

ACC

AC258/1/TN4

10000/148/2354

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10000/148/2354

ACCIDENT - MISC. REPORTS OF
AUG. 1944 - DEC. 1945

GENERAL DIRECTION ISR.
Transportation Dept.

1 December 1945
M.112.52.24.45

SUBJECT: Collision of trains
7342 & 7304 at Bicocca
on 28 November 1945

To: DIRECTION M.R.S.
Bldg.

- 1.- We beg to inform that at 2040 hrs. of 28 Nov. train 7304 ex Syracuse, entered Bicocca station (line 97) unobserving protection signal and collided with train 7342 which was shunting on deviation point for line 99.
- 2.- Owing to collision three cars derailed and suffered heavy damages, and both lines were interrupted. Heavy damages to engine of train 7304. Light damages to tracks; no injuries to persons.
- 3.- Line 99 was cleared at 0800 hrs. of 29 Nov., and line 97 at 1330 hrs. of same day.
- 4.- During the interruption transfers was made on following trains: AT 414 with stock sent from Catania; 4933 with AT 492. Train EVAT 521 has been routed via Messina.
- 5.- Investigations are being made in order to ascertain eventual responsibilities, which will be severely punished.

THE GENERAL DIRECTOR
Sgd. Di Rainondo

May Matson
For Information
May London
12/3/45

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION, A. C.
(Rail Division)
% TRANSPORTATION (BR) MAIN, C. M. F.

Tel. 843209
Ref. AC/32/8258/1/Tn4

8 November 1945

SUBJECT : Accidents on Italian State Railways.

TO : Director, Transportation S/C.

1. Attached hereto are two reports of incidents which have occurred on the Italian State Railways within the last few days. Perhaps, you may desire to draw the attention of the Public Safety Sub-Commission to the incident at Aversa.

2. As to the accident in the Varano tunnel, it will be observed that the absence of glass in the windows caused the trouble. I have already drawn your attention to the export of Italian glass to Austria.

R. P. MOSS
Chief, Rail Division

Attachments:

As stated above.

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION (RAIL)
ROME DIVISION

14 June 1945

Ref. Tco/RD/4

SUBJECT: Rail CollisionTO : Col. Thomas, Deputy Director,
AC Transportation Sub-Commission

Last night at 21:20 hours, a collision of trains 5641 & 5646 took place between Baschi and Castiglione, exactly between 114 and 115 kilometers.

There are about 150 people killed and injured, mostly Italian military and 4 Englishmen travelling on 5646 train and heavy damages to the engines, rolling stock, and material. Moreover 3 wagons loaded with gasoline drums caught on fire.

The causes of the accident are due to the fact that trains 5646 and 5641 were supposed to have normal meeting at Attigliano station and this meeting was changed to Baschi, it seems, without any notice to train 5641 which had made normal stop in said station.

When 5641 arrived at Baschi, the Station Master did not withdraw the train order and made gesture with his hand to proceed, in order to get the train's rear end off the entrance points.

The engine-driver who had not been notified about the meeting, interpreted such a gesture as a signal to proceed and left, causing collision with 5646 train coming in the opposite direction.

The tool wagon, officials of various services, and a railway surgeon are on the spot. All traffic is stopped. Trans-shipment of passengers from train 3401 on 8 empties which arrived there with the tool wagon will be provided for.

This line will be blocked for approximately two days.

/sgl/ S.C. HALL, Capt. T.C.,
A.C. Rail T.N. Officer,
Rome Div.

REPORT

TO : THE CHIEF COMMANDING
510 TROVOST GOR
B.M. POLICE

Sir,

I have to report that at Bari on the 27-2-45 at about 0030 hrs I received instructions to proceed to the scene of an accident on the Bari-Foggia road 5 miles north of the 15 km Stone Blockade U.S. Army involving a U.S. Vehicle and a train engine and truck.

On my arrival I saw a 3 ton Dodge U.S. No. 15556970 lying upside down on the road. Enquiries revealed that the driver was only suffering from a head and elbow and a cut lip.

The driver had already received medical treatment at the Central MI BOMBARDI, and had returned to the scene. I obtained his particulars which are as follows: -

B/51241 DOW. MIZENBERG
468 PARASITICIAN GENERAL TRANSPORT OUT
R.A.S.O.

