

262/TIV.2- U.IV.R. P.A

100

Declassified E.O. 12356 Section 3.3/NND No. 785021

100001148/837

PASSENGER & FREIGHT STATISTICS PERIOD 1 - 15 SEPTEMBER 1945.

APPEND

COMPARTI- MENTO	N° of pas- sengers	PASSENGER TRAINS: Kms run					MIXED Trains Kms run					FREIGHT Trains				
		Electr.	Coal	Nafta	Diesel electr.	Total	Electr.	Coal	Nafta	Diesel electr.	Total	Electric	coal	Nafta	Diesel electr.	Total
TORINO	1184615	87816	50243	16520	—	154579	3272	1280	—	—	4552	30557	56466	—	—	—
MILANO	1247023	113812	34992	12600	—	161404	—	—	—	—	—	22003	21815	—	—	—
VERONA	387265	30401	22348	4749	—	57498	—	—	9020	—	9020	—	manicano dati	—	—	—
PIEMONTE	360125	—	979	33044	886	34909	—	—	—	—	—	—	1990	50234	3445	—
TRIESTE	231424	20655	2336	—	—	22991	—	4200	—	—	1200	29454	3100	—	—	—
PALESTRA	469541	—	48081	55303	—	103384	—	2970	—	—	2970	—	53043	—	—	—
NAPOLI	920169	4380	21159	—	—	25539	—	4920	—	—	4920	61701	50994	—	—	—
VENEZIA	98881	—	7092	—	—	7092	—	16141	—	—	16141	—	53379	—	—	—
GENOVA	774076	46789	2562	5760	—	55111	2040	2342	—	—	4382	56005	9414	—	10592	—
BOLOGNA	354707	—	—	53207	14280	67487	—	—	—	—	—	—	5533	35925	—	—
ANCONA	129500	9090	6826	6552	—	22468	4490	12277	3094	—	22061	45652	58683	22219	—	—
ROMA	2576	49	22740	15844	—	38584	—	4782	—	—	4782	—	11781	1104700	—	—
BARI	816902	—	74455	—	—	74455	—	11034	—	—	11034	—	109157	—	—	—
REGGIO C.	361575	63602	22741	—	—	86343	—	2475	—	—	2475	36188	33345	—	—	—
CAGLIARI	74883	—	8691	29250	—	37941	—	3735	—	—	3735	—	13904	—	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	7413262	376594	325245	232829	15166	949785	12002	63126	12114	—	87242	281560	481604	213076	14037	9

APPENDIX B

TR & FREIGHT STATISTICS PERIOD 1 - 15 SEPTEMBER 1945.

TRANS: Kms Run		MIXED Trans Kms Run.					FREIGHT Trans Kms Run					Grand total
Diesel elect.	Total	Electr.	Coal	Nafta	Diesel elect.	Total	Electric	coal	Nafta	Diesel elect.	Total	
---	154579	3272	1280	---	---	4552	30557	56466	---	---	87023	246154
---	161404	---	---	---	---	---	22003	21815	---	---	43818	205222
---	57498	---	---	9020	---	9020	---	manonno	dist	---	---	---
886	34909	---	---	---	---	---	---	1990	50234	3445	55669	90578
---	22991	---	4200	---	---	1200	29454	3100	---	---	32554	56745
---	103384	---	2970	---	---	2970	---	53043	---	---	53043	159397
---	25539	---	4920	---	---	4920	61701	50994	---	---	112695	143154
---	7092	---	16141	---	---	16141	---	53379	---	---	53379	76582
---	55111	2040	2342	---	---	4382	56005	9414	---	10592	65419	124912
14280	67487	---	---	---	---	---	---	4533	35925	---	51050	118537
---	22468	6690	12277	3094	---	22061	45652	58683	22219	---	124554	171083
---	38584	---	4782	---	---	4782	---	11781	1104700	---	116481	159847
---	74455	---	11034	---	---	11034	---	109157	---	---	109157	194646
---	86343	---	2475	---	---	2475	36186	33345	---	---	69533	158351
---	37241	---	3735	---	---	3735	---	13204	---	---	13204	55580
15166	949785	12002	63426	12114	---	87242	281580	481604	213078	14037	990279	1960788 kms.

APPENDIX

TONNAGE OF FREIGHTS RECEIVED DURING THE PERIOD 1 - 15 Sept 1945					
COMPARTMENT	ALLIED FORCES ACCOUNT	A.C. ACCOUNT	ITALIAN FORCES ACCOUNT	CIVILIAN ACCOUNT	TOTAL
7					
TORINO	538	120	161	14041	140933
MILANO	643	3453	30	6583	79167
VENEZIA	26455	3554	5210	17008	52265
FIRENZE	41581	139	134	22571	71808
TRINATE	22590	14278	—	2543	56417
PALERMO	565	—	803	19176	40544
NAPOLI	65653	10535	1280	42244	123724
VENEZIA	18581	13893	507	23350	61335
GENOVA	37757	59171	5017	60194	171139
BOLOGNA	18180	1572	497	12078	36287
ANCONA	20692	620	72	20751	42045
ROMA	3091	3745	1135	27544	34535
BARI	50018	3261	2258	14889	89266
REGGIO C.	7304	194	784	23742	34230
CASERTA	206	—	479	10304	10989
GRAND TOTAL	319164	116647	15426	580433	1035870

APPENDIX C.

PERCENTAGE OF PATIENTS RECEIVED DURING THE PERIOD 1 - 15 Sept 1945				
ACCOUNT	A.S. ACCOUNT	ITALIAN FORCES ACCOUNT	CIVILIAN ACCOUNT	TOTAL
	199	161	140941	140933
	3453	80	65983	70157
	3552	5210	11038	52235
	120	124	29577	71802
	11270	---	20543	56111
	---	203	39176	40544
	10516	1239	42244	123722
	18395	509	23330	61335
	59171	6017	68194	171132
	1572	457	16078	36287
	620	72	20751	42045
	3765	1135	26544	34535
	3261	2238	32589	89266
	194	784	25748	34236
	---	475	10301	10909
	116647	19426	58033	1035670

Locomotive utilization on the 15th of Sept 1944

Departments	Locomotive Utilization	EFFICIENT										UNDER REPAIRS									
		In Service					Out of Service					Light repairs					Heavy repairs				
		Locs	Coal	Hafts	Locs	Coal	Locs	Coal	Hafts	Locs	Coal	Locs	Coal	Hafts	Locs	Coal	Locs	Coal	Hafts	Locs	Coal
TORINO	1 (Pass.)	56	118	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	3	4	—	—	—	13	30	—	—	18
	2 (Freight)	53	29	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	—	40	12	—	—	13
	3 (Shunting)	—	41	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	5
	Total	109	188	—	—	—	15	—	—	—	—	4	8	—	—	—	51	49	—	—	36
MILANO	1	40	54	—	—	5	81	—	—	—	—	1	4	—	—	—	11	14	—	—	4
	2	32	60	—	—	—	36	—	—	—	—	3	2	—	—	—	7	10	—	—	1
	3	8	34	—	1	3	64	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—
	Total	80	148	—	1	8	181	—	—	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	18	30	—	—	5
VERONA	1	10	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	2	56	113	6	—	1	6	—	—	—	—	4	12	2	—	—	34	38	—	—	1
	3	—	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
	Total	66	141	6	—	1	6	—	—	—	—	4	13	2	—	—	34	38	—	—	—
FIRENZE	1	—	12	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	1	—
	2	—	7	60	40	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—
	3	—	11	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	12	3	1	—
	Total	—	30	60	40	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	—	17	6	2	—
TRIESTE	1	14	6	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	2	2	—	—	—	1	7	—	—	—
	2	7	20	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	3	2	—	—	—
	3	—	16	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	4
	Total	21	42	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	4	9	—	—	—
PALERMO Principal station	1	—	55	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	7
	2	—	97	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	22	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2
	3	—	23	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	11	—	—	2
	Total	—	175	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	34	—	—	—	—	17	—	—	—
PALERMO Secondary station	1	—	26	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
	Total	—	26	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	—	2	—	—	—
NAPOLI	1	20	23	8	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	3	3	4	—	—	1	—	—	—	2
	2	26	87	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	7
	3	—	62	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	5	20	4	—	—	2	3	—	—	15
	Total	46	172	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
GRAND TOTAL	1571	322	922	74	41	9	219	17	—	19	100	6	—	109	154	3	1	13	79	—	—

Locomotive situation on the 15th. of Sept 1945

OUT OF SERVICE				LIGHT REPAIRS				HEAVY REPAIRS				AWAITING REPAIRS				TOTAL			
COAL	HAFTS	BLADES	WHEELS	COAL	HAFTS	BLADES	WHEELS	COAL	HAFTS	BLADES	WHEELS	COAL	HAFTS	BLADES	WHEELS	COAL	HAFTS	BLADES	WHEELS
5	—	—	—	3	4	—	—	13	30	—	—	1	18	—	—	20	19	—	—
5	—	—	—	1	3	—	—	40	12	—	—	5	13	—	—	20	6	—	—
5	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	3	—	—
15	—	—	—	4	8	—	—	51	42	—	—	6	36	—	—	40	28	—	—
5	81	—	—	1	4	—	—	11	14	—	—	—	4	—	—	38	13	—	—
—	36	—	—	3	2	—	—	7	10	—	—	—	1	—	—	16	27	—	—
3	64	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	3	—	—
8	181	—	—	4	9	—	—	18	30	—	—	—	5	—	—	55	43	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	10	16	—	—
1	6	—	—	4	12	2	—	34	38	—	—	—	—	—	—	81	128	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	13	—	—
1	6	—	—	4	14	2	—	34	38	—	—	—	2	—	—	91	157	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	12	28	—	—
30	1	17	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	1	—	—	—	—	9	26	2	4
—	1	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—
40	2	17	—	—	2	—	—	—	12	3	1	—	—	—	—	21	60	2	4
—	1	—	—	2	2	—	—	1	7	—	—	—	2	—	—	9	13	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	6	—	—	3	2	—	—	—	1	—	—	7	32	—	—
—	5	—	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	9	—	—
—	6	—	—	2	9	—	—	4	9	—	—	—	6	—	—	19	64	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	6	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	12	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	22	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	7	—	—	—	55	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	—	1	—	14	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	34	—	—	—	11	—	—	—	12	—	1	—	81	—	—
—	8	—	—	—	4	—	—	—	2	—	—	—	5	—	—	—	21	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—
—	8	—	—	—	4	—	—	1	2	—	—	3	—	—	—	—	21	—	—
—	1	—	—	3	3	4	—	1	2	—	—	5	6	—	—	18	12	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	8	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	2	3	—	30	20	1	—
—	1	—	—	3	20	4	—	2	3	—	—	6	7	—	—	46	36	—	—
—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	15	3	—	—	60	60	1	—
9	219	17	—	19	100	6	—	109	154	3	1	13	49	3	1	272	522	3	4

Locos utili- zation		EFFICIENT								UNDER REPAIR							
		In Service				Out of service				Light repairs				Heavy repairs			
		Elect.	Coal	Wafte	Diesel	Elect.	Coal	Wafte	Diesel	Elect.	Coal	Wafte	Diesel	Elect.	Coal	Wafte	Diesel
IA	1	---	30	---	---	---	9	---	---	---	10	---	---	---	3	---	---
	2	---	30	---	---	---	3	---	---	---	11	---	---	---	8	---	---
	3	---	40	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	10	---	---
	Total	---	100	---	---	---	12	---	---	---	23	---	---	---	21	---	---
IOVA	1	31	6	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	2	62	17	---	---	16	6	---	---	---	---	---	---	39	8	---	---
	3	---	23	---	4	---	14	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	---	---
	Total	93	46	---	1	16	22	---	---	---	---	---	---	39	11	---	---
BOLOGNA	1	---	3	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	---	---	---	---	---	---
	2	---	14	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	3	---	7	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	---	---	---	---	---	---
	Total	---	24	35	---	---	---	---	---	---	5	---	---	---	---	---	---
ANCONA	1)	31	80	25	---	---	---	---	---	2	26	5	---	---	---	5	---
	2)	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	3	---	13	---	1	---	---	---	---	---	2	---	2	---	---	---	---
	Total	31	93	25	1	---	---	---	---	2	28	5	2	---	---	5	---
ROMA	1	---	22	7	---	---	---	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	1	---	---
	2	---	59	66	---	---	---	24	56	---	7	12	---	---	1	---	4
	3	---	36	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	4	---	---	---	3	---	---
	Total	---	117	73	---	---	---	24	56	---	13	12	---	---	5	---	4
BARI	1	---	44	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	10	---	---	---	5	---	---
	2	7	97	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	14	---	---	1	10	---	---
	3	---	53	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	6	---	---	---	3	---	---
	Total	7	194	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	30	---	---	1	18	---	---
REGGIO C.	1	10	18	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	2	16	32	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	15	---	---	---	5	---	---
	3	---	10	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	---	---	---	---	---	---
	Total	26	60	---	---	---	---	---	---	3	18	---	---	---	5	---	---
GAOLIA- RI	1	---	13	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	1	---	---	---	2	---	---
	2	---	18	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	3	---	---	---	4	---	---
	3	---	5	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---	---
	Total	---	36	---	---	---	2	---	---	---	4	---	---	---	6	---	---
TOTALS		157	678	133	2	16	36	24	56	5	121	17	2	40	66	5	4
		322	922	74	41	9	219	17	---	19	100	6	---	109	154	3	13
G.TOTAL		479	1600	207	43	25	255	41	56	24	221	23	2	149	220	8	5

1573

UNDER REPAIR																		
Out of service				Light repairs				Heavy repairs				Light repairs				Heavy		
Elec. Coal Hafta Diesel				Elec. Coal Hafta Diesel				Elec. Coal Hafta Diesel				Elec. Coal Hafta Diesel				Elec. Coal A.		
Electr				Elect.				Elect.				Elect.				b/ee		
					10				3				8				40	
9					11				8				5				55	
3					2				10								18	
					23				21				13				113	
12																28		
2																85	11	
6								39	8								4	
14									3							113	15	
16	22							32	11							82	32	
					1												71	
																	46	
					4											82	151	
					5													
				2	26	5				5			1			48	54	2
					2		2										5	
					2		2						1			48	59	2
				2	28	5	2			5			1			12	25	
					2				1							7	68	
		24	56		7	12			1		4						13	
					4				3							19	106	
		24	56		13	12			5		4		2			1	4	
					10				5				7			5	2	
					14			1	10				12					
					6				3				7			6	9	
					30			1	18				26				20	
									5				1	7		1	48	
				3	15												2	
					3				5				1	7		1	50	
				3	18												7	
					1				2				1				20	
					3				4				6				4	
2									6				7				31	
2					4													
16	36	24	56	5	121	17	2	40	66	5	4	1	56			269	545	2
9	219	17		19	100	6		109	124	3	1	13	19	3	1	272	522	3
25	255	41	56	24	221	23	2	149	220	8	5	14	135	3	1	541	1067	5

SITUATION OF VEHICLES IN REPAIR ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER 1945

COMPARTI- MENTO	Coaches		Total coaches	Buses		Total buses	Total coaches & Buses	cars			Total cars
	Light	Heavy		Light	Heavy			Closed	Opened	tanks	
	2 or 3 axles	4 axles		2 or 3 axles	4 axles						
TORINO	67	359	426	149	25	174	600	397	584	34	1015
MILANO	111	335	446	153	2	155	601	980	1543	54	2577
VERONA	84	368	452	154	14	168	620	1266	1777	182	3225
FIRENZE	42	136	178	108	14	122	300	868	686	51	1605
TRIESTE	10	137	147	63	—	63	210	980	827	66	1813
PALESTRO	32	117	149	60	—	60	209	841	766	103	1710
NAPOLI	27	133	160	84	20	104	264	1623	83	1652	3364
VENEZIA	59	183	242	144	—	144	386	1136	1276	100	2514
GENOVA	18	230	248	70	4	74	322	193	314	66	573
BOLOGNA	29	88	117	46	—	46	166	1053	1142	119	2345
MODENA	2	23	25	5	—	5	30	289	374	26	689
ROMA	19	138	157	80	—	80	237	764	723	47	1540
BARI	12	60	72	54	—	54	126	874	733	62	1672
REGGIO C.	22	52	74	48	—	48	122	847	607	61	1515
CAGLIARI	68	36	104	27	3	30	134	154	246	—	402
G. TOTAL.	602	2395	2997	1245	82	1327	4324	12241	11695	2623	26559

SITUATION OF VEHICLES IN REPAIR ON THE 15TH OF SEPTEMBER 1945

Total coaches	<u>Baggages</u>		Total baggages	Total coaches & Baggages	<u>cars</u>			Total cars	GRAND TOTAL
	Light 2 or 3 axles	Heavy 4 axles			Closed	Opened	tanks		
426	149	25	174	600	397	584	34	1015	1615
446	153	2	155	601	989	1543	54	2577	3178
452	154	14	168	620	1268	1777	182	3225	3845
178	108	14	122	300	868	686	51	1605	1905
147	63	—	63	210	920	827	66	1813	2023
149	60	—	60	209	844	768	103	1710	1919
160	84	20	104	264	162	83	1652	3364	3628
242	144	—	144	386	1136	1278	100	2514	2900
248	70	4	74	322	193	314	66	573	895
117	46	—	46	163	1088	1142	119	2345	2508
25	5	—	5	30	289	374	26	689	719
157	80	—	80	237	764	729	47	1540	1777
72	54	—	54	126	871	733	62	1672	1798
74	48	—	48	122	847	607	61	1515	1637
104	27	3	30	134	156	240	—	402	536
2997	1245	82	1327	4324	12241	11692	2623	26559	30883

COAL SITUATION

COMPARTIMENTO	CONSUMED TONS (1 st -15 Sept. 45)	TONS IN REMAINDER (15 Sept. 45)
TORINO	3.128	7.758
MILANO	3.892	7.495
VERONA	2.995	2.183
FIRENZE	421	4.136
TRIESTE	2.065	3.408
PALERMO	3.468	2.195
NAPOLI	7.752	43.844
VENEZIA	2.179	12.315
GENOVA	948	5.578
BOLOGNA	715	1.593
ANCONA	3.502	8.327
ROMA	2.657	15.500
BARI	5.684	35.491
REGGIO C.	2.256	2.687
GALLIARI	594	472

GRAND TOTAL

45.356

153.982

1571

Ext. 513

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION
APO 394
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION

ESL/em

Ref. 232/1/TN.2

7 November 1945

SUBJECT: U.N.N.R.A. Request for Information for
Purposes of Planning.

TO : Roads Division.

1. For purposes of planning U.N.N.R.A. has requested certain information from Transportation Sub-Commission.

2. Specifically U.N.N.R.A. wishes to know the pre-war status of highway transportation, the extent of war damage and reconstruction plans.

3. Information in this office is fragmentary. It is detailed below, so that you may correct it and supplement it with information available to you.

4. According to a report received 22 July, 1945 from the Ispettorato Generale della A.S.I.C. of the Ministero Dei Trasporti, there were, in 1939, 200,000 kilometers of highways in operation and 170,000 in May 1945. In May, 1945, the same report indicated that 5,000 steel bridges and 35,000 other bridges were out of service. It is suggested that Mr. Griffith of the Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission (Tel. 491048) may have more accurate information on this subject and that he will be able to state what the plans of reconstruction are.

5. According to the above mentioned report, the numbers of motor vehicles in 1939 were as follows:

Type of Vehicle	Number
Private Cars	339,000
Taxis	9,700
Hackneys (for hire cars)	11,000
Motor Buses (interurban)	3,519
21 - 40 Passengers	1570

1. For purposes of planning U.N.R.R.A. has requested certain information from Transportation Sub-Commission.
2. Specifically U.N.R.R.A. wishes to know the pre-war status of highway transportation, the extent of war damage and reconstruction plans.
3. Information in this office is fragmentary. It is detailed below, so that you may correct it and supplement it with information available to you.

4. According to a report received 25 July, 1946 from the Ispettorato Generale della M.C.N.C. of the Ministero Dei Trasporti, there were, in 1939, 200,000 kilometers of highways in operation and 170,000 in May 1945. In May, 1945, the same report indicated that 5,000 steel bridges and 35,000 other bridges were out of service. It is suggested that Mr. Griffith of the Public Works and Utilities Sub-Commission (Tel. 451048) may have more accurate information on this subject and that he will be able to state what the plans of reconstruction are.

