

2nd Lt Albert P. Rocco
 1st Lt Gust P. Rakus
 2nd Lt John A. Rich
 2nd Lt Benjamin J. Roseto
 2nd Lt Mario Sicher
 2nd Lt Frank A. Ursino

1st Sgt Mario Wax

1st Sgt Jack E. Davis
 T/Sgt Frank G. Moss
 Y/1c William H. Quinn

Y2c Robert J. Diaz
 Y2c William S. Galan
 Y2c Wilson D. Hole
 Y2c Robert Longoria
 Y2c Joseph N. Martinez
 Y2c Flavio S. Quiroz

T/4 Gerald B. Everts
 T/4 Melvin D. Filipovich
 T/4 Benjamin L. Gilmore
 Sgt Eugene S. Morgan

Sgt Simon Tari
 T/5 Peter Agrusa
 T/5 Samuel Biern
 T/5 John F. Casademont
 T/5 Manuel N. Gambino

T/5 Kurt Hirsch
 T/5 Mariano Lameiras
 S1c Joseph A. Nicolini
 Cpl John Sebesian
 Pfc Henry J. Amate
 Pfc Matteo Arlia
 Pfc Raoul S. Benais
 Pfc Charles R. Benjamin
 Pfc Henry N. Carrera
 Pfc Ferdinand A. Ciarleglio
 Pfc Anthony Gima

Capt Stanley W. Dimwiddle
 Capt Charles Goodall
 Capt Leslie T. Jackson (Br)
 Capt William M. Joost
 Capt Leo P. Lombardo
 Capt Miguel J. Montesinos
 Capt Archibald O'Donnell (Br)
 Capt J. A. Ronnele
 Capt Alfred J. Tria
 Lieut Robert L. Woodcock
 Lieut Karl S. Brown (USNR)

1st Lt Henri P. Ayres
 Lt (jg) Joseph E. Blanton (USNR)
 1st Lt Richard Boulton
 1st Lt Frank Bonasera
 1st Lt Charles E. Carluccio
 1st Lt Peter J. Carpentieri
 1st Lt Raymond A. Clark
 1st Lt Rosario L. DiBella
 1st Lt Eliseo M. DiDomenica
 1st Lt Joseph H. Finlay
 1st Lt Joseph P. Garrotto
 1st Lt Richard L. P. Garzarelli
 1st Lt Arthur W. Gutenber
 1st Lt Herbert L. Jacobson
 1st Lt Alfred E. Krull
 1st Lt Alfred A. Lazzarini
 1st Lt Louis D. Leah
 1st Lt William H. Morris
 1st Lt. Umberto P. Motroni
 1st Lt Frank J. Palacio
 1st Lt Andrew C. Robertson
 1st Lt William T. Scenna
 1st Lt John A. Santoro
 1st Lt Howard F. Shepston
 Lt (jg) Harry R. Snow (USNR)
 1st Lt Henry W. Stopher, Jr.
 1st Lt DeWitt L. Stora

Postal Address: Civil Censorship Group, Italy, INC, AFHQ
 APO 550, U S Army

Signal Address: IBS for Stubblebine for McKean.

Lt. Umberto Motroni, HQ Allied Armies in Italy. Tel. 50581, Naples.

Lt. Wm H. Morris, Italian Post Office Bldg., Tel. 2040, Salerno

1987

Pfc Harry C. Cordes
Pfc Fiore P. Decicco
Pfc Thomas J. DeFrancis
Pfc John J. D'Orazio
Pfc Peter Erio
Pfc William E. Grove
Pfc Anthony J. Klados
Pfc John J. Manzo
Pfc Nicholas A. Marmo
Pfc Albert J. Mercoli
Pfc Joseph L. Pardo
Pfc Armando Penha
Pfc John J. Rafti
Pfc Joseph Rando
Pfc Paul A. Rossi
Pfc Contran S. Russo
Pfc Bruno L. Simonelli
Pfc Albert Veiri
Pfc Nevio A. Zanetti
Pfc Charles M. Zimmerman

Pvt Thomas Alaimo
Pvt Humbert J. Barilla
Pvt Frank Boyak
Pvt Oresto Buccini
Pvt Angelo Chimino
Pvt John Cipriano
Pvt Victor DeYorgi
Pvt Saverio Donato
Pvt Frank Fragale
Pvt Ciro Laveccia
Pvt Issac M. Levine
Pvt Frank T. Liferieri
Pvt Mario M. Napoleoni
Pvt Angelo L. Radassao
Pvt Josef Rawicz
Pvt George W. Solovieff
Pvt Nunzio A. Villani

2200

U. S. RESTRICTED

Equals Grade RESTRICTED

18 APR 1944

- OUTGOING

Telegrams
JLB/hft

RESTRICTED

ROUTINE

FATIMA BEAR

FREEDOM

2/17
2638
AIR

REF TRANSFER CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP TO ACC YOU HAVE CONCURRED UNIT ~~SELF~~
 CONTAINED (IN TRANSFER PD TO FREEDOM FROM FATIMA BEAR FROM HENDERSON SIGNED
MACFARLANE PD HOW IS THIS BEING EFFECTED QUETH SUGGEST GROUP REMAINS ON
 PRESENT TWO SIX SEVEN THREE HRS COMPANY ESTABLISHMENT AND ATTACHED
 WITH EQUIPMENT TO HRS ACC

AUTHENTICATED:

Roger B. Denny
 ROGER B DENNY
 1st Lt. A.G.D.
 Adjutant

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - Adj File
- 1 - DSC
- 1 - DCC ✓
- 1 - Telegrams

(2)

U. S. RESTRICTED

Equals Grade RESTRICTED

17 Apr

3/11/1 Transfer of Civil Censorship

file/100

✓

U. S. RESTRICTED

Equals British RESTRICTED

13 APR RECD

3975

DSH 549

13 APR 1946

INCOMING

/war

18/14

RESTRICTED

9488

NOT GIVEN

AIR 141800Z

Cite ID AG-1058

LIVE SUBMARINE FROM MCKEAN, CIVIL CENSORSHIP O

APR 151125Z

Via ACC Courier

WATKINS BEAT FOR HENDERSON BEAT TO AFHQ FOR INFO FOR
 HENDERSON AND FILIPOT FOR IT MONTGOMERY, ALLIED CENSOR CONTROL O

Traffic of Naples cable censorship field station will be handled there.
 Location of cable section at Naples as suggested by you to Capt Brunner
 is not desired. It is suggested that you submit your reasons since it
 would be possible that location could be found in town nearby if a question
 of space is involved. The closest coordination will be required for all
 censorship operations.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG
- 1 - DSG Info
- 1 - DCG
- 1 - Telecom ACTION

DCC

1884

DSG VCC
 12 APR 1946
 RECEIVED

U. S. RESTRICTED

Equals British RESTRICTED

file/490

20

14 Apr

3/11/1
 Transfer of Civil Censorship

Cpl. HendersonCapt. StoneDSH 550
18 APR 1944ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Censorship Branch
A.P.O. 512, U. S. Army
12 April, 1944

Dear Captain Stone.

It was a great pleasure to see you again and I am sorry that my visit did not allow me to spend more time with you.

I was not able to take up the question of direction of policy of Civil Communications Censorship with the Army Group as Brigadier Airey was not there. I do think, however, that if possible you should press for this, as on my return to Naples from Palermo I found that two Civil Censorship officers had arrived there with the intention of censoring all press messages which are, of course, all handled by my officers and therefore are not subject to Communications Censorship.

I expect to be coming back to Italy fairly soon and shall call upon you, but if, in the meantime, there is anything which I can do for you at AFHQ, you have only to let me know.

Kindest regards,

Yours Sincerely

R. Scott Bailey

Captain Ellery Stone, USN,
Headquarters, Allied Control Commission,
A. P. O. 394, U. S. Army.

