

1537

ACC

AC220/TN.4

10000/140/2300

PILFER  
NOV. 1944

148/2300

PILFERAGES  
NOV. 1944-JUN. 1945

Transportation Sub-Commission,  
Allied Commission,  
Southern Region.

19 Nov 44.

I spent ~~xxxx~~ from 2100 hrs last night until 0300 hrs on investigation of the pilferage going on in Sestimento yard, Naples.

Every night, starting about 2300 hrs members of the "Guardia merci" climb through certain brake cabins of loaded cars. This is done by making a hole about two feet by one foot, after which the sacks and cases are handed out through the hole. The goods being divided among the gang, on the spot.

2. There are three or four of these gangs operating all specialized in the art of stealing. The most important one seems to be composed of railroad employees, who are in a position to know where waggons are spotted and to direct an engine to the place and pull two or three cars out to a better location for their purpose of robbery.

3. As an example, I know that a car is hooked on to by an engine in the vicinity of the box cars used as offices, yard offices, and pulled out 200 yards further on, to a place known as "Scala Basco". Another place is referred to as "Porta Massa" and another "Cava Porchiano." The spelling of the last name place may not be quite correct.

4. Adjoining these places are two single roads surrounded by many destroyed buildings. Here are gathered a score or so of merchants who buy the stuff on the spot for cash. When the cars are emptied and the labels destroyed, the cars are often moved far away from where the pilferage took place..

5. The military guards (American) seem to be more often drunk than sober, and are apparently more concerned with finding a comfortable place to sleep than in doing what they are probably there for.

6. In the course of conversation with someone there I found that a month ago somebody discovered a gold mine, namely a car of silk, and another car of sugar.

7. I have discovered 5 warehouses used for the storage of these stolen goods. 6749

8. Given the necessary time to work at night, I could manage to find out the names of some of the people concerned in these affairs.

sd. V. E. BOWERS,  
Major.

CRW/elo

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Transportation Sub-Commission

Tel : 478704

20 June 1945

392/33/Tn 3

SUBJECT : Unsealed Railway Cars

TO : HQ, MTCUSA

1. Reference your letter AG 400.73/254 D-0 dated 19 May '45.
2. AFHQ G-4 (Mov & Tn) have already drawn the attention of this HQ to the question of sealing of wagons containing civilian traffic and a copy of our letter 392/28/Tn 3 dated 22 Apr '45 on this subject, is attached for information.
3. AFHQ G-4 (Mov & Tn) have since stated that :-
  - (a) Train Guards have been instructed that when wagons of civil supplies are included in a train which they are guarding, they will take normal precautions to ensure the safety of the contents.
  - (b) Investigations will not however be made into losses from wagons of civilian stores, nor will they be refused movement.
4. The I.S.R. hope to have available by end of July one million seals of a special type (specimen attached) which will be held by station masters and available for sealing of wagons containing civilian supplies. The I.S.R. are being pressed for initial supplies to be distributed before the end of July if at all possible.

For the Chief Commissioner

6748

TO : HQ, WTCUSA

1. Reference your letter AG 400.73/254 D-0 dated 19 May '45.
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For the Chief Commissioner

6748

*M. J. Sierp*

M. J. SIERP, Colonel

Copy to : Economic Section  
Rail Division (Tn 4)

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
APO 394

AG/14619/PS

12 April 1945

SUBJECT : Police Report on Railways  
TO : Transportation Sub-Commission  
(attn. Major FING)

1. The attached copies of S.I.E. report submitted to Allied Police Conference held at Rome on 31st ultimo, are forwarded for your information.

*John W. Chapman*  
JOHN W. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, J.A.G.D.  
for Director Public Safety  
Sub-Commission

BP/1b

6747

Reference No.  
SIP.HC/A/45/9.

H.O., Special Investigation Branch,  
c/o Provost Marshal's (Br) Office,  
Allied Force Headquarters, GAF.

SUBJECT :- Stealing from Railways.

Provost Marshal (Br)  
Allied Force Headquarters.

With further reference to the above mentioned subject and to my report of 4 Jan 45, relative to this matter.

As instructed, I have continued my investigations in the ROSE Area, and up the AME/70 line to Railhead. The results of such enquiries are far too complicated and lengthy to record fully, but I will endeavour to enumerate the salient points and problems as briefly as possible.

#### DISTRIBUTION.

ROSE Area is an entirely American responsibility, so far as the guarding of marshalling yards is concerned. There are several yards, but the three main yards which are used for general traffic, are TUSCALOOSA, TIBURTINA and SISTEMTO. All trains from the South pass through ASALITA, and from here they are sent to TUSCALOOSA or TIBURTINA, according to the destination of the majority of traffic. Wagons for LECHON go to TUSCALOOSA, and wagons for AREZZO and the East coast go to TIBURTINA. The latter traffic is then switched to SUIVENTO. Thus there is a continuous switching of wagons between yards. British guards accompany the train to DIAE where they hand over to the Americans, who guard the yards, and wagons being switched within the ROSE Area. Trains are then made up and the travelling guard again taken over, Americans on the LECHON line, and British on the AREZZO and East coast line.

The three yards are at present guarded by two American M.P. Companies, 186 and 187. The former Company provide for TUSCALOOSA and Train Guards to the North, whilst the latter Company provide Guards for TIBURTINA and SISTEMTO, and other small yards in the area.

It is not possible to obtain figures of losses or incidents in ROSE Area as no comprehensive record is kept.

6746

With further reference to the above mentioned subject and to my report of 4 Jun 45, relative to this matter.

As instructed, I have continued my investigations in the ROBE Area, and up the ARIZO line to Railhead. My results of such enquiries are far too complicated and lengthy to record fully, but I will endeavour to enumerate the salient points and problems as briefly as possible.

DISTRIBUTION.

ROBE Area is an entirely American responsibility, so far as the guarding of travelling loads is concerned. There are several yards, but the three main yards which are used for general traffic, are TUCUMAN, TIBURCIA and SISTRINGO. All trains from the South pass through ASALTA, and here they are sent to TUCUMAN or TIBURCIA, according to the destination of the majority of traffic. Wagons for LECOM go to TUCUMAN. The and wagons for ARIZO and the East coast go to TIBURCIA. Thus there is latter traffic is then switched to SISTRINGO. British a continuous switching of wagons between yards. British guards accompany the train to ROBE where they hand over to the Americans, who guard the yards, and wagons being switched within the ROBE Area. Trains are then made up and the travelling Guard again taken over, Americans on the ESCOBAR line, and British on the ARIZO and East coast line.

The three yards are at present guarded by two American R.F. Companies, 186 and 187. The Police Company provide for TUCUMAN and Train Guards to the North, whilst the latter Company provide Guards for TIBURCIA and SISTRINGO, and other small yards in the area. 6746

It is not possible to obtain figures of losses or incidents in ROBE Area as no comprehensive record is kept. There is a system of main Check Reports for inter-yard switching etc., but my notes indicate the reports are not Military Railway Service, ROBE, and such reports are not consolidated. This is unfortunate because the problem is and there is a problem unless it is clear what that problem is and where the majority of the trouble is taking place. The reports, arrests made, and property recovered from time to time, show that there is still a considerable amount of stealing from Railway Wagons in the area.

TUSCANY.

186 M.P. Company supply approximately 8 men per 8 hour shift, in the form of moving guards. There is also an unloading siding here, known as the Magazine, where supplies for ROME are sent. One truck is also allocated for the unloading of A.C. supplies. This Magazine is specially guarded by a Detachment from the Chechire Regiment, and it seems quite secure except for A.S. supplies upon which no check is kept.

The main yard is quite open at all sides. The guard is supplemented by a small number of Civil Police during the day but not at night. There seems to be far too many civilians loitering around, and at times very few of the Guard can be located in the yard. Many civilian women can be seen around the "Guard Post" at practically all times, talking to members of the Guard, and the supervision seems very slack.

TIBERIA.

187 M.P. Company supply approximately 17 men per 8 hour shift, all moving guards. Again the yard extends over a large area and is open practically all round the perimeter. It is littered with wrecked rolling stock and bomb damaged buildings and generally extremely vulnerable.

SALVEMERINO.

There are actually two yards here, known as LITTORIO 1 and 2, the latter being about a quarter of a mile down the line. They are guarded by men from 187 M.P. Coy, with approximately 12 men per shift - 9 on LITTORIO (1) and 3 on LITTORIO (2) which is not generally used. As in the case of the other yards it is quite open and littered with wrecked wagons and damaged buildings.

In all yards there is a very apparent lack of liaison between persons concerned, especially between Guards and RTOs. Trains arriving with wagons broken open or unsealed are - or were - often being sent forward without being repaired or re-sealed. In some cases RTOs are not being informed when, for instance, a hole is found in the roof, or 'Brake Box'. Trains are checked on arrival by the RTOs staff, but it is more often than not such damage is not discovered during this inspection. Not one RTO was in possession of material for sealing. I brought this matter up at a conference at U.S.A.C. and the necessary equipment was supplied within a week.

6745

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#### TRAIN OPERATIONS

137 U.S. Company supply approximately 17 men per 8 hour shift, all Moving Guards. Again the yard extends over a large area and is open practically all round the perimeter. It is littered with wrecked rolling stock and bomb damaged buildings and generally extremely unclean.

#### STATION

There are actually two yards here, known as LITTONIO 1 and 2, the latter being about a quarter of a mile down the line. They are guarded by men from 137 U.S. Coy, with approximately 12 men per shift - 9 on LITTONIO (1) and 3 on LITTONIO (2) which is not generally used. As in the case of the other yards it is quite open and littered with wrecked wagons and damaged buildings.

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The Moving Guard system is good in theory, but in practice, it is not, unless the individuals do their respective jobs and there is adequate supervision. On enquiring into the extent of trouble in specific areas the reply is invariably that it is not thought to be serious. It appears as though more interest and action could be taken if parties concerned were aware of the extent of trouble in their areas of responsibility.

6745

(3)

Bad shunting by the ISR is obvious in all yards and I have watched doors being smashed off wagons merely because a wagon has been rolled down the track at excessive speed.