5. According to the above mentioned report, the numbers of motor vehicles in 1939 were as follows:

Type of Vehicle	Number
Private Cars	335,000
Taxis	5,700
Hackneys (for hire cars)	11,000
Motor Buses (interurban)	3,510
21 - 40 Passengers	1570
-20 Passengers	
Motor Buses (urban)	3,253
41 - 60 Passengers	800
- 40 Passengers	676
Trucks	
15 Quintals and less	54,330
16-35 Quintals	26,900
Over 35 Quintals	17,500

It is not clear whether the above figures include military and other publicly owned vehicles. They probably do not.

as our military intelligence figures indicate that there were about 110,000 trucks instead of the 99,000 trucks shown in the above table.

6. The information requested should be in this office not later than 10 November 1945.

P. D. C.

P. D. C. BUCHANAN, Colonel
~~Major~~ Director

MEMORANDUM ON ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. 25 October 1948.

At the Third Session of the UNRRA Council recently held in London the functions and responsibilities of the Central Committee of the Council were enlarged to include the following:

The Central Committee of the Council, will in future, approve the Director General's Program of Operations before the Administration can draw upon the further contributions to be made available by Member Governments. Programs of Operations will be subject to continuing consideration in the light of the relative needs and the availability of supplies and finances. The Central Committee will be advised by standing sub-committees on "ability to pay" who, in addition to their present function of advising the Director General as to whether a government is in a position to pay, will keep under continuous review the financial situation of the receiving countries and the extent of their need for free assistance (Resolution 80).

To perform their new functions the members of these Committees will require a flow of good economic and statistical information in order to:

- (a) ensure that programs of operations reflect current needs of recipient countries, and are such as to ensure the equitable distribution of supplies, between these countries. For this purpose the Committees will require to have up-to-date information regarding the effect of UNRRA imports upon the economic structure of receiving countries. This should include comparisons of pre-war and present industrial and agricultural production, indices of prices and wages and any other information indicative of the degree of economic recovery;
- (b) in order to keep under continuous review the ability of receiving countries to pay for UNRRA supplies with suitable means of foreign exchange, the committees will need information regarding the financial situation of the Government concerned and an indication of any improvement.

In order to follow any inflationary developments, they will require data on money in circulation, prices, etc.

It is underlined that the principal contributing Governments, who sponsored Resolution 80, will stress that the sub-committees referred to above should be provided with full information about the economic and financial condition of the countries receiving UNRRA supplies, and in particular on the effects which the flow of UNRRA supplies is having upon those conditions. As these sub-committees will, in future advise not only upon the ability of countries to pay, but also upon the extent of their need for free assistance, and as the Central Committee will be called upon to approve the Administration's broad programs, it is to be expected that the fullest possible information will be required in the future to justify individual country programs.

THE ITALIAN ECONOMY TODAY

I. INTRODUCTION

Characteristics of the Italian economy today

II. AGRICULTURE AND FOOD

1. The Importance of Agriculture

Importance of agriculture in the country's economic system:

- how many does it employ
- how is it organized
- what does it contribute to the economy

etc.

2. The Scorched Land

Effects of the war upon Italian agriculture:

- war destruction and devastation, land mines....
- destruction of land reclamation projects
- lack of manpower
- lack of fertilizer (give prewar consumption figures)
- lack of draft animals

etc.

3. Agricultural Output and the Food Supply

Comparisons of production by quantities of individual major crops (grains, legumes, etc.) in typical prewar year and now - indication of how much retained at farm and available for sale (prewar and now).

Livestock situation - prewar and now.

-2-

4. Assessment, Rationing, Food Imports and the Food Balance.

- Brief description of "amasse" mechanism
- Description of food rationing - list of official rations
- Import needs to meet the rations
- The food balance: how many calories from official rations
- " " " " " free (black) market
- Free and 'black' market prices.

5. Summary and Outlook

Summary of current conditions
Main current needs
Outlook for the future

III. FUEL AND POWER

1. 'Black' Coal, 'White' Coal and Oil

Coal: the 'sinequinos' of Italian industry - power needs and uses - present production and needs -

Electric Power - its growing power importance - war damage - its importance now

Petroleum Products - Power imports and uses - present requirements.

2. Summary and Outlook

IV. INDUSTRY

1. Italian Industry: a Summary View

- General characteristics of Italian industry
- Leading components of the industrial structure
- Main features of industrial organization

2. War Damage.

- Extent of destruction etc.
- Lack of fuel, raw material, transport

3. Industrial Output and Employment

Overall and by major industries - prewar and now
(quantity figures or indices if available)
(number of persons employed - unemployment data).

- the mineral industry
- the iron and steel industry
- the mechanical industry
- the chemical industry
- the textile industry
- the building industry
- the rubber industry
- other industries.

4. Import Needs and Distribution Problems

- main import needs and reconstruction plans
- plans for distribution of imported raw materials and finished products.

5. Summary and OutlookV. TRANSPORT AND COMMUNICATIONS1. The Transport System - General CharacteristicsRoads:

- prewar status
- war damage
- reconstruction plans

Railways:

- prewar status
- war damage
- reconstruction plans

Airways:

- prewar status
- war damage
- reconstruction plans

Inland Intercoasts:

prewar status
war damage
reconstruction plans

Shipping:

prewar status
war damage
reconstruction plans

2. The Communications System - GeneralThe Post Office:

prewar status
war damage
reconstruction plans

Telephones and Telegraphs:

prewar status
war damage
reconstruction plans

3. Summary and OutlookVI. FINANCE1. The General Financial Situation

A birdseye view of Italy's present-day finances - the threat of inflation -
The Government's general financial plans.

2. Government Finance

The Budget - Current budget estimates: Revenues and expenditures by
major sources and objects. Taxation - plans for tax reform -
Government borrowing: major types - municipal finance - war damage
compensation.

3. Money, credit and the Banks

Growth in note circulation and demand deposits - Military currency issues -
The Central Bank balance sheet - the value of the lire - in terms of
prices (general price index) - in terms of foreign exchange (free
rates) - The commercial banks - Savings banks -

-6-

4. Summary and OutlookVII. FOREIGN TRADE AND THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS1. Imports, exports and the trade balance.

Main power imports and exports (values and quantities)
 Present imports and exports
 Trade agreement negotiations.

2. The Balance of International Payments

General characteristics
 Major items in the balance - prewar - today

Present international assets:

Gold
 Foreign exchange holdings
 Other foreign assets.

Prospective foreign exchange income:

Exports
 Emigrant remittances - value by month
 - regulations in force as to magnitude, etc.

Other income: shipping
 \$ equivalent of troop pay

Inflow of foreign capital

Import credits)
 Foreign loans) present and prospective developments

Debit items:

Cost of imports; service of foreign debt, diplomatic
 expenditures, flight of capital

VIII. LABOR AND THE STANDARD OF LIVING1. Employment

The employment situation - prewar - now

2. Labor Organizations

Prewar - present

3. Social Insurance System

Main benefits and characteristics - prewar - now.

1562

-6-

4. Prices, Wages, and the Standard of Living

Indices
General Comments.

5. Summary and Outlook

CONFIDENTIAL

Copy No. 122

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

"... TO MEET THE URGENT NEEDS OF THE ITALIAN POPULATION..."

(Third Session of the UNRRA Council, London,
August 1945)

Italian Division
European Branch
FOREIGN ECONOMIC ADMINISTRATION

1562

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

TABLE OF CONTENTS

SUMMARY

Page

1

MINUTES OF MEETINGS, REPORTS AND RESOLUTIONS

I. SEVENTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL,
AUGUST 13, 1945

- (A) Introduction of Resolution for Relief to Italy, by the U.S. Delegate William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State..... 7
- (B) Resolution Supported by the U.K. Delegate..... 10
- (C) Referral to General Committee..... 10

II. GENERAL COMMITTEE

- (A) Third Meeting of the General Committee, August 14, 1945..... 11
 - (1) Opening of the Discussion..... 11
 - (2) Introduction of Amendment to Resolution by U.S..... 12
 - (3) Introduction of Resolution for Relief to Venezia Giulia by Yugoslav Delegate..... 12
- (B) Fourth Meeting of the General Committee, August 15, 1945. Continuation of the Discussion..... 14
- (C) Referral of the Resolution to the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy..... 16

III. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON POLICY

- (A) Preliminary Draft of Verbatim Report of Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy, August 18, 1945..... 17

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

	<u>Page</u>
(B) Preliminary Draft of Verbatim Report of Seventh Meeting of Committee on Policy, August 21, 1945.....	41
(C) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy.....	57
(1) Adoption of the American Resolution, as Amended.....	57
(2) Rejection of the Yugoslav Resolution on Venezia Giulia.....	58
IV. <u>TWELFTH PLENARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL,</u> <u>AUGUST 22, 1945</u>	
(A) Debate on the Report of the Committee on Policy: Operations in Italy and Austria.....	59
(B) Vote: Approval of the Resolution...	68
(C) Statements by the Director General..	69

2

SUMMARY

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-1-

The proposal that Italy be made eligible for a full program of UNRRA assistance was placed formally before the Third Session of the UNRRA Council in London by the U.S. delegate, William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary of State, on Monday, August 13, 1945. Following its presentation, the Resolution was referred to the General Committee, a fourteen-man group headed by the Chairman of the Council (Sir Girja Bajpai, the Indian delegate). There it was taken up two or three times, and each time postponed after some debate, on the request of the delegates from Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. The latter delegate stated that he had not yet received instructions from his Government. Subsequently the Russian delegate asked that the Resolution be referred to the Policy Committee, a committee composed of all member governments, with the press and public excluded. The governments supporting the proposal agreed, and the Resolution was debated on its merits in the Policy Committee August 18, 1945.

While the Italian proposal was before the General Committee, the Yugoslav delegation submitted a resolution which proposed to deal separately with the area covered by the SACMED-Yugoslav agreement of June 1945, i.e., the Venezia Giulia area. As soon as the resolution was presented to the General Committee, the U.S. delegate took the line that the area in question was already being taken care of under the proposed resolution. To the Yugoslav contention that the Yugoslav part of the area was Yugoslavia, not Italy, Mr. Clayton replied that if the Resolution was adopted, the Venezia Giulia area would be covered regardless of the interpretation of the agreement, since both Yugoslavia and Italy would then be UNRRA countries.

The delay on the Italian proposal held up consideration of the additional funds requested by UNRRA to continue its operations through 1946. Both the U.S. and the U.K. delegates made it clear that the question of additional funds for UNRRA virtually depended upon a favorable vote on the Italian proposal.

On August 18 and 21, the main debate on the Italian Resolution took place in well-attended sessions of the Policy Committee. The attitudes taken by various delegates are briefly summarized below:

Ethiopia. The Ethiopian delegate proposed to delete two of the Whereas clauses and to change the resolution itself as follows (underlined part is his addition, the part in parentheses is his deletion):

Be it resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-2-

relief and rehabilitation assistance (on the same standards and basis of priority as apply to liberated areas of the United Nations and their nationals) adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations (previously) imposed on the Administration in Resolutions 1, Part 1 (3) and 58 are modified accordingly by the Council.

The Ethiopian delegate spoke right after Mr. Clayton's presentation of the Resolution to the full committee, and the U.S. delegate immediately stated that he accepted the amendments, on the understanding that they aimed to remove a political implication which was not intended, and not to place Italy in a lower category as a claimant for supplies.

Yugoslavia. The delegate from Yugoslavia spoke against the Resolution, stressing the bad effect that its passage would have on public opinion in his own country and his dislike for sharing UNRRA's limited resources with a nation so recently an enemy, "which has not yet agreed to pay reparations."

South Africa. Subsequently the South African delegate took the lead in opposing the Italian Resolution. He made a long, carefully worked out speech against the Resolution, bringing in under the same tent the proposals relating to Austria, Formosa, and Korea, as well as Italy. The main points he made can be summarized as follows:

- (a) The tendency to tie the Resolution to increased contributions of funds by the major supplying countries constituted the use of "pressure" on the receiving countries.
- (b) The proposal is unconstitutional, in view of the Atlantic City Resolutions. He saw in the Whereas clause about the Resolution 58 program an attempt to quote Resolution No. 58 as a precedent, and stressed the fact that at Montreal it had been specifically agreed that the children and expectant mothers resolution would not create a precedent for further operations in ex-enemy territories. Now, he added, we have four such proposals, and at the next meetings of the UNRRA Council perhaps there will be proposals for relief to other Axis satellites, and even to Germany and Japan.
- (c) The member Governments had only a few days to consider the Resolution, which must be studied at length, because it raises the question of reparations, and other basic problems.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

- (d) In conclusion, he suggested that the matter be handled by intergovernmental negotiations, rather than in the UNRRA Council.

United Kingdom. Mr. Noel-Baker answered one by one the arguments of the Yugoslav and the South African delegates and placed before the delegates the basic questions: If UNRRA does not do this job, who will? And if nobody does it, can the peace of Europe be kept in the face of the social unrest which may ensue in Italy?

Greece. The Greek delegate stated that while he could not possibly vote for the Resolution, he would not vote against it, but would abstain.

United States. Mr. Clayton, answering previous arguments, declared that the Resolution was not based on precedent, but on necessity, and that the reference to Resolution 58 could be removed from the Resolution. He disclaimed any desire to exercise the type of "pressure" to which the South African delegate had referred, but simply stated that he "would have been less than frank" if he had withheld from the committee the very pertinent fact that the outcome of the Italian proposal would greatly increase the difficulty of getting additional funds for UNRRA at the next session of Congress. He then reiterated the basic question asked by Mr. Noel-Baker.

China. The Chinese delegate, agreeing that the resources of UNRRA are small, said that nevertheless they had to be shared. The Chinese, he said, were not asking an increased allocation of funds for Formosa, but would share with their "brothers across the straits" the supplies available for the Chinese mainland. Then he added: "Chinese people hate Japanese today, but if the question came up I would vote for relief to Japan." This unexpected statement evoked a gasp, and spontaneous applause.

Canada. Mr. Pearson addressed himself the question of "pressure", and reemphasized that if the motion was defeated, it would inevitably have a serious effect on the availability of funds for the other operations of UNRRA.

Norway. The Norwegian delegate recalled that he had been opposed to the Italian proposal at the Montreal Conference, and had inserted in the Resolution the provision that it would not constitute a precedent. He stated that the Norwegian delegation was considering the opportunity of reversing its action at Montreal. Reason: Now "we have a new Italy."

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-4-

The Yugoslav delegate reaffirmed his viewpoint and proposed that the Resolution include (a) a reservation of rights of Italy's victims to reparations, and (b) a provision to ensure that relief for Italy does not interfere with relief to other countries.

United Kingdom. Mr. Noel-Baker immediately replied that in his view approval of relief to Italy would mean more, not less, relief to Yugoslavia.

Belgium. The Belgian delegate stated that he hoped that there was no intention of treating Italy better than the fighting allies, and suggested that the decision be on the high level of the speeches by the Ethiopian and Chinese delegates (in other words, that the Resolution be approved).

At the close of the meeting of the Committee on Policy of August 18, when the Chairman asked whether a vote should be taken, the Russian delegate, Mr. Sergeev, asked that the vote be postponed until he had had a chance to study the transcript of the speech by the delegate from South Africa. The vote was therefore postponed, after the U.S. delegate, Mr. Clayton, stated that he did not wish to press the matter to a conclusion until everybody who wished to be heard had had an opportunity to speak on it.

After delaying the matter through Monday, the Policy Committee met again on Tuesday morning, August 21, to continue the discussion on the Italian Resolution. The Russian delegate did not make any statement during the discussion which developed into an argument between the Yugoslav delegate on one hand and many other members of the Committee on the other.

Finally a vote was taken, by the raising of hands, on the incorporation of the Ethiopian amendment into the original U.S. Resolution, and the amendment was carried with only one dissenting vote -- Yugoslavia. The Resolution as amended was then put to a vote and carried, again with the Yugoslav as the only dissenting vote. The Greek delegate had announced that he would abstain from voting. The South African member modified his original position against the Resolution and abstained from voting, declaring that his country did not wish to stand in the way of any agreement that could be reached, while "fully reserving" her position.

Finally the Policy Committee decided against the Yugoslav Resolution, on the ground that the area involved was already made eligible for UNRRA assistance by the Resolutions just passed on Italy and Austria, and by the fact that Yugoslavia was already receiving UNRRA assistance.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-5-

The report of the Policy Committee recommending to the Council (1) the adoption of the American Resolution as amended, and (2) the rejection of the Yugoslav Resolution on Venezia Giulia was submitted to the Twelfth Plenary Meeting of the Council on August 22, 1945. The adoption of the report was moved by the chairman of the Policy Committee (the delegate of Czechoslovakia) and seconded by the delegate of Brazil.

In the debate which followed the Yugoslav delegate reiterated his opposition to the American Resolution, stressing Italy's attitude against Yugoslavia, Fascist attacks and war crimes, and the problems of restitution and reparations. The delegate of U.K. pointed out that Italy gave a "not inconsiderable" contribution to the final victory of the Allied forces and stressed the necessity of providing the minimum requisites for the reestablishment of normal conditions in Europe; he insisted that relief to Italy be given by UNRRA, because no other alternative is possible. The American delegate emphasized once again the necessity of assisting Italy's economic recovery in order to avoid serious consequences which would affect all of Europe, and especially the neighboring countries. Luxembourg, Norway, China and Mexico also declared themselves in favor of the American Resolution, while the Greek delegate stated that although he would not wish to oppose the Resolution, he would abstain from voting. Finally the Resolution for Italy was carried with only one member (Yugoslavia) voting against the motion. Besides the delegate of Greece, the delegate for South Africa abstained from voting, and requested that it be placed on record that South Africa reserved its position as far as any additional financial contribution arising from the Resolution was concerned. The debate was closed with a statement by the Director General Herbert H. Lehman.

The Resolution finally adopted reads as follows:

Whereas under Resolution No. 58 the Administration has already undertaken certain operations in Italy confined to the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, to assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons and to the care of children and nursing and expectant mothers and the welfare services associated therewith; and

Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August, 1945, it is therefore

Resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assist-

1556

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-6-

ance, adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations previously imposed on the Administration in Resolution I, Part I (3), and 58 are modified accordingly by the Council.

In the discussions, the Italian proposal was not presented as an earmarking of a predetermined amount of money, but simply as an authorization for UNRRA to conduct in Italy a program comparable to the UNRRA programs in other countries. However, in the Policy Committee discussions Mr. Clayton, the U.S. Delegate, consistently used two figures to indicate the order of magnitude of the proposed program: (a) an approximate figure of \$500,000,000 as the cumulative cost of the relief and rehabilitation program carried through by the U.S., U.K., and Canadian Governments, through the end of 1945; and (b) an estimated \$450,000,000 needed for an Italian program under UNRRA auspices during 1946. This latter figure has come down from the original figure agreed between the State Department and FEI (\$500,000,000) because it is contemplated that some of the supplies, especially food, should not be sent after the harvest of 1946. The figure of \$450,000,000, therefore, would not correspond to a full year's program.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 - 70. -7-

September 4-11, 1945

I. SEVENTH PLenary MEETING OF THE COUNCIL,
AUGUST 13, 1945 1/

(A) Introduction of Resolution for Relief to Italy, by
the U.S. Delegate William L. Clayton, Assistant Secretary
of State.

Mr. William L. Clayton: I said this morning that I believed we would have in the United States considerable difficulty in getting the Congress to approve another substantial appropriation say of the order of the first one, for UNRRA operations, but if the program were satisfactory I believe that we could obtain from the Congress of the United States another appropriation of approximately one per cent of the national income for the fiscal year ending July, 1943. I do not of course in this matter undertake to make any commitment on the part of the United States Congress.

I would like to speak here on some additions to the program presented by the Director General in his report. I have in mind particularly the needs of two countries: Italy and Austria. There are two resolutions which I would now like to present covering assistance to those two countries.

It will be useful to outline for the benefit of the Council the background against which these Resolutions are presented, and the reasons why the United States Government considers them an important and integral part of the action to be taken at the Council during the current session.

