in vagabonding. Crossed the front the 25 Dec 43 at Orsogna at Ateaza, Dangerous for the security of troops.

FINESSO Luciano	Via Alessandro Peerle, Padova	Sailor	7.1.44	# 326	Sixty days B

This man has come through from enemy territory from La SPEZIA where he claims to have volunteered for the Italian Republican Navy under German command about 1 Dec After three days he claims to have escaped. Since his status as prisoner of war cannot be determined, he is interned for the duration. Duration of War.

FISCHETTI Vincenzo	Torre E. Piccilli	Sgt. MVSN	17.11.43	# 326	B

Sgt in MVSN. Three witnesses declare that before the Allied occupation of area subject indicated to Germans hiding place of a British PW. (N.B. Subject has been evacuated to POW Camp 372. Signed statements of witnesses will be sent to this camp for any further action.) Duration of War.

GADDI Dino	6 Via Trento Follonica	Soldier	17.1.44	# 326	B

Attempted to cross to enemy territory. Subjects movements since his unit was disbanded subject to suspicion. At one point was in German hands, but claims he escaped. When apprehended was dressed in paramutist outfit. Evidence insufficient for AMG, but actions make it desirable that he be interned. Until Follonica occupied.

GIESKE Rudolf	Castelvetrano di Calore		9.11.43	# 326	B

German national. Never served in military capacity because of physical limitations. Interrogation indicates that he is most probably not implicated with any espionage operations, but rather an anti-Nazi who applied for transfer to Italy and secured work in a German air force quartermaster establishment. Remained in Castelvetrano instead of retreating with Germans because residence there of his fiancee. Duration of War.

GRANDONI Maria	Via Marinella No 12 ROME	Entertainer	11.1.44	# 326	B

This woman persists in wandering about the front lines area both in II Corps and 10 Corps. She has attempted at least once to pass thru our lines to the enemy, for the alleged reasons of returning to her home in ROME. She has in her possession some 25,000 lire in A/M and American gold coin.

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GIL DI 6 Via Ircnio
Dino Pollonica

Attempted to cross to enemy territory. Subjects movements since his unit was dis-
banded subject to suspicion. At one point was in German hands, but claims he es-
caped. When apprehended was dressed in parachutist outfit. Evidence insufficient
for AMG, but actions make it desirable that he be interned. Until Pollonica occupi

8.11.43 # 326 B

GIESKE Castelvetturo di
Rudolf Calore

German national. Never served in military capacity because of physical limitations.
Interrogation indicates that he is most probably not implicated with any espionage
operation, but rather an anti-Nazi who applied for transfer to It. and secured
work in a German air force quartermaster establishment. Remained in Castelvetturo
instead of retreating with Germans because residence there of his fiancee. Duration
of War.

11.1.44 # 326 E

GRANDONI Via Merinaile No 12
Maria ROME Entertainer

This woman persists in wandering about the front lines area, both in II Corps and
10 Corps. She has attempted at least once to pass thru our lines to the enemy, for
the alleged reasons of returning to her home in ROME. She has in her possession some
25,000 lire in AMG and American gold seal currency, and a collection of toilet artic
of American origin which she claims were given her. She appears to be irresponsible
and eccentric, although interrogation has failed to reveal suspicion of espionage.
(N.B. Sent to POW Camp 371 before arrangements made for transfer of case to AMG.
Recommend that subject be released after proposed period). Thirty days.

21.11.43 # 326 E

ICHIO 3 Via Scintilla Peasant
Mario Coriglia di Sessa

Was arrested for acting suspiciously and asking questions concerning troop movement
effectiveness of shelli etc. Statements contradictory and suspicious under interro-
gation. Considered a danger to the security of operations. Duration of War.

21.1.44 # 326 B

MALAGISI Via Sirigatto 4
Giuseppe Minturno Labourer

First escaped from the Germans and then volunteered to work for them and was accepted
for work with the German Army. Undesirable to have this man in a forward area.
Three months.

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(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)
MENICHINO Giovechino	Mascarcola	None	3.11.43	# 326	B

Lived in the United States from 1905-1939, where he had a criminal record and was finally deported in 1939 following third arrest. Fraternized with U.S. Soldiers and also military information claiming he was a member of the F.B.I. when living in the U.S.

MUSOLLINO Franco	Via Cmuisa Cervaro		19.1.44	# 326	Duration of B

Member of Fascist party since 1923. Reported to have celebrated the return of Mussolini in the public square of Cervaro. Held hon post in Municipio. Thirty Days.

OCCHINTO Francesco di N.N.	P.IMI	Seaman	27.1.44	# 326	B

Volunteered for work with the Germans after the armistice, looted with the Germans at CASTELFORTE and also looted on his own account whilst with the Germans, all this on own admission. Refugees from CASTELFORTE have given information confirming his guilt in this respect. His presence is extremely undesirable in a forward area. Six Months.