From ROSE, the next stage of the journey under British Guard is to ORTE and TERMI where the Guards change over. Trains from ORTE go up to REZZO and trains from TERMI go on to FERRIANO where SLI Guards hand over to Pioneer Corps Guards, who escort trains to the East coast. At each 'hand over' Train Check Reports are made out and any incidents are noted. The train is also checked by the RTOs staff. Static Guards at ORTE and TERMI are provided by the SLI, the yards merely have traffic passing through and the situation here seems well in hand.

#### REZZO.

This is the main British Railhead in Western ITALY and the present arrangements for safeguarding such an important location cannot be considered satisfactory.

The yard is not large but only three SLI men per shift are provided as Guards. They are, it is true, supplemented by two Italian soldiers, but these merely patrol the side road adjoining the yard. The area is completely open and one track, from which attractive stores are unloaded, runs alongside a public road. It was at one time separated by a wall but this is now almost destroyed. The lighting on the yard at night is very good, but it is mainly concentrated on one side, leaving the opposite side of wagons, containing attractive stores, in comparative darkness.

No 'back-stacking' is done in the yard; the wagons are opened and the contents loaded into lorries which transport goods to various Depot and Consignees. Transport is called and enters through one gap, backing in with the checker. When loaded the driver is given a convey note and he leaves through another gap, reporting his vehicle number and his destination as he does so. There are other exits, but it is rarely left to the driver to report out. There is no check on other exits and little or no check on numerous civilians employed in the yard. No rear Guards are provided for the trucks and no effort is made to fasten the rear flaps to lessen the risk of pilferage on route. When wagons are unloaded and checked with waybills many serious deficiencies are noted, but unless the existing system it is not always possible to ascertain whether such deficiencies are caused by short loading at Depots, or stealing on route or in the yards.

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4-20-20.

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The Petrol Railhead is at CASTIGLION FIORENTINO some distance away, and seems adequately guarded. They have in fact a stronger guard than the main Railhead. Whilst here I was informed of the loss of petrol from two wagons which arrived on 22 Feb 45, from No. 8 Petrol Depot, CASORIA. No less than 977 four gallon cans of petrol were missing (3908 gallons). A large amount of petrol is delivered in four gallon cans which are often placed in open wagons, or, if in box wagons, are not secured or sealed. Thus it is not possible for the train guards to know whether any interference has taken place. There should be waybills with each consignment, but even if the guards had access to these they cannot check the load during the journey.

To place four gallon cans of petrol in open wagons with no special Guard is simply asking for trouble. I examined one such

(4)

wagon myself at TIBURTINA and it appeared then that some 50 cans were missing. It had not been reported as a suspected deficiency however, for the Guard were unable to know, except perhaps by guessing. Such losses appear to be extensive and yet the only action taken by consignees, is to report to the SIB at AREZZO, who, incidentally, are powerless at that stage, to take any useful action. So far as I could ascertain, the matter had not been taken up with No. 6 Petrol Depot.

Between the Marshalling Yards the usual activity - as mentioned in my previous report - is taking place, but the position appears worse between PAVLES - ROME - TERNI and ORTE. There are an increasing number of cases of holes being cut in Brake-boxes and roofs of wagons. There are also several instances of 'Hot-boxes', in which case the wagon is dropped off at some small station, to be picked up later. Needless to say it is more often than not, broken into before it is finally collected.

Subsequent to the conference held at AFHQ I have seen several circulars respecting sealing of wagons, Movements refusing to accept wagons if not in a secure condition, and suggesting the squashing of ACME seals with pliers to prevent them being opened. Yet few of the persons concerned that I have interviewed, appear to have received copies of these documents. Such instructions should of course, be circulated to all persons concerned with, or interested in, the movement of rail traffic.

The foregoing points are but few of the faults which are such too numerous and complicated to discuss at length in this report. It appears that thieves are becoming more daring, and there appears no doubt that our present efforts are inefficient.

In an endeavour to alleviate the trouble on the ROME-PAVLES line seven members of the SIB and American CID have been investigating over a period. They have been able to effect the arrest of some 30 civilians and 6 US soldiers in connection with thefts from railways. This will no doubt have some good effect. The enquiry will be the subject of a special report.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

##### ROME AREA.

Considering personnel problems the present Guards should be sufficient if each individual performed his duty conscientiously. This includes Guards, Officers, FICs and all others concerned. Some firm action is necessary to prevent Guards fraternising with women and other civilians, whilst on duty. I have received information that certain thieves employ practices to engage Guards whilst they carry out their nefarious activities.

6743

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The foregoing points are but few of the faults which are much too numerous and complicated to discuss at length in this report. It appears that thieves are becoming more daring, and there appears no doubt that our present efforts are inefficient.

In an endeavour to alleviate the trouble on the ROME-BARI line seven members of the SB and American CID have been investigating over a period. They have been able to effect the arrest of some 30 civilians and 6 US soldiers in connection with thefts from railways. This will no doubt have some good effect. The enquiry will be the subject of a special report.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS.

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Considering personnel problems the present Guards should be sufficient if each individual performed his duty conscientiously. This includes Guards, Officers, NCOs and all others concerned. Some firm action is necessary to prevent Guards fraternising with women and other civilians, whilst on duty. I have received information that certain thieves employ prostitutes to engage Guards whilst they carry out their nefarious activities.

It seems also that a few static posts in the yards and a general overhaul of the areas assigned to each man might assist. This would enable visiting officers and NCOs to ensure that men are doing their duty. The eight hour tour of duty is long and tedious and men should be allowed a break during this period. Such break periods should be laid down and adhered to and so arranged to allow one man's area to be covered by the man on the adjoining area whilst he is away.

Lights in all yards need urgent attention. In most cases some fittings are already there and merely need a little attention. By the submission of the Train Check Reports to HQ, MRS., monthly figures could be published giving an indication of the trouble in each particular area. This helps to foster interest and creates a 'competitive spirit' which should have good results.

(5)

For example if the Officers of our Company realised there is  
for more crime in their area, then in the area of the adjoining  
Company, they may take more active measures to improve the situ-  
ation.

Liaison between Movements and Guards could be improved,  
for at present American Guards and RTOs etc., seem to be working  
independently. I see no reason why they should not compare  
Train Check Reports and work in conjunction on such matters as  
general security, re-sealing and arranging the repair of damaged  
wagons, etc. Officers i/c Guards or RTOs should study the  
position in their respective areas to ascertain what parts of their  
yards could be fenced off to reduce risks and make the area less  
vulnerable. It is certainly almost impossible to completely  
enclose these large areas, but if certain portions receive atten-  
tion it would improve matters. I discussed this particular point  
with the RTO at TSS.L.M. and he has already arranged to have  
certain vulnerable points wired off.

Every effort should also be made to exclude unauthorised  
civilians. Warning notices should be exhibited and action taken  
against any persons infringing this regulation.

REZEC

A substantial increase in the Static Guard is most  
necessary, and both sides of the yard should be patrolled.  
Such guard must be properly organised and frequent visits paid to  
all sentries throughout the day and particularly at night.

Fencing in the yard is most urgent. This is certain-  
ly practicable on both sides, leaving just the necessary gaps  
which could be guarded by Italians if necessary, except of course  
the check points. This needs attention immediately. With the  
sides thus protected there would be the two ends to be watched,  
the level crossing where the main road crosses the lines, and the  
fir end leading out to the BSD sidings. A static entry might  
well be posted at either end. Some form of 'Watch Tower', with  
spot lights has been suggested, and if practicable this is a sound  
idea. The old signal box at one end could be put to good use in  
this respect.

Civilians should be made to use one entrance and exit,  
and they should be searched, at least occasionally, when leaving  
the yard on completion of their work. The whole situation should  
easily be organised similar to the system operating in most ports.  
Notices warning unauthorised civilians they are liable to be  
arrested and punished for trespassing should be displayed at  
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eration.

RTOs and their staffs must be warned against authorising  
individual civilians to travel on Military Trains. I have heard  
of several cases where guards have attempted to clear civilians  
from trains only to find that they have some form of travelling  
permit from an ATC. These civilians are becoming a serious prob-  
lem, and it might be worth while to consider running a civilian  
train from REZZO, if only once per week.

The sealing of back loads is very poor and the provision  
of the necessary seals and equipment should be given priority.

More supervision by RTOs, ROOs and Officers i/c Guard appears very necessary, and occasional checks on vehicles carrying stores from the Railhead would serve a useful purpose in addition to the deterrent effect. If it is at all possible one Officer already employed at the Railhead could be appointed a Security Officer, not only to supervise the guarding of the area, but also to ensure the checking and sealing etc., are properly carried out.

LOADING SERVICES.

There is still far too much short loading of, and absence of waybills in wagons. Sealing is also very bad. A new system of sealing has apparently not yet been decided upon and so far as I have been able to ascertain, there is little or no evidence that Movements are refusing to accept wagons badly sealed. Who is responsible for this? RTOs certainly do not seem to be aware of the fact. If they are, there is decidedly little sign of any action by them.

Ordnance Services in many cases place waybills under the label, outside the wagon, with the result that they are often lost or become illegible. There is no reason why all waybills should not be placed in an allocated position inside wagons. Further, as previously mentioned, some immediate measures are required regarding the transporting of petrol (especially in four gallon containers). I have discussed this problem with Officers at the Petrol Railhead and there seems no reason why properly sealed box wagons should not be used.

RTOs and their staffs need to be more 'crime minded' and they could do much more to combat this serious problem. They should certainly endeavour to ensure that when necessary, all wagons are re-sealed and repairs effected when holes are discovered in brake boxes and roofs.

GENERAL.

The majority of the trouble still seems to be taking place between Marshalling Yards etc. Some cases reported last month include 105 bales thrown from one train in transit, 658 cotton comforters from another, and the 4,000 gallons of petrol previously mentioned. There are an increasing number of holes being cut into the roofs of wagons, and one train recently arrived in ROME, with holes cut in no less than eight brake boxes. Another case reported within the last 2 days concerns a raid on a train near MDDAWOLI by some 30 or 40 civilians, during which a large quantity of grain was stolen. This train was unguarded.

Trains continue to stop at practically all <sup>674</sup> stations, and invariably, even at night, crowds immediately collect round, making the guards task exceedingly difficult. One case reported concerned a man seen on top of a wagon at ROCCA SECCA, extracting stores through an open ventilator. When he observed the Guard approaching he casually climbed down from the wagon and mingled with civilians, including women, standing around. Under these circumstances the guard is forbidden to use his firearm.