In the centre of the road and pushed off the rails was a railway engine with a small railway truck still attached. I could not see any number on the railway engine, but I learnt from the driver that it was locomotive No. 2. The driver: -

PARACCHIAI NICOLA
155 VIA FLORENCE
BARI

stated he was employed by the Car SICAM had engine being at No. 3 CORSO VITTORIO EMANUELE BARI. The fireman on the engine was: -

AZZURRI LUIGI
122 VIA S. ANTONIO
BARI

I obtained statements from all three concerned, which are attached.

Damage to the U.S. Vehicle was to such an extent that I could not hope to clarify every detail. The main body structure and frames were crushed, both front wings were badly bent, the top of the driving cab was badly bent in. This vehicle was recovered by 219 Ambulance Car Coy R.A.S.O. to which unit the driver is attached.

I had previously phoned 651 Italian Recovery Unit R.I.N.I. but they failed to arrive until after the vehicle had been placed on its four wheels, I therefore used their recovery wagon to pull the railway engine and truck on the rails.

Damage to the railway engine was the right rear part of the cab, which is made of wood, was smashed. The driver stated he thought the boiler was damaged, but after the engine was put back on the rails it drove away under

to about 10. 2.

Sheet No. 2

0720 hrs. The condition of the road was dry, visibility was good, it was day-light. There were no other injuries.

I gave the driver's accident slip to the Engine driver, in order to do this a vehicle was dispatched to 468 P.O. R. Coy HQ to bring back an accident form 38.76 as the driver was not in possession of one, neither was he in possession of a vehicle log book 412.

Sketch map of scene of accident is attached.

QUT
27-2-45
CH

3135715 J. MATTHEW/C
510 Provost Coy C.M.P.

STATEMENT

made by: -

P/31241 Det. MURRAY H.
468 P.O. C.M.P.
R.A.S.C.

On the 24-2-45 at about 0720 hrs I was driving three ton Dodge 5655520 from MURRAY to BARI after taking Italian labourers to MURRAY and was returning to the depot.

I had reached the bridge just before the level crossing, the sun was bright and directly in my eyes, suddenly I saw a train engine and truck crossing the main road. I applied my brakes but was unable to avoid colliding with the truck.

My vehicle turned over, I was able to climb out of the vehicle by the right hand door which had flown open.

At that moment two of our vehicles arrived on the scene. One driver took me to the Central MI BARRACK in BARI the other driver returned to Unit HQ and reported the accident.

After I had received medical treatment to my right elbow, I returned to the scene.

Later the Military Police arrived on the scene.

The speed of my vehicle was 20mph.

I did not see the sign denoting that a level crossing was ahead.

The road was dry.

QUT
27-2-45
CH

Sgt: - P/31241 MURRAY H.

TRANSPORTATION
SUB-COMMISSION

S U A T E N E N T

Made by: -

2/31241 Det. METRACHI M.
453 P.M. G.I. COY
S.A.S.C.

On the 24-2-45 at about 0720 hrs I was driving three ton Dodge 5656960 from MELBENNA to BARI after taking Italian labourers to HOLLENA and was returning to the docks.

I had reached the bridge just before the level crossing, the sun was bright and directly in my eyes, suddenly I saw a grain engine and truck crossing the main road. I applied my brakes but was unable to avoid colliding with the truck.

My vehicle turned over, I was able to climb out of the vehicle by the right hand door which had flown open.

At that moment two of our vehicles arrived on the scene. One driver took me to the Central AI ROOM in BARI the other driver returned to Unit HQ and reported the accident.

After I had received medical treatment to my right elbow, I returned to the scene.

Later the Military Police arrived on the scene.

The speed of my vehicle was 20mph.

I did not see the sign denoting that a level crossing was ahead.

The road was dry.

207
27-2-45
OL

Sgn: - 2/31241 METRACHI.

TRANSPORTATION SUB-COMMISSION RAIL SECTION		SEEN INITIALS
CHIEF.		
ASSISTANT		
ADMIN.		W. G. S.
CIVIL ENG.		
MECH. ENG.	1873	S. J.
TRAFFIC.		
STORES.		

STATEMENT

made by: -

PARNAMIRI HIRIA

195 VIA HIRIA

BARI (employed at: -

BARI

CORPO DELLA VIGILANZA 3

On 27-2-45 at 0720 hrs I, engine driver, was driving a engine along BARI-TRONCA railway of the Company SIDA, when approaching the level crossing BARI S. SPIRITO I gave repeated signals of whistle.