First, as regards Italy. Ever since the invasion of Sicily in 1943, the Allied Armies responsible for military operations in Italy have provided minimum amounts of supplies to relieve immediate distress in Italy, and to prevent disease and unrest among the civilian population which might prejudice the military operations in the area. This was particularly necessary in Southern Italy which was normally a deficit area for food, and in which the Germans methodically destroyed essential industry, electric power and utilities. When VE-day came, the Italians found themselves in a particularly unfortunate position. While the northern part of their country had been liberated rapidly without any major destruction of industrial facilities, the Italians did not have the means to make those factories run. The men, the skill and the electric power are there; but coal and raw materials and petroleum products must be imported to get Italian production on its feet. In spite of efforts to produce the largest possible quantities of food, the Italian grain harvest this fall is extraordinarily poor, due to drought, and in certain areas to grasshoppers.

1/ UNRRA Journal, Third Session of the Council, August 14, 1945. .

1555

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-8-

Normally, the northern part of Italy helps to feed the South, while the islands of Sicily and Sardinia are roughly self-sufficient. Next year the total deficit of wheat alone may reach close to two million tons for the year, in order to maintain even the present low ration of 300 grams of bread per day.

The combined military responsibility for sending civilian supplies to Italy ceases at the end of this month. For the interim period between September and December of this year, a minimum flow of basic supplies to Italy will be maintained through a special appropriation which has been made by the United States Government for the purpose. It is our hope and belief that the British and Canadian Governments will be joining with us in keeping this supply line open until the end of the year.

To meet the problem, from December on, it is proposed that UNRRA should assume the responsibility for basic relief and rehabilitation supplies to Italy during the year 1946.

The provision of UNRRA help to Italy, as all the member nations are aware, has a history. At the Atlantic City Conference, the Council decided that UNRRA would not conduct relief operations in enemy or enemy territories except to the extent necessary to provide relief to United Nations displaced persons and to prevent epidemics affecting United Nations nationals. At the Montreal Conference, the Council voted in Resolutions 57 and 58 to conduct a supplementary relief operation in Italy to the extent of no more than \$50,000,000 worth of supplies. This operation is already well under way, under the able direction of UNRRA's Chief of Mission in Rome, Mr. Keeny. However, it is necessarily extremely limited and contemplates only the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons, and welfare services for children and nursing and expectant mothers. It is clear that this limited program is no substitute for the basic supplies which would be maintained by UNRRA if the resolution I am about to present is approved by the Council.

The question naturally arises—should a United Nations organization assume the responsibility for relief in an area which only two years ago was an enemy country? I believe that during these two intervening years Italy has earned the right to be treated as a member of the community of free nations. Italy's partisans played a major part in the liberation of the Po Valley, as Field Marshal Alexander and General Mark Clark have testified. The new Italian Government, which began its life under great handicaps in a tiny section of the country, has been progressively strengthened, is growing in a democratic mould, and is now headed by a Prime Minister who formerly directed the resistance movement in Northern Italy. The recent Tripartite Conference at Berlin resulted in complete agreement that a formal peace treaty with Italy should be drawn up and made effective as quickly as possible.

1554

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-9-

The section of the Berlin Declaration dealing with Italy is an important statement of policy, and I would like to read it in full:

"The three Governments have included the preparation of a peace treaty for Italy as the first among the immediate important talks to be undertaken by the new Council of Foreign Ministers. Italy was the first of the Axis Powers to break with Germany, to whose defeat she had made a material contribution, and has now joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan. Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of a democratic Government and institutions. The conclusion of such a peace treaty with a recognized and democratic Italian Government will make it possible for the three Governments to fulfill their desire to support an application from Italy for membership in the United Nations."

In order to enable UNRRA to conduct in Italy a program of relief and rehabilitation, I believe that the relevant procedures require two things to be done at this Council Meeting. The first is to act on the Resolution which I am presenting to the Council herewith. The second is to modify the Program of Operations in order to provide sufficient funds with which to undertake an Italian program on the same standards and basis as the programs for other liberated areas.

Thereafter, UNRRA can take immediate steps to build up its Mission in Italy so that it can cope with its new responsibilities; to negotiate an agreement with the Italian Government and to build up a supply pipeline which can be effective when the present pipeline runs out at the end of the year.

... The text of the Resolution is reproduced below

Whereas Italy, being the first of the Axis Powers to break with Hitler, made a material contribution to the defeat of Germany and thereafter joined with the Allies in the struggle against Japan; and

Whereas Italy has freed herself from the Fascist regime and is making good progress towards the reestablishment of democratic Government and institutions; and

Whereas under Resolution 58 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has already undertaken certain operations in Italy confined to the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, to assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons and to the care of children and nursing and expectant mothers, and the welfare services associated therewith; and

Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August 1945;

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-10-

Resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance on the same standards and basis of priority as apply to liberated areas of the United Nations and their nationals, and that the limitations previously imposed on the Administration in Resolutions 1, Part I (3), and 58 are modified accordingly.

Mr. Chairman, I move the adoption of that Resolution.

(B) Resolution Supported by the U.K. Delegate.

Mr. P. Noel-Baker: . . . Then, we have the proposals just made by Mr. Clayton that Italy and Austria should become recipients of UNRRA help. Like other members of the Council, I should like to examine in detail the Resolutions which Mr. Clayton has circulated to us today. I think it almost certain that I shall be in agreement with them, but as to the details I want to keep a free hand, and I know he will agree that we, like other members of the Council, should do so. But I want at once to say that we agree with the main substance of the propositions which he makes. We believe that Italy should be treated as he proposes. He spoke of the work of the Italian partisans, and recalled the messages of appreciation sent by Field Marshal Montgomery while operations were going on; but far more important to this Council is the prospect of what might happen in Italy if adequate help were not brought there through this coming winter. In the northern plains of Italy there are 23,000,000 people. We expected that their factories and their transport system would be smashed. Happily for us, and for the world at large, partly through our action, partly through the action of the Italians themselves, that did not happen. We are so far fortunate, but if it should happen that nevertheless the mills and the factories remain idle, that men are standing round the streets while their families are hungry through this coming winter, can we expect to avoid trouble which might be disastrous for us all? Those remarks apply in full to Austria. It will be a very serious thing for all of us if there should be disturbances in Italy or Austria, which might happen if the conditions became as bad as they would be without UNRRA help. Therefore, as I tried to argue the other day, this -- like all the rest of UNRRA -- action is a matter of enlightened self-interest for every country which belongs. . .

(C) Referral to General Committee.

Under the Council's Rules of Procedure a resolution presented to the Council must be referred to a committee. The Chairman (Sir Girja Bajpai), with the concurrence of the Council, therefore referred to the General Committee the Resolution on Italy presented by the U.S. delegate, Mr. Clayton, as well as a similar Resolution relating to Austria, which was placed before the Council by the U.S. delegate at the same time.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-11-

II. GENERAL COMMITTEE(A) Third Meeting of the General Committee,
August 14, 1945. 1/(1) Opening of the Discussion.

.....

The Chairman then asked the pleasure of the Committee in respect to the disposition of two Resolutions from the United States delegation, the one relating to the program of relief and rehabilitation assistance in Italy and the other relating to relief and rehabilitation operations in Austria.

The delegate from Yugoslavia stated that he was not prepared to discuss this item and asked that discussion on it be postponed until later. This motion was seconded by the delegate from USSR. The delegate from the United States having pointed to the shortness of time available to the Council for the conclusion of its business, asked that the two resolutions be dealt with as expeditiously as possible, and suggested that they be discussed in General Committee on either August 14 or 15; the delegate from the U.S. also suggested that both Resolutions be discussed in the Plenary Session of the Council.

When the Chairman asked the Committee to resolve the question as to whether the two Resolutions be discussed in the General Committee, in some other Committee or in the Council, the delegate from the USSR stated that he was unable to discuss any aspect of the U.S. proposal until a later date.

The representative from the United Kingdom pointed out that a satisfactory disposition of these two resolutions greatly affected the contributions of the principal paying and supplying Governments. He expressed his hope that the resolutions might be discussed on the August 15 by the Council in Plenary Session.

The Chairman suggested the desirability of referring the question of the two Resolutions on Italy and Austria to a meeting of the General Committee on August 15 at 4 P.M. To this proposal the representative of the U.S. agreed although the delegate from Yugoslavia dissented. At this point the delegate from Yugoslavia suggested the desirability of inviting representatives of all those countries invaded by Italian forces at the next meeting of the General Committee, when it discusses the Resolutions of Italy and Austria. The Chairman suggested that such an improvisation would provide no beneficial result and pointed out that the Committee on Policy and the Council itself would undoubtedly receive the Resolutions, and that in either case, the representatives of those powers which have suffered Italian aggression would, as a matter of course, be present.

1/ Council III, Document 114.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-12-

The member from the U.K. supported the Chairman's view and reminded the Committee again of the importance of these proposals to the principal contributing powers.

The delegate from Yugoslavia dilated on the difficulty of this proposal by the Yugoslav Government.

The member from France then reminded the Committee that his country had suffered Italian aggression, but that he was in favour of the proposal of the United States to discuss the matter at the earliest possible moment.

The delegate from the U.K. reminded the Committee again of the unhappy consequences to the recipient countries of social disturbances during the coming winter in Italy and Austria.

(2) Introduction of Amendment to Resolution by U.S.

The delegate from the United States proposed to amend his own resolution concerning Italian operations by deleting from the first paragraph the following words:

"Made a material contribution to the defeat of Germany and thereafter join with the Allies in the struggle against Japan;" and by deleting the following words from the second paragraph: "whereas Italy"

Thus the first paragraph of the resolution should read:

"Whereas Italy, being the first of the Axis powers to break with Hitler, has freed herself from the Fascist Regime and is making good progress toward the reestablishment of democratic government and institutions."

(3) Introduction of Resolution for Relief to Venezia Giulia by Yugoslav Delegate.

The delegate from Yugoslavia then introduced a resolution relating to Venezia Giulia (territories as defined by the Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Allied Forces Headquarters Mediterranean Theater of Operations, June 16, 1945). The resolution reads as follows:

Whereas special conditions exist in liberated territories which are defined by the Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the representatives of the Allied Forces Headquarters Mediterranean Theater of Operations in Devin June the 16th 1945 and

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945


-13-

Whereas they were liberated by the active participation of their population in the armed struggle against Fascism since 1941 and it being desirable that the Administration should operate in these territories, and

Whereas the Allied Military Authorities recognize the liberated character of these areas; it is therefore

Resolved that territories which have been defined by the Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Allied Forces Headquarters Mediterranean Theatre of Operations of June 16th, 1945, be considered as liberated territories within the meaning of Part I Resolution 1, and the Administration being hereby authorized to operate in such areas in agreement with the Authorities which administer these areas, upon the terms and conditions as in other liberated areas.

.....



INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-14-

(B) Fourth Meeting of the General Committee,
August 15, 1945. Continuation of the
Discussion. 2/

... The Chairman then invited the attention of the Committee to the Resolutions offered by the United States delegation relating to UNRRA activities in Italy and Austria...

The member from the United States reminded the Committee that the Governments of the United States, United Kingdom, and Canada have already spent nearly \$500,000,000 for relief in Italy, and that the task is by no means complete; that Italy has no foreign exchange; that stabilization of Italian economy is essential to the peace and prosperity of Europe; and that such a responsibility is clearly that of UNRRA.

The member from the United States stated that the same considerations applied to the proposed activities of UNRRA in Austria. He therefore asked the approval of the General Committee on these two Resolutions.

The member from the United States stated further that the area identified by the Yugoslav Resolution . . . is now in the hands of the military, but in any case, is covered by the United States Resolution relating to Italy.

The member from Yugoslavia submitted that the territories were disputed territories and were not included in the United States Resolution on UNRRA activity in Italy.

The member from the United Kingdom suggested that the Committee limit its discussion to the Resolutions offered by the Member from the United States.

The member from the United States again stated that in his opinion, the territories identified by the Yugoslav Resolution were covered by one or the other of the United States Resolutions on Italy and Austria.

The member from the USSR stated that he did not yet have instructions from his Government on the two United States' Resolutions,

2/ Council III, Document 119.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 6970

September 4-11, 1945

-15-

and that he must ask for postponement of the discussion on this question for another day or two. He suggested that inadequate notice of the discussion on these questions accounted for his request for further postponement.

The Member from the United Kingdom stated that it had been known for some time that these Resolutions were contemplated and that, in his opinion, the Governments concerned had ample opportunity to consider their merits. He reminded the Committee that failure to provide relief to Italy and Austria would result in anarchy and chaos and disease in those countries which could not be restricted to the areas in which they break out. He stated further, that the Governments of the U.S. and U.K. could not continue to bear the burden of relief in Italy and that further appropriations to UNRRA from those Governments would be impossible unless favourable action were taken on the United States' Resolutions.

The Member from the USSR suggested that sufferings in other territories should be more compelling arguments for further appropriations to UNRRA.

The member from the United Kingdom answered that UNRRA assistance is not given as an award for merit nor as charity; that UNRRA assistance is supplied to those parts of the world which are unable to begin the task of reconstruction themselves, that one of these areas is Italy. He stated further, that the whole reconstruction of Europe would be retarded by failure of UNRRA to assist in the reconstruction of Italy.

The member from the United States stated that if the U.S. Government is asked to appropriate another \$400,000,000 for Italy, further appropriations for UNRRA would, in his opinion, not be realised.

The Chairman reminded the Committee of the importance of agreeing upon a time when these issues might be resolved. He asked the members from the USSR and Yugoslavia when they would be prepared to continue the discussion.

The member from the USSR stated that he required two more days.

The member from Canada suggested that the General Committee now agree to refer the matter to the Council in Plenary Session, and that such reference take place not later than Friday morning.

The Chairman stated that this was the proposal he was about to make.

The member from the United Kingdom indicated his acceptance of the proposal of the member from Canada.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 - 70

September 4-11, 1945

-16-

The member from the USSR asked for further consideration in the General Committee.

The members from the United Kingdom and the United States requested conclusion of discussions of the General Committee on Friday morning and referral to the Council at 10:30 A.M. on Friday morning.

The Chairman then appealed to the delegates from the USSR and Yugoslavia to agree to the proposal that the General Committee meet at 9.30 A.M. August 17 to conclude discussion on the Resolutions relating to Italy and Austria, and to refer these matters to the Council in Plenary Session to be held as soon as possible after the conclusion of the discussion in Committee.

The member from the USSR stated that he was agreeable to further discussion at a meeting of the General Committee at 9.30, but in view of the political character of the questions, thought that referral to the Committee on Policy might be more appropriate than referral to the Council.

The member from the United Kingdom stated that the question was not a political one and further, that a final vote in any case must take place in the Council.

The Chairman reminded the Committee that a political question may appropriately be resolved in the General Committee for referral to the Council, and that the General Committee would meet at 9.30 on Friday to conclude discussion on these items, would preferably continue discussion until the matters were concluded and shall then refer them to the Council for discussion in Plenary Session on Friday.

The member from the United States asked postponement of further discussion of the Yugoslav Resolution until the meeting of the General Committee at 9.30 A.M. Friday August 17 . . .

(C) Referral of the Resolution to the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy. 3/

At its meeting on August 17 the General Committee decided, on the motion of the USSR delegate, to refer to the Committee on Policy, for its consideration, the Resolution relating to a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance in Italy, and the Resolution relating to Venezia Giulia.

3/ Council III, Document 123.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-17-

III. AD HOC COMMITTEE ON POLICY 1/(A) Preliminary Draft of Verbatim Report of Sixth Meeting of the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy, August 18, 1945. 2/

CHAIRMAN: (Mr. Jan Masaryk): The Session of the Committee is open. The first item on the proposed Agenda is Relief and Rehabilitation Assistance for Italy. The Resolution as proposed by the United States delegation is in your hands, and therefore I do not think we need have it read.

May I say, before I go any further, that this is a private meeting, and if there are any members of the press or the public here, they should remove themselves.

Do I take it that the representative of the United States wishes to say something on this Resolution?

UNITED STATES (Mr. William L. Clayton): Yes, Mr. Chairman, I would like to move the adoption of the Resolution, and to say a few words regarding the situation in Italy. After the Italian surrender, the Italians proved themselves to be very useful in the interests of the United Nations in the war. While Northern Italy was still under the occupation of the German arms, the Partisans and Resistance forces there were responsible for many heroic acts of sabotage, the blowing up of bridges, the ambushing of Germans, and even in occupying substantial blocks of territory. They were able to preserve many vital power plants from demolition and yet render those plants useless to the Germans by the simple act of occupying the area in which they stood. This was a fight their hearts were in and we feel that they acquitted themselves admirably in it. At the same time, on the Allied side of the lines, the Italians made available without stint what industrial capacity had been left undestroyed by the retreating Germans, and plants that could be repaired by "cannibalisation", that is, by the use of parts from damaged plants to piece together one workable plant, were so repaired. The manufacture of some munitions, and many Quartermaster items, essential to the soldier's life and fighting efficiency, was carried on in thousands of Italian plants which have been working for the Allied Armies. The Italian railroad system has worked nearly full time for the Allies. Countless military vehicles have been kept on the road, and ships on the seas, by Italian facilities and mechanical skill.

These services and facilities have alone amounted to several hundred million dollars in value, so that the Italian people have not got, so to speak, a "free ride" -- they have paid with such assistance as it was in their power to give.

1/ In accordance with the decision of the Council at the Twelfth Plenary Meeting the principal speeches published below under (A) and (B) were reproduced with minor editorial changes in the UNRRA Journal, of August 23 and 24, 1945. The speeches of the delegate from South Africa were not reproduced.

2/ Council III. Document 133.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-18-

Now, Mr. Chairman, the United States Government and the British Government and the Canadian Government have, in connection with the occupation of Italy by their Armies, been conducting a program of relief in Italy. Up to the end of this year these three Governments will have put out the very substantial sum of about 500 million dollars in this relief work. This will not be sufficient to tide the Italians over to the point where they can become more or less self-sustaining on the very minimum subsistence level of standard of living.

It has been calculated after very careful examination and appraisal of the situation that it will probably take in the neighbourhood of 450 million dollars additional to provide the necessary relief to the Italians until after the next harvest, say next August or September, about a year from now. We feel that this is a job which UNRRA should undertake. It was agreed at Potsdam by the Heads of the three Governments, the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet Government, that a Treaty of Peace would be prepared promptly with Italy, and that in due course Italy would be accepted into the United Nations. Meantime, the United States Government recognized the Italian Government some months ago. So that we feel that UNRRA should undertake this very important job of relief to Italy. If UNRRA does not undertake it, somebody must do so. If the job is not done, there is very grave danger that the economic, social and political life of Italy will disintegrate and that there will be conditions there which will be very serious not only to Italy itself, but to the neighbouring countries, and indeed to the whole of Europe. We feel that it would certainly be against the interests not only of all Europe, but of the whole world that any such condition as that should be brought about. For that reason, we hope that the Resolution will be adopted.

ETHIOPIA (His Excellency Blatta Ephrem Twelde Medhan): The other day, during the discussion of the Director General's Report by the Council, I stated, with a sense of gratification that UNRRA had been successful in affording widespread relief, as was recognised by the representatives of the recipient countries. I further stated that UNRRA had not yet started operations in Ethiopia, the first country to be liberated from occupation by one of the Axis Powers. At that time I did not expect that a few days later we would be invited to accept a Resolution conferring upon one of the original Axis Powers the right to relief and rehabilitation assistance by UNRRA on the same standards and basis of priority as applied to liberated areas of the United Nations. It is needless for me to say here that this Resolution will be a painful surprise to the people who are still smarting from the wounds inflicted by those whom it is now proposed

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-19-

to treat on the same basis as the United Nations. The people who have suffered atrocities in various cruel forms at the hands of the nation which was the aggressor would be shocked if they learned that it is contemplated to assist the aggressor on the same basis as its victims, and that even before the victims have received first-aid to heal the wounds inflicted on them by the Axis Powers.