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#### GENERAL.

The majority of the trouble still seems to be taking place between Marshalling Yards etc. Some cases reported last month include 105 holes thrown from one train in transit, 658 cotton containers from another, and the 4,000 gallons of petrol previously mentioned. There are an increasing number of holes being cut into the roofs of wagons, and one train recently arrived in ROHE, with holes cut in no less than eight brake boxes. Another case reported within the last 2 days concerns a raid on a train near LDBALQMI by some 30 or 40 civilians, during which a large quantity of grain was stolen. This train was unguarded.

Trains continue to stop at practically all <sup>6741</sup> stations, and invariably, even at night, crowds immediately collect round, making the guards task exceedingly difficult. One case reported concerned a man seen on top of a wagon at FOCCA SECCA, extracting stores through an open ventilator. When he observed the Guard approaching he casually climbed down from the wagon and mingled with civilians, including women, standing around. Under these circumstances the guard is forbidden to use his firearm, and before he could take any other action, the man, with others, made good his escape. This took place at 0300 hours. Why were all these people there at that time? Some were no doubt attempting to board the train, others probably to assist the thieves or to steal themselves. It does seem certain that they know of our reluctance to shoot, and therefore use the crowd as cover. Our efforts to cope with such a situation must appear extremely feeble to them.

(7)

If we are to solve this increasing menace to our lines of communication we must rectify this particular flaw immediately. Stations such as these at least could be made a prohibited area and a curfew imposed during the hours of darkness, when the majority of the trouble occurs. This could be enforced by local Carabinieri and our Railway Police when they are in the locality. It would not entirely rectify the position, but a few prosecutions would have a good effect and ease the situation considerably. I know it is said there is insufficient Carabinieri but one can still see many of them standing around inside and outside many public buildings nothing more than a 'decoration'. Apart from this Italian soldiery could be used provided their officials were made responsible. Train guards constantly passing through these points would soon know if these people were being their job. If such action were decided upon, a list of places requiring attention could soon be supplied. One or two such points on each section of the line could also be used as a check point to clear a train of any unauthorised persons who had boarded at any of the numerous stations along the line.

Civilians hiding Military Trains, and breaking into wagens from brake-boxes, are increasing. With reward to the former, many cases are being reported of Guards standing in their escort wagons after the train has started, and watching civilians jump on the train, and later goods being thrown out on to the line. They are powerless to act. They cannot cause the train to stop and they are not allowed to shoot, (at least in the first place) even if they could see the persons responsible. Generally they cannot see. The Italians are now completely responsible for the operation of the railways in most areas, and the situation is likely to become worse.

It must be agreed that many of the aforementioned troubles could not take place without the aid, active or passive, of the numerous brakemen and train 'Caps'. These men should be potential extra guards instead of which they are potential thieves. They should be made to accept some responsibility and to assist in safeguarding the supplies they are transporting. At present they walk away at the end of the journey, perhaps with a large hole in the roof or brakebox of the wagon they have occupied, and seldom, if at all, are any questions asked of them. They claim and ask to be Allies. Why cannot they be asked to act as such?

I contend that these brakemen should be made responsible for the wagon they occupy during a journey - arm them if deemed necessary and expedient. The 'Capo' train should then have a list of brakemen on the train, together with the number of the wagon they occupy. The list should be handed over with the Train Check Report and if there should be anything seriously wrong with a wagon occupied by one of these men he should be held responsible in the absence of a very substantial explanation. Let them all be informed of this and threaten them with, and take, severe action when necessary. Failing the 'List' system, they could be ordered

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Public notices and press notices might also be published warning civilians against loitering around Railway Stations, especially at night, and also against riding on Military trains. The existing system of allowing Railway Officials to collect fares from unauthorised civilians found on trains, is encouraging crime, and should be abolished forthwith. These civilians will travel

(8)

by some means and it may be considered possible, in the near future, to introduce a limited passenger service, if only using open wagons for this purpose.

The 'Hot-Box' trouble with wagons seems to be occurring more frequently and it is most likely many of these are deliberately caused. At present the faulty wagon is detached and left with the station 'Cape' at the nearest station, who merely gives the guard a signature for the wagon. It is significant that such trouble usually occurs to wagons containing attractive stores and they are usually pilfered before they are eventually collected. It is not always possible to have a member of the Guard remain with it, so it seems that again we must make the 'Cape' station where it is left, responsible. He will have to take steps to protect it and cause it to be taken to the nearest Static Military Guard at the earliest possible moment.

There seems no doubt that we are failing to understand the mentality of the civilian population of this country and instead of appreciation and co-operation we are being treated with contempt. They have been accustomed to Fascist and German methods and ours in comparison must be exceedingly weak. How would their own Felice tackle this problem? Undoubtedly they would take severe measures and use firearms liberally. The population are used to and expect such action. If it is not forthcoming they take liberties which form the subject of this report. How often do we find an Italian in possession of German clothing or equipment? Seldom, if ever. The answer is obviously fear: fear of the consequences if found in possession of such property.

I have consulted certain ISR officials at HQ MRS, ROME, respecting the position on railways prior to our arrival. I am informed that when the Germans were in control there was little or no trouble in connection with rail transport of Military supplies. It was stated that the Italians were afraid to approach a German Military Train and actually went out of their way to avoid them. Such trains were usually accompanied by troops, who kept the train clear of unauthorised persons; otherwise they passed the responsibility completely over to the Italians who had to ensure safe delivery.

I merely mention these points to emphasize the conditions to which these people are accustomed. We too must take firm action if we wish to cope with our problems. If political reasons prevent appropriate measures being taken, we are left with the choice of accepting the present serious losses or properly guarding our trains and supplies.

GUARDS

6729

The increase of Guards from 2 to 3 men per train is not yet generally in force. Even so, three men are still insufficient to guard a train of some 60 wagons. They cannot hope to keep civilians off a train of such size, and once the train is in motion

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The increase of Guards from 2 to 3 men per train is not yet generally in force. Even so, three men are still insufficient to guard a train of some 60 wagons. They cannot hope to keep civilians off a train of such size, and once the train is in motion and the Guards 'safe' in their escort wagon, the thieves can and do, commence to break into wagons from brake-boxes, etc. I have attempted to clear gangs of civilians from trains myself, but they merely wait nearby and re-board as soon as the train starts off. It is worthy of note that they mostly travel at night, and it is not possible to know how many of them are thieves awaiting an opportunity to steal from the train.

The Guards themselves, both British and American, need more supervision, and this can only be done by some form of travelling 'Inspectors' (Officers or NCOs) such as used by Public

(9)

Transport Services in our own country. The new Police Section and SIB Section, will do much to ease the situation, but it must be remembered, they will merely 'scratch the surface', and for every ten persons arrested, another ten are ready to take their place. The results are worth the risk in connection with this matter.

Many of the faults I have mentioned need correcting locally and to accomplish this Security Officers are necessary to keep constant check and to put things right on the spot - i.e. if wagons from a certain Depot are found badly sealed, the Depot should be visited and the matter rectified. This all points to one thing. The whole system of guarding railways needs revision. It is not sufficient to just augment the existing Battalion, another could well be used and all placed under one Supreme Headquarters, with Movements Officers and representatives of other Branches, attached to enquire into and correct individual faults.

One body similar to MRS should be responsible for Railways, and should incorporate every Branch concerned with Railways, including Police and Customs. We have something similar in our own country. The Railways have their own Police system. One central Headquarters could be set up similar to an Area Headquarters and all problems could be tackled from here. A clear picture of the situation could then be obtained and it would be a considerable improvement on the present system where many separate Departments are working independently with no liaison. Attached representatives could be used as Inspecting Officers as suggested above. ISK Officials are already at HQ MRS, ROME and Italian personnel problems can be dealt with by them.

I have endeavoured to cover in this report all the difficulties with which we are faced, and to suggest a number of ways to improve matters. There is certainly no one simple answer to this problem, each improvement, no matter how slight, will help considerably. We have solved untold problems during this War and should not let the safeguarding of our supply lines defeat us. If we face up to the situation and tackle it now, it will obviate further trouble and prepare us for future commitments.

Respectfully submitted,

6728

F. JOHNSON. Capt. DAFM.  
Special Investigation Branch,  
Corps of Military Police.

26 Mar 45

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26 Mar 45

SUBJECT: - Pilferage on Railways

Provost Marshal (Br)  
Allied Force Headquarters

With reference to my investigation into pilferage from Railways which, according to instructions, has at present been confined to NAPLES and surrounding districts.

Apart from independent investigation and observation, the majority of the persons concerned with this matter have been interviewed and various problems discussed at length. The information thus obtained is too detailed to be discussed fully, but a general summary of the situation is as follows.

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Firstly, it has not been possible to ascertain the actual extent of losses of stores in transit by rail and no comprehensive figures are available. The only guide at present is the pilferage reports received by the Train Guards (30th Somerset Light Infantry), property recovered from time to time and arrests made. That it has reached serious proportions is realised by all concerned and many measures have already been taken to combat it. Consequently there seems to be a considerable improvement.

During November there were 76 Pilferage Reports received by the SII from all Sections of the line guarded by them. Some of these are merely suspected pilferages and may be the result of short loading. Further, there have been some sixty arrests during December in this district, in connection with this type of offence. Of these, 32 were arrested by SIB for conspiracy to steal from Depots or trains, and a further 15 were arrested by the Questura for receiving WD property suspected stolen from trains. This does not include arrests made by British and American Military Police or other bodies.

8797

I would refer firstly to NAPLES Yards, about which numerous complaints have been made. They cover approximately 200 acres of ground and employ some 10,000 civilians. The Yards consist of NAPLES Central Yard, Smaestanto or NAPLES East Yard, and the Salvage Yard or "Scalo Basso", and these cater for four main sidings on which are situated the various Depots. All Docks traffic also passes through this yard.