When I saw the road two from traffic I went through very slowly, but a British truck, which was coming from S. SPIRITO at a very high speed, collided with the truck carrying coal (which was att. to the engine) without applying the brakes in the attempt to avoid the collision.

When the accident occurred the whistle was still blowing and it would have continued if I had not stopped it. It is realized that the British driver had not applied the brakes because the road did not show any danger sign.

The English driver coming off the track after the accident had complained, stating that he did not see anything because blinded by the sun whilst he was proceeding along S. SPIRITO BARI ROAD.

At the collision I struck with the abdomen and shoulder against the tools case. It is a slight contusion. Damage to the engine: - the right corner of the driver's cab broken. It will be ascertained in the 7/8 days if the boiler has been broken. I have read over and under signed: -

PARNAMIRI HIRIA

BARI 27-2-45

True and correct translation

DI MASONI.

STATEMENT

made by: -

ACQUARONE LOUIS

195 VIA HIRIA

BARI

On the 27-2-45 at about 0720 hrs I, driver, was travelling in the engine with the engine driver along BARI-TRONCA railway. Of the company SIDA, when approaching the level crossing BARI-S. SPIRITO we reduced the speed to a few miles per hour and we gave the signal of whistle.

When we saw the road two from traffic we went through. But whilst we were crossing I saw a British truck coming from S. SPIRITO at a high speed and when it was at a very short distance from the engine, I called out, forecasting the accident.

The British truck collided with the truck carrying coal (which was att. to the engine) pushing it with the engine out off the rails.

At the collision I jumped off the engine. I have read and undersigned.

When I saw the cold water from the 18 I went through very slowly, but a British eagle, which was coming from S. 10000 at a very high speed, collided with the vessel carrying coal (which was not to the engine) without applying the brakes in the attempt to avoid the collision.

When the accident occurred the vehicle was still blocking one of the walls. I decontaminated it. I had not stopped it. It is possible that the British driver has not admitted the incident because the road did not show any speed signs.

The English driver coming off the road was accident and insurance, stating that he did not see anything because disabled by the sun whilst he was speeding along A167EN ENJOY WITH.

At the collision I struck with the abdomen and ankles against the tools case. It is a slight contusion. Damage to the organ - the right coast of the liver's a call for it. It will be superficial in the #/stomach if the boiler has been broken. I have read over and under-sighted."

UNIVERSITY MICROFILMS

FBI 77-2-10
 From: SAC, Cincinnati
 To: SAC, New York
 Re: MURKIN

物理人字源起知所學

ARMED AND DANGEROUS
194 VIA SARDING
1001 TROTTMAN

On the 27-2-45 at about 0720 hrs I witnessed, while travelling in the engine with the engine driver along EARL-PIGOTT railway, of the company BIRM, when approaching the level crossing EARL-SPIRING we reduced the speed to a few miles per hour and we gave the signal of whistle.

When we left the road free from traffic we went through. But whilst we were crossing I saw a British warplane from 3. approaching at a high speed, and when it was at a very short distance from the engine, I called out, "avoiding the accident."

The British truck collided with the truck carrying coal (which was also to the mine) making it wreck the engine out off the rail.

At the collision I was sent off the oval. I have read and understand.


2762-41.5

1878

Thus the concept translation
of Western thought.

TRANSPORTATION COMMISSION	PAUL ELLISON
KEEN, INITIALS	
CHIEF	
ASSISTANT	
ADMIN.	
CIVIL ENG.	
MACH. ENG.	
TRAFFIC	
STORES	


SKETCH MAP OF SCENE OF ACCIDENT



C.M.F.
27th FEB. 45

3133Y15
SIC. PROVS
C.M.F.

MAP RISK T. 3686 -
SHEET 20. SCALE 1:250,000
ITALY.



- A. POSITION OF OVERTURNED 3 TON DODGE.
- B. POSITION OF RAILWAY ENGINE AFTER ACCIDENT.
- C. POSITION OF RAILWAY TRUCK AFTER ACCIDENT.
- D. DIRECTION OF TRAVEL OF 3 TON DODGE.
- E. DIRECTION OF TRAVEL OF RAILWAY ENGINE.

3133715 Watts 4/20/01
510 Provost Coy.
C. M. POHRE.

TRANSPORTATION SUB=COMMISSION
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
PROVINCE OF REGGIO IN CALABRIA

SUBJECT: ACCIDENT CATANZARO SALA.