Ethiopia is in no way actuated by a vindictive spirit, as was demonstrated by her support of the Resolution presented by the United States in the Montreal Session of the Council to extend limited assistance to Italy. It will be recalled, however, that as Representative of Ethiopia I declared at that time that such assistance should be on a purely humanitarian basis and should have no other significance. I now maintain that the present Resolution should be on the same basis and be framed accordingly. The view of my Government, in the first place, is that it is premature for UNRRA to treat Italy as if she were one of the United Nations. The negotiation of a treaty between Italy and the United Nations has not yet begun, and so far as my Government is concerned, it will await the signature of its own peace treaty with Italy, including full satisfaction of its claims. My Government does not wish to prejudice its position by supporting a Resolution which by its wording appears to accord to Italy politically a position equivalent to membership of the United Nations.

I should much regret to find myself in direct opposition to anything proposed by the United States and supported by the United Kingdom; but in its present form the Resolution appears to me to have a political implication which I hope to see removed. For this purpose, I beg leave, Mr. Chairman, to propose the following amendment to the Resolution now before the Council, namely:

1. Omit the first paragraph of the Preamble.
2. In the Resolution, after the word 'assistance' in line 4, insert a comma, and substitute for the remainder of the Resolution the following:
adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations imposed on the Administration in Resolutions I, Part I (3), and 58 are modified accordingly by the Committee on Policy.

The Resolution as a whole will then read as follows:

Whereas under Resolution 58 the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration has already undertaken certain operations in Italy confined to the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, to assistance in

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-20-

the care and return to their homes of displace persons and to the care of children and nursing and expectant mothers, and the welfare services associated therewith; and

Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August 1945;

Resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance, adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations imposed on the Administration in Resolutions I, Part I(3), and 58 are modified accordingly by the Council.

In conclusion, I wish to stress the point that Ethiopia does not grudge increased supplies being furnished by UNRRA to the Italian people, according to their ascertained needs, but merely wishes to avoid the appearance of giving Italy a political status which is incompatible with the present situation. I therefore earnestly hope that the Amendment will be adopted.

UNITED STATES (Mr. Clayton): The statement by the delegate of Ethiopia to which we have just listened was on very broad lines and principles, and in all the circumstances I think it is a very commendable one. It was not the intention of the United States delegation that this Resolution should have any political implications whatever, and on the understanding that the amendment proposed by the delegate of Ethiopia is to clarify that aspect of the Resolution and show that it has no political character and is not intended to limit or modify the economic or relief aspects of the document, we gladly accept the amendment.

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic): Mr. Chairman, members of the Council, this question means very much to my country and is very important. Italy, together with Germany, attacked my country in 1941, and she has held vast territories of my country under her occupation till the second half of 1943. During that occupation the Italian army has committed an uncountable number of crimes on these territories. I will not speak of our soldiers, but we lost thousands and thousands of old people, women and children. The material damage done is enormous and we are still suffering from it. Since the Italian military force was broken Italy has not undertaken anything towards

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69- 70

September 4-11, 1945

-21-

repairing that damage. Not even one war criminal has been turned over to us. Our gold and other treasures that were taken away have not been returned. The Italian Government has not undertaken an obligation to pay reparations; and now it is proposed that we must share with Italy the limited means we have in the United Nations for relief and rehabilitation, although there are not sufficient means to help those who have, since the first days, fought for the common cause of the United Nations. I consider that, as an organization of the United Nations, UNRRA must not receive that undertaking. The peoples of Yugoslavia would never understand that. We do not wish chaos and hunger in Italy but we will feel hurt if that task is undertaken by an organization of which we are members. We consider it an honour to be a member of that organization. Besides that, we consider that such a decision would very negatively influence international morals because in the future it will give encouragement to other invaders. Italy could also explain this decision as a precedent for the future - the non-payment of reparations - and not only to us but to all other nations who request it and who have the right to do so. I think we have already spoken quite a bit about the economic position in Yugoslavia after four years of war, and I do not consider it necessary to defend the rights of Yugoslavia to reparations and needs for reparations, because on it depends whether thousands and thousands are going to die of hunger and whether in future many generations are going to feel the results. In the name of a country whose efforts for the common cause are generally recognised throughout the whole world and whose people consider that they deserve the fullest help and who expect that help because it was promised during the war, and who are hungry today and who are suffering just on account of the Italian occupation, I cannot receive this Resolution. I cannot receive it because if I did so my own people would consider me a traitor. Regarding the amendment proposed by the member for Ethiopia, I would wish to see the text so that I could decide on the matter, because it is very important for me.

CHAIRMAN: I really think the amendment is so simple (it is only one sentence) that the member for Yugoslavia might study it for a while during the proceedings of the next few minutes and we would not have to interrupt the meeting.

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic): Yes, I should like to study it before coming to a decision.

CHAIRMAN: The delegate for South Africa.

SOUTH AFRICA (Mr. J. R. Jordaan): Mr. Chairman, my remarks on Italy will equally apply to the proposals relating to Austria, Formosa and Korea. I should like to ask, therefore, whether my remarks could

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-22-

be fully transcribed in the record, because they will serve two useful purposes: I will not have to repeat my remarks when the other proposals come up for discussion and it will give members an opportunity of studying and reflecting on my criticisms and also give them the opportunity of demolishing them, if they can.

Mr. Chairman, when the Council met for the first time in Atlantic City in November 1943 it had before it the Agreement establishing the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. The preamble of this Agreement provides in part as follows: "Immediately upon the liberation of any area by the armed forces of the United Nations or as a consequence of the retreat of the enemy, the population thereof shall receive aid and relief from their sufferings", etc.

I have stressed the word "liberation" because that to our mind is the operative term in this particular clause.

States which were signatory to that agreement had been consulted beforehand and had had time for reflection on and consideration of the proposals later embodied in the agreement; they had been given an opportunity to express their views. I repeat the intentions had been carefully considered, and there was never any doubt in the minds of those representatives who met in Atlantic City that the areas which were intended to benefit from UNRRA relief were those areas of the United Nations which had during this war been occupied by the enemy. That is why the agreement speaks of "liberated areas." The citizens who were to benefit by the operations of UNRRA were intended to be the citizens of the United Nations.

That was the basic concept which underlies all the resolutions framed at Atlantic City. Delegates at that Conference argued forcibly that enemy and ex-enemy territories should not be included in the scope of UNRRA's activities. Foreseeing that UNRRA might nevertheless have to operate in such enemy or ex-enemy states the Conference deliberately adopted a resolution providing that in such an eventuality the Council shall "approve the scale and nature of the operations it is proposed to undertake and the standard of provision; and that all expenses connected with such possible operations in an enemy or ex-enemy area should be carried by the enemy and ex-enemy country concerned." This is a quote from Resolution 1, part 1, paragraph 3.

At the Montreal Session of the Council a successful effort was made not to modify the basic concept to which I have referred, but to make a limited exception to that concept as a special case

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4 - 11, 1945

-23-

and on grounds of high moral compulsion. I refer to Resolution No. 58 which authorized strictly limited assistance to Italian displaced persons, children, nursing and expectant mothers.

If I recall the speeches of the Greek, Yugoslav and Ethiopian delegates and the speeches of other representatives of occupied or liberated countries, I can assert without fear of contradiction that assent to that proposal was reluctantly given and was only given because assistance to that small group of Italians constituted a compelling United States domestic consideration.

The South African delegation at Montreal alone raised the issue of constitutionality of the extension of UNRRA's scope in that way. The American delegate argued his case very ably. He held that assistance to Italy could be rendered on the basis of Article 2 of the Agreement which lays down the purposes and functions of the Administration, namely - "to plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations." The South African delegation at that time held that the interpretation placed on this provision was faulty and inaccurate. They still hold that view. The phrase, "any area under the control of any of the United Nations" must be read with the preamble which speaks of liberated areas. If that were not so there would have been no need for the Administration to seek Council authority to operate in Italy. The Administration could have moved in and could have started operations in Italy in the same way as they started operations in Greece, Yugoslavia, Poland and other areas now under the control of any of the United Nations, without seeking special Council authority.

I said before that modifications of the basic concept of the Agreement was reluctantly given by the representatives of the occupied countries, and let me add by the representatives of South Africa. It was given largely because the United States delegate stated categorically that the limited assistance to Italy was not to be construed as a precedent for further extension of UNRRA's scope. I reiterate: the limited assistance to Italy was not to be construed as a precedent for further extension of UNRRA's scope. This proviso is in fact embodied in paragraph 6 of Resolution No. 58!!

Now, Mr. Chairman, I am going to hold the United States delegate to that statement of his predecessor in Montreal. The draft resolution before us regarding Italy specifically refers to Resolution No. 58 passed at Montreal, and I say that that Resolution was not intended to establish a precedent, and we should refuse to treat it as such.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-24-

We felt in Montreal at that time that if you say A you will have to say B, and if you say B you will have to say C. That feeling, I regret to say, now appears to have been amply justified. Not only Italy but also Formosa, and also Korea and even Austria are now roped in. We are asked to authorize the Administration to undertake relief and rehabilitation operations in all these areas. I say to members of the Council that if you agree to these proposals you will inevitably have to agree at the next Council Session, or at the Session after that, to proposals extending UNRRA's scope to Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland and eventually, who knows, even Germany and Japan (Laughter).

You will have absolutely no grounds for saying "no" in these cases when they arise for you will have established the precedent once and for all.

The basic conception of UNRRA will have been radically modified. The considerations upon which you are now asked to authorize assistance to Italy, Formosa, Korea and Austria will equally apply in the cases of Hungary, Roumania, Bulgaria, Finland, Germany and Japan, when the same conditions develop there, which I feel they will.

The proposals regarding Italy and Austria were introduced a few days ago by the Member of the Council for the United States. They have been seconded by the member of the Council for the United Kingdom. The sponsors of the proposals are large contributing States.

Mr. Clayton has told us openly and fearlessly that unless these proposals, or at any rate the one relating to Italy, are passed, a further contribution towards UNRRA's requirements may not be forthcoming. Mr. Noel-Baker said very much the same thing as far as the United Kingdom contribution is concerned.

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this Council should not be called upon to take a snap decision on tremendously important issues without so much as a week's notice, and without disclosure of the full facts that surround these issues.

The statement that further contributions may not be forthcoming unless the resolutions are passed constitutes such tremendous pressure on the recipient countries that I, for one, will understand if such countries feel themselves compelled to agree to the proposals, not because they feel convinced of their reasonableness, but for the sake of their countries' requirements in their hour of need.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-25-

This pressure I submit, Mr. Chairman, makes it virtually impossible for Members of the Council to assess the merits of the proposals dispassionately. Persuasion, reason and sound merit, these alone should be the deciding criteria in any decision we should be called upon to take.

Let me say that I sincerely believe that Mr. Clayton and Mr. Noel-Baker's statements were not *prima facie* intended to force the issue, but that they were intended as statements of conditions which must be squarely faced. But they do constitute pressure for all that. That being so, are there any good reasons why these proposals should be rejected? We feel that there are such reasons and these are now the reasons why the South African delegation will vote against these proposals.

Firstly, the proposals raise new issues of major policy on which time for consideration is needed. Time for such consideration has not been given. It was but a few days ago that we learned for the first time that the resolution regarding Austria would be introduced. It was but a few days previous to that that the South African delegation learned for the first time that the resolution regarding Italy would be introduced. In the space of a few days my Government is expected to come to a snap decision on the basis of - what? How much information has been given to us as to the conditions in Italy and Austria? We have been told in Session here how critical the conditions are in Italy and why it is considered imperative to come to her aid. Surely the conditions in Italy and Austria must have been known to the sponsors of the proposal, say, six weeks ago, let us say even four weeks ago? Why could not member governments then have been advised in good time of these conditions? Why could not they have been told that the resolutions before us would be introduced and have been asked to submit their views or suggestions? In all fairness, that is the least that we could have expected. I submit that Member Governments should not be placed in a position where they have to come to an immediate decision on matters of such major importance, and on the basis of such scanty detail.

Secondly, the proposals are unconstitutional; that is, they change the whole basic concept on which UNRRA was constructed. If we changed that basis now it would open the door for applications for assistance in respect of every single ex-enemy state. I have already dealt with this point, and do not propose to elaborate it further.

Thirdly, the proposal regarding Italy bases its justification largely on the precedent of Resolution 58. I have already pointed out that Resolution 58 cannot be taken as a precedent, and that we should refuse to treat it as such....

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

-26-

September 4-11, 1941

... There another reason why I would vote against the proposals regarding Italy and Austria, and it is the most important one. There is no denying that approval of these proposals would establish a firm precedent. Conditions in Europe, we all know, are such that circumstances may well develop which will demand the urgent relief and rehabilitation of other ex-enemy territories on political grounds. There is talk of exacting reparations from ex-enemy countries. The extension of UNRRA's benefits to ex-enemy countries in circumstances where the occupying powers exact reparations from these states raises questions of such high Government policy that, I submit, this Council assembled in executive session, is not competent to deal with them.

... I do not know whether Italy will be called upon to pay reparations. But Italy had colonies. To what extent has her loss of control over these colonies and the loss of the food and the materials derived from these colonies been conducive to the creation of conditions that now necessitate UNRRA's assistance?

These questions, Mr. Chairman, merely indicate the vast political implications of the proposals before us. How can any Government be asked to come to an immediate decision, when all the facts are not known, and their implications have not been studied?

For this reason, also, I would vote against the proposals.

As regards Korea and Formosa, perhaps I may be permitted to recall what I said on Thursday afternoon. I then stated that when the first Conference met at Atlantic City both territories had, for many years, dating back to before the last war, been recognized by the Governments represented here, as falling within Japanese sovereignty. I said that while the desirability of their return to China had been freely canvassed, there was never any understanding at Atlantic City that they fell within the definition "liberated areas" as that term is generally understood. The term "liberated areas" was in our opinion intended to have application only to the present war, just concluded, and even if we regard this war as having begun with the Japanese seizure of Manchuria in 1931, such an interpretation would not cover Formosa and Korea.

Finally, Mr. Chairman, there is a limit to the resources of the contributing countries. We have already been asked to make contributions additional to the one originally contemplated. We are asked to authorize UNRRA to undertake operations in a number of additional territories with millions of necessitous inhabitants. Where is the money to come from? The answer is that the countries now in receipt of UNRRA assistance will have to share UNRRA's resources with these other territories. They must therefore expect to get less, not more, assistance from UNRRA.

Mr. Chairman, I come to the end of my statement. Let me make this abundantly clear. I do not wish for one moment to contend that assistance to Italy and Austria, and, for that matter, to some other ex-enemy country, may not be necessary on political or humanitarian grounds, or even that such assistance may not eventually be in our own long-range national interests.

1545

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945

-27-

What I do contend is that UNRRA on the basis of its constitution, operating as it does within the framework of the Agreement of November 9, 1943, and with the limited resources at its disposal, cannot and should not deal with these questions.

There are tremendously large issues involved, as I have attempted to sketch. How, then, should these problems be tackled? There is, in my opinion, only one way: The way that was followed towards the conclusion of the UNRRA Agreement, the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, and others. That is, separate inter-Governmental negotiation. Governments should be given all the pertinent facts as soon as possible, together with concrete proposals intended to solve the problems involved. I suggest that such a course be followed by the sponsors of the proposals before us as quickly as possible. It may well be that our Governments, after consideration and study of all the facts involved, may find UNRRA the only appropriate organisation to carry out that task. If so, well and good. Our Governments can then agree to a modification of UNRRA's basic agreement and the basic resolutions, but that is for our Governments to determine, not for this Council (which has only a few days' time at its disposal) or for its members who are not plenipotentiaries authorised to come to an immediate decision on issues of such profound importance.

This, then, Mr. Chairman, is the position of the South African delegation.

If my words have been critical, I regret it, but I must also confess that they were intended to be so, for I submit that the cause of international cooperation is not served by a refusal to face facts squarely. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that the South African delegation's attitude is as sound and a reasonable one. That being so, I would urge as strongly as I can that the proposals relating to Italy, Austria, Formosa and Korea be rejected pending consideration of the factors involved, on which, I trust, the sponsors of the proposals will furnish full particulars to our respective Governments. (Applause).

UNITED KINGDOM (Mr. Noel-Baker): Mr. Chairman, I should like, if I may - if it will not be thought unbecoming - to say how much I appreciated the tone of what the Member for Ethiopia said to the Council this afternoon. I recognise his right, above that of all other people in this room, to speak on the question of UNRRA help to Italy today. Ethiopia was the first victim of Fascist-Italian aggression; Ethiopia suffered when other nations did not come to her help, when they stood alone. Fearful crimes were committed by Fascist agents in Ethiopia and in the capital of that land. I recognise the right, of course, of our Yugoslav colleague to come here and say that the feeling in his country about help to Italy will be bitter.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-28-

I remember while the war was going on hearing from his men and from ours who had been in his country with the partisans fighting against the common enemy what terrible things had been done; and I know what bitter memories must have been left behind. When he says "Italy with Germany attacked my country in 1941", I am obliged to say too "Italy with Germany attacked my country in 1940". The Italians sent bombers to rain down destruction on London. It is true they only did it once (Laughter). But in the Middle East, in the Mediterranean, where we were fighting a desperate battle almost alone, a battle on which the whole future of the United Nations depended in 1940 and 1941 -- for does anyone believe that if the Axis had got through to the Middle East and to the oil wells of the Caucasus at that time the issue of the war would not have been far longer protracted and the cost of it immensely greater than it was? Italy brought us to the very verge of defeat.

Sir, we too have a right to talk about Italy, but we, and I believe our Yugoslav colleague too, make a distinction between Mussolini and the Italy we have today. I never believed, for my part, that Mussolini had a majority of Italy behind him at any time in the whole of his career, and I am very certain he had not got it when he made his wars; and I think that the conduct of many of the Italian divisions in the war proved that that was so. Certainly today we have a very different Italy, and we have to consider that the people who are going to rule Italy are those who opposed Mussolini while he had his terror machine under his command, while in opposing him they took fearful risks.

Sir, I mentioned before - I think I mentioned it in the Plenary Council - that our Field Marshal Alexander has frequently paid public tribute on the wireless and in other ways to the work which the Italian partisans have done, to the aid which they gave us in making the victory in Italy much swifter than it would otherwise have been, in advancing the day when we were able to bring more help, as we mean to bring more help, to Yugoslavia.

Sir, for that reason I would say that the first paragraph of the original United States draft Resolution would be fully justified if the Council desired to accept it; and so I think the last paragraph would be. But, like the American delegation, I am ready to accept both those changes. I cannot feel that the original Resolution would have encouraged other criminals to make aggressive war; I cannot feel that it would be a precedent for future aggressors not to pay reparations. If we have another world war, with atomic bombs, I do not think the question of reparations will arise in any very practical form; but in any case arguments of that kind do not seem to me to be really justified today. But for the sake of agree-

1544

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-29-

ment, in order, if we can, to do something to help in the matter of the bitter feeling which I know there is in Yugoslavia and in other countries, we are prepared to accept the amendments which have been put forward by the Member for Ethiopia.

When our Yugoslav colleague goes on to say that if we adopt this Resolution it means that thousands and thousands of people will die of hunger in his country, again I am sorry but I must differ on the facts. In my belief, this Resolution will save thousands and thousands of people from dying in his country; because this Resolution will enable us to get more funds than we could otherwise obtain.

Now, that brings me to the substance of what has been said by the Member for South Africa. I do not want now to speak at great length about what he said. He has invited us to study his remarks and to talk about them in Plenary Session. I shall be very glad to do so. But I do say to him that it is a basic fact which everybody must face in this discussion that there is an inevitable connection between UNRRA help for Italy and the provision of further funds which UNRRA must have. We cannot help it. It is not the fault of our United States colleagues, it is not our fault, that that happens to be the situation.

He says that when we adopt that we are exercising a tremendous pressure on recipient countries. I would say to him that the facts in Italy are exercising a tremendous pressure on my Government today. He asks if we want to force the issue. I do not know what he means by forcing the issue. We do want this Council to understand where they are.

SOUTH AFRICA (Mr. J. R. Jordaan): May I say, I did not say that the United Kingdom and the U.S.A. wished to force the issue. I said the very reverse - that I sincerely believed that they were not intending to force the issue, and that the position must be squarely faced.

U.S.A. (Mr. William L. Clayton): Mr. Chairman, I just wish to reply very briefly to some of the remarks.