1883

File/yes

(19)

12 Apr.

3/11/1 Summary of Civil Censorship

2203

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

CONFIDENTIAL

7244

DSB 546
17 APR 1944

X.C.C

W13/15
CONFIDENTIAL
PRIORITY
FREEDOM SOB CING
HQ AAI RPT TO PATIMA

APR150219
APR141933
F32362
PRIMO

TRANSFER OF CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP TO BE TO ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
ACCORDANCE ORIGINAL ARRANGEMENT

Ref AAI 02502

ACC LIST

Action - Telecom + Posts
Info - The Gen
DCC
Ex Offs
Field
Float

(17)

14

file 1882

18

10 APR 1944
10 APR 1944
10 APR 1944

CONFIDENTIAL

311.1 Summary of Civil Censorship

2204

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION *X.C.C.* INCOMING MESSAGE

7228
153 543
16 APR 1944

MSG Center No : N 40/13
Classification : NONE
Precedence : NONE
From : EQ AAI
To : AFHQ INFO AGG

Date | Time Rec'd : APRIL 13/2100
Date | Time Sent : APRIL 13/1900
Reference NR : 02502
Cite : NONE

(10) - See Page 2

YOUR FHING F26138 OF 1 APRIL GAVE YOUR AGREEMENT TO TRANSFER OF CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP TO AGG ON CERTAIN CONDITIONS. THESE CONDITIONS AGREED BY AGG AND YOU WERE INFORMED BY OUR 02462 OF 8 APRIL. YOUR F29931 OF 9 APRIL THEN REQUESTED OUR AGREEMENT ASSIGNMENT OF CIVIL CENSORSHIP TO AAI. IN OUR 02486 WE CONCURRED IN ERROR WE DID NOT REALISE YOU HAD CHANGED PROPOSED ASSIGNMENT. WE WANT YOU TO ASSIGN CIVIL CENSORSHIP TO AGG IN ACCORDANCE WITH YOUR ORIGINAL SUGGESTION. PLEASE CONFIRM THAT THIS WILL BE DONE

(15)

AGG DIST

INFO SECY GEN
DEP CC
CA ER
TELECOMS & POSTS
EX OFFRS
G-1 (A)
G-1 (B)
FILE *1881*
FLOAT

✓

(17)

00002
13 01

3/11/44

2205

CONFIDENTIAL

3179

14 APR 1944

12 APRIL 1944

SECRETARY GENERAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PRIORITY

EXT. 174

MAJOR DOB

H. AAI

SUBJECT IS CIVIL GUARDSHIP GROUP PD PAREN TO H. AAI FOR DISCHARGE FROM R. T. M.
SIGNED BLACK PLANE JARREN REFERENCE YOUR CABLE ZERO TWO FOUR EIGHT SIX PD IT
IS NOTED THAT FREEDOM CABLE FOR TWO NINE NINE THREE ONE MENTIONED ASSIGNMENT
TO ALLIED ARMIES IN ITALY PD THIS IS NOT RPT NOT IN ACCORD WITH OUR CABLE
TWO FIVE FOUR NINE OF TWO EIGHT MARCH AND YOUR ZERO TWO FOUR ZERO ONE OF THIRTY
MARCH TO FREEDOM PD REQUEST YOU SIGNAL FREEDOM CLARIFYING THIS

L.T. MONTANT, JR.
2nd Lt. AGO
Adjutant

CONFIDENTIAL

1880

RECEIVED
12 APR 1944
VCC

16

12 apr

311.1 Special - Transfer of Civil Cases

2206

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

7052
A.C.C.

CONFIDENTIAL
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

MSG Center No : N1/12
 Classification : CONFIDENTIAL
 Precedence : NONE
 From : HQ AAI
 To : AFHQ
 INFO ACC IBS

DSN 538
 15 APR 1944

Date Time Rec'd : APRIL 11/2355B
 Date Time Sent : 11/1445B
 Reference NR : 02486
 Cite : NONE

(14)

REF YOUR F29931 DATED 9 APRIL. THIS HQ CONCURS. ACC WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ARRANGING ACCN IN NAPLES AND ANY DETAILS FOR THE MOVE.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:

M

INFO - Secy Gen
 - Dep. CC
 - C. H. B.
 - Telecom. & Posts
 - Ch. Offs.
 - G-1 (A)
 - G-1 (B)
 - File
 - Float

1879

(15)

CONFIDENTIAL

2207

CONFIDENTIAL

Dep. C C,

6964

5/10

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC

HQ AAI RPTD FATIMA RPTD IBS FOR SHANE FOR MCKEAN.

APRIL
100105B
091834B
F29931
THING

CONCURRENCE REQUESTED IN ASSIGNMENT CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP, ITALY, TO ALLIED ARMIES ITALY. GROUP NOW CONSISTS OF MAJOR GORDON MCKEAN (UNITED STATES) OFFICER COMMANDING AND FOLLOWING: 37 US ARMY OFFICERS, 10 US NAVY OFFICERS, 8 BRITISH ARMY OFFICERS, 48 ENLISTED MEN, 8 US NAVY YEOMEN AND 1 SEAMAN AND 1 OTHER RANKS. NO CHANGE CONTEMPLATED IN ATTACHMENTS OF PERSONNEL NOW ON MAINLAND OR OF SMALL COMPLEMENT OFFICERS AND ENLISTED MEN REMAINING SICILY AND SARDINIA REUR O-2452 DATED 8 - 12 APRIL. ONLY SHIFT OF PERSONNEL IS MOVEMENT OF GROUP HEADQUARTERS FROM PALERMO TO NAPIES AREA. ON RECEIPT CONCURRENCE WILL REQUEST ORDERS FOR ABOVE ASSIGNMENT TO YOUR HEADQUARTERS AS OF 30 APRIL, PROPOSED EFFECTIVE DATE OF TRANSFER.

ACC DISTRIBUTION:

Info.....Sec'y Gen
Dep C C
C A Br (for Ex Com)
Tele coms and Posts
Ex Offrs (Ext Br)
G-1 (B)
G-1 (A)
File
Float

1878

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

6967
Dep. CC

57/9

CONFIDENTIAL

ROUTINE

FREEDOM SIGNED GING

IES FOR BEARS FOR MCKEAN REPEATED TO HQ AAI REPEATED TO FATIMA

APRIL 09/2330

APRIL 09/1519

F- 29801

FIND

ARRANGEMENTS EARLY TRANSFER CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP ITALY TO ALLIED ARMIES ITALY BEING
 MADE SOME FOLLOWING ALLIED ARMIES ITALY AND ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION AGREEMENT ON TERMS
 OF TRANSFER PREVIOUSLY FORWARDED YOU. INFORM THIS BRANCH WHETHER NAPLES AREA HEADQUARTERS
 OBTAINED AND PROBABLE DATE MOVE TO MAINLAND. ORDERS ISSUED PERMANENTLY TRANSFERRING
 MCKEAN TO NAPLES TO BE FOLLOWED FORTHWITH. MCKEAN TO CONFER WITH BOB (1) AT ARMY GROUP
 AND STONE AT CALABRO EARLIEST. DICKSON ARRIVING CASERTA MONDAY AFTERNOON. CONFIRM
 ARRANGEMENTS ON MOVING VEHICLES AND EQUIPMENT TO MAINLAND.

ACC DIST

INFO SESY CMN

DEF CC

TELECOMS & POSTS

SA MR(FOR EX GUN)

FILE

FLOAR

CONFIDENTIAL

F 29801

9 Apr

2209

8 APR REC
2866

INCOMING

/sk

IN CLEAR

0-2462

ROUTINE

081115H APR

HQ AAI

091645B APR

ACTION COMMUNICATIONS CENSORSHIP BRANCH INC
AFHQ INFO FATIMA

Via 94 S4 Signals

SEE (10)
NO RECORD

Your E-26138 cite PHMC of 1 April. Proposals acceptable this HQ and ACC.

Assume you will now make necessary arrangements transfer.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AAI
- 1 - DSC - info
- 1 - DCC - info
- 1 - Telecomms - info
- 1 - Lt. Palacio - info

1877

12
0-2462
8 Apr

RESTRICTED

3029

SF

SECRETARY GENERAL

7 APRIL 1944

RESTRICTED

EXT. 174

ROUTINE

MAJOR DOB

HQ AXI

10

40/g(OPS) - attache

REFERENCE YOUR LETTER TWO APRIL FIVE FOUR ZERO SLANT GEORGE PARKER ONE PARKER
 PROPOSALS MENTIONED FROM AFSA PARKER TO HQ AXI FROM E'TIRA SIGNED PROPANLAW
 PARKER ARE ACCEPTABLE

✓

1876

L. T. MONTANT, JR
 2nd Lt, AGD
 Adjutant

RESTRICTED

6 April 1944

TO: Colonel Monfort

With reference to the attached and AAI's telegram #679 of March 30, the marked sentence in para 2 c of AAI's letter dated 2 April is contrary to the sentence which I have marked in AAI's telegram.

AFHQ's telegram quoted in para 2 was written by Lt Col Hoover of INC and I am not impressed with such phrases as "to provide integration with world wide censorship network". I therefore favor AAI's recommendation in its original telegram that the policy for Italians' censorship will emanate from AAI.

I have no real say in the matter. It must be decided between AAI and AFHQ as E.W.S. My
I can see AAI appeal to want to have policy themselves as opposed to AFHQ. I don't think I should approve.
6 Apr. 1875

2212

SUBJECT: Civil Censorship.