REF: REG I/I5/3

TO:
H.Q. A.C.C.
TN SUB=COMM
A.P.O. 394

1. Your File ACC TN/258/I/3 and letter of 21 AUG 44.
2. Attached is report of accident with findings which occurred at Catanzaro Sala on 17 Aug 44.
3. It is understood that disciplinary action is reserved for the General Manager.

W. F. Blair
W.F. BLAIR, MAJOR
DIV. SUPT. TN SUB=COMM

1876

TRANSLATION

/fa
258/1/5

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS
I.S.R.

Ref. CC.E. 33. 5. 286

Reggio Calabria - Oct. 30th 1944

To : Maj. Blair

Div. Supt. Tn. S/C.

Subject : Collision of train 8533 against train 4755 bis
at Catanzaro Sala on Aug. 17th 1944

In compliance with your request, we beg to send
herewith enclosed copy of the report concerning the collision
between trains 8533 and 4755 bis, which occurred at Catanzaro
Sala on Aug. 17th 1944

for the Chief of the Compartment
sgd. (illegible)

TRANSLATION

PRELIMINARY REPORT CONCERNING THE COLLISION BETWEEN TRAINS
8533 AND 4755 BIS, WHICH OCCURRED AT CATANZARO SALA ON AUG.
17TH 1944

On Aug. 17th 1944 at 22.10 hrs, freight-train 8533 (two locos and 6 cars, total weight 74 tons) collided with passenger train 4755 bis, staying on IInd line, in the station of Catanzaro Sala.

(Train 4755 bis had been operated in replacement of corresponding regular train which had been employed as Diesel-train on Allied Authorities' behalf).

In consequence of above collision 3 persons were killed (Sgt. CIANFLONE Francesco of Domenico, class 1921 from Amato; Mr. CABRINI Mario of NN, class 1909 from Savelli; BUCCINAI Salvatore of late Antonio, 40 years old from Nicastro, deceased on account of his wounds), 3 were seriously injured (Simonetti Rocco, 26, from Gioiosa, diagnosed to be well in 60 days unless complications set in, on account of fracture of the right thigh-bone; Furfaro Agostino of late Domenico, 39, diagnosed to be well in 30 days unless complications set in, on account of fracture of the right shoulder, Schirripa Cosimo of Rocco, 19, from Gioiosa, with prognosis uncertain on account of total crushing of the right leg, fracture of the left thigh-bone and several bruises) and 7 were slightly injured and diagnosed to be well in 10 days; 2 of this seven persons were I.S.R.'s employees.

As for the material the luggage car No. 96614 belonging to train 4755 bis had its front axle derailed and the assistant engine of train 8533 had its axles derailed.

The damages to the material were estimated at 5.000 Lire.

The break-down van, requested to Loco-Depot of Catanzaro Mar. at 2336 hrs, arrived on the place of the accident at 0115 hrs of Aug. 18th. Train 4755 bis left Catanzaro Sala at 0205 hrs with 345 minutes retardation and train 8533 was cancelled.

Train 4755 bis had arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 2141 hrs. The station master on duty, Capo Stazione II Cl. COSCO Giuseppe, acknowledged receipt of it to the Dirigente Unico (sole train director) at 2147 hrs and he was then informed by said D.U. that train 8533 had left Marcellinara at 2144 hrs. At nearly 2200hrs, having completed head and tail shuntings of train 4755 bis, in order to detach five cars which were left on 1st line (above shunting required

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As it was not possible to establish beforehand how long time above shuntings would have required and having considered that III line, the only one available to receive other trains, was not clear since the tail-loco or train 4755 bis was, even slightly beyond the clearance indicator (traversa limite) and that, on the other hand, train 8533 had been instructed to enter Catanzaro-Sala with carefulness, having set at "stop" the protection signal, Station Master COSCO's duty should have been to subject to his approval the departure of train 8533 from Settingiano.

But S.M. COSCO did not do anything neither did he attempt anything in spite of his assertion that he intended to do that when he was hindered from despatching train 4755 bis by the discussion between the Guard and the Chief of parcel staff, but he refrained from carrying out his intention as soon as, having picked up the telephone, he heard, at 2159 hrs, the Chief master of Settingiano informing the sole trains director that train 8533 had already left that Station. The COSCO says that his sole care was then to despatch train 4755 bis at any price even without having completed the control or the parcels to be unloaded at Catanzaro Sala, and that he did not protect the tail of train 4755 bis because the hand stop-signal could not have been easily seen by the engine crew of arriving train on account of the smoke which would have filled the tunnel and no fog-signals were available.