The Depots call for wagons and they load and seal them. The SII then supply a guard to escort them to the marshalling yards, where they are handed over to the static guard. A Trip Check List is made out showing particulars of all wagons and this is checked by the static guard on arrival. The wagons then become the

1562

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The Depots call for wagons and they load and seal them. The SII then supply a guard to escort them to the marshalling yards, where they are handed over to the static guard. A Trip Check List is made out showing particulars of all wagons and this is checked with the static guard on arrival. The wagons then become the responsibility of the static guard until the train is made up and ready for departure. The SII Detachment are then informed and two men escort the train on the next stage of the journey, handing over at certain points where the same procedure is adopted. All wagons containing pilferable goods are thus checked throughout the journey and if one is discovered insecure or pilfered, a Pilferage

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DM 3 District

9727

Report is made out. It is thus possible to ascertain on which section of the line the incident occurred, but it is not always possible however to know, at this stage, exactly what has been stolen.

Naples Yards are a PES responsibility and static guards are provided by the 183 MP Coy USA. Approximately 28 men are on duty throughout the day and night. There are five men on Naples Central Yard, fourteen men on Naples East (Smetemento), two men on Salvage Yard (Scalo Basso), two men near Salerno Junction through which North bound and Dock traffic proceeds, and three men at the Northern extremity of the Yards through which the majority of North and South bound traffic passes. The latter five men assist in guarding trains held up awaiting acceptance into the marshalling yards. Five men are also provided as guards at Campo Flegrie, making a total of approximately 32 men per tour of duty, although this may vary according to the number of men available.

A list is kept by the guard showing on which tracks highly pilferable wagons are standing and the man responsible for particular tracks is informed when commencing his tour of duty. So far as is possible the movements of these wagons within the yards are followed, and the list amended accordingly. In the past there have been cases of wagons being unlawfully shunted down into the lower Salvage Yard, on to isolated tracks, where they have been pilfered. Now, every effort is made to prevent this. No wagons containing stores are allowed into the Salvage Yard and at each end of the Naples East Yard two men are posted who check this and query any unlawful shunting. There have also been instances where the labels on wagons have been changed in an endeavour to get wagons off the main yards, but this is now appreciated by all concerned and every effort is made to prevent it.

The condition of Naples Central (Caribaldi) Station is still very bad and it is over-run by children and unauthorised civilians. This is the responsibility of the Questura and Carabinieri who fail to do their job. They have complained of lack of personnel and insufficient fencing and other protective measures, and this is now being pursued by the Public Safety Officer, Allied Commission. The Questura are being increased to 50 and the Carabinieri to 46, working eight hour shifts. These men must be made to do their job. One can still stand at the barrier on the Station and see three officials merely watching persons entering and leaving and making no effort to check them. This has recently again been brought to the notice of the Italian authorities and the result is awaited. Wire fencing is also being erected at certain spots through which access is gained. **6736**

Generally, so far as Naples Station is concerned, the position has undoubtedly greatly improved. The American authorities have conducted their own investigations and the system of guarding and supervision reviewed and improved (sic). There is no evidence of large scale pilfering actually in Naples Yards and reports to the contrary have not been substantiated. In the month of December only five cases of pilfering have been reported in the Yards.

It therefore appears that the majority of the trouble occurs outside the main marshalling yards and again this is supported by three incidents reported during the early part of December when raids on trains were made by armed gangs at CASORIA and S. MARCELINO. Two cases occurred at CASORIA where

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It therefore appears that the majority of the trouble occurs outside the main marshalling yards and again this is supported by three incidents reported during the early part of December when raids on trains were made by armed gangs at CASORIA and S. MARCELLO. Two cases occurred at CASORIA where the guards fired upon a gang attempting to raid a train and the fire was returned, and another incident took place at S. MARCELLO where train guards opened fire on a gang removing boxes from a wagon. Again the fire was returned, the gang dispersed and some 34 boxes of medical supplies were recovered. These are not the only cases, but they give some indication as to what is taking place, usually at small Stations where there is no static guard and where trains are held up (sometimes intentionally) or slowed down awaiting clearance. There are many black spots throughout the line, but recently it has been particularly bad at small Stations between NAPLES-AVERSA; AVERSA-VILLAS LITERNO; NAPLES-CASERTA and CASCELLO, etc.

- 3 -

The problem is extremely difficult in view of the corruption amongst ISM personnel who appear in numerous cases to be working in conjunction with the thieves, apart from thieving themselves. Complaints have been received of improper marshalling of trains, where Military wagons containing attractive stores have been split up in yards unnecessarily and sent to isolated sidings; have been split up on trains to increase the difficulties of the guards. This is followed by inexplicable stops during the journey - on bends where guards can only watch part of train and with part of the train in a tunnel etc. Obviously this is done at pre-arranged locations where thieves are waiting to raid the train. Various excuses are given for these stops, such as lack of steam, train too heavy and engine breakdown. In some cases attractive stores have been distinguished by marks or other signs on the wagons.

It also appears that many brakemen on wagons are also implicated, cases being reported of breaking into wagons from their cabooses. On many occasions they have also been found in possession of side-cutting pliers and undoubtedly accept bribes to allow unauthorised persons to ride trains. Only two guards are provided per train, sometimes make up of as many as sixty wagons, and their task is extremely difficult.

Except in Naples Yards, cases occur of trains being sent off without guards sometimes no doubt intentionally - or of guards being notified just prior to the departure of the train, thereby having no opportunity to check the wagons. A recent case reported involved an Italian Warrant Officer who attempted to bribe a member of the SII to allow a wagon containing stores to be shunted into a siding for the purpose of pilferage. This was reported and the man was arrested with members of the gang who were waiting to break into the wagon. It is more than likely that such persons are sometimes successful in their efforts, for they are in a position to offer huge sums of money.

Another case now under investigation involves two train guards who are alleged to have sold cases of soap to Italian soldiers. Generally, however, the SII are doing extremely good work with the comparatively few personnel at their disposal and the position could be improved further if they were given suitable reinforcements.

Throughout, inadequate sealing of the wagons is obvious. The 5mm wire which should be used is not available, but even this is far from satisfactory. Certain American and AC wagons are merely using a piece of string and a small metal seal.

#### RECOMMENDATIONS

6725

NAPLES YARD: - As stated, position is not serious in yards themselves if individuals do their job conscientiously. A few extra guards at spots, outside the main yards, where trains are held up would help considerably. Lights are most important in marshalling yards and are always an efficient deterrent. Two flood lights have already been installed at Smeramento Yard, but more are urgently needed in the Salvage Yard and at the above-mentioned points where trains are stopped awaiting acceptance. There seems no reason why this should not be done, various fittings already being there.

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The Salvage Yard is below the Smetamento Yard and is separated from the road by a wall. In this wall at present there are seven gaps through which vehicles can be driven. Empty petrol drums are unloaded in this yard and at least two openings are necessary to allow access to vehicles. Another two, about ten yards apart, have rail tracks running through, but the remainder could well be bricked up. There are but two raving guards in this yard and the closing of these gaps would help to exclude children and unauthorised civilians, and free the guards to concentrate their attention on more vulnerable spots. As previously stated, there are far too many unauthorised civilians roaming around the yards and every effort should be made to exclude these people. The Queue naturally will not approach the yards, for fear of being shot at by the guards, but there seems no reason why armed uniformed Carabinieri, in pairs, should not assist in this task.

- 4 -

SEALS

As stated, the main trouble is elsewhere and without doubt the present system of securing wagons is entirely unsatisfactory. This has been the complaint of almost everybody connected with the subject matter, and yet nothing has been done to improve the situation. At present pilferable wagons should be secured with 5mm wire with an acme seal to indicate any interference, but both wire and seals are in short supply. Inspection of almost any train shows the securing wire to be absolutely hopeless, and in many cases can be broken off with the hand. The position has gone beyond discovering interference; we know that it is taking place only too well; it is now a question of prevention. The wire can be cut in a few seconds, even while a train is moving slowly, and I have previously mentioned brakemen found in possession of cutting pliers. Something must be done about this.

The answer appears to be a bolt with double nuts, and with the end burred over so that it can only be removed by cutting through with a hack-saw or the use of a heavy wrench. I have arranged to have a number of experimental bolts made by RME. These can be passed through the staples on the wagons and with two nuts leave just a small fraction of the bolt showing. This is then burred over slightly. Then, with a heavy wrench the first nut can be removed re-cutting the thread and the removal of the second nut cleans up the thread. Failing this it can be cut in a few minutes with a hack-saw.

There will be many objections to this no doubt and it may be said it will make too much inconvenience to consignees. In this respect I will point out that it has been said that a very large proportion of wagons arrive at their destination pilfered, and therefore it would seem better to take time to open an intact wagon than to open one in a few seconds only to find half the contents missing. If it is difficult for the consignee, then it is equally difficult for the thieves and dishonest guards who sometimes open wagons on the excuse that they suspect pilferage and are checking the contents. The expense would be well worth it if it helps to solve the problem, for at present it seems that these gangs of thieves are merely laughing at our feeble efforts to secure important War supplies.

This system, with the addition of acme seals, can surely be adopted. If all wagons containing pilferable stores were made secure by consignors and then fastened in this manner it would also assist guards in their difficult task, for thieves would then be obliged to literally smash their way into a wagon in order to pilfer. As many rails are made on slow moving trains, this would be most difficult and the noise so made would attract attention.

This has been tried before, successfully, and I am informed that No 53 BGD have been bolting their wagons containing whiskey for some time. So far as is known none of these wagons have been pilfered. I suggest an experiment with, shall we say, the above Depot. Let every wagon be bolted for a given period and a special check kept. If this is successful then a general adoption of the system might be considered. In this respect special care must be taken the wagons are otherwise secure and effects made to obviate short loading, waybill indicating the exact contents.

the position has gone beyond discovering interference, we can cut in place only too well; it is now a question of prevention. The wire can be cut in a few seconds, even while a train is moving slowly, and I have previously mentioned brakemen found in possession of cutting pliers. Something must be done about this.

The answer appears to be a bolt with double nuts, and with the end buried over so that it can only be removed by cutting through with a back-saw or the use of a heavy wrench. I have arranged to have a number of experimental bolts made by RME. These can be passed through the staples on the wagons and with two nuts leave just a small fraction of the bolt showing. This is then buried over slightly. Then, with a heavy wrench the first nut can be removed re-cutting the thread and the removal of the second nut cleans up the thread. Doing this it can be cut in a few minutes with a back-saw.