PALMERI Alberto	Via Vittorio Veneto 22. Chiaveri	Mate nurse & Ex sailor	19.1.44	# 371	B

This man has come through from LA SPEZIA. He claims to be of French birth and to have lived at LYONS for 16 years, but he speaks indifferent French and indifferent Italian. He said he escaped from the Germans three months ago but only reached CASTELFORTE where he has been for the last two months. While awaiting interrogation he has stated to a stooge that he would like to escape back into enemy occ. territory. It is considered dangerous for him to be at liberty. Three months.

PELEGRINO Ernesto	13 Via San Pietro Caserta		6.11.43	# 326	B

MVSN since 1940. Served as a guard at German Prisoner of War camp at Sparanise, where according to reports of escaped PW he was abusive. Subject to bribes, and was seen wearing a German uniform. Consider a danger to the security of operations. Duration of War.

PERETTA Paolo	2 Vico Croce Nuova Collole di Sessa	Guardia Rurale	1.12.43	# 326	B

Sgt. of the Guardia Rurale who is reported to have made every effort to have assisted German troops. During interrogation he gave false information. His record of corruption is such that he is considered a danger to security.. Duration of War.

PERRONI Alfonso	San Gonsto	Peasant	9.1.44	# 326	B

Crossed from enemy territory about 9 Jan. During interrogation by R.I.. related one story which later denied. Consequently held for short period, because no means of checking activities exist. .. Sixty days.

PEZZINO Felice	Via Frosinolle 9 Basico	Laborer	16.1.44	# 326	B

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he has been for the last two months. While awaiting interrogation he has stated to a stooge that he would like to escape back into enemy occ. territory. It is considered dangerous for him to be at liberty. Three months.

PELLEGRINO — 13 Via San Pietro — 6.11.43 — # 326 — B
Ernesto — Caserta
MVSN since 1940. Served as a guard at German Prisoner of War camp at Sparanise, where according to reports of escaped PW he was abusive. Subject to bribes, and was seen wearing a German uniform. Considdr a danger to the security of operations. Duration of [illegible]

PERRETTA — 2 Vico Croce Nuova — Guardia Rurale — 1.12.43 — # 326 — B
Paolo — Cellole di Sessa
Sgt. of the Guardia Rurale who is reported to have made every effort to have assisted German troops. During interrogation he gave false information. His record of corruption is such that he is considered a danger to security. Duration of War.

PERRONI — Peasant — 9.1.44 — # 326 — B
Alfonso — San Geneto
Crossed from enemy territory about 9 Jan. During interrogation by R.I.C. related one story which later denied. Consequently held for short period, because no means of checking activities exist. ... Sixty days.

PEZZINO — Via Frosinello 9 — Laborer — 16.1.44 — # 326 — B
Felice — Desico
Volunteered for the Republican National Army on 29 September 1944 by own admission. Crossed lines in the vicinity of Cervaro, allegedly on his way home to Sicily. Interned for duration inasmuch as status as prisoner of war undetermined. Duration of War

RENDA — 91 Via Tasso — Lawyer — 14.1.44 — # 326 — B
Salvatore — Naples
Squadrista. March on Rome. Ex-Podesta. Fascist party member since 19[illegible]. Capt in the Royal Army. Now secretary of the Albergo di Poveri in Naples. Leader of the Fascist party in the commune of Maddaloni. Fascist Party inspector for the communes of Maddaloni, Valle de Maddaloni and Corvino. Continued Fascist propaganda after armistice. Duration of War

RICCIARDI — Monte Corvino — 29.12.43 — # 326 — B
Giovanni (di Nicola) — Pugliano
Originally arrested 26 Nov 1943 at Frattamaggiore by a French patrol as he was trespassing in French bivouac area. His identity papers were removed from him after his first interrogation by the B.S.I. and he was told to report back to the B.S.I., but he did not reappear. B.S.I. requested the CIC 5 Army to have him arrested. This was done through the CC.MR. Past record indicates that he is unreliable and a potential threat to the security of our troops. Three months

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(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
SCALISE Felice	Vico Terzo Cona 14 Serra Stretta	Farmer	10.1.44	# 326	B

Subject crossed our lines from the enemy side under suspicious circumstances on or about 9 Jan 44. Interrogation here has failed to reveal anything of importance, but SCALISE lied during initial interrogation as did his former travelling companions, CILLINO & PERRONE. Consequently held for a short period since no means of checking activities prior to capture. Sixty Days.