UNITED KINGDOM (Mr. Noel-Baker): I have not finished my speech. I am sorry. I shall not be a moment. There is a sense in which we do want to force the issue. We want to get a Resolution now which will enable us to get more funds for UNRRA this week or next, because the Director General has told us that he must have them, and it must be done at this Council and we cannot put it off to another. Now, it is not we who are forcing it: it is the facts of the situation.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-30-

I will try to deal with better justice with the arguments of our South African colleague when I come to speak in Plenary Council, but I must say now that I found no argument of any weight in what he said about the Council not having received full information about conditions in Italy. In the first place, I think his Government, if he consults them, will be found to have a good deal of information about conditions in Italy, and about what my Government and the American Government have had to do to provide relief for the Italians up to the present time; but it is not really relevant at all. We are not now voting this money to Italy, we are agreeing that the Italian case shall go to Committee under Resolution 23, which will examine whether there is need, which will examine whether Italy can pay, which will examine whether it is in the general interests of members of UNRRA that this shall be done, and will make then its own untrammelled decision. All that we are doing now is making it possible for such a Committee to make its decision.

He said it would be unconstitutional. I do not so read the Constitution. In Article I, paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement, the functions of the Administration are defined as follows: "To plan, coordinate, administer or arrange for the administration of measures for the relief of victims of war in any area under the control of any of the United Nations". As I say, I will make further observations upon that later, but I cannot accept his interpretation of the Constitution, or admit any constitutional impediment to what has been done. His observations about Austria seem to me to be covered by what I have said about Italy. Austria, too, will go to Committee under Resolution 23.

I would like to put him a question, which perhaps he will answer in Plenary Session: How does he propose that the Italian situation should be dealt with this winter? He said the Council had not many days. UNRRA and the Governments have not many weeks before this winter will begin. What are we going to do? We are paying now. We want more money for UNRRA to undertake more tasks. The United States delegate says, and I am afraid I am obliged to say the same, that we shall not be able to get more money unless the Italian obligation is taken off our hands.

The South African delegate spoke of separate governmental negotiations. I do not want to say anything that is in the slightest disrespectful -- nothing is further from my intention; but separate governmental negotiations outside an International Conference is a very old device if you want to have nothing done. I should be very reluctant to agree to separate governmental negotiations, because I believe that meetings of this kind are intended to settle questions of this kind and are infinitely better machinery for getting them

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-31-

settled than separate governmental negotiations outside; and therefore I hope we shall not consider that.

Sir, winter is coming on, and I would ask all the delegates who have spoken, and in particular our colleagues from Yugoslavia and from South Africa, to consider that there is for all of us one common cause which overrides everything else, the common need for every Nation to ensure that the world as a whole shall return as soon as possible to prosperity, cooperation and unity.

GREECE (Mr. Alexander Pallis): Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council, I have been asked by the Member of the Council for Greece to make the following statement on his behalf:

When at the Meeting of the Council at Montreal the proposal was first put forward to extend the scope of UNRRA's help to certain ex-enemy countries, and specifically Italy, the Representative of Greece voted in favour of the proposal.

In his support of the motion he explained that, although Italy had been responsible for much of the immense damage and suffering inflicted upon our country during the war, it was not Greece's desire, nor that of the Greek people, to object in any narrow spirit of vindictiveness to UNRRA's resources being used for alleviating the sufferings of Italian women and children.

Today we have before us a proposal to enlarge that assistance, and to extend the full benefits of UNRRA's help to Italy.

I am sure you will realise that public opinion in a country like Greece, which has been on the side of the Allies since the very beginning of the struggle and where the memories of the harsh Italian occupation are still fresh, is extremely sensitive on a question of this kind, and to any suggestion that a country which, after all, has only recently entered the struggle on the side of the Allies, should be entitled to equality of treatment.

We fully appreciate the humanitarian and other arguments put forward in favour of the proposal, of the Honourable Representative of the United States, and our delegation will not oppose the proposal so far as the provision of emergency relief to the Italian population is concerned; but I am sure the Council will appreciate Greece's delicate and difficult position, and will understand the reasons for which we will have to abstain from voting, if it is a question of the Resolution as put forward by the Representative of the United States. In any case, we shall reserve our final attitude in case of other amendments being put forward in the course of this debate.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-32-

UNITED STATES (Mr. William L. Clayton): Mr. Chairman, I wish to reply very briefly to some of the points made by the delegate from South Africa. Later on I may wish to reply to his statement more in detail. I wish to say first that this Resolution relating to Italy is not based on any precedent; it is based on humanitarian and practical considerations. It is true that in the second "Whereas" of the Resolution, reference is made to the relief that has already been given to Italy and is being given to Italy under Resolution No. 58 of UNRRA, but if the delegate from South Africa would be any happier about the matter with the deletion of that paragraph, I certainly have no objection to the deletion being made.

The delegate from South Africa spoke of the mention here in debate by the delegate of the United Kingdom and by myself of the question of the appropriation by our respective Governments of additional funds for UNRRA, and spoke of this matter as perhaps in the nature of pressure on the recipient countries. I want to assure the delegate and to assure the Council, that I have not at any time made any reference to money or appropriations by the United States Government or any other Government in the sense of attempting to bring pressure on anybody. I would have been far less than frank, however, if I had not told you the facts. I assumed that the Council wanted the facts. Before leaving Washington I had two long conferences with leaders in Congress, and went into this matter of the Appropriation to UNRRA at great length. There were a number of very important leaders, particularly in the House, who were present at these conferences, and I have tried to give you, Mr. Chairman, and Members of the Council, as nearly as I can an accurate expression of the feeling of those people who in the end will be called upon to vote an appropriation to UNRRA, if UNRRA is to continue its humanitarian work.

In my opinion, as I have said before, we are going to have a good deal of difficulty in getting from the United States Congress an additional appropriation for UNRRA. I think that difficulty would be greatly increased if the United States Congress understood that that money would not be used to continue the relief in Italy which has, up to this time and will up to about the end of the year, be carried on by the United States Government, the United Kingdom and Canada. If it were known that the Congress were being asked to make an appropriation which would not include the continuation of that relief to Italy, I merely state it as my opinion, based on my full discussion of this matter with leaders in Congress, the difficulty of getting any such appropriation would be very greatly increased.

I felt it my duty to tell this to the Council as a statement of fact. I have listened with appreciation and sympathy to what the delegate from Greece has said. I certainly understand and

1542

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-33-

appreciate the position of Greece, Ethiopia and Yugoslavia. I can understand the feelings of the people of those countries and the political problems involved. I can understand that the people of those three countries would have great difficulty in understanding and approving of relief to Italy by UNRRA. I think that the position that Ethiopia has taken in the matter is particularly broad and fine, and I appreciate it. I can understand that Greece would not wish to vote. But we are facing a practical matter here, and I ask anyone who takes the position that UNRRA should not do this job, what are we going to do about it. Is relief not to be continued in Italy? Are you going to abandon the job there? Or do you want the Governments conducting relief there to continue to conduct it when they feel that the continuation of relief in Italy is an UNRRA problem and not one for individual Governments? I do not know why the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada should take this job on their shoulders and relieve other Governments of responsibility in the matter. We take most of the financial burden on our shoulders, but it is definitely an UNRRA function, we feel, to continue this relief, and I hope that the Council will agree with us on it. Otherwise our job in trying to induce Congress to carry on this great humanitarian work will be enormously complicated and made much more difficult.

CHINA (Dr. Tsiang): When we considered the question of relief in Italy at Montreal, I voted for extension of scope. I regretted that that first extension was very meagre. My reason was this, that it seemed to me, and I think it must seem to most people, that the feeling of fraternity among the peoples of the world should be kept alive, and that it is the duty of the United Nations to encourage the growth of that feeling of fraternity among the peoples of the world.

I know very well that if we accept this Resolution for the inclusion of Italy and Austria, the share that will fall to China will be diminished. I know that that would mean hardship among many people in China. But it seems to me that it is wiser for me to adopt that attitude. Many people in the world today are in need. Our resources are not enough to meet all those needs. Then, what shall we do? I feel it is best for us to share what we have, even though that sharing may mean a smaller portion for us. That is the reason why I favoured extension of scope at Montreal, and that is why I would favour it today.

Our colleague from South Africa pointed a finger at us when he spoke about extension, and second and third extension, and warned us about a day when we may be asked to include even Japan and Germany. Today I must say that the Chinese people hate the Japanese, but if we should come to the question of extension of re-

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-34-

lief to Japan, I would say I would vote for it. I may be called a traitor by some of my fellow countrymen today, but I feel sure in time they will appreciate the stand I would take here. The question today is of the extension of scope to Italy and Austria, not to Formosa and Korea, but our colleague from South Africa has twice made reference to those two areas. I do not wish to extend the debate on that question, but I wish to say a few words so that the Council will not be prejudiced in the consideration of those two areas.

.....

CANADA (Mr. L. B. Pearson): Mr. Chairman, I just want to say a word on this motion. Our colleague from South Africa said that we should approach it with considerations of reason and sound merit. I am persuaded by reason and sound merit exclusively and by no other consideration that it is a wise motion and I will support it. I would like also to refer to the question that has been raised by the delegate of the United Kingdom and the delegate of the United States, that if we do not do it here, who will take on this burden? At present the burden is being borne by three governments. My Govern-

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-35-

ment is not any more concerned with the international problem of Italy than the government of South Africa. My government has just as much and just as little information about it as the government of South Africa. We have been put in a position - not forced into a position - whereby we have contributed to relief in Italy over the past months. We have contributed not a large amount in dollars but a higher proportion of the total relief than we have contributed to UNRRA. Now, so far as we are concerned, we do not see why that situation should continue. If it were to continue I think it is perfectly safe for me to say that we would continue to accept the responsibility and do our part, but that we would probably find it necessary to lessen our contribution to UNRRA accordingly. Those would be the facts of the situation in our case; I do not know whether they would be the facts of the situation in the case of the United States or the United Kingdom. If they were, then I suggest to the Council that the defeat of this resolution would be a very serious business indeed in so far as UNRRA is concerned.

NORWAY (Mr. A. Ordning): Mr. Chairman, Norway has not suffered especially from the activities of those ex-enemy countries which are now being discussed and has so far no special reason to participate in this discussion; only, as you may know, Norway felt very strongly on the principles involved in this subject at the earlier sessions of this Council, and paragraph 6 in Resolution 58, which has just been pointed out to us, does expressly state that the previous decision on Italy should not make a precedent to later decisions, and that was proposed by the delegate of Norway on that occasion. For this reason I would only say a few words. The representative from South Africa has pointed out that he thinks we are here deciding upon an amendment of the agreement. The delegate from the U.K. has denied that that is so. I will not go into legal matters but I do not think our discussion and our decision can hide the fact that surely we are here entering into a field of operations which was not originally intended. Surely we are now taking a step to make UNRRA operate in a field very much enlarged not only in area but also to some extent in principle compared with what was originally intended. I would at once say, although I have to reserve the final decision of my delegation as to how we will vote on this matter, that if the Norwegian delegation now may contemplate, although hesitantly, altering their original attitude, it is because we feel that something has happened; because we feel, as was mentioned today, that we have a new Italy. We have the start of something new which I am sure we all look forward to. If we now decide, therefore, to extend UNRRA's help to Italy, it is because we are looking for a new democratic Italy, an Italy which is our concern, our interest to help to be established and to prosper as soon as possible. I would only say also that part of the argument which has been put forward this evening is new to me, dealing with the principal effects of such

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 - 70

September 4-11, 1945

-36-

a decision on the attitude to reparations from Italy, and it has not been considered by my delegation and for the moment I cannot see the whole aspect of that problem; but as regards the question of ability to pay, we are satisfied, of course, as was mentioned by the U.K. delegate, that this question will be considered according to Resolution 23. However, the main question for the receiving countries will, of course, be what will the effect of extending help to Italy be on UNRRA and the other receiving countries; because I feel that, whatever we decide, we and the Director General should still keep in mind the basic idea of UNRRA and the basic conception of primarily bringing help to those who have fought the enemy.

Now, the U.S.A. delegate and the delegate of Canada have told us that the conditions of their countries in regard to public opinion are such that the decision not to help Italy might bring a similar corresponding limitation on the resources available. I take it that what was meant is that on the other hand, the widening of the operations of UNRRA should make it possible to bring into the funds of UNRRA resources which will prevent this decision meaning that we will have to limit the funds available for the liberated areas to the same extent as we are widening the operations here. I would only make these few remarks. I am sure that we will appreciate and agree to the proposed amendment as put forward by the Ethiopian delegate; but otherwise I would reserve the right of my delegation as to its final attitude.

YUGOSLAVIA (Prof. R. Bicanic): Mr. Chairman, the Yugoslav delegation was able very briefly to examine the resolution proposed by the Abyssinian delegate, and we are sorry to say that, although this amendment goes some way towards our point of view, it would not be acceptable to us. Mr. Chairman, I had the honour to represent my country at Montreal and voted for Resolution No. 58. It was to give limited help to Italy. Now, we voted for this Resolution 58 only because there was a Resolution 56 which previously stated that "it is recognised that in accordance with the Agreement it is the Administration's primary responsibility to secure relief and rehabilitation supplies for the areas, liberated or to be liberated, of the United Nations. That special weight and urgency shall be given to the needs of those countries in which the extent of devastation and of the sufferings of the people in a part or the whole of their respective areas is greater and has resulted from hostilities and occupation by the enemy and active resistance in the struggle against the enemy". We voted for this Resolution 58 in view of this Resolution 56. In the Report of the Director General we see that up till May 31, 1945 Yugoslavia was given help by UNRRA in the

1540

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945

-37-

value of 12.3 million dollars, and that the limited help extended to Italy amounted to 11.9 million dollars. The expectant mothers and children of Italy have been given help by UNRRA practically to the same extent as has been given to the Yugoslav population.

We have heard today that some United Nations governments have helped Italy to the extent of \$500,000,000. We appreciate very much help given to Yugoslavia, but it amounted to less than one-tenth of the help accorded to our still enemies. Help to Yugoslavia up to August 1st amounted to \$48,000,000. You see the difference.

To us the proposed amendment is not satisfactory for three reasons. The first is that it does not include a clause which states that the help given to Italy does not preclude the rights to reparations by the United Nations. It would be very difficult for us to explain to our people that help would be given to Italy at the cost of a decreased share to Yugoslavia. Thirdly, that the limitation imposed by Resolution 58 in this new text is greatly increased. In practice there is no limitation. This resolution is a change in form but not a change in fact of the proposed resolution.

Of course we are bitterly concerned with the question of more funds; they are a great need for UNRRA to help our country. We do understand that. We would like if we could to have more information about the facts of the situation; but we feel it would not be possible for us to go further than the resolution which on humanitarian grounds we voted for in Montreal, Resolution 58. Certainly we can make a distinction - our people were forced to make a distinction - between Mussolini and the Italians who fought on the side of the United Nations. They were unfortunately not very numerous; but there is an Italian Government which does not take into consideration those facts; an Italian Government which has not shown good will and has made no sign of friendship towards Yugoslavia.

The question arises if help is given to Italy whether there would also be a chance for other countries to get a share of the war surpluses which will remain to a very great extent in Italy. I have been told that these war surpluses will remain in Italy and will be given to the Italian Government in view of certain financial obligations. I do hope we will be spared the unpleasant position of buying Allied war surpluses from the Italian Government. What about Italy if she is not given help? Well, what about our country? The Italians have a government. A stark winter is facing our

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-38-

country as well as Italy, and in view of the help received and the programme which we hope will be carried out by UNRRA, and in view of the fact that I am afraid the help given to Italy may be more generous than the help given to Yugoslavia up to now what we cannot accept is equal merit between the victorious nations, between the victims of Italian aggression and Italy who was an aggressor herself.

BELGIUM (Vicente de Thieusies): Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council: I apologise for taking up time for a few minutes because I do not like speeches myself, but there is a statement I would like to make and an explanation for which I should like to ask. First of all, I would only try and treat it from the purely practical point of view, following the lead of our Chinese and Ethiopian colleagues who have treated the subject from a very high point of view. We quite understand the special situation of Italy, and we quite understand that there is an obligation of human solidarity. There is more than that; there is another aspect, and it is the aspect of common sense. I think in the actual situation of Europe if we do not all stand together to a certain extent, if we do not all go forward together, the big nations like the small ones, there will come a point when we will all fall together. It is said there is another aspect of the problem, and that is where the explanation comes in, and that is why I am ready to follow the Ethiopian amendment to a great extent. We do think there ought to be some difference between the nations who have always fought together and those who have been at one time our enemies, and that under no circumstances ought a country like Italy to be more favoured than one of the Allied nations. I quite understand it should receive whatever may be absolutely necessary, but it ought not under any circumstances to be treated better than one of the Allied nations. That is all I have to say, Mr. Chairman.

SOUTH AFRICA (Mr. Jordaan): I just want to put a few impressions in reply to Mr. Clayton. I do want to say again that I at no time said that there was any endeavour to force the issue. I said the very opposite to that. I said I sincerely recognised the fact that the circumstances which they indicated were not intended to force the issue, but that they were explained to the Committee in order that the Committee might face the facts squarely. The trend of my remarks was not that conditions in Europe were such that assistance to the ex-enemy territories should not be given or that it may not be in our long-term interest to give such assistance; but the point is that the proposal to our way of thinking changes the basic concept of the UNRRA agreement in circumstances where there are a number of questions of major governmental policy on which we, as delegates

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945

-39-

here, cannot decide at short notice. My Government has not considered all these questions of policy; and it is for that reason that we are unfortunately in the circumstances in opposition to the motion. It is not on humanitarian grounds; we need no persuasion on those grounds.

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic) (interpreted): Mr. Noel-Baker has addressed an appeal to me and I should like to answer his appeal. It is an appeal from the representative of a country which is our ally and which fought with us, a country for which we have the greatest respect and the greatest feeling of friendship. Because my country has suffered so much in the war against Italy I should like to make an appeal to Mr. Noel-Baker to understand our feelings and our point of view. It is not that we are being obstinate. I read yesterday that the citizens of Leeds and Manchester refused to hoist the Italian flag. Why, then, should we be criticised if we openly and frankly say what our people feel? We are not so shortsighted as not to foresee the changes which are taking place all over the world. We do see what has been changed and we can see what has happened in Italy; but we ask to be allowed to measure those changes according to their effects on our own country. It has been said that we cannot see any change as far as our own country is concerned. Yet we wish Italy to take her place one day among the United Nations and we are wishful that it should happen as soon as possible, but we think that that date has not yet arrived. We, as Italy's immediate neighbours, would be very happy if we could say it had arrived. It is understood that nobody is so interested in this matter as we are.

On the question of reparations, Mr. Noel-Baker has said that he does not think that this resolution will prejudice the position on the question of reparations. I have the feeling that there is considerable danger in this matter, and therefore my proposal is that the resolution should state clearly that this assistance that it is proposed to give to Italy does not in any way prejudice the question of reparations.

UNITED KINGDOM (Mr. P. Noel-Baker): I only want to say one word to our Yugoslav colleague. I have not the slightest intention of criticising anything he said; on the contrary, I tried to make it plain that I understood very well the feelings which he had. I hope he will understand our reasons, the reasons that make it so imperative for us to ask that this resolution should be passed. I could say a great deal about the figures which were quoted, but I will not say more than this. Our purpose in all this is to bring more help to Yugoslavia, and we believe that this resolution will enable us to bring more help and to bring it more quickly and to save Yugoslavia from other dangers by which she may be encircled.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-40-

USSR (Mr. Sergeev): Mr. Chairman, is it possible to obtain a copy of the statement which was just made by the representative of South Africa, because it is very difficult to concentrate and to keep in mind what he said. I should like to take part in the debate, but I cannot do so without first studying that statement.

CHAIRMAN: I presume that the South African delegate will be able to give it to you. I do not suppose we could have it now. The Secretariat, I am told, could produce it; and as I take it this discussion will go into the Council, we ought to have it. This matter will be debated again. Do you wish to have the South African statement before the Vote is taken?

USSR (Mr. Sergeev): Yes, Sir.