There will be many objections to this no doubt and it may be said it will make too much inconvenience to consignees. In this respect I would point out that it has been said that a very large proportion of wagons arrive at their destination pilfered, and therefore it would seem better to take time to open an intact wagon than to open one in a few seconds only to find half the contents missing. If it is difficult for the consignee, then it is equally difficult for the thieves and dishonest guards who sometimes open wagons on the excuse that they suspect pilferage and are checking the contents. The expense would be well worth it if it helps to solve the problem, for at present it seems that these gangs of thieves are merely laughing at our feeble efforts to secure important War supplies.

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This has been tried before, successfully, and I am informed that No 53 RCD have been bolting their wagons containing whiskey for some time. So far as is known none of these wagons have been pilfered. I suggest an experiment with, shall we say, the above Depot. Let every wagon be bolted for a given period and a special check kept. If this is successful then a general adoption of the system might be considered. In this respect special care must be taken ~~to~~ <sup>to</sup> the wagons are otherwise secure and efforts made to obviate short loading, waybill indicating the exact contents of the wagon.

#### TRAIN GUARDS

The present system seems satisfactory, the main complaint being lack of personnel. Two men to guard a train of some sixty wagons are insufficient, especially when they have to contend with ISR officials in league with the thieves. There have been cases of men losing their personal kit when they alighted to inspect a train held up at some small station or isolated spot. If possible at least three or four men should be provided for each train. Here the personnel problem is appreciated, but if nothing else is possible the use of Italian personnel might be considered, to work in conjunction with British guards. These cannot be trusted, but with wagons bolted and with British guards to supervise, they may be of some use, even if only to assist in keeping unauthorised civilians from trains.

-5-

It appears also that guards should be provided with more efficient lights. Most of the trouble occurring during the hours of darkness and with armed gangs to contend with, these are hopelessly inadequate. Some form of spot light on each side of the train whereby guards could keep the majority of these pilferable waggons under observation, seems to be needed. This would be particularly valuable when dealing with armed gangs and would be a deterrent in itself, especially if the thieves realised a man with an automatic gun was behind the light. Failing this some powerful portable lamp might be provided.

These gangs of thieves can only be dealt with in one way - action. It seems it is the only way they understand. At present a Court of Inquiry is convened each time any civilian is shot or wounded. This, apart from considerable waste of time, gives men the impression that their conduct is being questioned and in time makes them reluctant to take proper action at the appropriate time. It may be deemed possible to dispense with these except in doubtful cases, but this is no doubt a matter for consideration by other authorities.

Finally in this respect it is obvious that little consideration is given when sending reinforcements to the SMI. Recently they have been sending men with previous convictions for crime, in the Police sense of the word, and these men have to be put on a job where they can receive high sums of money for merely turning their backs. A system of vetting could be used to ensure only the best type of available men was sent to a Train Guard Battalion.

#### GENERAL

Large scale corruption of SMI personnel is a serious problem and it is difficult to suggest any solution. Close supervision is certainly needed and liaison between Station 'Copps', WOs and Train Guard detachments improved. A general warning to these officials and firm action against them if they fail to comply is needed. There have been many cases of railway officials being arrested for being involved in stealing from trains, released and back at their previous jobs within a few days. The excuse is of course that they cannot be replaced. They, together with the thieves, know our shortcomings and are taking advantage. The sending off of trains without notifying the guard, the shunting of pilferable waggons to isolated sidings, improper making up of trains so that waggons of attractive stores are separated by civil or empty waggons, can be stopped if proper action is taken against offenders.

So far as possible Military waggons should be kept together and not split up during the journey. This must be done when train is re-marshalled at such places as MAPLES and MBERN, but here there are static guards and there seems no reason why they should not be made up similarly for the next stage of the journey. It is, in fact, done at MAPLES. A case reported within the last two days occurred between SAUERNO and MAPLES where empty waggons were placed in front of the guard's wagon and the waggons he was guarding. In front of these, next to the engine, out of sight of the guard and without his knowledge, a wagon of 40 supplies was placed. Needless to say it was later found pilfered and was only sealed with string. It would also help if brakemen were detailed to remain in their boxes until the train is checked and that these 'boxes' be examined each time a train is checked. Some sound system of supervision is necessary throughout.

6733

To ensure that action is taken against such offenders, to check the conduct of dishonest Train Guards and to endeavour to eliminate them.

seems it is the only law they understand. At present a court of inquiry is convened each time any civilian is shot or wounded. This, apart from considerable waste of time, gives the impression that their combat is being questioned and in that makes them reluctant to take proper action at the appropriate time. It may be deemed possible to dispense with these except in doubtful cases, but this is no doubt a matter for consideration by other authorities.

Finally in this respect it is obvious that little consideration is given when sending reinforcements to the SLM. Recently there have been sending men with previous convictions for crime, in the Police sense of the word, and these men have to be put on a job where they can receive high sums of money for merely turning their backs. A system of vetting could be used to ensure only the best type of available men was sent to a Train Guard Battalion.

#### GENERAL

Large scale corruption of SLM personnel is a serious problem and it is difficult to suggest any solution. More supervision is certainly needed and links between Station 'Copos', SMOs and Train Guard detachments improved. A general warning to these officials and firm action against them if they fail to comply is needed. There have been many cases of railway officials being arrested for being involved in stealing from trains, released and back at their previous jobs within a few days. The excuse is of course that they cannot be replaced. They, together with the thieves, know our shortcomings and are taking advantage. The shunting off of trains without notifying the guard, the shunting of pilferable wagons to isolated sidings, improper taking up of trains so that wagons of attractive stores are separated by civil or empty wagons, can be stopped if proper action is taken against offenders.

So far as possible military wagons should be kept together and not split up during the journey. This must be done when train is re-mmarshalled at such places as M.P.E.S and M.B.E.R.A., but here there are static guards and there seems no reason why they should not be made up similarly for the next stage of the journey. It is, in fact, done at M.P.E.S. A case reported within the last two days occurred between S.M.E.R.V.O and M.P.E.S where empty wagons were placed in front of the guard's wagon and the wagons he was guarding. In front of these, next to the engine, out of sight of the guard and without his knowledge, a wagon of AC supplies was placed. Needless to say it was later found pilfered and was only sealed with string. It would also help if brakemen were detailed to remain in their boxes until the train is checked and that these 'boxes' be examined each time a train is checked. Some sound system of supervision is necessary throughout.

8733

To ensure that action is taken against such offenders, to check the conduct of dishonest Train Guards and to endeavour to eliminate gangs of armed thieves, it seems a Railway Police Section is required for investigation duties. Here, however, we are again faced with shortage of personnel and this may not be possible. Assuming it is impossible to form a section of SIB personnel, it may be that a Section of Military Police, perhaps with a percentage of SIB, could be utilised for this purpose with members of the Guesstam attached to assist. Efforts could then be made to tackle the black spots mentioned earlier in this report and they could concentrate on any section of the line according to necessity. The corruption of ISR personnel could also be dealt with and a few examples would no doubt tend to improve matters. Something of this nature seems very necessary, at least until the position is eased, for it is obviously a question of prevention rather than subsequent investigation. Little can be done when an Incident Report reaches the SLM about four or five days after the occurrence. Such a Section would need to be mobile and a headquarters could

/well.....

will be established at the HQ of the 30th En Bli who receive all reports of incidents on the majority of the Western Italy lines. Failing this, two or more men might be detailed to specialize in railway thefts, etc, in each area, i.e. BARI, NAPLES and CASERTA, etc. These men would also need Questionnaire Agents and assistance in making raids, etc.

The question of pilfering and doubtful loading of rail-wagons at the docks has not been investigated, as this appears to be a separate problem, but no doubt a large amount of Allied Forces property goes astray here. Mail cars are now provided with couriers and if these men do their jobs the position seems satisfactory.

The difficulties regarding many suggestions are appreciated, but it appears that thieves are taking advantage of our lack of effort. It certainly seems that action must be taken to properly secure wagons and this should be given priority. Not all the suggestions will be deemed practicable, but some very firm action is necessary to curtail the activities of determined and persistent train thieves.

Respectfully submitted,

(Signed) F. JOHNSON, Capt  
Supt  
Special Investigation Branch

8702

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION A.C.

ALLIED ~~CONTROL~~ COMMISSION

PROVINCE OF REGGIO IN CALABRIA

220/22

SUBJECT: REPORT OF INVESTIGATION.

REF: REG. 1/29/0  
26 MAR 45

TO: TPTN. S.C. A.C.  
C/O TN INC. C.M.D.

1. Your AC/220/Tn 4 of 5 Feb. Car 200886 was loaded and sealed by Consorzio Agrario on 8 Jan, delivered same day by train 0120 with A.C. labels for Leghorn. It arrived Battipaglia 13 Jan on Tn. YY and left same day on special train 0.
2. From above I gather that normal freight service was used.

*BW Boddy*

B. W. BODDY  
CAPTAIN  
DIVN. SUPT. TPTN. S.C. A.C.  
REGGIO CAL.

6721

220/21

ACP/av

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AG.  
(RAIL DIVISION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
G.M.F.

13 March 1945

Tel. 843236  
Ref: AG/220/Tn 4

TO : Rail Movements

SUBJECT : Illegal possession of Olive Oil by Station Master  
Taranto

1. A complaint was registered last December that the Stationmaster at Taranto had been detected carrying illicit olive oil in his personal baggage.
2. I.S.D. enquiry proves that the man concerned was a retired 2nd class station master who stated he was the Taranto stationmaster in the hope that such a high position would ensure the return of his oil.

O.H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.S.  
Chief, Rail Division

6700

Copy to: Regional Commissioner, Southern Region  
(Complaint of Taranto Zone Commissioner)

Ministry of Transports  
I.S.R. General Directorate  
Movement Service

Rome 10 MAR 1945  
M.P. 424/4990 43/1944/Deca/3170/35  
Ref: AC. 320/1/Tn. of  
29 November 1944

Subject:  
Discipline.

Headquarters  
Allied Commission - APO 394  
Transportation Sub Commission

1. Further to note same file dated 16 December 1944, we report about the investigation made on the distress of an olive oil can, that was found out into the baggage of a passenger riding the Bari Naples train of 10 November 1944 and who stated to be the Station Master of Taranto.