TIXON Leonardo		Olive Grower	23.11.43	# 326	B

Was member of the Fascist Party from 20 October 1922. Took part in the March on Rome; Squadrista, Sciarpa Littorio. In 1928 he was appointed Ispettore di Zona from the GARIGLIANO to the VOLTURNO Rivers. In 1929 he quarrelled with the Federal Secretary GANSENELLI and resigned. In 1937 he was appointed Administrative Secretary of the PNF and continued in that position until the Post was abolished in 1940, when he became a member of the Direttorio of the PNF for MARIGO area. From March 1943 until 21/22 July 1943 he acted as Vice Federal Secretary for the same area. From July 1943 (after the fall of Fascism) until 29 Nov 1943 he remained in CONCA DELLA CAMPANIA. During the German occupation his house at CONCA was occupied by the Germans but TIXON states that before they retracted they mined it. He is considered a very prominent Fascist.
Duration of War

VERRENGIA Filomena fu Gabriele	Casale Di Sessa	Prostitute	22.1.44	# 371	B

Arrested for security of personnel in forward area. This woman is suffering from VD (medical certificate attached) and is very undesirable as a contact for troops in an area of operations. Three months.

VISONE Salvatore di Raffaele di Rea/ Caserta	Via Unita Italiana 162	Student	27.1.44	# 326	B

Volunteered for work with the Germans after the Armistice, looted with the Germans at CASTELFORTE and also looted on his own account whilst with the Germans, all this on his own admission. Refugees from CASTELFORTE have given information confirming his guilt in this respect. His presence is extremely undesirable in a forward area
Six Months.

ZANNONE Vincenzo	29 Via P[illegible]loria Teano		17.1.44	# 326	B

Attempting to cross to enemy occupied territory. Discrepancies in his story. Friend of Gandi, Dino, parachutist, who has been interned on grounds of suspicion. Not sufficient evidence for AMG action, but past associations make it desirable to intern him
Until Florence occupied.

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1943 [illegible] fall of Fascism) until 29 Nov 1943 he remained in [illegible]
German occupation his house at CONCA was occupied by the Germans and TIXON states that before they retreated they mined it. He is considered a very prominent Fascist.
Duration of War

VERRENGIA Casale Di Sessa Prostituto 22.1.44 # 371 B
Filomena fu Gabriele
Arrested for security of personnel in forward area. This woman is suffering from VD (medical certificate attached) and is very undesirable as a contact for troops in an area of operations. Three months.

VISONE Via Unita Italiana 162 27.1.44 # 326 B
Salvatore di Raffaele di Roc/ Caserta Student
Volunteered for work with the Germans after the Armistice, looted with the Germans at CASTELFORTE and also looted on his own account whilst with the Germans, all this on his own admission. Refugees from CASTELFORTE have given information confirming his guilt in this respect. His presence is extremely undesirable in a forward area
Six Months.

ZANCHE 23 Via F [illegible]lorio 17.1.44 # 326 B
Vincenzo Foam
Attempting to cross to enemy occupied territory. Discrepancies in his story. Friend of Gandi, Dino, parachutist, who has been interned on grounds of suspicion. Not sufficient evidence for AMG action, but past associations make it desirable to inter him
Until Florence occupied.

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MOST SECRET

CONSOLIDATED LIST OF ARRESTS REPORTED DURING PERIOD 16-31 JAN 44 AND PERIODS OF INTERNMENT AUTHORISED BY G.S.I(b) H.Q. EIGHTH ARMY IN AGREEMENT WITH A.M.G. EIGHTH ARMY.

Name	Father's Christian Name	Address	Employment	Date of Arrest	Disposal
ACQUA Gaetano	fu Gaetano	ROME, Via Annia	Student	22 Jan 44	Eighth Army P.W. Cage.
Brief reason: Self confessed spy. Category B Recommendation: Pending.					
ALBERTI Emilio	di Giovanni	ROME Via Lorenzo Cambichi 128	Machinist (Woodwork)	22 Jan 44	Eighth Army P.W. Cage.
Brief reason: Self confessed spy. Category B Recommendation: Pending					
ALLULLI Fulvio	fu Saverio	TERAMO, Via Umberto I, 35	Mechanic	14 Jan 44	RIP Eighth Army.
Brief reason:- Suspected Spy. Category C. Recommendation:- Pending.					
..NSC Giuseppe Raffaele	fu	Near FROSOLONE S. Elena Sannita	Knife grinder.	11 Jan 44	ISERNIA Civil Gaol.
Brief reason/ Offence against control of Movement Order. Category A Recommendation:- Trial pending.					
ALONSO Nicola, Raffaele	fu	Near FROSOLONE S. Elena Sannita	Knife grinder.	11 Jan 44	ISERNIA Civil Gaol.
Brief reason: Offence against control of Movement Order. Category A Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.					
ANGELOTTI	Santino.	ACQUAVIVA PICENA Giacomo Pannelli	Category A	24 Jan 44.	Civil Prison

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Emilio	Giovanni	Lorenzo Cambichi 128	(Woodwork)		

Brief reason: Self confessed spy. Category B
Recommendation: Pending

ALLULLI Fulvio	fu Saverio	TERAMO, Via Umberto I, 35	Mechanic	14 Jan 44	RIC Eighth Army.

Brief reason:- Suspected Spy. Category C.
Recommendation:- Pending.