CHAIRMAN: I do not think we could have it, at the earliest, before tomorrow morning. Will you leave it in the hands of the Committee? Do Members of the Committee wish the debate postponed in order to have the South African statement studied, or do they wish to put the motion to the Vote?

UNITED STATES (Mr. Clayton): The United States delegation does not wish to insist upon a vote at this stage, if our Soviet friends wish to obtain a copy of the statement of the delegate of South Africa so that they can study it. If they wish to say something about the matter we certainly do not wish to prevent them from doing that.

CHAIRMAN: In that case, Gentlemen, we will call another meeting as soon as we can, and continue the discussion. The papers will be circulated tomorrow morning, we hope, in the usual manner. The Committee stands adjourned.

1538

INTELLIGENCE MEMO NDUM No. 69-70

-41-

September 4 - 11, 1945

(B) Preliminary Draft of Verbatim Report of Seventh Meeting of Committee on Policy, August 21, 1945. 3/

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen: The seventh meeting of the Committee on Policy is herewith convened.

.....
On the Agenda today you have the Resolution relating to relief and rehabilitation assistance for Italy proposed by the Representative of the United States. . . . This resolution as amended by the amendment proposed by the Representative of Ethiopia has already been circulated. . . . I think everyone has had ample opportunity to study these two documents; they are not too long; and I would like to ask the Committee if there is any further discussion of this subject; and, if so, will anyone ask to be heard? The representative of Czechoslovakia.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA (Mr. K. Brumlik): May I sum up very briefly our position with UNRRA? Up to the end of July we received UNRRA's help amounting to 75,000 tons at a value of about \$30,000,000. In the same period we transported about two million people who were waiting for repatriation, and this means an expenditure for Czechoslovakia of more than half of what we received up to the end of July. The amount of our relief from UNRRA so far is consequently small, but we have thankfully acknowledged this help which at the time eased our situation considerably.

We understand that the UNRRA funds in 1946 at best will be about the same as in 1945. But many more applications for help have been tabulated, some of them very justified, and the help which UNRRA will be able to grant in future will probably be more thinly spread. I am mentioning these facts in order to call the Committee's attention to the worries which several European countries, members of the United Nations, probably share with Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

We certainly do not want starvation, upheavals and epidemics in Italy or anywhere else. What we wish to do is to express our confidence that the Great Powers and the Administration will see to it that whatever is done for relief in Italy will in no way affect the legitimate and urgent needs of the European United Nations. We hope that a formula can be found to show the special nature of the relief for Italy which could assure us that first things come first.

CHAIRMAN: Are there any further speakers?

INTEL. SOURCE MEM. ANDUM No. 62-70

September 4-11, 1945

-42-

ETHIOPIA (H. E. Blatta Ephrem Twelde Medhem): Mr. Chairman, Members of the Council: The other day I made it clear that Ethiopia must maintain all her claims against Italy; that, of course, includes her claims to reparations. I welcome the statement that has been made, in particular by Mr. Noel-Baker, that nothing in this amendment will affect the matter. On this understanding, I move the adoption of the amendment.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, you have the motion which is before the Committee for adopting the amendment as proposed by Ethiopia. Is there a seconder for that?

BELGIUM (Vicomte Obert de Thiensies): I have much pleasure in seconding the motion.

CHAIRMAN: The representative of Belgium has seconded the motion. Are there any further speakers?

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic) (Interpreted): I consider the resolution which has been just proposed by Ethiopia is going to have the contrary effect. It states in the resolution that the Administration should authorize and initiate as soon as possible a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population. This formula is even better for Italy than the prior formula contained in the United States proposal. It speaks of "urgent needs"; but in most of the countries which have been receiving UNRRA's relief up to now not even the most urgent needs have been covered. Yugoslavia, which has been a country at war since 1941, does not wish that anything else but her most urgent needs should be satisfied. If this formula in this new Resolution, or rather in the amendment to the Resolution, is applied to us we shall be very satisfied. We consider that the formula in Ethiopia's proposal and amendment goes much further than the earlier proposal of the United States.

CHAIRMAN: I understand the representative of Yugoslavia to say that if this formula were applied to Yugoslavia, that is to say, the amended motion as suggested by Ethiopia, his delegation would be in favour of it.

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic): (Interpreted): Mr. Petrovic says that he thinks this formula is too wide, that it gives a preference to Italy that other nations have not had, because in the receiving countries there are most urgent needs that are not yet covered.

CHAIRMAN: I think I may be rather stupid. Do I understand that the delegate of Yugoslavia wishes to oppose the amendment?

YUGOSLAVIA (Ing. Nikola Petrovic) (Interpreted): Yes.

CHAIRMAN: Are there any other speakers?

FRANCE: (M. le Roy) (Translated): I would like to state very

1537

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM JM No. 69-70
-43-

September 1-11, 1945

briefly the position of the French delegation with regard to the Resolution proposed by the American delegation.

We have already discussed this matter last Saturday. The representatives of Ethiopia, of Yugoslavia, of Greece and of the United Kingdom have spoken of the Italian attacks against their countries. It seems to me that as the representative of the French Government, I also have the right to recollect the Italian aggression of June 10, 1940, which was a tragic episode in the history of France and which has left profound effects in the memory of the French people. This attack took place at the moment when France was crushed beneath the blow of the German Armies.

Why is it that my Government has authorized me to express its agreement with the American proposal?

The question which confronts us is not a question of theory or a question of policy, but a question of fact. Italy is at present fed by the British and American armies of Occupation. These Armies are going to evacuate Italy on the 1st of September next, and if things are to be left as they are, Italy will be without food.

Should this supply of food cease? It is in the interest of Europe, of all Europe, to prevent economic and social disturbances of an extremely serious nature. It is, therefore, necessary that someone should take the place of the present Armies of Occupation, and for this reason the French Government has instructed its delegation to vote for the American Resolution. Nevertheless, I should say that the first form of this Resolution was only partly satisfactory to us. The amendment proposed by the Ethiopian delegation complies perfectly with the view of the French Government and I am happy to be able to give our support to the Resolution in the form as amended by the Ethiopian delegate.

Finally, one last point that I think should be noted, that which has been stressed by the Yugoslav delegate. It is the question of reparation. The passage of the American Resolution should, in our opinion, in no way prejudice the decision which will be finally taken on the subject of reparations. The two questions are not connected either in fact or in law. They are absolutely distinct. I believe for my part that it is useless to present an amendment on this point but I would like that the minutes of this debate should record the reservation that I have expressed on behalf of the French delegation.

CHAIRMAN: The speech of the French delegate has been taken down in French in shorthand and delegates will be able to get it. A resume of it is that he is in favour of voting for the Resolution as presented by the delegation of the United States as amended by the Ethiopian amendment.

NORWAY: (Mr. Aake Ordning): Mr. Chairman, Members of the Council, I would only make a few remarks as regards the substance of this matter.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

-4a-

September 4-11, 1945

The Norwegian delegation have previously expressed their views. We think that the United Nations in embarking upon a task so great should take care not to injure the cause for which they have fought. That cause is above all embodied in the confidence of those people who rose to their feet and fought the enemy. We think that one lesson above all should be learned from this war; that is, to withstand evil and that as far as possible we should in all things act justly. That is why we have been hesitating in bringing equal help to ex-enemy countries as to the valiant fighters for freedom. But we are all aware that sooner or later the time will come for a change. There are arising in the ex-enemy countries these democratic forces on whose support alone can European peace be built. The question before us is, therefore, has this time come now as regards the countries in question? In considering that question, the opinions of those countries which have suffered most from these enemies must necessarily weigh heavily, and there have been expressed, especially by the Ethiopian delegate in his first speech on this subject, some views which may look a little disturbing, so far as it may be understood that Ethiopia has had no help and nothing is moving in that field, whilst at the same time we start to operate on a larger scale in Italy.

We have had no further explanation on that subject, but we take it that we shall be assured that Ethiopia and of course Yugoslavia and Greece and other countries will at least have the same assistance as Italy and at the same speed, as far as possible. Only on that basis can the case be considered.

Furthermore, it will be made clear that it is a new Italy which we are helping. When I consider the objections made by the South African delegate in starting the discussion I feel that he is not objecting so much in substance as to the formality. There are, however, some problems connected with this Resolution. I do not think it will be necessary to explain the attitude in the Resolution itself, but from the Norwegian side we would like to stress the following reservations; firstly, that ability to pay, as previously said, will be considered on its own merits, according to Resolution 23. Secondly, that by accepting this Resolution no opinion is expressed as to reparation to be paid by these countries or their eventual international legal status. Thirdly, we are confident that the administration in carrying through its work will still keep in mind that according to Resolution 56 those countries are peoples which have suffered most in the fight against the enemy surely constitute the subject of the main task of UNRRA. On the basis of those considerations the Norwegian delegation will support the proposal as amended by the proposal from the Ethiopian delegate.

AUSTRALIA: (Mr. S. M. Bruce): Mr. Chairman, this discussion has gone on for a very considerable time and I feel that practically every point has already been dealt with and exhaustively discussed. I did not propose to intervene. I was hoping we should get to a vote. But, as the discussion has continued, I now feel compelled to express the

1536

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-43-

views of Australia on this matter. I will do so as briefly as I possibly can.

The first and fundamental point as it appears to me, which has been taken in the discussion is that taken by the delegate for South Africa on our right to deal with this matter at all. He says it falls outside the scope and constitution of UNRRA. Well, that view I cannot accept. I am in entire agreement that the intention of UNRRA was to assist and aid the United Nations and not the ex-enemy countries. I am in entire agreement that the Resolution at Montreal extending a measure of assistance to Italy cannot be taken as a precedent; but I am quite clear in my own mind that under Resolution 1, part 1, paragraph 3, where there is a reference to ex-enemy countries it is made quite clear there that UNRRA may function in ex-enemy countries, but it is for this Council to be the arbiter of whether the time has arrived when such action should be taken; and that is the Resolution before us now, as to whether we consider or do not consider such time has arrived.

I am prepared to support the Resolution as proposed by the United States with the amendment that has been accepted by the United States proposed by the Ethiopian Government. Very briefly I will give my reasons. They are that the whole circumstances have changed since UNRRA came into being. Italy capitulated some time ago. Since her capitulation Italy's resistance movement gave valuable aid to the United Nations, such aid having been testified to by Field Marshal Alexander. Since the capitulation drastic steps have been taken to destroy Fascism, and an attempt is being made now to build up a democratic government in Italy. It is in the interests of all that those attempts should succeed.

But, while recognising all these facts, I do not think we should be carried away in our sympathy for the Italian people. We have to remember that Italy has been guilty of very base treachery and has perpetrated many foul deeds. Attempts are made to attribute all these things to Fascism, but we have got to remember that the Italian people acquiesced and the Italian people have got to face the consequences.

To my mind, we are not only concerned with what is best for Italy: we are much more concerned with what is best for the United Nations and for the world as a whole; and, basing to a great extent my views upon self-interest - although we must have some sympathy for human suffering and the position in which Italy finds herself - we should certainly now take action to try and prevent chaos being created in Italy.

Sir, the question is, who is to do it? Now, if we decide in this Council that UNRRA is going to do nothing, it is perfectly clear that some aid and assistance is going to be given to Italy by the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada; and that aid being afforded

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945

-46-

to Italy may have considerable repercussions upon the position of UNTRA herself.

The South African delegate suggested that we should not deal with this, but it should be dealt with by long-range consultation between the Governments concerned.

Well, I share Mr. Noel-Baker's view of that, that it is not a very fruitful way to get anywhere and get anything achieved. But, after all, this is a meeting of 44 nations, yesterday augmented by two new nations, to whom I would desire to extend my welcome, and surely this is an international body that should come to some decision on this question.

Now, Sir, if we are going to give this aid, I certainly think it should be on a basis of the Ethiopian amendment which has now been accepted by the United States. The representative of Yugoslavia has suggested that this amendment is granting more generous treatment to Italy than the original amendment. I cannot accept that view for one second. The whole of these discussions have shown that the idea is that we should not accept what is embodied in the original American draft, namely, "that relief and rehabilitation assistance should be extended to Italy on the same standard and basis of priority as apply to liberated areas of the United Nations and their nationals." We have not accepted that; we have accepted the amendment by the Ethiopian delegation that the assistance to Italy should be limited to this extent - "adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population"; and I certainly would dissent very strongly from the view of the Yugoslav representative that we are improving the position of Italy by this amendment; we are giving a very definite indication that the views of this Council are that it should not be the idea of complete equality of treatment between Italy and all the United Nations but that the "urgent needs" of Italy should be met.

Sir, I would desire to pay a very great tribute to the Ethiopian delegate for this amendment, that he has moved and for the speech which he has made. I think it is an example to all of us of wide thinking, clear vision and, if I am not impertinent to say it, broad statesmanship (applause). I have great sympathy with the position of other countries. I think the attitude of Greece is a great example to us all. I sincerely sympathise with the feelings of Yugoslavia; but lots of us have got those same feelings. France has not forgotten the treacherous stab in the back that Italy gave her. We of the British Empire have not forgotten what Italy's action in the Mediterranean meant. My own people in Australia, who had the good fortune to go to Greece and to attempt to help Greece in their heroic struggle, have very clearly in their minds what they saw and what they heard of the deeds and actions of the Italians in Greece. But, Sir, we have got to take on this question a rather broader view, and I think the representative of China gave us a very good lead in that field the other day, when he made what to my mind was a very courageous

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-47-

statement, with broad vision, saying that it may be in the future of international cooperation China will be forced even to cooperate with and help the Japanese people, when at this hour they so heartily detest. Sir, I suggest that is the attitude we have to take on this question, because it is action which is designed to prevent Italy going into chaos, and it is one of the foundations upon which we have got to build the future of international cooperation, so that we may progressively get the economies of all the European nations and all other nations so moving that they can play their part in international trade and commerce to the benefit of us all.

Sir, one point has been made, that surely this is a strange doctrine if you are going to give help to Italy with one hand and you are going to demand reparations with the other; and, at first glance, that appears to be a somewhat convincing argument, but, on a little examination, it is surely an incredibly unsound argument. If Italy goes into chaos in the coming winter, anybody's hopes of getting reparations are going to disappear very rapidly. If, by means of a little aid in the next few months, the Italian economy can be got going again, then there may be some opportunity for demanding that Italy shall pay just reparations, if reparations are decided upon. I am in complete agreement with the representative of France that we are in no way, in discussing this question here, determining the issue whether there should or should not be reparations.

Sir, the only other point that I want to say one word about is that aid to Italy is another burden added on the shoulders of UNRRA. The financial statement we have had has shown that UNRRA has not the resources to meet all that she is required to do at the moment. She will have to have further resources, and in these further resources will have to be some provision for meeting the needs of Italy; but, Sir, this is not the moment to discuss that side of the question. We have, at this Conference, to come to some decision as to what is to be done to meet the further requirements of UNRRA, and I would only add this one word on that subject; that the original allocation was on a flat basis of 1 percent of the national revenue, but I am not at all sure that that principle can be continued indefinitely. The circumstances of countries vary; the effects of the war upon their economies are entirely different; and I think we will have to arrive at some basis whereby the contributions to UNRRA by the contributing countries will have to be adjusted to the financial and economic services of each individual country. That question, however, Sir, does not arise at the present moment.

I apologise for keeping the Committee, but I felt, in view of the discussion, that I had to make clear Australia's attitude, and we will vote in favour of the American Resolution as amended by the Ethiopian suggestion.

INTELLIGENCE W/ ORAMUM No. 69 - 70 September 1 - 11, 1945

-48-

SOUTH AFRICA (Mr. E. K. Scallan): Mr. Chairman, before this matter is put to the vote, I would like to make a very short statement. I have listened with great attention to the arguments of delegates who have spoken before me. As council members will recall, the arguments we advanced in justification of our opposition to the proposals before us related solely to the constitutionality of these proposals and to the consideration of major government policy inherent in these proposals. Arguments have been advanced in an endeavour to disarm the criticisms we had to offer. I regret to say that on the main issues we have not been convinced. There is, however, another aspect of the problem. Mr. Noel-Baker and Mr. Clayton in particular have stressed the urgency of finding a solution to an extremely critical situation in Italy and Austria. We readily accept their assurances that such a situation exists. These are the countries most intimately concerned with the problem, and we recognise that they are representatives on this Council who can speak with more authority than anyone else as regards the facts of the situation. On the basis of Mr. Clayton's and Mr. Noel-Baker's statements we recognise that there is a grave danger of UNRRA closing down unless these resolutions are passed. We admit that the considerations which they have advanced may well outweigh the criticisms which we in our turn have suggested to you. We cannot retreat from our position, but, at the same time, we do not wish to stand in the way of any agreement that can be reached here. If Council feels that it can adopt the proposals, we ourselves will not vote against them. We will abstain from voting whilst fully reserving our position.

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen, before you is the motion of the representative of Ethiopia, seconded by the representative of Belgium, to incorporate in the original American Resolution the amendment as proposed by the representative of Ethiopia. I am now putting it to the vote. Will those in favour raise their right hand? Thirty-one in favour. Those against? The Ethiopian Resolution has been incorporated into the original American Resolution.

Now, Gentlemen, I propose to take a vote upon the American Resolution, incorporating the Ethiopian amendment. Will anybody propose that the vote be now taken? ----
I think the representative of Colombia wishes to propose it.

COLOMBIA (His Excellency Senor Don Jaime Jaramillo-Arango): I wish to second the proposition of the American representative, and at the same time I should like to say a few words with regard to the position of Colombia in this matter, and I should like to ask you to allow me to speak in French, because French is better for me.

As the representative of Colombia, a country which, if it has not contributed on a large scale to the finances of UNRRA, has nevertheless contributed in a remarkable fashion to the cause of democracy and the United Nations -- faithful to her past she has been one of the first countries of Latin America to rally to the cause of the

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-19-

United Nations and to face up to Nazism and Fascism - - I would like to state how my country regards this matter.

Without doubt the activities of an organization like UNRRA always contain, whether one sees it or not, implications which are more or less of a political nature. But we, a country on the other side of the Atlantic, would like to see these political implications minimized as much as possible, in order to concentrate on the task that UNRRA is really destined to accomplish: to protect the peoples of Europe against the dangers of famine, against the cold, and to provide them with shelter. This assistance must be given in a manner more or less indiscriminate, whether it is to Belgians, Frenchmen, Czechs, Greeks, Italians, or any of the other nations of Europe, because there is one aspect, Mr. Chairman, on which sufficient attention has not been focused, that is to say the biological situation in which these peoples are found.

When one reads technical reports, medical reports, relating to the condition of the peoples of Europe, one is truly frightened. If such diseases as scurvy, rickets, pellagra and other kinds of dermatitis could spread in the times of Caesar or in the Middle Ages or even in the course of the last war, that is understandable: but in this age when airplanes can cross the Atlantic in 6-1/2 hours, one cannot but ask how it is possible that three months after the end of the war the people are still threatened with famine. Famine and epidemics are liable to compromise the economic and social reconstruction of the continent. If the continent cannot be reconstructed, there will be no equilibrium or unity in the world.

It is not to be forgotten - - and my fellow countrymen and I are profoundly conscious of this - - that we the people of Latin America owe to Europe and to European culture a great part of what we are. It is for this reason that we would not want to see Europe reduced to a condition of inferiority. We would also wish that these problems should be considered in a spirit of humanity as something essential to the reconstruction of Europe and to the equilibrium of the world.

HONDURAS (Senor Tiburcio Carias, Jr.): Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council: After listening with patience and great interest to the various points of view and appreciating the intellectual doubts that seem still to prevail, I wish to say something before I read a message which I addressed to our Director General from Liverpool on August 4, in the hope of conveying the spirit in which my Government approaches the gigantic problems that are placed before us.

Notwithstanding that the overwhelming circumstances through which we are passing tend very seriously to weaken our faith in mere words, I should like to emphasize my conviction of their necessity as strong inspirers of hope and constant sources of moral principles. Because at Geneva it so frequently happened that strong words were

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-50-

followed by weak deeds, there are today many extreme "realists" who, ignoring all the beneficial influences of the League of Nations, assiduously establish a conspicuous contrast between the profusion of good intentions and the sterility of their achievements. But today it has been demonstrated that the idealists of the present frequently prove to be the most practical men of the future.