TO : A.C.C.

~~NE~~
H.Q., A.A.I.

40/G(ops)

Ref your 2549 dated 28 March '44.

1. The following has been received from A.F.H.Q. in reply to your proposals. *File 26138*

2. "Transfer of Civil Censorship Group Italy to Allied Control Commission would be agreed following basis :- *T26138*

(a) Group is self contained operating unit with necessary personnel and vehicles and would be based in Naples area. Officer now under orders to locate quarters in that area regardless of transfer.

(b) Personnel added your strength would be subject your direction and attached as your headquarters directs. Group to be kept intact with separate Table organization and war establishment. Trained personnel not to be used for other assignments by you. Agree no withdrawals without your agreement except probable maximum of ten officers and eight enlisted men in training for future operations in other areas. Reference additions, INU policy is release for combat duty of officers and men who can be replaced by limited service personnel. Therefore replacements may in some case be placed on temporary duty for training. *111*

(c) File of directives and chart organization in possession of Captain DICKSON, Communications Censorship Branch Liaison Officer Allied Armies Italy. Reference policy, Allied Force Headquarters must retain policy control to ensure compliance with requirements imposed by combined Chiefs of Staff and to provide integration with world wide censorship network. Latter obviously impossible from Italy. Staff personnel here familiar with requirements of United States and Imperial Censorships, which maintain Liaison Officers at Allied Force Headquarters for this theatre as a whole."

3. It is presumed that these conditions are agreeable to you and we await your confirmation before making the necessary arrangements.

2 April, 1944
FM/gb

Captain Stone,
Room 412 Right

/s/

for
Lieut. Gen.,
C.G.S.

1874

RECEIVED

C O P Y

*General MacFarland's reply
not received 4/4/44
900*

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Military Government Section

U-2888
TBJ/thh

~~DC~~
4 APR REC'D
2733

MGS 091.6-2

1 April 1944

SUBJECT: Censorship of Telecommunications - Italy

TO : Headquarters, Allied Control Commission

Reference letter from Communications Censorship Branch, INC, under reference CCB/130-9 of 21 March (copy direct to you) on the above subject could you now state please the position in the matter.

For the Acting Chief of Section:

T. B. Jackman
T. B. JACKMAN,
Major.

(9) a

Recd. 3 Apr. 44.

2214

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785015

SECRET

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE

SECRET

ROUTINE

H. RAI

PATINA

M/C NO 51/30

REF NO 6/9

FILED 301645

REC'D 302235

(ACTION ATTN: INFO PATINA FROM H. RAI CITE C-2401)

FURTHER TO MY C-2383 OF 28 MARCH. AGC AGREE TO ACCEPT RESPONSIBILITY CIVILIAN CENSORSHIP OPERATION SUBJECT TO FOLLOWING CONDITIONS WHICH PLEASE CONFIRM. (A) THAT THE UNIT IS A SELF CONTAINED OPERATING UNIT WITH NECESSARY PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES AND IS ESTABLISHED IN SIPLER AND NOT AS AT PRESENT IN SICILY. (B) THAT PERSONNEL WHO ARE ADDED TO STRENGTH MY DEPARTMENT WILL BE SUBJECT TO MY DIRECTION AND NOT ATTACHED TO ANY OTHER UNIT AND THAT NO WITHDRAWALS OR ADDITIONS WILL BE MADE WITHOUT MY AGREEMENT. (C) THAT BEFORE GIVING FINAL APPROVAL I BE FURNISHED COPIES OF ALL CIVIL CENSORSHIP DIRECTIVES NOW IN FORCE AND CHARTER ORGANIZATION. POLICY FOR SUCH CENSORSHIP WILL EMANATE FROM THIS HQ. PATINA PLEASE NOTE.

AGC DIST:

Action - Telecoms & Posts
 Info - DSG
 - DCC
 - CARR
 - File
 - Float

1873

SECRET

U-2158

Rear HQ 367
26 MAR 1944
1840

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Communications Censorship Branch
APO 512

OCB/130-9

21 March 1944.

SUBJECT: Censorship of Telecommunications, Italy.

TO : Military Government Section, Allied Force Headquarters,
APO 512, U.S. Army.

1. Plans for censorship control of civilian telecommunications, Italy, are now completed to such a degree that Communications Censorship Branch will favorably consider any request for the opening of such services in Italy, including Sicily and Sardinia. It is pointed out, however, that this Branch is not the initiating or authorizing agency for the opening of such service. Nevertheless its concurrence in the opening of new services is required.

2. Civil Censorship Section, Allied Force Headquarters, has already requested movement orders for cable and radio censorship personnel for the censoring stations at Naples, where traffic by R.C.A.C. and Cable and Wireless, Ltd., can be controlled, and at Brindisi, where traffic for Cable and Wireless, Ltd., can be controlled, from the censorship point of view. The personnel in question are expected to be at their stations on or about 1 April 1944.

3. This information is for your files and such future use as you may care to make of it.

DONALD B. HOOVER,
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, Communications Censorship Branch.

cc: Capt. Ellery W. Stone, USAR
Chief of Staff, A.C.C.

1872
RECEIVED
21 MAR 1944

8

21 Mar

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Communications Censorship Branch
CIVIL CENSORSHIP GROUP - ITALY
APO 550, U. S. Army

28 March 1944

CCG/20-54

Subject: Transmittal of Requested Material.

To : Captain Ellery Stone,
Deputy Chief Commissioner,
Allied Control Commission,
Salerno.

Inclosed are one copy of Technical Operations Report on Italy, one copy of Bi-weekly Operating Report #4 of Civil Censorship Section from 20 February to 4 March 1944, and Directives of Combined Chiefs of Staff (WD AG 000.73 (17 July 43) OB-S-B-M of 26 August 1943, Subject, "Censorship of Civilian Communications in Occupied Areas").

R. A. Clark
1st Lt CE

for GORDON W. McKEAN
Major Cavalry
Deputy Civil Censorship Officer,
ITALY

3 INCL:

- Incl 1. Technical Operations Report
- Incl 2. Bi-Weekly Operating Report (20 Feb - 4 Mar '44)
- Incl 3. WD AG 000.73 (17 July 43) OB-S-B-M, 26 Aug '43

1871

SECRET

OUTGOING

29 MAR 1944

ews/hjp

6/28

29 MAR 1944

2549

MAR

SECRET

PRIORITY

FATIMA REAR

FILPOT

982300A

YOUR RL TWO FIVE SPACE ONE TWO THREE SIX TWO RE CENSORSHIP PD PAREN TO FILPOT
FROM FATIMA REAR SIGNED MACFARLANE PAREN IN PRINCIPLE I AM AGREEABLE TO TAKE
 RESPONSIBILITY FOR CIVIL CENSORSHIP OPERATIONS CMA SUBJECT TO FOLLOWING CONDITIONS
 CEN PAREN A PAREN THAT THE UNIT IS A SELF CONTAINED OPERATING UNIT WITH NECESSARY
 PERSONNEL AND VEHICLES AND IS ESTABLISHED IN NAPLES AREA AND NOT AS AT PRESENT
 IN SICILY PD PAREN B PAREN THAT PERSONNEL WILL BE ADDED TO STRENGTH OF MY
 COMMISSION CMA WILL BE SUBJECT TO MY DIRECTION AND NOT ATTACHED TO ANY OTHER
 UNIT CMA AND THAT NO WITHDRAWALS OR ADDITIONS WILL BE MADE WITHOUT MY AGREEMENT PD
 PAREN C PAREN THAT BEFORE GIVING FINAL APPROVAL I BE FURNISHED COPIES OF ALL
 CIVIL CENSORSHIP DIRECTIVES NOW IN FORCE AND CHART OF ORGANIZATION

AUTHENTICATED:

ELLERY W. STONE
 Captain, USMC
 Deputy Chief Commissioner

1870

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files
- 1 - Chief Comm
- 1 - Dep Chief Comm
- 2 - Dep Sec Gen



SECRET

U.S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

INCOMING

/sk

SECRET

F 23255

ROUTINE

261725A MAR

FREEDOM SIGNED CINC CITE FHINC

262100A MAR

IES FOR SEARS FOR McKEAN RPTD FOR INFO
FATIMA HEAR FOR STONE

British Signals

Please despatch urgent immediate to Captain Stone Deputy Commissioner Allied Control Commission AFO 394 all copies biweekly operating report civil censorship section from 5th February to date. Also one (1) copy technical operations report on Italy. Also Directive of Combined Chiefs of Staff under which this censorship is being conducted. McKean to notify this branch immediately on despatch of requested material.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG
- 1 - DSC - info
- 1 - DCC - info

1869

U.S. SECRET Equals British SECRET

5a

26 Mar

25 MAR 1944

2316

ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION INCOMING MESSAGE /msr

SVC/REPLY NO.