..ONSO Giuseppe	fu Raffaele	Near FROSOLONE Si:Elena Sannita	Knife grinder.	11 Jan 44	ISERNIA Civil Gaol.

Brief reason/ Offence against control of movement Order. Category A
Recommendation:- Trial pending.

ALONSO Nicola,	fu Raffaele	Near FROSOLONE S. Elena Sannita	Knife grinder.	11 Jan 44	ISERNIA Civil Gaol.

Brief reason: Offence against control of movement Order. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

ANGELOTTI Santi	Santino.	ACQUAVIVA PICENA Giacomo Pannelli		24 Jan 44.	Civil Prison LANCIANO

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

ANGELUCCI Giacomo	Francesco.	LAMA dei PELIGNI Via Garibaldi.	Farmer. Category C	11 Jan 44	Civil Gaol Casoli.

Brief reason: Suspected Spy.
Recommendation: Pending.

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ANTONELLI Carlo.	di Odoardo.	MILANO Via Paolo Veronese	Chauffeur Category B	14 Dec 43	Civil Prison VASTO.

Brief reason:- Now serving two months imprisonment for offence against control of movement Order. Security threat as he is likely to attempt to cross the line again. pending transfer to P.W. Cage.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

2/....

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BALDIN, Ruggero	Luigi	VERONA Via XX SETTEMBRE, 117	Clerk	15 Jan 44.	5 Corps POW Cage.

Brief reason: Threat to Security of "A" Force. Category B
Recommendation:- Internment for Duration.

BASILICO' di Giovanni	Vincenzo	GISSI Via Largo Laporto No: 8.	Artist	20 Jan 44	CAROVILLI Civil Prison.

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of movement Order. Category A
Recommendation:- Trial by A.G pending.

BIANCI di Tullio	Domenico	MICERTA FELTRIA Via Melinn.Mozzi	Miller	14 Dec. 43	Civil Prison VASTO pending transfer to PW Cage.

Brief reason:- Now serving one months imprisonment for Offence against Control of Movement Order. Security threat as he is likely to attempt to cross the line again. Category B
Recommendation : Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

BUCA di Giuseppe	Rosario.	SAN NICANDRO GARGANICO Vico Portovecchio No: 6.	Farmer	17 Jan 44	Civil Prison, CASALBORDINO

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by A.G. pending.

CALDATO fu Antonio	Giuseppe	MILANO Via Varanini No: 82	Carpenter.	20 Jan 44.	5 Corps POW.

Brief reason: Offence against Control of Movement

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Tullie Domenico Via Melinn.Moozi — VASTO pending transfer to PW Cage.

Brief reason:- Now serving one months imprisonment for Offence against Control of movement Order. Security threat as he is likely to attempt to cross the line again.
Recommendation : Internment and reconsideration after 6 months. Category B

BUCA di SAN NICANDRO Farmer 17 Jan 44 Civil Prison, CASALBORDINO
Giuseppe Rosario. GARGANICO
Vico Portovecchio
No: 6.

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by A.M.G. pending.

CALDATO fu MILANO Carpenter. 20 Jan 5 Corps
Antonio Giuseppe Via Varanini 44. POW.
No: 82

Brief reason: Offence against Control of movement Order. Category B.
Recommendation: Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

CAMPO Giuseppe CAMPOBASSO Chief 17 Jan 370 PW
Angelo Scala C I Accountant. 44. Camp for
Palazzo Incis, onward transmis-
Piazza Savoia. sion under guard
to Army POW Cage,
FOGGIA.

Brief reason:- Componente della Commissione di Disciplina della Federazione (CAMPOBASSO 1942) Componente del Direttorio del Fascio (1941) Primo Seniore (M.V.S.N) 1941. Very active Fascist record and threat to Security. Category B
Recommendation:- Internment for Duration.

SANTELLI di RELIS Radio
Marino. Luigi Rue St. Telephonist. 22 Jan Eighth
Tierry. 44 Army PW
Brief reason: Self confessed Spy. Category B Cage.
Recommendation: Pending.

3/....

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CAVA, di RIPATRANSONE 20 Jan 44 5 Corps POW
Tazische Goffrello Builder.
Brief reasons:- Offence against control of Movement Order.
Recommendation: Trial by Category A.
AMG pending.

CHIAVARA Alessandro LANCIANO, Baker 8 Dec. 5 Corps
Angelo Mario Valero 60 43 P.W. cage.
Brief reason:- Suspected sympathy for PRF and Germans.
Ardent Fascist. Category B
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 12 months.

CIVITARESE, Domenico POGGIOFIORITO Farmer. 22 Jan Civil
Mario Contrada Chiuse 44 Prison;
LANCIANO
Brief reason:- Assisting escaped enemy PW to evade capture.
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending. Category A

CIVITARESE Domenico POGGIOFIORITO Segretario 22 Jan 5 Corps
Sabatino Largo di Luca. Comunale. 44 PW Cage.
Brief reason:- Suspected of Pro-German activity after the Armistic
Officer of MVSN for at least 10 years. Spoke in
conversation for Germans and against Allies. Category B.
Recommendation:-Internment for Duration.