I believe it was J. B. Priestley who said on one occasion that in the most sombre hours of English history it was immortal words, spiritual weapons which assured the survival of the British Empire. The late President Roosevelt, by his sublime teachings and high example, was able to imbue many weak peoples with a fuller sense of life and strength with renewed anxiety to excel.

I therefore believe that in this age, when humanity stands perplexed before the revelation of the atomic bomb, and when events are big enough to stagger the imagination, clear actions, accompanied by genuine assertions and stimulating words, will be factors even more necessary to gain the confidence of men, to avoid degrading pessimism and ironic resignation, whilst dissipating harmful prejudices.

Our honest attitude - symbolic, perhaps in the eyes of the world at large, but very faithful to our incipient economy - is highly significant, because it coincides with the deep concern of the great and the small countries for the erection of new institutions capable of avoiding a relapse of mankind into international anarchy.

The message which I addressed to our Director General reads:

The Government of the Republic of Honduras, in its desire to comply faithfully with its obligations in conformity with the statutes of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration approved in the First Session of the Council, has honoured me with the nomination as representative for Honduras in this Council, which we regard as an eloquent symbol of a new loyalty towards humanity.

Honduras, profoundly conscious of the greatness of the purpose in which she is participating and in full knowledge of the dark perspective which confronts the European continent, without losing the sense of proportion of her limited possibilities, offers to the tormented citizens of Europe her modest aid, trusting in the belief that she is acting rightly in considering that the whole world should be the field of humanitarian activity.

1533

It is not long since the meaning of words suffered frequently under the influence of geography. I myself wrote in 1942:

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4 - 11, 1945

-52-

The phrases 'collective security' and 'common prosperity' perhaps may be designated by the sceptics as monuments of pedantry, but today at least one is inclined to admit that misery is indivisible.

The sinister designs which have provoked the pathetic spectacle which today we contemplate with astonishment; the stupendous advance of science which is at times terrifying, compelling some philosophers and exponents of applied science to find formulae and doctrines to achieve understanding and happiness among the peoples of the world; the approval of the United Nations Charter, the Act of Chapultepec, etc., are all powerful reasons to elevate our sentiments without detaching us from hard realities.

For those who have had the sad privilege of living intimately the moving European drama, it is possible to cherish the hope that the lesson will be lasting and edifying and that ideals will be purified by the tragedy.

The young Republic of Honduras wishes, in those solemn moments of human history, to re-affirm her faith in the cause of civilisation, collaborating sincerely in the immense task of procuring relief and rehabilitation for suffering but illustrious Europe.

I avail myself of this opportunity, to transmit to you and your co-workers the recognition and admiration of my Government for your strenuous and noble endeavours. I desire also to be allowed to pay tribute to the British people for their heroic participation in bringing about the success of a permanent and living universal destiny (applause).

CHAIRMAN: The original amendment as seconded by the delegate of Ethiopia is now coming to the vote. It was proposed by the delegate of the United States and seconded by the representative of Colombia. Those in favour of that will kindly raise their right hands There are thirty-one votes for. Those who oppose? ... There is one vote against. Then that is carried....

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-52-

CHAIRMAN: Gentlemen: Item 4 on our Agenda is the Resolution as to territories defined by the Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Allied Forces Headquarters Mediterranean Theatre of Operations of June 1945, as to areas in which UNRRA should operate

With your permission, I will make a short statement on this matter. The Resolution proposed by the Yugoslav delegate, which has been circulated.....refers to the territories as defined by the Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the Allied Forces Headquarters Mediterranean Theatre of Operations of June 16, 1945. As it is not clear to what territories this statement relates without reference to the text of the Agreement, which is not available, the representative of Yugoslavia has made the following explanation: The territories referred to are approximately the territories which were previously part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire but which came under Italian control after the war of 1914-1918, with the exception of the South Tyrol territory and territories in Carinthia. That is the explanation kindly supplied to us by the Yugoslav delegate as to the territories that are in question. Does anyone wish to speak on this?

1532

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

-53-

September 4-11, 1945

YUGOSLAVIA (Dr. Rybar): Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council: The Yugoslav delegation has proposed this Resolution concerning territories, as has been explained already by our Chairman, which before this war were under the control of Italy and which came to Italy against the will of the population of those territories. These territories have been exempt from the control of the Italian authorities in accordance with the declaration made by the Deputy Commander General Joseph McNarney, who, on June 28, announced that with the exception of Venezia Giulia, as these territories are usually known, the whole of the territories would be handed over to Italian control on September 1, 1945. Therefore, these territories had an exceptional character, and have been by an Agreement between the Yugoslav Government and the British Ambassador on June 9 and June 20 respectively defined according to the line of demarcation stated. To the east these territories are administered by the Yugoslav authorities, and to the west by the Allied Military High Command. These territories have, therefore, a special character. The Yugoslav delegation proposes that these territories should be given the character of liberated areas within the meaning of Resolution 1, Part 1.

I should like to underline the fact that the population is composed mainly of Yugoslavs and of Italians who have taken an active part in the struggle against Fascism. They were alongside the Allies, fighting for the Allied cause. Even our Allies have many times recognized the valiant fight of the civilian population who have brought Fascism to defeat. Even the Allied High Command has recognized that by signing this agreement, that these territories because of their active armed struggle against Fascism and the common enemy, should be recognized and given the character of liberated territories. Therefore, I think it is only fair, as an open recognition of the common fight with the Allies put up by the population, that UNRRA should take up its position at the side of the Allied Military High Command and give these territories the character of liberated areas. Therefore, I propose this Resolution and move its acceptance.

CHAIRMAN: Is that seconded?

GREECE: (M.A.A. Pallis): I beg to second that.

CHAIRMAN: The Resolution proposed by the Yugoslav delegate is seconded by the Greek delegate.

UNITED STATES (Mr. Clayton): Mr. Chairman, we certainly feel that the inhabitants of this area covered by this Resolution are entitled to receive UNRRA relief. There is no question of that character involved here, because under the program which UNRRA is now conducting and under the Resolution which has just been passed by this Committee relief, and adequate relief, will be supplied to the inhabitants of this area. Mr. Chairman, there are political questions involved in this Resolution, which I do not feel myself competent to discuss. Moreover, I seriously question whether the UNRRA Council Chamber is the appropriate place to discuss them. If there were any question involved here about this people getting relief, I would view this Resolution with a great deal of sympathy and would be inclined to support it; but there is no question of that kind involved. Relief is provided for, as I stated before, in the program which UNRRA is now conducting and under the Resolution which we have already passed. In those circumstances, I should be c

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-54-

compelled to vote against the Resolution.

CHAIRMAN: Are there any more remarks on this Resolution?

YUGOSLAVIA (Dr. Vladimir Rybar): I am sorry; but I should like to point out to the honourable member for the United States that there are no political questions involved here at all. It is a practical question. What we are asking is that help should be given to these territories, which are, as I pointed out before, excepted from the Administration by the Italian authorities; the authorities which are administering these territories are partly Yugoslav authorities and partly Allied Military Command. We are not seeking in any way to settle political questions in connection with the help given by UNRRA to our population because those political questions will be solved otherwise than by that method subsequently. We are asking for a practical solution to this question.

CHAIRMAN: The Member of Council for the United Kingdom.

UNITED KINGDOM (Mr. Noel-Baker): Mr. Chairman, I would always consider with the utmost sympathy any question relating to Venezia Giulia. The reason for that is that I spent three years there between 1915 and 1918, and whenever anybody mentions to me the name of Venezia or Caporetto or Tolmino, or any other place in that region, I have keen emotions of varying kinds. But with great respect to what the member for Yugoslavia has just said it does not really seem to me possible to argue that a practical question arises. This territory may be regarded as part of Italy, as part of Yugoslavia, or as part of Austria. All are eligible now under the Resolution just adopted for help from UNRRA. It is quite plain that this territory, of course, is eligible; and the gallant people there, whose services to the Allied cause I knew have been great (I know the people and I have a great affection for them), I am quite certain, will get the relief that they ought to have under the Resolutions already taken. It seems to me that the effect of this Resolution, if it were adopted, whatever the purpose which the Committee had in mind, would be to prejudge the political question; and when the Yugoslav delegates quote action by a military commander I would say that it is impossible for a military commander, in signing some document which lays down the action to be taken at a given time and place, to prejudge the ultimate political decisions which are going to be made. He cannot do it. It could not possibly bind us here even if, on other grounds, that might be right. But, in point of fact, when the Yugoslav delegates asked us and invited UNRRA - I am trying to quote - to take sides with the Allied Military Commanders and to regard these territories as special areas in some senses, with great respect that is pure politics and something which UNRRA certainly ought not to do. I hope that we shall not adopt this Resolution. I feel sure that the needs of the people will be fully met by the other Resolutions which have been adopted, and I hope that that may be, after argument on the one side and the other, the unanimous view of the Council.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-77

September 4-1945

-55-

GREECE (M. Pallis): Mr. Chairman and Members of the Council: I think that we should explain our support of this motion. In supporting the motion, we consider that this is a purely practical, and not a political question. We consider that there is a precedent for this proposal in the case of the Dodecanese. That is a territory inhabited by Greeks; it was Italian territory until recently. By an arrangement come to between UNRRA and the military authorities occupying that territory, the inhabitants of the Dodecanese are receiving the help of UNRRA; and we consider that in the same way, it ought to be possible to give to the inhabitants of this territory which is mentioned in the motion of the Yugoslav representatives the same help as is given to the inhabitants of other territories. We support the motion. We consider it has no political significance. We consider it to be a practical and humanitarian point.

USSR. (Mr. I.A. Iliushenko): The suggestion of the Yugoslav delegation is a practical one, and the Soviet Union expresses its sympathy with the suggestion just made. We consider that this suggestion has a great similarity with the suggestion made at the second Session in the case of the Dodecanese Islands which were mentioned by the Greek representative. This region mentioned in the Resolution is under a separate administrative control. In the case of the territories mentioned by the Yugoslav representative, they might not be covered fully by those arrangements which have already been made or which are already provided for in the Resolutions already passed; so that I think, from a practical point of view, the Resolution proposed by Yugoslavia should be adopted by this Committee, because it is definitely stated that the responsibility of providing relief and rehabilitation for the populations of liberated territories is a question. On this assumption the Soviet delegation will support and vote in favour of the Resolution proposed by the Yugoslav delegation.

FRANCE (M. G. R. W.) (translated): I would like to emphasise one point.

The delegate of the United States has explained that the Resolution relating to Italy would cover the territory to which the Resolution proposed by the Yugoslav delegate relates. I note, however, that the Resolution relating to Italy provides for assistance "to meet the needs of the Italian population". Would this phrase exactly cover the territory question? I do not know.

In the other hand, it is certain that the Yugoslav proposal has a political implication with which it is not the function of UNRRA to concern itself. UNRRA has not been created to decide on a question which should be dealt with by the authorities charged with the preparation of the peace treaties.

For my part, I would wish that the text could be modified so that the political implication should be removed.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-56-

YUGOSLAVIA (Dr. Rybar): I would like to dispel any doubt on the part of my colleague from France that there has been any political arrière pensée in our Resolution. Because we proposed in this Resolution which we put before the Council that this territory should be separately supplied and helped by UNRRA, we never concluded or even thought that the population of 450,000 people of this territory should be included in the Yugoslav UNRRA supplies. Therefore we ask that this question should be separately treated. I would like to thank the honourable member from Great Britain for the interest he has taken in Venezia Giulia, and I do so with special emphasis, being myself a son of this territory; but I would like to say to the honourable member that we have not asked that UNRRA should be dealing with the military authorities in a political way, but that the same recognition should be given as has been given by the military authorities in regard to the Dodecanese, it being recognised by UNRRA also that this same formula would be applied. Therefore I again underline that there is no political arrière pensée behind this. We are confident that this question will be settled in the political peace settlement and not here in the Council of UNRRA.

CHAIRMAN: Now I will put the Yugoslav Resolution to the vote. It has been proposed by the representative of Yugoslavia and seconded by the representative of Greece. Those in favour of the Resolution will kindly signify in the usual manner. There are seven in favour. Those opposed kindly indicate - fifteen. Gentlemen, it seems to me that this concludes the task which the Committee on Policy was entrusted with at this Session. May I thank you all for being kind to your Chairman. May I thank you for having come to a decision. All I wish to do now is to announce that tomorrow morning at 10 o'clock there will be a Plenary Meeting of the Council.

YUGOSLAVIA (Dr. Bicanic): Mr. Chairman, I want to ask the Director General what will be the procedure and how the territories mentioned in the Yugoslav proposal are going to be handled. As Article 1 foresees that UNRRA can act in a territory only in agreement with the national Government concerned, and as there is no national Government in this territory, but only a provisional Government, I would like to ask the Director General how that scheme envisages the activities of UNRRA, with whom the agreement is going to be made, and who is going to put up the requirements for the population of these territories.

THE DIRECTOR GENERAL: I wish I could answer the delegate from Yugoslavia, but I am unable to do so. It is quite a new question and I have not thought it out. I do not want to make a statement which might be inaccurate and I ask the indulgence of the gentleman till I can reply at a later time.

1530

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM NO. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-57-

YUGOSLAVIA (Dr. Bicanic): Thank you.

BELGIUM (Viscount Obert de Thieusies): Mr. Chairman, Members of the Committee on Policy: I have been sparing of my words so far, so I hope I shall be allowed to say a few words of thanks to our Chairman. Through our very difficult debates his good humour and patience have been unfailing and we are very grateful to him. Though the debates were sometimes animated and sometimes prolonged, I think we shall leave with the feeling that we have worked together and we shall forget any unpleasant incidents. (Applause.)

GREECE (M. A. A. Pallis): I would like to second the proposal of a vote of thanks to our Chairman. (Applause).

(The vote of thanks to the Chairman was carried by acclamation).

CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Gentlemen. You have been very kind, though sometimes a little slow. (Laughter).

(C) Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Policy. 4/

(1) Adoption of the American Resolution, as Amended.

.....The Committee considered at its sixth and seventh meetings the Resolution proposed by the representative of the United States, relating to a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance in Italy. The representative of Ethiopia proposed two amendments to the form of the Resolution, subject to the adoption of which he was prepared to vote in its favor. The Committee decided to adopt these amendments and to recommend to the Council the adoption of the Resolution as thus

4/ Council III, Document 151.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-58-

amended in the following form:

Whereas under Resolution No. 58 the Administration has already undertaken certain operations in Italy confined to the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, to assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons and to the care of children and nursing and expectant mothers and the welfare services associated therewith; and

Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August 1945, it is therefore

Resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance, adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations previously imposed on the Administration in Resolution 1, Part I (3), and 58 are modified accordingly by the Council.

.....

(2) Rejection of the Yugoslav Resolution on Venezia Giulia.

The Committee considered the Resolution on this subject proposed by the representative of Yugoslavia. The Committee agreed that it was desirable that the inhabitants of the area in question should receive relief and rehabilitation assistance from the Administration; the discussion turned solely on the point whether any further Resolution was necessary for this purpose, in view of the adoption of the two previous Resolutions relating to Italy and Austria and of the fact that Yugoslavia was already in receipt of relief and rehabilitation assistance from the Administration. The matter was put to a vote and the Committee decided against the adoption of the proposed Resolution.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-59-

IV. TWELFTH PLEMARY MEETING OF THE COUNCIL,
AUGUST 22, 1945 1/

The Twelfth Meeting of the Third Session of the Council was called to order at 10.00 A.M. on Tuesday, August 22, at the County Hall, by the Chairman, Sir Girja Shankar Bajpai.

(A) Debate on the Report of the Committee on Policy:
Operations in Italy and Austria.

The first item of business before the Meeting was to discuss a Report of the Committee on Policy, regarding particularly

(a) A Resolution relating to a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance in Italy. . . .

The resolutions had previously been circulated as Council Document 151.

The adoption of the Report was moved by the Chairman of the Committee on Policy (the member of the Council of Czechoslovakia), and seconded by the member of the Council for Brazil.

Comments by the Member for Luxembourg

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for Luxembourg.

M. Pierre Elvinger: The proposed admission of Italy and Austria among the beneficiaries of UNRRA's activities will put a further strain on the resources of the Administration. This circumstance compels me once more to stress the situation of my country.

As I have already pointed out in commenting on the Director General's Report, Luxembourg's gravest problem is industrial fuel. Without an adequate supply of coke, Luxembourg, far from being a valuable asset to the United Nations, will become another liability. Members of the Council have rightly said that the receiving countries should not just sit back and wait for aid to come, but should harness their resources and energies to the utmost to alleviate their plight and that of their sister nations. This is exactly what Luxembourg wants to do, and what she is particularly fitted to do, provided that her main requirements of coke can be fulfilled. Without reasonable supplies in the

1/ UNRRA Journal, Third Session of the Council, August 23, 1945.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70 -60-

September 4-11, 1945

very near future, Luxembourg, instead of being a contributing country, will most certainly be compelled to become a further claimant on UNRRA's resources. This can and ought to be avoided. Nowhere else could a relatively small supply of fuel, available as it is in adjacent Germany, produce greater dividends in establishing economic and social stability, and in securing urgently needed supplies for the rehabilitation of Europe.

Comments by the Member for Norway

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for Norway.

Mr. Anders Frihagen: The question of help through UNRRA to the peoples of ex-enemy countries was thoroughly discussed at Atlantic City and Montreal. The Norwegian delegation on both occasions felt strongly that the suffering peoples of occupied countries could not agree that the limited supplies and services made available through the common efforts of the United Nations should be used for these enemies who were responsible. Norway itself has suffered severely under the Axis powers. Thousands of our citizens were imprisoned, and many executed without regard to law and order; thousands of homes have been devastated, and our economic resources and means of transport have been worn out. We can appreciate to the full the feelings of other countries who have suffered under those ex-enemies which it is now proposed to help. The Norwegian delegation feels, however, that the situation has moved forward. In such countries as Italy, new democratic forces have their share - even though limited - in the victory which has been won. We must recognize that the strengthening of these new democratic forces is to the United Nations' interest, and that help to them through UNRRA will strengthen the position and possibly increase the funds of the Administration, to the advantage also of the formerly occupied countries.

The Resolution accepted by the Committee on Policy would limit help to Italy to urgent need. Norway will give her vote for the Resolution as it now reads. We do this on the assumption that the ability of these countries to pay is to be considered in the ordinary way according to Resolution No. 23; that by this Resolution no opinion is expressed as to the reparations to be paid by those countries, or to their legal international status. We assume that the Director General will keep in mind the fact that, in accordance with Resolution No. 56, the basic idea of UNRRA is to help those who have suffered most from their valiant fight against the enemy. Mr. Chairman, I believe that we must try to build the future of the world on a higher moral plane than that of our defeated enemies. I believe that it would be in accordance with the high principles on which UNRRA was created if there could be a unanimous vote for help to Italy as proposed in the Resolution now before us, and with the reservations which have been made.

Comments by the Member for Yugoslavia

The Chair recognized the member for Yugoslavia.

1528

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-61-

Mr. Petrovic: The Resolution before us proposes that UNRRA undertake what is necessary to meet the urgent needs of Italy, despite the fact that the most urgent needs of others who supported the Allies since 1941 have not yet been met. It was decided at Montreal to grant Italy limited assistance amounting to \$50,000,000. The proposed resolution goes a step further. It means that Italy will be put on an equal footing with the countries who ranged themselves against Nazism and Fascism from the beginning and who suffered enormous losses in human lives and material in order to preserve their liberties and support the common cause. UNRRA was formed at a time when battles of war raged furiously. It brought encouragement and hope to people who had destroyed their own homes rather than relinquish them to the enemy. There was Italy in those days? On which side was Italy from 1934, and even earlier? From 1943 onwards did Italy contribute towards the common struggle to the same extent as other countries with which it is proposed to put her on an equal footing? The answers to these questions are self-evident. In order to facilitate the solution of the problem, I feel it is my duty to draw the attention of this assembly to certain recent events.

From the day of Yugoslavia's unification, Italy's attitude was hostile to my country. From 1918 to 1941 Italy conducted a policy directed against Yugoslavia and her national independence. She held the destiny of 600,000 Yugoslav nationals in her hands - nationals in Istria, Venezia Giulia and Trieste. These people remained within her boundaries after the first world war and were systematically subjected to de-nationalization and even physical destruction.