CLASS: NOT GIVEN

PREC: IMPORTANT

FROM: HQ AAI

TO: ACC

I/C NO:

REF NO: RL/25 12362

FILED: MAR 251535A

REC'D: MAR 251550A
Via teletype

AFHQ have suggested that you should be responsible for Civil
Censorship operations in Italy. Do you agree to this transfer.
We are accepting responsibility for Base Censorship.

DISTRIBUTION:

- 1 - AG File
- 1 - ISG Info
- 1 - DCC ACTION ✓
- 1 - Maj Colville INFO ✓

see reply at 6

1868

(5)

2220

CONFIDENTIAL

25 MAR 1944

3475

ROUTING

ILD/

DSN 177
25 MAR 1944

11/25

2530

MAR

CONFIDENTIAL
ROUTINE
FATHA REAR
FREEDOM

REFERENCE LETTER CHARLES CHARLES BAKER SLANT ZERO ZERO THREE DASH ONE TWO
OF ONE EIGHT MARCH FROM TO FREEDOM FOR THIS FROM FATHA REAR FROM STONE
SIGNED MACE/MALARE FAREN NONE OF THIS ⁶ ~~IS~~ ENCLOSURES REFERRED TO IN THIS
LETTER HAVE BEEN RECEIVED TO PLEASE EXPEDITE

AUTHENTICATED:

KELLEY W. STONE
Captain, USMC
Deputy Chief Commissioner

DISTRIBUTION:

- 2 - AG Files
- 1 - Dep Chief Comm
- 2 - Dep Sec Gen ✓

1867

(4)

CONFIDENTIAL

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Communications Censorship Branch
APO 512

CCB/003-12

18 March 1944

Dear Captain Stone,

Since our conversation at Salerno, reorganization of the Censorship Branch has been completed, with a Press and Radio Censorship Branch headed by Lieut. Col. V.E. Scott Bailey, and a Communications Censorship Branch headed by me. The latter is responsible for handling military as well as civil communications, which should simplify dealing with such problems as SCM and EFM messages, which are covered in the letter enclosed.

The question of transferring Communications Censorship Branch to G-2, AFHQ, is pending and I naturally would not want to begin formal discussions of your commission taking over Civil Censorship operation without concurrence from G-2. Please therefore consider this letter as an answer to the points raised in yours of 9 March, received today.

The information desired by General MacFarlane to provide a background on the civil censorship operation is enclosed. It is:

- a. Directive of Combined Chiefs of Staff under which this censorship is being conducted. *Incl #1*
- b. Technical report on operations to 20 January 44, including all proposed regulations and basic procedures for postal, cable, radio, telephone, telegraph and travelers censorship. *Incl #2*
- c. Copies of bi-weekly operating reports of the Civil Censorship Section, to date. *Incl #3 - (1 only 20 Feb to 4 Mar)*
- d. Chart of organization of civil censorship operations. *Incl #4*
- e. Chart showing staff functions of Communications Censorship Branch. *- ?*

These are the basic data on the operation.

Answering your point on the group being self-contained and being located in the Naples area, the organization is complete with Table of Organization, necessary equipment and facilities for operation under attachment to Peninsular Base Section in a

manner similar to its present attachment to Island Base Section (Sicily.) Major Gordon W. McKean, CAV, Deputy Civil Censorship Officer, Italy, is today being directed to personally review arrangements for accomodation of the group in the Naples area and the move will be undertaken as soon as possible.

Reviewing our conversation, if A.C.C. becomes the directing authority for civil censorship within Italy, Communications Censorship Branch will keep A.C.C. fully informed of any policy directives issued to the group, and will be concerned primarily with those external policies involved in integration with the world-wide United Nations network directed by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Due to the fact a number of officers now being trained in the Italian operation may be required for future operations or for staff duties at AFHQ, the right would be reserved to withdraw such personnel, recognizing also the responsibility to maintain an efficiently-functioning unit responsible for censorship of such internal and external communications as are now or will be subsequently permitted under Allied supervision.

The letter dealing with the HCA Naples circuit was not written until today, due to the fact that pertinent signals sent from A.C.C. were not recorded at the AFHQ message center as having been received.

It was a pleasure to hear from you, and I shall look forward to seeing you again to discuss details of the transfer if it is agreed. Should the transfer not be made, we will be represented by a liaison officer who will be familiar with Communications Censorship Branch operations and policies. Would you kindly do me the favor of letting me have your comments on the attached tentative draft of instructions to such officer. Similar instructions would be provided to Major McKean on the policy level.

Yours sincerely,

Captain Ellery W. Stone, USNR
H.Q. Allied Control Commission,
Deputy Chief Commissioner,
A.P.O. 394, U. S. Army.

not used

DONALD D. HOOVER, 1865
Lieutenant Colonel, G.S.C.,
Chief, Communications Censorship Branch.

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WAR DEPARTMENT
The Adjutant General's Office
Washington

AG 000.73 (17 Jul 43) CE-S-B-M

KLE/el-2B-939 Pentagon

26 August 1943

SUBJECT: Censorship of Civilian Communications in Occupied Areas.

TO: The Commanding Generals:
United States Army Forces, European Theater of Operations
United States Army Forces, North African Theater of Operations
United States Army Forces in the Middle East.

1. The Combined Chiefs of Staff have approved a policy defining the responsibility for censorship of civilian communications in Eur-African areas. A copy of the approved decision is inclosed - CCS #271. You are requested to take the following implementing action:

a. Establish and operate censorship of all civilian communications in areas occupied and controlled solely by United States forces under your command, or

b. Protect the censorship interests of the United States in areas occupied and controlled by United Nations' forces, of which forces under your command form a part.

2. The additional responsibility imposed upon commanders by the Combined Chiefs of Staff policy is extensive - see inclosed copy of memorandum, Censorship of Civilian Communications in Territory Occupied and Controlled by the Armed Forces.

3. The following requests apply in the situation described in paragraph 1 a. above. In the situation described in paragraph 1 b. above, every reasonable effort is to be made to have these procedures followed insofar as their application may be practical:

a. The operation of civilian censorship is to be separate from that presently required for military censorship--that is, for communications to or from military personnel.

b. The duties of preparing for and operating civilian censorship and maintaining liaison should be delegated to a Civil Censorship Officer. **1864**
It is imperative that this Civil Censorship Officer be an individual who has had actual extensive experience in organizing and supervising civilian censorship. Officers who have been on duty with the United States Office of Censorship and have there gained the required experience are available within the Army. If such a qualified officer is not presently within your command, or if you desire an additional officer for this assignment, one may be

Incl #1 to CEB/303-12 (18 MAR 44)
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AG 000.73 (17 Jul 43)OB-S-B-M

(Cont'd)

26 August 1943.

requisitioned from the Military Intelligence Division, War Department, Washington, D. C. Qualified subordinates as needed may also be requisitioned from the Military Intelligence Division.

g. Direct communication on technical aspects of civilian censorship matters is authorized between the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department General Staff and Civil Censorship Officers. Immediately upon appointment of Civil Censorship Officer for your area his name and official address should be reported to the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department, Washington, by cable.

d. It is desired that the War Department be kept constantly advised of censorship plans and operations in your area, as the War Department is responsible for integration with all censorship agencies and activities.

4. The War Department is establishing a Deputy Censorship Office in London, England, with functions as outlined in the inclosed copy of memorandum. In addition to its other duties, that office will be available to you to provide such information and assistance as you may desire.

By order of the Secretary of War:

3 Incls.

- #1. CCS Dir #271, Definition of Responsibility.
- #2. Memo. Censorship of Civilian Communications.
- #3. Statement of Functions, Deputy Censorship Office.

J. A. ULIO,
Major General,
The Adjutant General.

COPIES FURNISHED:

Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1, WDGS
Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, WDGS (20)
Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations Division, WDGS
Director, Civil Affairs Division, Office, Chief of Staff.

CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL**U. S. CONFIDENTIAL
BRITISH SECRETENCLOSUREDEFINITION OF UNITED STATES AND BRITISH RESPONSIBILITY FOR
CENSORSHIP OF CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS IN EUR-AFRICAN AREAS

1. Recent decisions of the War Department, United States, and the War Office, Great Britain, reached in agreement with the respective Directors of civilian censorship, acknowledged that the establishment and operation of censorship of all civilian communications in Eur-African areas occupied and controlled by British or American armed forces will be a function of the military authorities.