CLARY Tito GRAVINO DI Student. 21 Jan 44 Civil Gaol
Antonietta PUGLIA CAMPOBASSO
Via Vittoria
Veneto, 4.
Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement
Order. Category A
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

COCCO Fantino. PENNAPIEDIMONTE Tailor. 15 Jan 44 Civil Gaol
Emilio Via Cavato; 16. ATESSA
Brief reason: Suspected Spy. Category C.
Released 29 Jan 44.

COCCO Fantino PENNAPIEDIMONTE, Cobbler. 15 Jan Civil
Giovanni Via Umberto I.10. 44 Gaol

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Sabatino Largo di [illegible]

Brief reason:- Suspected of Pro-German activity after the Armistice. Officer of MVSN for at least 10 years. Spoke in conversation for Germans and against Allies. Category B.

Recommendation:-Interment for Duration.

CLARY Antonietta	Tito	GRAVINO DI PUGLIA Via Vittoria Veneto, 4.	Student.	21 Jan 44	Civil Gaol CAMPOBASSO

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of movement Order. Category A

Recommendation:- Trial by AmG pending.

COCCO Emilio	Fantino.	PENNAPIEDIMONTE Via Cavato; 16.	Tailor.	15 Jan 44	Civil Gaol ATESSA

Brief reason: Suspected Spy. Category C.

Released 29 Jan 44.

COCCO Giovanni	Fantino	PENNAPIEDIMONTE, Via Umberto I 10.	Cobbler.	15 Jan 44	Civil Gaol ATESSA.

Brief reason:- Suspected spy. Category C

Released 29 Jan 44.

COCCO Luigi	Fantino	PENNAPIEDIMONTE Via Umberto I, 10.	Clerk.	15 Jan 44	Civil Gaol; ATESSA

Brief reason: Suspected Spy. Category C

Released 29 Jan 44

COCCO Umberto	Fantino	PENNAPIEDIMONTE Via delle Scuole 4	Clerk at Municipo	15 Jan 44	Civil Gaol ATESSA

Brief reason: Suspected Spy. Category C.

Released 29 Jan 44.

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COIA fu Vincenzo Sabatino — CERRO AL VOLTURNO — Shop-keeper — 9 Jan 44 — FORLI Civil Gaol.
Brief reason:-Illegal possession of arms. Category A
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

DE SOLA di Alfredo Vincenzo — NAPOLI Via Domenico Morelli, 7. — Hairdresser — 25 Jan 44 — Civil Gaol, CAMPOBASSO
Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A.
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

DE RITIS di Maria Ciro — PAGLIETA Via Porta — Housewife — 10 Jan 44 — 113 PWC
Brief reason: Segretaria del Fascie Faminile 1943 Power behind last Pol. Seg. Ardent Fascist. — PW Cage. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

DI BIAGGIO di Guido Severino — UDINE Via BASALDELLA I. — Student. — 23 Jan 44 — Local Prison; CAROVILLI
Brief reason:-Suspicious activity in forward areas. Category C.
Recommendation:-Decision pending.

DI CANIO, Francesco Riccardo. — FOGGIA Via Trani 12 — Farmer. — 13 Jan 44 — 209 POW Cage.
Brief reason:- Suspected Enemy Agent; to be held for further interrogation and enquiries. Category C.

DI FILIPPO fu Maria Andrea — PESCARA, P. Piedmonte, 85. — 19 Jan 44 — Civil Prison; LANCIANO
Brief reason:- Assisting escaped enemy PW to evade capture. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

DI MARINO Antonio Domenico — TORRICELLA Via Umberto I — Shoemaker. — 13 Jan 44 — Civil Gaol CASOLI.

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Brief reason: [illegible] Category [illegible]
areas.
Recommendation:-Decision pending.

DI CANIO, Riccardo. Francesco FOGGIA Via Trani 12 — Farmer. 13 Jan 44 — 209 POW Cage.
Brief reason:- Suspected Enemy Agent; further interrogation and enquiries. to be held for Category C.

DI FILIPPO Maria fu Andrea PESCARA, P. Piedmonte, 85. — 19 Jan 44 — Civil Prison; LANCIANO
Brief reason:- Assisting escaped enemy PW to evade capture. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

DI MARINO Domenico. Antonio TORRICELLA Via Umberto I No: 33 — Shoemaker. 13 Jan 44 — Civil Gaol CASOLI.
Brief reason:- Suspected of leading German patrols through lines and pointing out British positions. Category C.
Recomandation:- Sent via RIP to Base P.W Camp BARI for further interrogation.

DI NIRO Carmine Afonso. FERRAZZANO Via Ospedale Vecchio No: 19. — Bricklayer. 17 Jan 44. — Civil Prison CAMPOBASSO
Brief reason:-Active Fascist sympathies and Anti-Allied propagandist after the Armistice. Category B. — pending transfer by AMG.
Recommendation -Interrment for duration.