2. It results that the above agent is not the Taranto Station Master.

3. In fact, the offender is the former 2d Class Station Master Meledandri Zoroastro, who alleged to be the Station Master of Taranto in order to get back his oil.

4. As said man is a pensioned off employee, dismissed from I.S.R. since 29 February 1944, no disciplinary measure has been taken against him.

Director General  
Signed: Di Raimondo

6729

Ca.10.cb.

1575

MINISTERO DEI TRASPORTI



~~MINISTERO DELLE COMUNICAZIONI~~  
FERROVIE DELLO STATO - DIREZIONE GENERALE

(1) Servizio Movimento

Roma, 10 MAR 1945  
N. M.P. 424/49903/43/1944  
Al N.A.C. 320/1/ del 29/XI/44 D  
Tn  
Seca/3170/35

OGGETTO: Disciplina

AL GRANQUARTIERE COMMISSIONE ALLEATA  
APO 394 -SOTTOCOMMISSIONE TRASPORTI

- 1) A seguito della lettera pari numero del 16/12 u.s., si riferisce circa l'esito degli accertamenti disposti in merito all'avvenuta confisca di una lattina di olio di oliva -contenuta nella valigia di un viaggiatore qualificatosi per il Capo stazione di Taranto- sul treno Bari-Napoli del 10/XI/1944.
- 2) E' stato escluso trattarsi del Titolare della stazione di Taranto.
- 3) Trattasi invece dell'ex Capo stazione di 2° classe Meledandri Zoroastro, il quale si qualificò pel Capo stazione di Taranto allo scopo di ottenere la restituzione dell'olio.
- 4) Nessun provvedimento disciplinare è stato preso nei riguardi del Meledandri, trattandosi di un pensionato, che non fa più parte dell'Amministrazione Ferroviaria dal 29 Febbraio 1944.

IL DIRETTORE GENERALE

*Indi Simoni*

6728

Stub. Tip. Pucci - Antona - Ord. 37 - 30-5-12-XX - 1.701.921.1

1576

220/19

ACP/1c

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AC  
(RAIL DIVISION)  
c/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.P.

Tel. 843238  
Ref. AC/220/In 4  
6 March 1945

TO : Public Safety Sub-Commission HQ. AC

SUBJECT : Pilferage on Railway.

1. Reference is your AC/14619/PS of 27 February.
2. ISR took over operation of Line 90 between Rome and Naples, and the whole of the Naples Compartiments as from 1 March 45.
3. It is felt that any suggestion you have to make for guarding the trains would be appreciated by CC Train Guards, Italy, especially in view of the newly created Rail Police Force.
4. May this Sub Commission be advised please of any developments in this respect?

*[Handwritten Signature]*  
 O. H. LINDBERG  
 Lieut. Col. R.E.,  
 Chief, Rail Division.

Copy to: MRS - Building.

6727

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
Public Safety Sub-Commission  
APO 394

Tel : 489081-365

27 February 1945

AC/14619/PS

SUBJECT : Pilferage on Railways

TO : Transportation Sub-Commission  
(Rail Section) ✓

1. Reference your letter AC/220/In.4 dated 9 Feb, 1945.
2. The Director General of Public Security, Ministry of the Interior, has been advised to strengthen the police employed on guarding railways in order to prevent pilfering.
3. As you are aware, the Ministry of Transport have drafted a decree proposing to form a special Corps of Railway Guards, of some 2000 men. This scheme has the approval of the Ministry of the Interior.
4. It is assumed that when it is finally decided that the Italian State Railways will take over the operation of both rail lines between Naples and Rome, arrangements will be made by the Italian authorities to provide adequate protection.

*John W. Chapman*  
John W. CHAPMAN  
Colonel, J.A.G.D.  
Director Public Safety  
Sub-Commission.

6726

APW/wg.

1578

220/17

AGP/av

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AC.  
(RAIL DIVISION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.F.

Tel. 843238  
Ref. AC/220/Tn 4

19 February 45

TO : Ports and Warehousing Division.

SUBJECT : Lack of ACC Guards at Civitatecchia.

1. Reference is to the attached communication from MRS Police Company.
2. Have you any observations on the matter please, before it is submitted to Public Safety Sub Commission for action? A definitive recommendation in respect of number of guards considered essential would be of help.

*all*  
O.H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.E.  
Chief, Rail Division

6725

Allied Force  
MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE  
186th Military Police Company  
Office of Commanding Officer

APC # 512  
14 February 1945

SUBJECT: Lack of ACC Guards at Civitavecchia.

TO : C.O., Railway Military Police-Italy, APC 512.

1. It has been brought to my attention that trains loaded with ACC Material at Civitavecchia are going out either unguarded or under guard by personnel of the Railway Military Police.

2. Trains are loaded at the docks in Civitavecchia and from there proceed either North or South. For some reason Italian guards are not placed on many of these trains. When the cars leave the railroads yard at Civitavecchia it is necessary to use American guards, if they are available.

3. In view of our definite shortage of guards it is requested that ACC Headquarters be informed of this situation and adequate guard personnel be assigned to ACC, Civitavecchia.

*Paul L. Meinert*  
PAUL L. MEINERT  
1st Lieut., F.A.  
Commanding.

370.091:MP 1st Ind.  
AF, MIL RY SV, HQ RY MIL POL ITALY, APC 512 US Army, 15 Feb 1945.

TO: A.C. Transportation Sub-Commission, APC 394, US Army.

1. For your information.

2. Request information as to any action taken in this situation.

*Loren J. Mann*  
LOREN J. MANN  
Captain, Inf.  
Commanding

6724

220/15

ACP/1c

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AC.  
(RAIL DIVISION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.F.

Tel. 843238  
Our Ref. AC/220/Tn 4

9 February 1945

TO : Public Safety Sub Commission  
HQ., AC.

SUBJECT : Pilferage on Railways.

1. Attached hereto is an extract minute of Meeting of Traffic Sub-Committee of Allied Railway Board.
2. The pilferage from Railways is reaching considerable proportions and it was reported at the meeting that hold ups have occurred on line 89 between Naples and Rome.
3. It should be pointed out that both rail lines between Naples and Rome will shortly be operated entirely by personnel of the ISR without Military Railway supervision, and adequate protection is essential, if we are to develop the railway services of the country as a means of ensuring satisfactory distribution.

*O. H. Lindberg, Lt. Col.*  
O.H.LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.E.,  
Chief, Rail Division.

6723

EXTRACTMINUTES OF FIRST MEETING  
of the  
Allied Railway Board  
TRAFFIC SUB-COMMITTEE

1 Feb.45.

2 (a). PILFERAGE:

Another major problem with we are confronted is pilferage from and robbery of trains, and it was agreed that action must be taken at once to put a stop to it.

G-4, Mov & Tn, AFHQ is attempting to get an increase in guards on trains.

The Italian State Railways are to apply to the Minister of Interior for help in the form of additional protection for trains. They will also make a special effort to stop unauthorized civilians from riding freight trains.

The Military Railway Service and Italiana State Railways are at present working on lighting facilities for all principal yards, in an effort to do away with pilfering of cars in yards. Yard guards have been supplemented with Italian State Railways police in the Rome Area and arrangements have been made for special guards.

3. Action as directed will be taken by representative members concerned without further advise.

W.P.WILSON  
Col. TC  
Chairman

(4)

SECRET

6722

ALLIED FORCE  
MILITARY RAILWAY SERVICE  
183rd MILITARY POLICE COMPANY  
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDING OFFICER

APO #512  
23 January 1945

SUBJECT: REPORT OF INVESTIGATION

TO : COMMANDING OFFICER, RAILWAY MILITARY POLICE- ITALY.

1. A report of investigation, is herewith submitted on boxcar # 200886.

2. Boxcar # 200886, contents G.L. Soap, arrived in the Naples Central yards, in the Y area, at approximately 1530 hrs 20 Jan 45, in a pilfered condition. There were no guards on this train when it arrived. One door was unwired & open approximately 5". Pilferage was discovered, at this time, by SGT. Bode, 183rd MP Co and estimated at about 10 cases of soap missing. SGT. Bode also reports that there were no car tags or other identifiable markings on this boxcar. I checked with the East Naples R.T.O. as to the arrival of this car and was told that there was no record at all of its arrival or departure. Upon contacting the Naples Central yards R.T.O. received information that car #200886, contents ACC soap, had been loaded at Reggio Calabria at Consorzio Agriani Provinciale and was consigned to Consorzio at Leghorn. This lone car left Reggio Calabria with a troop train unescorted, on the 8 Jan 45 and arrived, with engine #014 in the Naples Central yards at about 1730 hours, 20 Jan 45 without a guard. This car was in a pilfered condition upon arrival and had no car tags or other markings. New car tags will be placed on car #200886 and it will be sent to its destination under the control of Italian Army escorts.

For the Commanding Officer

*Jack D. Hansford*  
Jack D. Hansford  
1st Lt. Inf.  
Investigating Officer  
183rd MP Co. 6721

220/13

CG/ic

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.  
(RAIL SECTION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.F.

Tel: 843402  
Our Reference: AC/220/Tn

12 January 1945

TO : AC. Div. Supt.  
Bologna Div. (Rimini)  
C.M.F.

SUBJECT : Sabotage - ISR

1. Reference is to HQ 86(Army) Area APM 2/2 dated 5 January 45, copy to you.
2. No information on this subject has reached this office. Can you explain the circumstances leading up to above letter please?

*O. H. Linberg*  
O. H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.E.,  
Chief, Rail Section.

6720

220/13

CG/ic

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, A.C.  
(RAIL SECTION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.F.

Tel: 843402  
Our Reference: AG/220/Tn

12 January 1945

TO : AC. Div. Supt.  
Bologna Div. (Rimini)  
C.M.F.

SUBJECT : Sabotage - ISR

1. Reference is to HQ 80(Army) Area APM 2/2 dated 5 January 45, copy to you.
2. No information on this subject has reached this office. Can you explain the circumstances leading up to above letter please?

*O. H. Lindberg*  
O. H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.E.,  
Chief, Rail Section.

6720

SUBJECT:- Sabotage - Italian State Railway.

HQ 86 (Army) Aerea  
AFM 2/2

5 Jan 45

DPM Rear HQ EIGHTH Army

Copy to:- Div Supt Bologna Div (Rimini)  
Transportation Sub-Commission  
(Rails Allied Commission)

---

Please find attached, reports from A.C.C.