2. In order to provide for effective control and coordination, it is necessary to define the responsibilities to be undertaken by United States and British authorities.

3. It is requested that the Combined Chiefs of Staff approve the following statements of policy for Eur-African areas:

a. Censorship of all civilian communications in Eur-African areas occupied and controlled by British or American armed forces will be established and operated by military authorities.

b. In an area occupied and controlled by either American or British forces, as contrasted to an Anglo-American force, the responsibility for establishment and operation of censorship of all civilian communications will be that of the commander of the occupying force.

c. The establishment and operation of censorship of all civilian communications in an area occupied and controlled by Anglo-American military forces will be the responsibility of the United Nations' commander of those forces.

③ ENCLOSURE NO. 1.

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d. When the occupying force moves on, the theater commander will be responsible for the exercise of the function of censorship as long as he considers it vital to his mission.

e. Any censorship of civilian communications established separately by British or American military authorities, or by them jointly, will be fully integrated with the United Nations world-wide censorship network. In all cases, liaison will be maintained between the censorship offices established under b, above, and the American or British forces, as the case may be, not in actual control of censorship activities in that particular area.

f. This directive does not apply to communications to or from military personnel or civilians who are a part of, or directly attached to, military establishments of the United Nations.

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CONFIDENTIAL**CONFIDENTIAL****CENSORSHIP OF CIVILIAN COMMUNICATIONS IN TERRITORY
OCCUPIED AND CONTROLLED BY THE ARMED FORCES**

1. The censoring of civilian communications in territory occupied and controlled by United Nations armed forces is imperative because of the necessity for:

a. Obtaining information, including:

1. That on subjects of value in the prosecution of the war effort within the territory.

2. That on the state of public opinion and morale within the territory in order to aid both the established military or other government of the territory and the governments of the United Nations in carrying out their individual and joint policies.

3. That on trade, finance and other subjects of an economic and political nature that will aid in the over-all war effort.

b. Assisting in the enforcement of regulations such as:

1. Developing information of violations of, or attempts to violate, any military order or regulation including those promulgated to govern the area.

2. Policing the measures of currency, international trade and other controls adopted by the United Nations.

c. Assisting the maintenance of security by:

1. Preventing information from reaching the enemy.

2. Detecting subversive elements in the territory or contiguous areas.

3. Protecting lines of communication.

2. From the point of view of control of communications there are three separate periods which must be considered, understanding that any one period may overlap with the next. These periods may be designated as:

a. The battle period.

b. The period of occupation.

d. The period during which an indigenous government is installed.

3. It is logical to anticipate that during the battle period control of civilian communications will be exercised by means of a complete stoppage of all such communications. Soldiers engaged in

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(3) INCLOSURE NO. 2.

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battle should not be required to act as censors nor should they be encumbered with a censorship organization during the active phases of a campaign. However, arrangements for the seizure and censorship of all captured mails and other documents must be carefully planned.

4. For censorship purposes the period of occupation is understood to cover the period from the end of the battle, when there will be a communication zone to be administered, to the time when there can be installed an indigenous government which can be entrusted with the control of communications. It is probable that during this period of occupation, control of civilian communications will be exercised in part by limiting the use of communication channels and partly by censoring those communications which are permitted. Under established policy the Army will be responsible during this period for the censorship control of civilian communications.

5. Upon the establishment of a recognized indigenous government the direct control of the censorship organization will pass to that government. There will then remain in the territory only liaison officers assigned as necessary to protect the interests of the United States.

6. In the case of enemy territory occupied by United States armed forces and governed by a United States military administration there is little likelihood that an indigenous government will be set up prior to the signing of a peace treaty. During the period of occupation the only powers exercised by the inhabitants themselves will be those delegated to them by the military administration and will be concerned with the maintenance of public order and of the essential public utility services. Censorship control of civilian communications will be a function of the military authorities during the entire period of occupation.

7. The types of communications that must be controlled include:

a. Postal:

1. First class or sealed letters
2. Second class or printed papers, magazines and newspapers
3. Parcels
4. Postal communications between civilians in the occupied territory and prisoners of war.
5. Communications to enemy territory through licensed channels such as the International Red Cross.

b. Telegraphic communications:

1. Land-wire
2. Cable
3. Radio

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c. Telephonic communications:

1. Land-wire
2. Radio

d. Travelers documents

e. Press dispatches and publications:

1. For local release
2. For world-wide release

f. Radio broadcasting

g. Films and photographs:

1. Motion picture
2. Stills

8. With the exception of radio broadcasting these types of communications fall into two distinct sub-divisions:

a. Internal communications, which are those originating within the territory and destined for points within the same territory.

b. External communications, which are those originating within the territory and destined for points outside the territory; or originating from points outside the territory and destined for points within the territory.

9. During the period of occupation of the territory of one of the governments of the United Nations it is assumed that in order to rehabilitate as speedily as possible the full life and economy of the liberated people it will be the policy of the military government to permit as free communication as possible with the outside world and between the inhabitants of the liberated territory, having due regard to the needs of security and to the enforcement of economic policy as agreed upon by the United Nations. Under such a procedure it will be undesirable to exercise control through the prohibition of communications except to enemy or enemy occupied territories and great reliance will have to be placed on censorship.

10. In the case of occupied enemy territory the same consideration of speedy restoration of communications is not applicable. In such a case the system of control should be based primarily upon severe restrictions on freedom to communicate in order to reduce the censorable matter to proportions which can be handled by personnel recruited exclusively from United States or Allied sources. With this principle adopted, measures which could be placed in effect include:

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a. External communications (other than official communications of United Nations):

1. Postal. Permits to write letters to destinations outside the occupied territory may be required, thereby limiting the number and nature of the letters which may be written. These permits may take the form of blanket permits for certain types of communications or individual permits for specific cases.

2. Telegraphic. Telegrams and cables outside the territory may be permitted only in exceptional cases upon proof of identity and upon satisfying the authorities as to the necessity for the communication.

3. Telephonic. In all probability no telephone communications to points outside the territory would be permitted except monitored press messages read from previously censored script.

4. Travelers. Presumably no persons will be allowed to enter or leave the territory except personnel of the United Nations armed forces traveling on duty or on leave or civilians traveling on official business of United Nations governments. This reduces censorship problems to those of arranging for the examination of personal communications carried by official travelers.

5. Press. All press releases would be censored in cooperation with the designated Public Relations officer.

6. Broadcasting. All broadcasting stations would be strictly controlled by the military administration. Censorship would be instituted in accordance with the desires of the military commander or governor.

7. Films and photographs. All films and photographs imported into and exported from the occupied area should pass through and be controlled by censorship. In all probability only those of a personal or family nature will be permitted although commercial motion pictures for entertainment purposes must also be allowed.

b. Internal communications (other than official communications of the United Nations):

1. Postal. Any regulation to curtail severely the volume of internal mail will be extremely difficult to put into effect and probably would result in a large clandestine traffic. Under anything approaching normal conditions the amount of internal mail far exceeds the capacity of any organization of a reasonable size to conduct a 100% censorship. Consequently, reliance must be placed upon a sampling process, either random or planned rotation. The scope of the sampling necessary will, of course, depend upon local conditions.

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2. Telegraphic. The treatment of internal telegrams will be affected by two factors. First, the necessity for the military authorities to make use of civil telegraph facilities to augment the communication channels available for official communications. Second, the necessity to withhold from civilians, particularly hostile or subversive, a speedy means of communication which would facilitate under-cover activities. Civilian use of telegraphic facilities is, therefore, likely to be restricted to emergency cases and to be available only upon proof of identity and upon satisfying authorities as to the necessity for the communication.

3. Telephonic. Local telephone service probably will be subject to restrictions similar to those imposed upon telegraphic communications and for the same reasons. Reinstatement of telephone service should be made only with the approval of the Intelligence Officer controlling the area and subject to whatever security requirements are imposed. Initially, calls outside the local area may be allowed under permit only. In any case, calls should be permitted outside the local area only within the capability of the censorship organization to maintain a 100% censorship.

4. Travelers. It is expected that travel control within an enemy occupied area will be rigidly enforced with the result that there should be little censorship problems.

5. Press. All press releases for purely local consumption will be censored in cooperation with the designated Public Relations officer.

6. Broadcasting. Since radio broadcast programs cannot be confined to a limited area, this medium is not considered to be a means of internal communication.

7. Films and photographs. It is probable that only commercial motion picture films for entertainment purposes will be permitted within an occupied area.

8. Captured documents. Documents of a military nature should be placed in the hands of Intelligence officers for examination but documents of a general or economic nature could best be examined by the organization established to censor civilian communications.