Above explanations of Mr. COSCO do not appear quite to be attended to. As a matter of fact, and even without considering that at 2159 hrs the shuntings had not probably been completed, COSCO did not point out, either during his examination on Sept. 3rd or in his report of Aug. 17th, that he was directly aware of the fact that train 8533 had left Settingiano at 2158 hrs. And besides, if he had really decided to despatch train 4755 bis, why did he not carry-out his decision between 2159 and 2210 hrs?

It is undersigned's opinion that COSCO did not pay much attention to the fact that the train 8533 was already running and therefore he did not take the necessary measures i.e.: to immediately clear IIIrd line and to close the switch No. 14 or to protect the tail of train 4755 bis with hand-signals.

As for the exact time of arrival at Catanzaro Sala of train 8533, there are some discrepancies.

COSCO wrote on his report that above train arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 2210 hrs, in COSCO's second examination he said that the train arrived at 2208 hrs. The Guard of train 8533 marked upon his register 2222 hrs; according to point-man FONTANA G.B. the train arrived at 2210 hrs. The same time has been recorded in Guard GENTILE's report, who travelled with train 4755 bis as ticket-examiner. Also Station Master TUCCI Guarino, titular of Catanzaro Marina's states 2210 in his report. The locos of both trains 8533 and 4755 bis did not carry any

anything in spite of his assertion that he intended to do that when he was hindered from despatching train 4755 bis by the discussion between the Guard and the Chief of parcel staff, but he refrained from carrying out his intention as soon as, having picked up the telephone, he heard, at 2159 hrs, the Chief master of Settingiano informing the sole trains director that train 8533 had already left that Station. The COSCO says that his sole care was then to despatch train 4755 bis at any price even without having completed the control or the parcels to be unloaded at Catanzaro Sala, and that he did not protect the tail of train 4755 bis because the hand stop-signal could not have been easily seen by the engine crew of arriving train on account of the smoke which would have filled the tunnel and no fog-signals were available.

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1873

Train 8533, which left Settingiano at 21:58 hrs, could have arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 22:18 hrs, bearing in mind that, according to the schedule, the distance between a/m stations ought to be covered in 24 minutes, having included the slowing-up to 20 Km/hr between Km. 36800 and 37530, and that the max. recuperation allowed between Corace and Catanzaro Sala (no recuperation is allowed between Settingiano and Corace) is 4 minutes (at the max. speed of 60 Km/hr being a light train with double engine). It results therefore that 8 minutes have been underly recuperated.

The sole train Director on duty, Station Master Lindi, GAROFALO Francesco, as soon as train 8533 had left Settingiano, called again and again Catanzaro Sala over the phone in order to get informations concerning train 4755 bis, to be forwarded to Catanzaro M. which had asked for them. After several attempts, he finally succeeded in getting a reply from pointman PROCOPI Luigi whom he asked for explanations of the delayed departure of train 4755 bis, pointing out that train 8533 had to be expected at any minute. PROCOPI advised him to stop train 8533 at Corace but D.U. GAROFALO replied that this was no longer possible as train 8533 had already by-passed Corace by that time and, besides, PROCOPI's suggestion could not have been carried out because the train does not stop at that station which is moreover not qualified and without station-master.

Having thus conferred with D.U. GAROFALO, PROCOPI was going towards station Master COSCO, still on the platform hurrying-up the entrainment of the passengers, when he heard from the tunnel the approaching of train 8533. Having seen the impending danger, he instructed the labourer VISCONTI Giuseppe to run towards train 8533 with the signal-lamp, while he himself hurried towards the head-loco of train 4755 bis to give the order of movement.

But both attempts did not succeed because 8533 covered the abt 100 meters between the exit of the tunnel and the tail of train 4755 bis, before VISCONTI could be able to arrive so far as to be seen by train 8533's engine-crew and before PROCOPI could be able to warn the engine-crew of train 4755 bis. Also the attempt of the driver of tail-loco of train 4755 bis, to somehow push-on, did not succeed.