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DI PAOLO, Pietro — fu Giovanni — SAN VITO Contrada Balsamente — Farmer. 16 Jan 44 — Civil Prison LANCIANO

Brief reason: Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A

Recommendation :-Trial by AmG pending.

DONZELLI Vittorio — fu Giovanni — PIOMBINO Corso Italia No: 178 — Moulder. 14 Dec.43 — Civil Prison VASTO pending transfer

Brief reason:- Now serving one months imprisonto P.W. Cage. ment for offence against Control of Movement Order. Security danger in view of possible further attempts to cross lines. Category B.

Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

FABRI Vincenzo — di Giovanni — SANT'ELPIDIA MARE, Porta di Lotta Nora, 17. — Farmer. 14 Dec.43 — Civil Prison VASTO pending trans- to PW Cage.

Brief reason: Now serving one month's imprisonment for Offence against Control of Movement Order. Security danger in view of further possible attempts to cross line. Category B.

Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

FACCHINO Nicola — di Michele — SAN NICANDRO GARGANICO Via Palermo 40. — Farmer. 17 Jan 44 — Civil Prison CASALBORDINO

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A.

Recommendation:- Trial by AmG pending.

FARINA Celestino — fu Francesco — NAPLES, Via Luigia S. Felice 19 — Surveyor. 25 Jan 44 — CCRR Prison, CASTELFRENTANO

Brief reason:- Offence against control of Movement Order. Category A

Recommendation:- Trial by AmG pending.

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	Vincenzo	Giovanni	MARE, Porta di Lotta Nora, 17.		Prison VASTO pending trans- to PW Cage.

Brief reason: Now serving one month's ... imprisonment for Ofience against Control of Movement Order. Security danger in view of further possible attempts to cross line. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

FACCHINO	di	SAN NICANDRO	Farmer.	17 Han 44	Civil
Nicola	Michele	GARGANICO Via Palermo 40.			Prison CASALBORDINO

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category A.
Recommendation:- Trial by AmG pending.

FARINA	fu	NAPLES, Via	Surveyor.	25 Jan	CCRR
Celestino	Francesco	Luigia S. Felice 19		44	Prison, CASTELFRENTANO

Brief reason:- Offence against control of Movement Order. Category A
Recommendation:- Trial by AmG pending.

FINAMORE	fu	LANCIANO	Clerk.	24 Jan 44	8 Ind. Div
Antonio	Vincenzo	Viale Cappucini, 107			PW Cage.

Brief reason:- Seg. Pol. FRISA after 1935, Ispettore Zona of Ufficio Annonario - Rogue and opportunist. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 12 months.

FIORITI	Florestano	CASALANGUIDA	Engineer	7 Jan 44	113FLG
Nicolantonio		Via del Popolo			

Brief reason:- Ex Segretario Politico.
Danger to Security. Category B
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

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FRIERI Marco	Erberto	CAMPOBASSO Via Angelo Scatolone, 7	Clerk.	17 Jan 44 370 PW Camp CAMPOBASSO for onward transmission under guard to Army POW Cage FOGGIA.

Brief reason:- Very active Fascist record., FiduciarioGruppo Rionale (1941), Componente del Direttorio del Fascio.(1943). Category B.
Security threat.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

FURLANI, Ferruccio	fu Celestino	TRIESTE	Officer Fascist Milizia	22 Jan 44 Eighth Army P.W. cage. Category B.

Brief reason:- Self confessed spy.
Recommendation:- Decision pending.

GIANORETO Fernando	di Cesare	Near CHIETI Fonte Vecchia No: 74	Labourer.	13 Jan 44 5 Corps P.O.W.

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

GRATICCIA, Lavinio	di France.	ORTONA	Student.	25 Jan 44 5 Corps POW.

Brief reason:- Suspicious conduct. Loitering near FDLS Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

GRUNHUT,	fu	LANCIANO	Surgeon	18 Jan 44 Civil

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Brief reason:- Self confessed spy.
Recommendation:- Decision pending.

GIANGRETO di Fernando Cesare		Near CHIETI Fonte Vecchia No: 74	Labourer.	13 Jan 44	5 Corps P.O.W.

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order.
Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

GRATICCIA, di Lavinio		ORTONA France.	Student.	25 Jan 44	5 Corps POW.

Brief reason:- Suspicious conduct. Loitering near FDLS
Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

GRUNHUT, Desiderio.	fu Isidoro	LANCIANO Corso Trente Trieste 72.	Surgeon	18 Jan 44	Civil Prison, LANCIANO.