No trace of 79 Pioneer Saction can be found in Army Troops, and there appears to be some doubt as to whether this was the correct unit.

Ref the report in respect of No. I Polish Bakery. May the necessary action please be taken with Pol Corps in this case.

It is considered that the only possible method of combating this type of incident is by publishing an Army Order on the subject, and stern action in dealing with any cases brought to light.

ACC have been requested to supply this office with full information on any future incidents. If agreed may steps be taken to initiate the necessary Army Order please.

JS.

Major, R.A.,  
Assistant Provost Marshal.

6719

1586

COPY

HEADQUARTERS  
AMG/ AG  
ABRUZZI-MARCHE REGION  
C.M.F.

R5/517/3

26 December 1944.

SUBJECT : Merchandise by Rail

TO : Transportation Sub-Commission, Railways, HQ.AG.

1. Attached please find copies of letters received by this office which are hereby forwarded to your Division for such action as is deemed necessary.

For the Regional Commissioner:

sgd: D.P.Richardson  
Capt.Inf.  
Regional Civil  
Transport Office.

Copy to: R5/517/3

6718

1587

COPY

FROM: Consorzio Agrario Chieti (Ortona branch)  
TO : R.S.O. Abruzzi-Marche Region  
SUBJECT : Merchandise by Rail  
DATE : 10 December 1944

We have recently found that many rail-wagons containing AMG Supplies are arriving at this station (Ortona) in open wagons and without tarpaulins; also with doors not properly secured, either without sealing or sealed with a plain wire, and in every case without the lead seals, so as to make the theft of the merchandise a simple matter.

In consequence of these omissions, the last wagon of sugar N.16908 despatched from Naples 17 November 1944 had a shortage of a good 34 sacks.

As for the grain (from Campobasso Province), despite it being carried in box-wagons were without secure seals. It is considered that these shortages are chiefly the result of theft in transit.

We have taken the precaution of bringing these points to the notice also of the R.T.O. (Ortona).

In each separate case of irregularity we have immediately asked the help of the Finance Guards at the unloading, the certification of contents, and the making out of the relative "verbales".

Will you kindly take up with the State Railways that they should make arrangements for the sealing of the wagons and at despatch will the lead seals and for the proper guarding of them both in transit and at stations, particularly during the night.

FROM: HQ. AC/AMG ABRUZZI MARCHE REGION (Economics & Supply).  
TO : Regional and Civil Transport Officer  
REF : R5/518/165  
DATE: 20 December 44  
SUBJECT : Merchandise by Rail.

6717

1. Ref. attached report.

2. Would kindly take this up with Transportation Sub-Commission? I know of course that the open wagons sometimes have to be used

a simple matter.

In consequence of these omissions, the last wagon of sugar N.16908 despatched from Naples 17 November 1944 had a shortage of a good 34 sacks.

As for the grain (from Campobasso Province), despite its being carried in box-wagons were without secure seals. It is considered that these shortages are chiefly the result of theft in transit.

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TO : Regional and Civil Transport Officer

REF : R5/516/165

DATE: 20 December 44

SUBJECT : Merchandise by Rail.

6717

1. Ref. attached report.

2. Would kindly take this up with Transportation Sub-Commission? I know of course that the open wagons sometimes have to be used because there are no box-wagons available and the stuff has to be shifted. But such things as sugar, grain which are highly pilferage and spoiled by rain should be given priority for box-wagons.

The lead seals, no doubt you know, are the normal Italian Railway seals sealing the 2 ends of a piece of string passed through eye holes on door and wheel of wagons.

For the Regional Commissioner:

Signed: D. SHAW KENNEDY

Captain,  
Regional Supply Officer

220/11

AGP/lc

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, AC.  
(RAIL SECTION)  
C/o Transportation Increment  
C.M.F.

Tel: 483238  
Our Reference: AG/220/Tn

27 December 44.

TO : Movements,  
West Italy,  
C.M.F.

SUBJECT : Complaints against British soldiers.

1. The enclosed copy of a report is sent you for such action as you now find possible.

*C. H. Lindberg*  
C. H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col., R.E.,  
Chief, Rail Section

Copy to: O.C., Railway Guards, L. of C. Area.

6716

Copy.

220/10

ALLIED COMMISSION

Naples Zone

(Provinces of Naples, Avellino, Benevento)

-----  
PREFETTURA NAPLES.

Naples 16 December 1944.

NZ/PS/ P 2 B

SUBJECT : Complaints against British soldiers.

TO : Major Bowers - Rail Transportation - A 9 Southern Region.

1. At 7 pm on 8th December a goods train left Naples and arrived at Casalnuovo about 8 pm.
2. Some shunting of cars took place and during this process two British soldiers were seen to sell five cases of soap, each case weighing 50 Kilos.
3. The soldiers asked 4000 lire but the purchasers, four Italian Soldiers, offered only 2000 lire.
4. The transaction was watched by CC.RR. who later arrested the four Italians and recovered the soap.

Forwarded for enquiry of the Military Unit guarding the trains.

Sgd Francis Scife Capt.

Public Safety Officer Naples  
Zone.

6715

220/9

Subject:- Pilferages on Rly.  
AC Transportation Sub-Commission,  
APO 394.

R/2/47c  
14 Dec 44.

Ref your IM 55 dated 9 Dec 44.

1. Communications regarding pilferages should be added HQ Movements West Italy or HQ Movements East Italy as the case may be, with a copy to the H.Q.
2. Full particulars should be given, i.e., Consignor and Consignee, dates of loading and unloading, probable route travelled.
3. On the pilferage referred to in your a/q letter you will probably receive a direct reply from units under comd this H.Q. (30 Som.L.I. and 510 It.Gd.Bn.)

CMF  
RBH/VG

G.H.F. Rault. Lt.Col.  
Commanding Rly Gds L of C Area.

Copy: Movwit.  
Moveit.  
30 Som.L.I. (Letter referred to addsd 'C' Coy).  
510 It.Gd.Bn. (Letter referred to addsd 4 Coy 6714 Bn Indisi).

1592



**MINISTERO DELLE COMUNICAZIONI**  
FERROVIE DELLO STATO - DIREZIONE GENERALE  
(1) Servizio Movimento

Roma, 16 DIC 1944 <sup>220/8</sup>  
N.M.P. 424/49903/43/1944/  
Al N.AC/320/1/T<sub>1</sub> del 29/11/1944 C.V.  
*Dece*  
1728/30

OGGETTO. Discipline

Al Granquartiere Commissione Alleata  
APO 394 - Sottocommissione Trasporti

- 1) Ho subito disposto accertamenti per identificare il Capo stazione al quale il 10/11/1944, nella stazione di Taranto, durante un'ispezione al treno Bari - Napoli, venne confiscato un gallone circa d'olio d'oliva.
- 2) Assicuro che a carico del colpevole saranno adottati adeguati provvedimenti.

Stab. Tip. Puccini - Ancona - Ori. 1/37 - 204-2-XX - 1.701.021/4

*Noted*

*[Signature]*  
DIRETTORE GENERALE

6713

1593

Ministry of Communications  
I.S.R. Direction General  
Transportation Service

Rome 6 Dec 1944

M.P. 424/49903/43/1944/Jca/1728/20

Reply to letter AC/820/Tn.  
of 29 Nov. 1944

Subject:  
Discipline

To HQ. A.C. Transp. Sub-Comm.

A P O 394

1) I have, at once, arranged investigations to identify the Station Master, from whom, on 10 Nov.44, at Taranto Station, during an inspection on Bari - Naples train, was confiscated about one gallon of olive oil.

2) I confirm that proper action will be taken on the matter.

For the Director General

Signed: Lo Cigno

Cu.15.cb.

6712

ACP/ld

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 324  
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION

Tele : 478701

29 November 1944

Our.ref.: AC/220/1/Tn

TO : Gen. Di Raimondo  
I.S.R.

SUBJECT : Illegal possession of Olive Oil by Station Master, Taranto

1. I am sending you copies of letters in this case, and you will see how strongly the Zone Commissioner feels about the matter.
2. The Station Master at Taranto is in a particular position of trust, and should be the first to set an example.
3. Disciplinary action is asked for in this case, and information as to the steps you take will be appreciated.

D. S. ADAMS  
Colonel, C.E.,  
Director, Tn. S/C.

Enclosures : Copies of letters

6711

COPY

ALLIED COMMISSION - SOUTHERN REGION  
TARANTO ZONE

SUBJECT: Illegal Possession of Olive Oil.

REF: T/ZPS/23

14 Nov. 44

TO : Hq., Southern Region  
Allied Commission, Naples.

1. The attached report from the Agricultural Officer is self explanatory. I feel very strongly that action should be taken to have the station master concerned removed.

2. The attitude adopted was that this suitcase was exempt from search as he is the station master.

3. If he is allowed to get away with this the train search becomes a farce.

sgd: Turner-Coles, Lt. Col.  
Zone Commissioner

WTC:mb

6710

COPY

SUBJECT : Station Master Taranto +

Sir,

The Bari-Naples train is inspected by the Questura in Taranto station for contraband goods.

During the inspection on the evening of the 10th Nov.44 the suitcase of the Station Master Taranto was opened which contained a prepared can holding approximately 1 gallon of Olive Oil. The Oil was confiscated as he did not have a permit to carry Oil.

signature illegible  
Lieutenant  
Agricultural Officer  
Taranto Zone.

14 Nov. 44.

6709

220/7

AGP/1c

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION (AC)  
( Rail Section )  
C/o Transportation Increment,  
C. M. F.

Tel: 843207

Our Reference: AC/220/Tn.

8 December 44.

Your Ref: PAC/24/B/81927/ICCA/1446/35

TO : Ministry of Communications  
ISR General Direction

SUBJECT : Watch on Railways Yards.

1. Reference your letter of 23 Nov. 44 on above subject.
2. Director General, Public Security, Ministry of the Interior, asks that Minister of Communications refer this matter to him for attention, when arrangements for arming of the guards will be made.

*O. H. Lindberg Capt*  
O. H. LINDBERG  
Lt. Col. R.E.,  
Chief, Rail Section.