11. Unless absolutely necessary no attempt should be made to censor transit mails that is, mail from one country to another passing through occupied territory. Existing censorship arrangements should be depended upon except in an unusual case where a particular mail has been by-passing United Nations censorship.

12. The personnel required for censorship of civilian communications in liberated territories of the United Nations can be held to a minimum through the employment of inhabitants of the territory as censorship examiners using military personnel for control purposes only. This would have the added advantage of facilitating withdrawal from military control of the censorship organization when an indigenous government takes over. In enemy occupied territory, however, local inhabitants could seldom be used because of their inherent hostility. Therefore, in this latter case, it is expected that it will be necessary to recruit censorship examiners from the armed forces or from civilians of adjacent United Nations territories.

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STATEMENT OF FUNCTIONS OF DEPUTY CENSORSHIP
OFFICE, LONDON. 14

I. Deputy Censorship Office.

The Deputy Censorship Office, London, will be attached for administrative purposes only, to the European Theater of Operations and under the direction and approval of the War Department will:

1. Keep the War Department fully informed concerning the censorship plans and activities of all United Nations' censorship agencies, both military and civilian, in Eur-African areas, including the presently designated European, North African, Middle Eastern and Central African Theaters of Operations.

2. Make recommendations to the War Department for the establishment of such policy as may be required to insure that the interests of the United States are adequately protected in all censorships established over civilian communications in Eur-African occupied or liberated territories.

3. Recommend to the War Department the adoption of such steps as may be necessary to insure that all censorships of civilian communications established and operated in Eur-African areas by United States Commanders are fully integrated with the United Nations' Censorship network.

4. Provide, at the request of United States Force Commanders charged with the establishment and operation of censorship of civilian communications in the Eur-African territories, all possible assistance in the discharge of their censorship responsibilities.

5. Maintain liaison as directed by the War Department with other censorship agencies of the United States and foreign governments.

6. Perform such travel as is necessary to execute the assigned mission successfully.

7. Furnish to theater commanders concerned copies of all communications to the War Department.

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INCLOSURE NO. 3.

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BOUND SEPARATELY

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Inclosure #2

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Extra copy

ALLIED FORCE HEADQUARTERS
Information and Censorship Section
Communications Censorship Branch
CIVIL CENSORSHIP SECTION
APO 550, U. S. Army

4 March 1944

CCS/163-5

OPERATIONAL REPORT NO. 4

ITALY

For the Period 20 February to 4 March 1944I. GENERALA. Transportation:

1. In order to make available additional transportation for use of ACCOs in the field, the following assignments of vehicles have been made.

1- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) to Naples. (This vehicle was formerly used by Captain Dickson at ACMF)

1- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) to Benevento.

1- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) to Foggia.

1- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) to Bari.

2. Request has been made to Communications Censorship Branch for authorization thru MGS for civilian vehicles in the provinces which we are about to take over.

3. The transportation available at headquarters consists of:

1- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) charged against T/E.

2- 3/4 ton W/C charged against T/E.

In addition to the foregoing the organization has 2- 1/4 ton C&R (jeep) on memorandum receipt. These are due to be called in shortly.

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Incl #3 - to CCB/003-12 AFHP I & C to CCB-18 Mar 44

B. Censorship Regulations: Changes still held pending Col. Hoover's approval.

C. Consolidation of Special Activities Subsection with Postal Subsection: Because of the close inter-relation between the matters handled by Special Activities Subsection and the Postal Subsection, the two have been consolidated by setting up the former as a unit of the latter. The result is to bring under one head, all matters affecting postal censorship operations. Existing arrangements and procedures for the handling of Watch Lists and other highly classified matters will not be disturbed.

D. Imperial Censorship and Office of Censorship Submission Slips and Reports: In order to assist this headquarters in making a proper evaluation of the information coming in from the field it is requested that the necessary steps be taken to secure copies of all submission slips and reports prepared by Imperial Censorship and Office of Censorship on Italian mail examined by them. It is believed that a review of this material may prove helpful in determining the character and type of information desired by these two organizations. Since there is usually a definite correlation between subjects in internal and external mails more effective results should obtain through this reciprocal exchange of information. It would also be possible to effect prompt Watch List posting where the information from the external mail when added to that gleaned from the internal mail justifies such action; whereas either one taken alone might not justify it. It is believed that this interchange of information should make for a more coordinated result.

E. Organization of External Censorship in Italy: A broad policy question is involved in the development and expansion of censorship activities as they relate to external communications. The expansion at present can be traced to a tremendous increase in Red Cross messages, Vatican messages and Prisoner of War mail. Future expansion may result from the processing of external mails, either through Watch Lists or through the examination of mail to newly liberated countries, i.e. Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania, etc. Since the process is likely to be gradual it is deemed important that some consideration be given at this time to policy, which if not formulated now, might easily drift into forming a pattern for future action with good, bad or indifferent results. The basic policy questions presented appear to fall into the following categories:

1. Responsibility- Because of the anomalous position of the Italian government as a cobelligerent it would appear likely that the responsibility for external censorship will continue to be that of the Allied armed forces. This should be confirmed.

2. Organization- If the responsibility is to be an Allied one, then the organization should be an Allied organization entirely operated by the Allied military forces and not merely a reconstituted Italian organization sanctioned by the Italian government.

3. Personnel- Regardless of the form that the organization may take, it is apparent that a substantial portion of the personnel must consist of Italian civilians. Steps should be taken to authorize their employment and payment and the source of such funds and to determine who will bear the eventual expense.

4. Procurement of Space, Supplies and Equipment- The procedure for the procurement of space, supplies and equipment should now be ascertained, as well as a determination as to who will bear the eventual expense.

The problem is not urgent at this time, but is being raised so as to permit sufficient time for investigation and solution. Likewise, the foregoing is not intended as a thorough discussion but merely as a preliminary estimate of the situation for the purpose of drawing attention to a development which is now just commencing.

II. POSTAL SUBSECTION

A. Personnel

1. Arrivals:
 - 25 February 1944- Pvt. George Solovieff
 - 28 February 1944- 2nd Lt. Beauvais Duffy
2. Changes in Assignments:
 - 24 February 1944- Capt. William Joust to 34th Div. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.
 - 24 February 1944- 2nd Lt. Dominick Loprete to Naples. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.
 - 24 February 1944- 2nd Lt. Arthur B. Avila to Lecce. Relieved from Headquarters, Palermo.
 - 26 February 1944- Pvt. Angelo Chimino to Syracuse. Relieved from Palermo Station.

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26 February 1944 - Pvt. Joseph Rawicz to Palermo Station. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.

2 March 1944 - 2nd Lt. Santo Giampapa to Catanzaro as ACCO. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.

2 March 1944 - 2nd Lt. DeWitt L. Store to headquarters, Palermo. Relieved as ACCO, Catanzaro.

3 March 1944 - 2nd Lt. Beauvais Duffy to Catania as ACCO. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.

3 March 1944 - Pvt. George Solovieff to Catania. Relieved from headquarters, Palermo.

3 March 1944 - 2nd Lt. Gerard Petrucci to headquarters, Palermo. Relieved as ACCO Catania.

B. Censorship Operations.

1. Statistical Summary: The chart below gives a daily average volume of all stations. The figures are the most recent received from the stations. The chart gives a representative picture of an average-sized station during the period covered by this report.

	DAILY AVERAGE VOLUME PER STATION				
	Daily Volume	Examined	Av. Per Examiner	Re-Examined	Av. Per Re-Examiner
Ordinary Mail	3497	1664	109	487	121
Reg. & Ins.	158	36	6	18	5
Military	1499	991	67	298	75
Official	185	46	3	46	12
TOTALS:	5339	2789	185	849	213

2. Resume: During the period covered by this report, the provincial stations (22) employed 325 examiners, 86 re-examiners, and 104 sorters and clerks.

For all stations concerned, 47% of all ordinary mail, 55% of registered and insured mail, 66% of military mail, and 26% of official mail was examined. For the same period, 30% of ordinary mail, 21% of registered mail, 30% of military mail, and 96% of official mail was re-examined.

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The percentage of examination and re-examination of official mail has dropped considerably as compared with the last bi-weekly report. This is indicative of compliance, on the Italian Officials part, with the terminology "official" as defined by censorship regulations

During the period covered by this report, headquarters has received 260 comment sheets and 1391 information slips.

Henceforth, in addition to the daily average volume statistics actual production figures will be given to cover a specific period, preferably 14 day periods as our provincial station reports are submitted every 7 days. Hence, the figures below cover the period 30 January- 12 February, roughly a half month.