Brief reason:- Possession of a pistol and ammunition (AmGOT Proclamation). Possession of a false Identity Card. Falsely pretending to be acting under authority of the AMG.
Category A

Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

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GUARNIERI di Giuseppe Ferdinando — MILANO Via Bonfadino — Mechanic — 14 Dec. 43 — Civil Prison VASTO.pending

Brief reason:- Now serving 2 months imprisonment for offence against Control of movement Order. Security danger in view of possible further attempts to cross lines. Category B
Recommendation Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

LA PORTA di Matteo Giuseppe — SAN NICANDRO GARGANICO, Via Cavour 4 — Farmer. — 17 Jan 44 — Civil Prison CASALBORDINO.

Brief reason: Offence against Control of movement Order. Category A
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

LA PORTA. di Matteo Vincenzo — SANNICANDRO GARGANICO Via Campagna 9 — Farmer. — 17 Jan 44 — Civil Prison CASALBORDINO

Brief reason Offence against Control of movement Order. Category A
Recommendation:-Trial by AMG pending.

MADONNA, Cesidio Giacinto — LANCIANO, Piazza Malvo. — Segretario Comunale — 20 Jan 44. — 5 Corps POW Cage.

Brief Reason:- Ispettore di zona, PNF. Zealous fascist. Continued fascist propaganda after the Italian Armistice. Pro-German sentiments Collaborated closely with the enemy. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

MASTROPAOLO di Giuseppe. Francescopaolo — FOGGIA, Via S. Masso, 29. — Farm Labourer. — 13 Jan 44 — Civil Prison CAMPOBASSO

Brief reason:- Loitering in military area in suspicious circumstances. Menace to Security. Category C
Released and Evacuated to RIP.

MAYER, Giovanni. Costantino — FOSSACESIA Piazza del Popolo. — Land Owner. — 18 Jan 44. — 5 Corps POW.

Prominent & active Fascist for about 20 years. Ex-Podesta of Fossacesia, left town before our occupation. Continued Fascist propaganda after Armistice, and urged population to assist enemy.

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Recommendation:-Trial by [illegible]

MADONNA, Cesidio Giacinto — LANCIANO, Piazza Malvo. — Segretario Comunale — 20 Jan 44. — 5 Corps POW Cage.

Brief Reason:- Ispettore di zona, PNF. Zealous fascist. Continued fascist propaganda after the Italian Armistice. Pro-German sentiments Collaborated closely with the enemy. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

MASTROPAOLO di Giuseppe. Francescopaolo — FOGGIA, Via Farm S. Masso, 29. — Labourer. — 13 Jan 44 — Civil Prison CAMPOBASSO

Brief reason:- Loitering in military area in suspicious circumstances. Menace to Security. Category C
Released and Evacuated to RIP.

MAYER, Costantino — Giovanni. — FOSSACESIA Piazza del Popolo. — Land Owner. — 18 Jan 44. — 5 Corps POW.

Prominent & active Fascist for about 20 years. Ex-Podesta of Fossacesia, left town before our occupation. Continued Fascist propaganda after Armistice, and urged population to assist enemy.

Category B.

Recommendation: To be evacuated to No2 district.in view of Age (75)

MAYER, Giulio — Giovanni — FOSSACESIA Piazza del Popolo. — Land Owner. — 17 Jan 44 — 5 Corps POW.

Brief reason: Continued Fascist propaganda after armistice. Active Fascist for over 20 years. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

MENICUCCI, Enrico. — fu Rizzieri — MILAN Via Michel Bianchi I. — Electrical mechanic. — 22 Jan 44. — Eighth Army PW Cage.

Brief reason: Self confessed spy. Category B.
Recommendation: Decision pending.

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MOZZI fu MONTEGNANA Clerk. 14 Dec.43 Civil
Decio Pietro Via Sceligera Prison
Brief reason:- Now serving 2 months imprisonment VASTO.
for Offence against Control of movement pending transfer to
Order. Security danger in view of Category B.P.W. Cage.
possible further attempts cross lines after 6 months.
Recommendation Internment & reconsideration
NUZZI (See foot-note at end).

PASELLI fu SAN NICANDRO Cobbler. 17 Jan 44 Civil
Matteo Costanzo GARGANICO Prison
Via Petrarch 4 CASALBORDINO
Brief reason:- Offence against Control of movement
Order. Category A.
Recommendation: Trial by AMG pending.

PASULLI fu MONTEFALCONE Farmer 24 Jan 44. CC.RR
Luigi Antonio Contrada Cuduchiano Caserma AGNONE
Via Nevere.
Brief reason:- Acting suspiciously in area of FDLS. Category C.
Recommendation: Decision pending.

PELLEGRINI, fu ROME Via Clerk. 22 Jan 44 Eighth
Carlo. Carlo, Oreste Salomone. Army PW
Brief reason:- Self confessed spy. Category B. cage.
Recommendation:- Pending.

PESCE, di ATESSA, Clerk. 2. Jan44. 113 FmC
Brune. Franco Tommaso. Largo PW Cage.
Municipio 6
Brief reason:- 2/Lt. MVSN Collaborated unnecessarily with
Germans after armistice. Remains convinced Fascist. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

PIZZUTO di MONACILIONI Shoemaker. 12 Jan 44 Civil
Francesco Lauro. , Salita Campanile 4 Prison
Brief reason:- Crossed line from ANCONA. Arrested CAMPOBASSO.
in British Military uniform. Category C
Released.