6708

1598

*John S. ...*

2206

AG Rear Eighth Army.

04/82

25 NOV 44.

SUBJECT: Issues in Transit.

HQ Allied GCMC  
HQ 45 Southern Region

Copies to: AI for Civil Affairs Section  
New York  
AI for Command Det 86 Area

Reference to signal P/15.1 dated 2 Nov 44.

1. Railway No. 18/169274 left Naples 6 Nov 44, the contents according to waybill No. 325 being 210 x 210 lb sacks of sugar. The wagon was lashed with seals numbered 42 and 43.
2. The wagon arrived at MILMI on 18 Nov 44. The seals on arrival were numbered 46 and 56. The contents consisted of 87 x 210 lb sacks, a shortage of 123 sacks.
3. Pilgrage report No. P/151/6 dated 20 Nov 44 was made out by RTO MILMI copies going to AM 66 Area.
4. The seals on which the theft took place, and the fact that differently numbered seals of the correct type were used by the thieves, would appear to indicate that this is an organized piece of work into which you may wish to make special inquiries.

5. Any further information elicited will be communicated to you at once.
6. Re para 1 above. It is regretted that the sacks were reported in my signal to be of 80 kg each. They were, in fact, 210 lb sacks.

*John S. ...*  
 Group Captain,  
 Officer Commanding,  
 AG Eighth Army.

for

6797

HEADQUARTERS  
 27 NOV 1944

Copies to: AI for Civil Affairs Section  
New Delhi  
413 Roadhouse Det 36 Area

Reference to signal R/1991 dated 2 Nov 44.

1. Trainers No. 34/122274 Iery Bagles 6 Nov 44, the contents according to waybill No. 526 being 210 x 210 lb sacks of sugar. The wagon was despatched with seals numbered 42 and 43.
2. The railway arrived R. PUNJI on 15 Nov 44. The seals on arrival were numbered 46 and 56. The contents consisted of 87 x 210 lb sacks, a shortage of 125 sacks.
3. Pilferage report No. 2/318/6 dated 14 Nov 44 was made out by HIO BIMIJI copies sent to AI 11 66 Area.
4. The seals on which the theft took place, and the fact that differently numbered seals of the correct type were used by the thieves, would appear to indicate that this is an organised piece of work into which you may wish to make special inquiries.
5. Any further information elicited will be communicated to you at once.
6. Re para 1 above. It is regretted that the sacks were reported in my signal to be of 20 Kg each. They were, in fact, 210 lb sacks.

*WTA* } *Young Major RA*  
*for* }  
 Group Captain,  
 Officer Commanding,  
 AMC Eighth Army.

6797

RECORDED  
 27 NOV 1944  
 A. C.

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
A.F.C. 394  
Food Sub-Commission

220/5

KJC/au

Tel : 408

27 November 1944

Ref : 53-1/87/FOOD

SUBJECT : Pilferage

TO : Transportation Sub-Commission

1. Advice has been received from Naples that pilferage of olive oil from tank cars Calabria to Naples has recently increased. More cars are arriving with ~~sacks~~ <sup>seals</sup> broken and more losses are being incurred.

2/ The following losses have been incurred.

ARRIVAL DATE	CAR No	FROM	LOSS QUINTALS
6 Nov.	982135	Pizzo	13.36
" "	982038	"	17.37
19 Nov.	516015	Gioia	20.00
" "	982147	Tayro	24.92

3. Please take action to have the trains from Calabria better guarded.

*J. H. H. H.*  
J. H. H. H.

Major, RASC

Acting Director; Food Sub-Commission

1601

Translation ( )

Ministry of Communications  
I S R General Direction  
PAG Service

220/4  
Rome 23.11.45  
PAG/24/B/81927/Deccal  
1446/35

Subject: Watch on railway yards

Allied Commission  
Transport Subcommittee  
Railways - Rome

The Chief of Rome Compartimento informs us about the always increasing number of pilferages on railway yards, where cars loaded with foodstuffs and clothes, assigned to Military Bodies or Ministries, are frequently pilferaged.

The I S R Administration, troubled by such continuous delinquencies, charged a certain number of railwaymen with watch on railway yards, but these employees, chiefly during the night, refuse to run the yards, alleging that they are unarmed. In order to put the watch service in full efficiency, it should be necessary to arm regularly said employees.

We beg therefore to examine the possibility of supplying us with the needed arms for this purpose.

We are awaiting for a kind reply. Director General

F.to DI RAIMONDO

*34 copies*

Ca.ng22

See app. file 32/



MINISTERO DELLE COMUNICAZIONI  
FERROVIE DELLO STATO - DIREZIONE GENERALE  
O SERVIZIO P.A.G.

Roma, 23 NOV 1944  
N. PAG. 24/B/31927/3cca  
Al N. del 1446/35

OGGETTO: Sorveglianza negli scali ferroviari

ALLA COMMISSIONE ALLEATA  
SOTTOCOMMISSIONE TRASPORTI (FERROVIE)

R O M A

Dal Capo Compartimento di Roma sono pervenute segnalazioni sul crescendo dei furti negli scali ferroviari, della manomissione di carri contenenti viveri ed indumenti diretti ad Enti militari o Ministeri.

Questa Amministrazione, preoccupata dal continuo verificarsi delle azioni delittuose del genere, ha preposto alle funzioni di guardia giurata, un certo numero di agenti ferroviari alla sorveglianza dei vari scali, ma detti agenti, specie nelle ore notturne, si rifiutano di girare per i piazzali, perchè sprovvisti di armi, onde permettere loro di svolgere con maggior ocularietà le attribuzioni ad essi affidati.

Allo scopo di rendere efficace il servizio di che trattasi, sarebbe necessario che gli agenti fossero regolarmente armati, ed è perciò che si rivolge preghiera a codesta Commissione di esaminare la pos-

Stab. Tip. Pitt. - A. Comp. - (rd. 37 - 3) - (44 - XX - 170135) - 4 - 1 -

BF(1) Servizio

6704

sibilità di concedere le armi occorrenti.  
Si rimane in attesa di un cortese cenno di risposta.

IL DIRETTORE GENERALE

*Vedi Ramon*

1604

AGP/nf

220/3

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Transportation Sub-Commission

16 November 1944

Tel. 478701

Our Ref: AC/TN/220/

TO : Food Sub-Commission  
HQ. A.C.

SUBJECT : Pilferages.

- 1 Reference is to your letter 53-1/64/Food of 8 November.
- 2 I am submitting details to the M.R.S. in order that the freight cars which caused damage through wet hay be carded for attention.
- 3 In regard to pilferage, you report it far from definite.
- 4 It is not indicated as to whether the freight cars were wired before despatch, and the document which should accompany the goods would only establish shortage and not prevent it.
- 5 It is suggested that if freight cars are satisfactorily wired the liability to pilferage will be reduced to a minimum.

*D. S. Adams*  
 D.S. ADAMS  
 Colonel, C.E.  
 Director, Tn. Sub. Comm.

Copy to: Public Safety S/C  
 M.R.S. (for action re cars)  
 Movements, Tn. Sub. Comm.

6703

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
Food Sub-Commission

KJC/LE

Tel. 515

53-1/64/FOOD

8 November 1944

SUBJECT: Pilferage

TO : HQ AC Transportation Sub-Commission  
Rail Section, (Capt. Ping)

1. We are enclosing the translation of a report on the conditions of 16 cars of flour received in Rome from Foggia. The report was made by the Consorzio Agrario, the consignee.
2. You will notice that considerable damage was done because the cars were in bad condition and leaked.
3. Many cars arrived with broken sacks which may have been caused by thieves or which may have been the result of poor quality sacks. The consignee reports that many of the cars arrived with the doors open which may indicate thievery. Nineteen sacks were definitively missing from car No. 1711881.
4. We are signalling the Capt. Sinclair of Foggia Province to request the Consorzio to try to avoid loading leaky cars and to put a document in each car indicating the contents of the car.
5. Will you please request the railroad to investigate and report on the cars on the attached list.

For the Acting Chief Commissioner:

  
W.J. LEGG  
Colonel  
Director, Food Sub-Commission

6700

Rome, 5 November 1944

## FLOUR FROM FOGGIA

RECEIVING MILL	NUMBER OF THE CAR	DATE OF ARRIVAL	DICHIANATA		RECEIVED		REMARKS
			SACKS	QLS	SACKS	QLS	
CERERE	1127184	31/10/44			348	131	The stock is in par wet, 60 sack are missire of contents for 8.20 qls.
PANTAMELLA	17497	1/11/1944			345	139,21	35 sacks are leaking
"	94667	2/11/44			245	117,50	" " "
"	1909	"			298	146,81	" " "
"	16276	"			340	169,92	" " "
"	192776	3/11/44			345	139,41	" " "
"	1026183	"			308	142,=	" " "
"	1131938	"			370	140,96	" " "
"	1021813	"			349	137,25	237 $\%$ wet, 35 broken with a loss of 235 Kg.
"	201861	"			350	136,80	180 $\%$ wet, 45 broken with a loss of 320 Kg.
"	991272	"			349	136,70	173 $\%$ wet, 30 broken with a loss Kg. 290
"	154840	"			475	186,10	152 $\%$ wet, 62 broken with a loss 390 Kg.
NATALINI	77196528	11/11/1944			342	127,25	all wet and several broken
"	27813	"			294	114,57	153 $\%$ wet and several broken
"	1711881	"	300		281	140,50	19 $\%$ sacks are missing and several are broken
AGOSTINELLI	8080 ex 97967 transhipment at S. Severo	"	300		297	145,15	3 $\%$ sacks are missing and several are broken and wet.

1607

ACP/cg

SECRET.

220/1

HEADQUARTERS ALLIED COMMISSION  
APO 394  
TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION

Tel: 478701

24<sup>th</sup> Nov 1944

Our Ref.: AC Tn.220/

TO : G-4 Mov. & Tn.  
AFHQ.

SUBJECT : Pilferage from Railway Wagons.

1. Attached hereto is a copy of a report submitted by one of the clerks of our representative at Naples.
2. It reveals a very serious state of affairs, and would appear to justify investigation.

*D.S.*  
 for. D.S. ADAMS  
 Colonel, U.S.,  
 Director, Tn. S.C.

6700

1608