Classification	Volume	Examined	Re-Examined
Ordinary Mail	914,893	414,220 (44%)	135,388 (32%)
Reg. & Ins.	37,431	25,077 (67%)	4,434 (13%)
Military	383,639	292,551 (76%)	135,329 (46%)
Official	28,730	28,730 (100%)	23,791 (82%)
TOTALS	1,364,693	760,578 (55%)	298,942 (30%)

For the same period, total comment sheets- 358
total information slips- 1053

3. External Mail: The first shipments of foreign civilian mail have been made and were observed by members of this organization. The following is a table showing all shipments made since the opening of the service on 16 February 1944:

EXTERNAL CIVILIAN MAIL DISPATCH RECORD

16 February - 5 March 1944

Destination	Dispatched From	No. of sacks	Weight
Cairo	Palermo	1	48 (Pounds)
Cairo	Bari	1	23 "
Cairo (for Tripolitania)	Palermo	1	24 "
London	Palermo	1	16 "
London	Bari	1	9 "
London (S.P.S.) *	Palermo	1	7 "
London (S.P.S.) *	Bari	1	20 "
Ottawa	Palermo	1	1 "
Ottawa	Bari	1	1 "

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EXTERNAL CIVILIAN MAIL DISPATCH RECORD (CONT'D)

16 February - 5 March 1944

Destination	Dispatched From	No. of Sacks	Weight
New York	Palermo	2	108 (Pounds)
New York	Bari	4	202 "
Tunis	Palermo	2	6 "
Tunis	Bari	1	14 "
TOTALS		17	487 (Pounds)

(Approximately 24,350 pieces)

* S.P.S. indicates Spain, Portugal, Switzerland, and Spanish Morocco mail. This mail has been censored in a Palermo station operated by Captain Miguel Montesinos. The examiners are 6 enlisted men. Since the opening of the service on 16 February 1944 the station has read 1324 letters and turned in 49 comment sheets and 5 information slips.

4. Italian Forms: The urgent request for printing and distribution of Submission Slips and Information Slips in Italian, which was placed with Major Colville on the 13th of January has just been accomplished and the forms distributed throughout King's Italy and the Calabrian Compartment. Sample copies of the form are attached.

C. Policy Matters: All new policy matters will be contained in "Special Instructions Number Seven" to be drawn up at a later date. Following test check of sorting made at Italian railway post office referred to in paragraph 3, 2. of Postal Subsection of Operational Report No. 3, an attempt was made to check on outgoing dispatch of external civilian mail on 26 February 1944. Access to this dispatch for the checking of the sorting, was denied by Lt. Alacie, ACC Postal Officer, Region 1 on the grounds that this was purely a postal matter. In the light of this statement and letter from Communications Censorship Branch, file CCB/1051/1 dated 25 February 1944, no protest was made and no further attempts to check the sorting of outgoing dispatches will be made, unless a direction to do so, is received.

D. Plans and Training: Tentative plans have been made for establishing provincial stations. Personnel allocation is as follows:

<u>Province</u>	<u>Officers</u>	<u>Enlisted Men</u>
Rome	Lt. Motroni Lt. Leah Lt. Ursino	2
Aquila	Lt. Scenna	1
Campobasso	Lt. Petrucci	1
Frosinone	Lt. Loprete	1
Littorio	Lt. Di Domenico	1
(Caieti Pescara)	Lt. Curatolo	1

The shifting of personnel to these provinces, outlined above, will entail moving other officers into the vacancies created. Hence, it is planned to move Lt. Carpentini to Naples and Lt. Otranto to Taranto.

6. Sicily

(a). The provincial stations in Sicily are well indoctrinated in the Allied form of Censorship. Approximately 30 days more are needed for the Allied Censor Control Officers to thoroughly train a "Capo D'ufficio" as a replacement for our ACCO's.

(b). It is planned to leave Lt. Priere as Regional ACCO of Sicily. His headquarters will be Palermo. Having been provided with proper transportation and an enlisted man Lt. Priere will see to it that our form of censorship is continued. We aim at control, and not a liaison and advisory objective.

(c). The morale of all Italian censorship personnel in Sicily will be enhanced if we are able to assure them their positions are secure under our guidance, and not subject to the quirks of local officials. Hence, it is urged that ACC be contacted on this problem and an assurance secured that no personnel will be dismissed without the concurrence of censorship.

III. CABLE SUBSECTION

A. Personnel:

1. Arrivals: None.
2. Changes in assignment: None.

B. Censorship Operations: None.

C. Policy Matters: A further study of cable routings, as a result of the surveys just completed, discloses the possibility of eliminating entirely the proposed Messina Cable Control Station as originally planned. This development will make possible a more effective use of the limited cable personnel now available.

Conditions point to the fact that traffic through Messina will be purely internal in character. The circuit from Rome to Messina, now reported cut, if restored would carry both internal and external traffic. However, external traffic can only pass through the Syracuse gateway where it can be fully controlled. The necessity to maintain cable censorship control at Messina is not now apparent.

The saving in manpower makes possible the manning of the Brindisi Cable Station and strengthening the station at Naples.

D. Plans and Training: Survey of telecommunications and general conditions as affecting cable censorship in Messina, Catania, Syracuse and Pozzallo which was under way at last report, has been completed and reports submitted.

As a result, Pozzallo Field Station as originally contemplated, can be dispensed with as unnecessary since all traffic over the Pozzallo-Malta cable, which is now cut, is normally channelled through Syracuse.

Plans and Training: (continued)

With this economy, and that described under "C" above, personnel now available can be used to man the proposed Brindisi station, and strengthen the station at Naples.

Requisitions for supplies and equipment for all proposed stations have been completed and submitted to Deputy Civil Censorship Officer, Italy, for processing through proper channels.

Work on censorship forms is proceeding.

Such forms will be prepared for general use throughout all cable censorship stations and at headquarters, conforming as much as possible to forms in general use in Civil Censorship.

Three officers en route to Palermo since 21 January 1944, still have not arrived, and the date of their arrival is unknown, as no word, official or otherwise, has been received from or about them. Signal has been sent to INC, AFHQ, requesting that inquiry be made of the Office of Censorship through channels for information of their present whereabouts and probable date of arrival.

To prepare enlisted and officer personnel for duty in the field language study classes in Italian are being conducted two hours daily under the direction of Seaman First Class J.A. Nicolini. Intensive study is resulting in rapid progress in learning the language.

IV LANDWIRE SUBSECTION

- A. Personnel: No change. Major Allman is reported to be en route, via steamer.
- B. Censorship Operations:
1. Telephone - none but experimental.
 2. Telegraph - Message from Allied Control Commission headquarters to A.C.C. Region I Signal Officer Palermo on 23 February, indicated headquarters approval of resumption of internal civil telegraph facilities in Sicily; but action has been delayed pending decision of the Chief Signal Officer No. I District (Catania). Present indications are that there are only a few minor circuits available for civil use at present. Arrangements to handle these are being made with the ACCO's concerned.
- ACCO's in King's Italy are censoring telegraph communications without any comprehensive set of instructions from C.C.S. Their operation is being guided by individual directives until a manual can be issued.
- C. Policy Matters: Arrangements have been made for the Island Base Section Signal Corps to handle all receiving, storage, distribution, and installation of telephone monitoring equipment shipped to Palermo.
- D. Plans and Training:
1. A telegraph censorship manual, revised to include instructions for Italian examiners and for the telegraph operating agency, is in rough draft, awaiting the concurrence of Major Allman upon his arrival. A similar draft for telephone censorship is in preparation. These revisions of earlier operating manuals are deemed desirable in order to effect proper transfer of the internal censorship operation to the Italian Government in the future.

1848

2. Weekly contact is maintained with Signal officers to determine the condition of telegraph and telephone circuits in Sicily and the toe of Italy, and plans are kept up to date for coverage of these lines at such time as they are made available to civil use.

V. TRAVELERS' SUBSECTION

- A. Personnel: No changes.
- B. Censorship Operations: None.
- C. Policy Matters: None.
- D. Plans and Training: Lt. Di Bella has completed his survey trip and has been ordered to remain in Algiers pending the arrival there of Col. Hoover, so as to enable a direct report. At the same time it will enable conversations with Major Champion should he arrive before Lt. Di Bella departs for Palermo.

VI. SPECIAL ACTIVITIES UNIT

A. Personnel:

1. Major Boyle left the unit on 21 February 44 to take up an appointment on the staff of Communications Censorship Branch, INC.
2. Lt Jackson is acting as head of unit.
3. A cable has been received from Washington stating that no cryptanalyst is available. Captain Dinwiddie has not arrived. The unit is therefore still seriously understaffed in officer personnel.
4. One Italian speaking enlisted man has been added to unit personnel.