RICCHIUTI Francesco. TORRECILLA, Peasant. 14 Jan 44 Civil Ga
Ersilia. Via del Merro CASCLI
II.
Category C

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Recommendation:- Pending.

PESCE, di ATESSA, Clerk. 2. Jan44. 113 FMC
Brune. Franco Tommase. Largo PW Cage.
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Brief reason:- 2/Lt. MVSN Collaborated unnecessarily with Germans after armistice. Remains convinced Fascist. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

PIZZUTO di MONACILIONI Shoemaker. 12 Jan 44 Civil
Francesco Lauro. , Salita Campanile 4 Prison
Brief reason:- Crossed line from ANCONA. Arrested CAMPOBASSO.
in British Military uniform. Category C
Released.

RICCHIUTI Francesco TORRECILIA, Peasant. 14 Jan 44 Civil Ga
Ersilia. Via del Merro CASCLI
II.
Brief reason:- Suspected spy. Category C.
Recommendation:- Pending.

RICCIO di BOIANO Student. 22 Jan 44. Civil Ga
Ciro. Antonio Corso Umberto 62. CAMPOBASSO
Brief reason:- Arrested at request of HQ 2 District. Category C.
Disposal on recommendation by HQ 2 Dist.

RIZZI Guetano. CASACALENDA Peddlær. 23 Jan 44 Civil
Vincenzo Via Scifaione di Prison
Blasi. LANCIANO.
Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Order.
Category A
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

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ROSSI di Mario Ugo. PORTO RECANATI Mechanic 27 Jan 44. 5 Corps POW

Brief reason:- Caught crossing line from North Security danger. Category B.
Recommendation Internment and reconsideration after 6 months.

SANTINI di Beniamino Enrico. PESCARA, Via Caprero 49 Student. 16 Jan. 44. 5 Corps POW

Brief reason:- Crossed lines from North. Acting suspiciously. Sent to CSDIC
Recommendation:- Pending. Category B.

SARACINO Orazio Michele. VASTO, Corso Plebiscito 52 Interpreter. 20 Jan 44 209 POW Cage.

Brief reason:- Security reason. Passed himself off as a British Officer engaged on Secret Mission. Made unauthorised investigations of political character ostensibly as a British Agent. Category B
Recommendation:- Internment and reconsideration after 12 months.

SPINOSI, Roberto. Giuseppe. MARTINSICURO Via Borgata. Sailor. 10 Jan 44 209 POW Cage.

Brief reason:- Has revealed to unauthorised persons secret information. Is considered a menace to security in that he will probably do so again. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

STASIO, Nicola. Giovanni TERRACINA Largo Gregorio Antonelli I. Student. 13 Jan 44. ISERNIA Civil Gaol.

Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Orders. Category A.
Recommendation:- Trial by MMG pending.

SULPIZI Ercole. Carlo. MORRO D'ORO Via Collacchione Farmer. 14 Jan 44 RIP Eighth Army.

Brief reason:- Suspected Spy. Category C.
Recommendation:- Pending.

TETI, Carmine. di Giuseppe. TORRICELLA PELIGNA Via Bellini. Farmer. 21 Jan 44. Civil

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SPINOZI, Giuseppe. [illegible] Cage.
Roberto. Via Borgata.
Brief reason:- Has revealed to unauthorised persons secret information. Is considered a menace to security in that he will probably do so again. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

STASIO, Giovanni TERRACINA Student. 13 Jan 44. ISERNIA Civil Gaol.
Nicola. Largo Gregorio Antonelli I.
Brief reason:- Offence against Control of Movement Orders. Category A.
Recommendation:- Trial by AMG pending.

SULPIZI Carlo. MORRO D'ORO Farmer. 14 Jan 44 RIP Eighth Army.
Ercole. Via Collacchione
Brief reason:- Suspected Spy. Category C.
Recommendation:- Pending.

TETI, TORRICELLA PELIGNA Farmer.
Carmine, di Giuseppe. Via Bellini. 21 Jan 44. Civil Gaol, CASOLI.
Brief reason:- Suspected spy. Category C. Transferred to 209 POW Cage.
Recommendation:- Decision pending.

TETI, Nicola. TORRICELLA Peasant. 12 Jan 44. Civil Gaol, CASOLI.
Giuseppe.
Brief reason:- Suspected spy. Category C. Transferred to 209 P.W Cage.
Recommendation:- Decision pending.

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NUZZI di MILAN Student 14 Dec 43 209 PW Cage.
Riccardo Savoini Viale Regina Margherita 32
Brief reason:- Suspected German Agent. Category B.
Recommendation:- Internment for duration.

(Please see Sheet 8°.

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