Fascist Attacks on Yugoslavia

Fascist Italy, with the aid of Nazi Germany, attacked Yugoslavia in April 1941. Together, they dismembered my country and took under their control large areas - the Croatian Littoral, Dalmatia, and other parts of Croatia, the southern part of Slovenia including Ljubljana, sections of Bosnia, Herzegovina and all of Montenegro. The people in these parts had endured terrible sufferings under the yoke of foreign taskmasters, but never were their sufferings more grim than during the time of the Italian occupation (1941-1943) and the German occupation which followed. Italy did not treat us in the manner of a chivalrous opponent upholding international principles of warfare. Her armies invaded our country, killing old and young. They pillaged our ancient monuments and burned the humble homes of our peasants. In their wake they left ashes, corpses of innocent children, tears and heartache. I do not refer now to the thousands of our soldiers who fell before the superior Italian war machine. I refer to the tens of thousands of innocent civilians who were killed during the two and a half years of Italian occupation. I refer to the immeasurable damage inflicted everywhere, to the devastated homes and destroyed and pillaged industrial enterprises. The extent of this damage is esti-

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-62-

mated at millions of dinars. The picture would be more complete if we were to add the fatal role played by Italy in preparing and starting the second world war, the war for which all nations paid so dearly and which threatened the very existence of the civilized world.

May I add some further details collected by our State Commission for the investigation of crimes committed by the invaders: in the Ljubljana Province alone, during the Italian occupation from April 1941 to September 1943, one thousand persons were shot as hostages. Eight thousand others were killed, despite the fact that many of them had been previously acquitted by the Ljubljana Military Court. Another three thousand were sent to concentration camps in Italy. Approximately three thousand dwellings were burnt. The Ljubljana Military Court sentenced thousands to long-term imprisonment. Forty-seven hundred internees died from starvation on the Island of Rab. The total population of the areas from whence these unfortunate people came amounted to only 300,000. Apart from those in prisons and concentration camps in Montenegro, 98,703 Montenegrins (men, women and children) were deported and interned in Italy. As the total population of this part of Montenegro did not exceed 300,000, it means that one-third of it was driven into concentration camps.

Measures of Restitution

In spite of these facts, I do not believe that Italy should be permanently excluded from the community of freedom-loving nations, or that the relations between Yugoslavia and Italy can never be normal again. That would be a mistake and it is not my view. I hope the day may soon come when our relations will be normal. I regret deeply that the Italian Government has not given sufficient evidence to date that it has completely broken with the past, although I do admit that some changes have taken place. I do not deny that Italian fighters for freedom have shown real courage in their activities behind the enemy lines, and I wish to express my deep recognition here and now. It is hardly necessary to point out that Yugoslavia, as a neighbour, is vitally concerned that Italy be liberated from the heavy burden of the past. If Italy wishes to join the Community of the United Nations, she must first make good the injustices which Mussolini's regime inflicted upon many countries, including my own. The changes in Italy must be judged according to the repercussions they will have on our country, and in no other way. Experience tells us that such changes have yet to transpire. Italy has still to repair the damage and injustice imposed on us. Despite demands and proofs, Italy has not yet extradited a single war criminal to Yugoslavia, many of whom are still at liberty. She has not returned that part of our gold still in Italy; she has returned none of the stolen treasures; and she has paid nothing in

1527

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69 -70

September 4-11, 1945

-63-

reparations. I believe the same applies to other countries with which she was at war, and which she occupied.

It is for these reasons that the Yugoslav delegation takes the view that the time has not yet come for UNRRA - an international organization created by the United Nations and imbued with their spirit - to adopt the same attitude towards Italy as towards its own members who ask for help, since it was Italy who contributed to their present horrible misery and unhappiness.

The Reparations Problem

I would like to add a few words on the reparations problem. Whatever the result of the voting on this Resolution may be, I consider the Council should emphasize that its decision does not prejudice the question of the reparations obligations of Italy, because it may happen that Italy will use it as evidence that she is in a precarious economic condition and unable to pay. That would be contrary to the principles applied to all other members of the former Hitlerite bloc - Rumania, Hungary, Finland and Bulgaria. That would mean a flagrant violation of the rights of Democratic Federative Yugoslavia, whose sacrifices for the common cause of the Allies are generally recognized. Apart from that, the release of Italy from payment of reparations would not only encourage her, but all other countries, to follow again the road of aggression. The peace conditions which will be signed must embody a lesson of what can and what cannot be done with impunity.

We agree that it will not benefit anyone, and least of all her neighbours, if there are chaos and anarchy in Italy during the coming winter. This does not mean that countries which have been in the United Nations camp from the start and countries which have yet to enter should be treated equally, particularly in view of the fact that UNRRA's resources, compared with the enormous needs, are relatively small. The point that raises anxiety in this connection is that a sum of 450 million dollars is foreseen for Italy's requirements. This figure is a relatively large sum, when the means of UNRRA and the needs in the devastated countries are considered. In this respect I would like to remind the delegates that Yugoslavia, up to May 31, 1945, had received help to the value of only 12.3 million dollars; out of the original sum of 50 million dollars allocated as limited help for mothers and children in Italy, 12.9 million dollars' worth of goods have already been delivered.

You will have entirely misunderstood us if you think that we wish Italian mothers and children to starve. We have had, and still have, in our country too much of this horror to wish it on anybody else. We are of the opinion, however, that UNRRA must not go further than

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-64-

embodied in Resolution 58 accepted in Montreal. In the Committee on Policy a suitable proposition was proposed by the South African delegate, requiring that this question should be discussed and decided upon by the Powers concerned outside of UNRRA.

UNRRA is an international organization of the United Nations for relief and rehabilitation and as such must not undertake the task of helping countries that were once in the Hitlerite bloc, except in a limited measure. The fact that not one of the injustices inflicted on the peoples of Yugoslavia during the Italian occupation has been made good proves to us that Italy has not decisively and finally broken with the past. Therefore, UNRRA cannot and must not put Italy on the same footing with the countries from the anti-fascist coalition. Here, high principles of international morals and international justice are involved, and I fear that we may infringe upon these principles. I fear the repercussions which such infringements may have on the life of nations, and on future relations between peoples.

The Yugoslav delegation to the Third Session of the UNRRA Council will vote against the proposed Resolution for these reasons.

Comments by Member for United Kingdom

The Chair recognized the member for the United Kingdom.

Mr. J. Hynd: No one in the Conference will depreciate the importance of the considerations mentioned by the Yugoslav delegates. The whole world appreciates the sufferings of Yugoslavia and those other countries which were in most direct contact with the Italian Fascist armies during this war. Indeed, our own country has cause to remember with bitterness the experiences of our people in the fighting on the Italian front. But it is relevant to bring into the discussion the other side of the picture. The early decision to give limited help to Italy, taken in Resolution 58, had some regard to the fact that "the Italian people are sacrificing life and property side by side with the forces of the United Nations in driving the Germans from Italian soil." There is no question that immediately the opportunity was brought to Northern Italy in particular a not inconsiderable contribution was made to the liberation of Italy, and thereby to the final victory of the Allied forces.

Resources for European Rehabilitation

We do not wish to over-emphasize that side of the picture. The purpose of UNRRA is not reward and punishment for activities during the war. The purpose and object of UNRRA is to deal with the hard and bitter

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-65-

facts that Europe and the world in general have got to face immediately, if we are to avoid catastrophe in the coming winter. The intervention in the Committee on Policy by the Ethiopian delegate shows that even that country, which, probably more than any other, has cause to feel bitterness against the Italian nation, realizes, on the broad view, that the considerations we must face at the moment are not punishment or reward, but the hard economic situation with which UNRRA was established to deal. Largely through the actions of the partisans of the North, Italy has been able to preserve some of the most important sections of her industrial capacity; but if she remains without the necessary raw materials and supplies, it is quite evident that in the coming winter this industrial capacity cannot contribute towards the reestablishment of normal economic activities in Europe at large as well as in Italy.

It is one of our purposes to try and reestablish normal conditions in Europe. We may then hope to reduce the liabilities of those countries which, after all, most contribute towards the maintenance of the minimum standard of life in all countries. It is obviously important to provide the minimum requisites to start these industries going, to establish the beginnings of normal life and to enable Italy to provide for the needs of its own people.

Alternatives

Every delegate, I believe, admits immediate relief to be essential in Italy now. That relief is in fact being provided outside UNRRA. It is being provided by those very countries which also contribute the major portion of the resources available to UNRRA. Inevitably the people of those countries will ask why, if relief has to be supplied to Italy, it should be borne by those particular countries and should not come from a common pool on the basis laid down by the UNRRA machinery.

The alternatives, unless this Resolution were passed, is that those countries would have to contribute for the next two or three weeks, but immediately the situation has changed, and the military channel is closed, there will be no relief at all. The very situation which UNRRA was specifically organized to prevent would arise in Italy, with inevitable repercussions throughout the whole of Europe and eventually throughout the world, in standards of living, in possibilities of pestilence and plague. Ruling out entirely humanitarian considerations, we have to face this question on the basis of enlightened self-interest.

It is on these grounds that the United Kingdom delegation is very desirous that the Conference should be able to pass this Resolution unanimously.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

-66-

September 4-11, 1945

Comments by Member for the United States

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for the United States.

Mr. William L. Clayton: The delegate from Yugoslavia spoke of the delay in UNRRA operations in his country and the small amount of money spent in giving relief there. Much of this delay was caused by the inability to reach agreement quickly between UNRRA and the Yugoslav Government relating to the procedures and conditions in which UNRRA would operate in Yugoslavia. That agreement was only concluded in March of this year. In view of that fact I do think that the Government of Yugoslavia must take its full share of the responsibility for any delay that ensued. The delegate also spoke of reparations, and we have heard that question mentioned here today in connection with this Resolution. I submit, Mr. Chairman, that UNRRA has nothing to do with reparations. The introduction of that subject here is really out of order and out of place. The Conference at Potsdam dealt with reparations; UNRRA is to deal with relief.

Obligations for Assisting Recovery

I understand, and I think we all understand, that Yugoslavia cannot quickly wipe from the memory of its people the results of the terrible aggression of Italy in this war; neither can Ethiopia, nor Greece, nor France. Those countries all suffered, and suffered dreadfully, at the hands of Italy, and there is no question about that. But that is in the past. The statement of the delegate of Yugoslavia and the views of UNRRA are matters for the present and the future. We want to get the world back onto its feet quickly. That cannot be done while people starve amid chaos and disintegration, political and social and economic.

Until now, the occupying armies in Italy have provided for relief. Arrangements have been made for that provision to continue till about the end of the year, but the job will not be finished then. There is still much to be done in Italy so that the people can look after themselves. When the occupying armies of the United States, Britain and Canada retire, they will turn over to the Italian Government, working on broad democratic lines, the responsibility for governing their country. If we are going to leave Italy alone then to shift for herself at a time when she is still unable to do so, what will the consequences be? I think those consequences would affect Europe, especially the neighbouring countries, far more than they affect the conditions of the United States, the United Kingdom or Canada. Why should we now leave the responsibility to those three countries, far removed physically from the area in question, and why should it be their responsibility to continue this relief?

1525

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-67-

I submit, Mr. Chairman, that this is the responsibility of UNRRA, and I hope that this Plenary Session of the Council will confirm the action that was taken by the Committee on Policy almost unanimously, and it would be extremely gratifying if the action could be unanimous here.

Comments by the Member for Greece

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for Greece.

Mr. A. A. Pallis: When this question first came up for discussion in the Committee on Policy, we explained the attitude of public opinion in Greece towards Italy. We said that we would reserve our final decision until we had heard all the arguments for and against the motion, and any amendments that might be put forward.

In Greece the memories of the harsh Italian occupation were still fresh in the minds of our people. We, too, could enumerate here a long list of acts of violence and all the destruction that the Italian occupation has brought to our country. But it is our desire to see Italy take her place once more among the democratic nations, and we hope and trust that the development of the true democratic spirit in Italy will lead finally to the development of better relations and a friendlier spirit between the Italian and Greek peoples.

We appreciate to the full the strength of the humanitarian and other arguments so ably expressed by the representatives of the United States and of the United Kingdom in favour of this motion. In view of what has been said by the representative of the United States in the discussion in Committee, when he said that he fully appreciated our position, we do not wish to oppose this Resolution, and we shall therefore abstain from voting.

Comments by the Member for China

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for China.

Dr. Tingfu F. Tsing: I agree with everything that our colleague from Yugoslavia has said about the iniquity of the Italy of Mussolini. I agree with him in those parts of his speech which referred to the pressing needs of the peoples of those countries who are members of UNRRA and to the inadequacy of the supplies available. But UNRRA was created to take care of the pressing needs of the common people, not to settle accounts of the past, for which purpose the United Nations have set up other instruments.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-68-

It is our view that the spirit of fraternity among the different nations should be nourished and kept alive. For that reason I stated the other day at the meeting of the Committee on Policy that if this Council should think it wise to render aid even to the great enemy of my country, Japan, we would favour it. I know very well that our resources are inadequate, but in face of the needs of the common peoples of the world, I would like to offer to this discussion the simple saying of the Chinese peasant. When the Chinese peasant is faced with distress and disaster, his simple reaction is this: "When there is rice, let us all share it." I know that sharing the resources of UNRPA with other countries will mean a smaller portion for us; but it seems to me that it is the only safe thing for us to do. Therefore I would appeal to my fellow members, Mr. Chairman, to vote for this Resolution.

Comments by the Member for Mexico

The Chair recognized the member of the Council for Mexico.

Dr. Don Alfonso de R. Li 2: We do not want to appear suspicious of any delegation present here. Mexico is among the few countries that has, so to speak, played the game of democracy openly and frankly at all times, and the view which Mexico now expresses pertain to no party. We are true friends of democracy in all countries. We appreciate the contribution of Yugoslavia to the cause of the United Nations; we understand the views of her representative on this Council. That is one reason why we willingly offer our economic contribution in the common cause. The reconstruction of the world is at stake, and consequently the Mexican delegation desires to give its support to the matter submitted by the delegation of the United States to the effect that aid should be given to Italy.

(B) Vote: Approval of the Resolution.

The Resolutions, which read as follows, were then put to the vote of the Council.

- (1) Whereas under Resolution 58 the Administration has already undertaken certain operations in Italy confined to the provision of medical and sanitary aid and supplies, to assistance in the care and return to their homes of displaced persons and to the care of children and nursing and expectant mothers and the welfare services associated therewith; and

Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August 1945, it is therefore

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 11, 1945

-69-

Resolved that the Administration is authorized and directed to initiate as soon as possible in Italy, and with respect to Italian nationals, a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance, adequate to meet the urgent needs of the Italian population, and that the limitations previously imposed on the Administration in Resolution 1, Part I(3), and 58 are modified accordingly by the Council.

(2) Resolution on Relief to Austria . . .

On vote, the Resolutions were carried, with one member (Yugoslavia) voting against the motion. The member for South Africa requested that it be placed on record that South Africa refrained from voting, and reserved its position so far as any additional financial contribution arising from this resolution was concerned.

The representative of the United Kingdom (Sir George Kennard) proposed that the speeches made on the subject might be made public. The opinion of the Chairman of the Committee on Policy (Mr. Jan Masaryk) was invited by the Chairman, and given in favour of publication. After discussion, it was agreed that the principal speeches made in the Committee on Policy concerning the Resolutions just adopted should be published, it being open to any speaker who did not desire publication to inform the Secretariat accordingly. ^{1/}

(C) Statements by the Director General.

The Chair invited the Director General to make a statement.

Mr. Herbert H. Lehman: I feel it is necessary to make a brief statement regarding the Resolutions adopted by the Council concerning relief in Italy and Austria. These resolutions impose large additional responsibilities on UNRRA, and I feel there may be confusion and misunderstanding unless the facts are clearly appreciated by both governments and peoples within and without these countries.

Possible misunderstandings
about aid to Italy and Austria

The second paragraph of the Resolution relating to a program of relief and rehabilitation assistance in Italy reads as follows: "Whereas the urgent needs of the Italian people for basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies are being met by the combined military authorities only until the end of August 1945."

^{1/} See Section III, above.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-70-

I am afraid that this will give the impression that UNRRA's responsibility in Italy will commence immediately after the end of August. This is not the case. As the delegate from the United States has stated, while basic imported relief and rehabilitation supplies will be furnished by the military only until the end of August 1945, other arrangements have been made and funds provided whereby relief can be carried through to December. I emphasize these facts because it will take some time for UNRRA to arrange for an adequate flow of supplies and the necessary organization to carry on the very much enlarged work which it is now undertaking. Obviously, it was impossible for the Administration to make preparations either for supplies or additional personnel, until action was taken by the Council. It must be clear that until UNRRA knows what additional funds will be contributed by Governments, it cannot carry on any expanded procurement program.

I am afraid there will also be misunderstanding in the case of Austria. A despatch from Vienna, which appeared in the London Sunday Times, reads in part as follows: "Vienna, Saturday, August 18. The most important topic here is the announcement that UNRRA is coming immediately to the assistance of Austria. The food situation has become very serious. Another week has passed and still there is no meat." This and other similar despatches may create an erroneous impression of the urgency of UNRRA's work in Austria. Obviously, there must be considerable delay before UNRRA can arrange to undertake this work. Supplies must be procured, the necessary organization must be set up, and, as in the case of Italy and other countries, the Administration must know what funds will be available. I assume, therefore, that until UNRRA is prepared to undertake its work in Austria, supplies will be furnished through the same channels which have operated previously.

I have sought to underscore the situation in Italy and Austria so that there may not be the same misunderstanding on the part of governments and the public that has existed in certain other areas hitherto. If this situation is not understood, the question will shortly be raised by many within and without these countries: "Where is UNRRA?" It must be made clear to all people that UNRRA, in order to carry forward adequately these new responsibilities, needs funds, supplies and personnel. However, if given the necessary support, the Council may rest assured that the Director General and his staff will take every possible step to accelerate aid to these countries.

UNRRA Supplies to Yugoslavia.

The Director General later made a brief comment on the extent of aid furnished to Yugoslavia.

INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM No. 69-70

September 4-11, 1945

-71-

Mr. Herbert H. Lehman: During the course of today's debate, the delegate for Yugoslavia mentioned a figure of \$12,000,000 as the measure of UNRRA aid to Yugoslavia. I have not the total figure at the moment, but I do know that during the month of July alone supplies from the eastern hemisphere estimated at a cost of \$23,735,000 were allotted by UNRRA for Yugoslavia.

Dr. Bie: I thank the Director General for having mentioned that figure. We are grateful for the help sent to us in the month of July. The figure stated earlier was a quotation from your report of relief dated May 31, 1945. I thought that correction might clarify the matter.

May I ask the Director General a question concerning the Resolution on relief to certain ex-enemy countries? There are certain territories which belong to Italy and which are not now under control of the Italian Government. May I ask the Director General if he is in a position to say (a) whether relief will be extended to those areas, and (b) as the authority and control of those areas is not with the Italian Government but with the Allied Mediterranean Command or the Yugoslav Government, will the authorities with which UNRRA will make agreements be the respective authorities in control of those areas?

Nature of UNRRA Agreements

Mr. Lehman: I have not had an opportunity, as yet, to study the geographical considerations or other implications with regard to procedures to be followed in bringing assistance to the people of the territory which was under discussion yesterday. Therefore, I must make it clear that the following answer is to be considered only tentative, subject to change if the premises on which I have based this answer are not accurate.

The member for Yugoslavia has asked a question with respect to the manner in which UNRRA intends to carry out its operations in the area referred to in the draft Resolution introduced by the Yugoslav delegation. Under the Resolutions of this Council, UNRRA, in carrying out relief and rehabilitation activities in an area, must act in agreement with the government or authority, military or civil, exercising administrative authority in the area concerned. It is my understanding that certain parts of the area referred to are under the administration of the Yugoslav authorities, while other parts are under the administration of the Allied military authorities. So long as this situation continues, UNRRA will, as provided in the Resolutions, act in agreement with the Yugoslav authorities and the Allied military authorities for the areas which each respectively administers. By the same token, in areas which are under the Administration of the Italian authorities, UNRRA will act in agreement with the Italian Government.

1932