B. Censorship Operations:

1. Watch List.

a. Statistics.

Names added	37
Old names removed	3
Total on Watch List	508
Number of intercepts disseminated	10
Number of intercepts forwarded to Hq	75
Number of intercepts not forwarded to Hq	27
Number of intercepts receiving local action	0

b. Reports.

There has been some improvement in the standard of reports.

c. Watch List Equipment.

1845 Flexoline strips have been received from Washington.

2. International Red Cross.

a. Mr. Kuhne has asked consideration of direct communication with Cairo, CICR. A letter was sent to Chief, INC, requesting censorship approval for this proposed channel of communication.

b. On the 24 February, a communication was received from Algiers concerning treatment of Red Cross messages here; Major McKean interpreted it as a continuation of present policy.

c. A draft letter to southern Italian Red Cross chapters requesting the use of accepted CICR forms and procedures was submitted by Mr. Kuhne, 2 March 1944.

3. Laboratory.

a. Supplies have arrived from Medical Supply Depot and from Captain Dinwiddie.

b. Letters received for laboratory study, since March first: 18. A considerable accumulation of mail on file.

4. Braille Mail.

a. File opened-, # 1523.

b. Since March 1, 1944, received 7 letters.

c. For two week period:

Released	9 Letters
Back log	23 Letters
	<u>32 letters received</u>

5. Vatican Messages.

Vatican Radio Messages have been received and are being held pending a directive from Chief, INC. (letter 24-2-44).

6. Code - Cipher.

To add to the accumulated mail waiting for analysis, since 1 March, 1944:

29 letters received
18 letters condemned
1 letter released

Those considered suspicious were entered on the Watch List.

7. Prisoner of War Mail.

a. File was broken down into seven files

b. Memo from Major McKean (18-2-44), subject:

Reduction of censorship percentage to 5% for Italian civilian mail to Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco Prisoners of War.

c. Directive from London via Mr. Thomas, Algiers, orders routing of POW mail to London in lieu of to Liverpool, England.

d. Headquarters will receive a routing scheme for POW mail and it will likewise receive all future distributions, according to cable #58909 of PHINC.

C. Policy Matters:

The Special Activities Subsection has now become a unit of the Postal Subsection for all special mail matters. Watch List and associated activities remain an independent function.

D. Plans and Training:

Instruction in special activity matters was given to the new Allied Censor Control Officer at Catania, Lt Duffy.

VII DISSEMINATION SUBSECTION

A. Personnel:

1. Arrivals: None.
2. Changes in Assignments: None.

B. Censorship Operations:

1. Statistical Summaries:

Number of Submission Slips	242
Special Reports	1

2. Resume: The number of submission slips prepared during the period is approximately the same as the number for the preceding period. It is believed that the quality of the information submitted and the variety of subjects is better. The report prepared is entitled "Effectiveness of the Purge of Fascists". Because of the character of the report, allocation is being withheld, until approval is received from headquarters.

C. Policy Matters:

No change.

D. Plans and Training:

1. A study was made of the submission slips from the provinces of Palermo, Taranto and Catania, in an effort to determine the value of examining intra-city mail. The findings were as follows:

a. Of the approximately 200 submission slips filed in the PALERMO folders, 75 were based on intra-city communications (63 letters to the authorities - AMG and Italian - and the balance private correspondence). There were a negligible number based on intra-city correspondence in TARANTO and CATANIA.

b. The PALERMO submission slips dealt largely with reported black market violations, Fascist individuals and groups, local houses of prostitution, and similar items of interest to ACC, Quostora, etc. As a matter of course these letters, addressed to official groups, would have reached their proper destination without censorship.

c. The chief usefulness of the CCS comment sheets in nearly all the above cases was the informing of additional local agencies (Allied) of specific violations, etc. In the future, as Allied agencies leave Palermo the investigation of anonymous letters and the complaints will be in the hands of the Italian authorities and the sole usefulness of CCS comments would be the sample of opinion as to local conditions thus afforded.

2. On the basis of these findings, coupled with the fact that security is in no way involved in intra-city mail, it is recommended that the examination of such mail be discontinued.

GORDON W. MOREAN,
Major Cavalry,
Deputy Civil Censorship Officer,
ITALY.

1843

2250

ALLIED CIVIL CENSORSHIP, AFHQ

CHIEF
LT. COL. D. B. HOOVER

DEPUTY CHIEF
MAJOR FINN

EXECUTIVE
LT. CLARK


ALLIED CENSOR CONTROL OFFICERS FOR POSTAL AND TRAVELERS TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH

CAPT. M. RIELLO	LT. P. POLLARD
EDDY L. LOMBARD	LT. M. DODGERS
LT. P. CARPENT	LT. P. LACROIX
LT. E. GRAYBELL	LT. M. STANLEY
LT. D. LEAH	LT. G. PATRICK
LT. V. METER	LT. S. ROBERT
LT. P. PALALIO	LT. M. STAN
LT. M. JOHNSON	LT. P. JAMES
LT. M. JOHNSON	LT. J. JAMES
LT. M. JOHNSON	LT. J. JAMES


CABLE
SUPERVISOR
COMMUNICATOR
PERSONS

WIRELESS
AND
ADMINISTRATIVE
MAJOR FINN

SPECIAL
ACTIVITIES
MAJOR
BOYLE



SHIP, AFHQ

EXECUTIVE
LT. CLARK

20 JANUARY 1944

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cl #1

Incl # 34 * CCB/003-12 AFHQ TAC Sec
CCB-18 Mar 44

2255

10 MAR 1944

ERS/hjp

9 March 1944

Lt. Col. Donald D. Hoover, G.S.C.
AFHQ Information and Censorship Branch
Censorship Branch
Civil Censorship Section
APO 550, U. S. Army

Dear Colonel Hoover:

I have taken up with General MacFarlane the subject raised by you--namely, AFHQ's plan to remove, so far as is possible, operating functions from the advisory and planning activities of the various Headquarters sections, and that pursuant to this policy the field activities of Civil Censorship would be cut loose from INC. You indicated that you and others feel that this should come under A.C.C.

General MacFarlane is not eager to take over Civil Censorship but if the operating and field functions of Civil Censorship are to be cut loose from AFHQ, he agrees it should not be cast adrift without a directing authority in Italy. He is prepared to give favorable consideration to have A.C.C. become this directing authority provided he is furnished with a copy of all directives or other statements of policy under which Civil Censorship now functions before making final decision, and provided that your operating group is a self-contained unit and can be moved to the mainland at an early date to the Naples area.

I shall be glad to hear from you in regard to these points.

I was glad to have our long delayed meeting and hope that we may have more contacts in the future. I have telegraphed you to see if you are willing to open the HQ Naples circuit to west-bound night letters from American military personnel, so that our troops may have the same privileges in this respect as are now permitted British Troops.

Sincerely,

ELERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Deputy Chief Commissioner

file
top

cc: Chief Commissioner

copy

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION *WES/Map*

30 January 1944

311.7

MEMORANDUM FOR: General MacFarlane

I do not think we should make this request until we are officially advised as to the intent of AFHQ to transfer censorship to ACC.

If this should prove to be the case, censorship would logically have come under the Communications Section as a separate subcommission. Under the reorganization, I suppose it should be a separate subcommission like Telecommunications and the Shipping subcommission.

As to the particular officer proposed, I should like to discuss his qualifications when I next see you.

/s/ Ellery W. Stone
/t/ ELLERY W. STONE
Captain, USNR
Acting Chief of Staff

1 Incl:

Memo, Maj Colville
28 Jan 44

1840

(Note written in red pencil):

Capt Stone
I agree -nothing doing
till we hear from AFHQ

NMM

copy

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
APO 394

JWC/mar

23 January 1944

MEMO TO:
Acting Chief of staff

1. I understand from Lt Col Scott Bailey (Chief, Censorship Branch, INC, AFHQ) that Censorship, both of press and communications, in Italy is likely to be transferred to ACC. Censorship Branch at AFHQ would maintain the right to handle major policy and contacts with the War Dept War Office and other outside agencies.

2. In view of this plan, Col Scott Bailey has suggested that I approach ACC with the proposal that I be appointed as adviser on all censorship matters. An officer for Press and Communications respectively would be appointed under my direction.

3. May this proposal therefore be submitted and, if approved, a request sent to Lt Col Scott Bailey for my transfer?

s/s/ J. W. ^{Colville} Collins
t/t/ J. W. COLVILLE
Major, G. S.

1879

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