The collision was rather strong. The consequences prove that the engine-crew of train 8533 did not observe the prescriptions concerning the carefulness when entering a station, on account of both pitch-darkness and smoke. The engine-crew was probably convinced that their train had been kept at Settingiano in order to clear the line at Catanzaro Sala and being thus sure that everything had been prearranged to accept their train, they took no heed of above prescriptions judging that those prescriptions' value was more formal than actual, in as much as said prescriptions had been enforced at S. Eufemia, where the train had started from. It is obvious that, had the engine-crew strictly observed above prescriptions, the accident would not probably have had so serious consequences.

GAROFALO Francesco, as soon as train 8533 had left Settingiano, called again and again Catanzaro Sala over the phone in order to get information concerning train 4755 bis, to be forwarded to Catanzaro M. which had asked for them. After several attempts, he finally succeeded in getting a reply from pointman PROCOPI Luigi whom he asked for explanations of the delayed departure of train 4755 bis, pointing out that train 8533 had to be expected at any minute. PROCOPI Advised him to stop train 8533 at Corace but D.U. GAROFALO replied that this was no longer possible as train 8533 had already by-passed Corace by that time and, besides, PROCOPI's suggestion could not have been carried out because the train does not stop at that station which is moreover not qualified and without station-master.

Having thus conferred with D.U. GAROFALO, PROCOPI was going towards station Master COSCO, still on the platform hurrying-up the entrainment of the passengers, when he heard from the tunnel the approaching of train 8533. Having seen the impending danger, he instructed the labourer VISCONTI Giuseppe to run towards train 8533 with the signal-lamp, while he himself hurried towards the head-loco of train 4755 bis to give the order of movement.

But both attempts did not succeed because 8533 covered the abt 100 meters between the exit of the tunnel and the tail of train 4755 bis, before VISCONTI could be able to arrive so far as to be seen by train 8533's engine-crew and before PROCOPI could be able to warn the engine-crew of train 4755 bis. Also the attempt of the driver of tail-loco of train 4755 bis, to somehow push-on, did not succeed.

The collision was rather strong. The consequences prove that the engine-crew of train 8533 did not observe the prescriptions concerning the carefulness when entering a station, on account of both pitch-darkness and smoke. The engine-crew was probably convinced that their train had been kept at Settingiano in order to clear the line at Catanzaro Sala and being thus sure that everything had been prearranged to accept their train, they took no heed of above prescriptions judging that those prescriptions' value was more formal than actual, in as much as said prescriptions had been enforced at S. Eustachio, where the train had started from. It is obvious that, had the engine-crew strictly observed above prescriptions, the accident would not probably have had so serious consequences.

It cannot be neglected the great importance of following deficiencies of equipment, which are a direct consequence of the war; the inefficiency of the signal, out of order for a long time and judged by IES as unfit for repair on account of lack of necessary materials (see memo II 3/5561/AC of 26-6-44) and the inefficiency of both head and tail lights on account of lack of fuel, lamps, wicks (see memo N.R/442 of 13-10-44 of the Chief of Traction Dept. of Catanzaro M.).

Both undersigned are deeply persuaded that, should not have occurred above deficiencies, the accident would have been prevented.

It is important to point-out also that all casualties had to be numbered among the passengers who had abusively clambered on buffers, running boards and roofs, while the passengers inside the coaches suffered only slight injuries.

The scarcity of both passenger trains and cars reserved for passenger service (be they coaches or passenger box-cars) had certainly a great part in above accident.

The responsibilities of the employees must therefore be judged, owing to above related exceptional circumstances, with all extenuating circumstances.

The delay in the request for the break-down van was due to the necessity to look after the injured and to the difficulty to carry out above rescue-work on account of the darkness and of the lack of artificial lights.

Here are the responsibilities:

Station Master II cl. COSCO Giuseppe (251505) of Catanzaro Sala Station, responsible for not having subjected to his approval the departure from Settignano of train 8533 and for not having taken necessary measures.

Driver GRANDE Ugo (304504) from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro, on duty on assistant-engine 625314, responsible for having unduly recuperated 8 minutes between Settignano and Catanzaro Sala and for having neglected the prescribed carefulness when entering Catanzaro Sala.

Driver NISCO Giuseppe (304510) from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro M., on duty on loco 625413, titular for train 8533, responsible with preceeding driver.

Labourer FERRARI Natale from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro Marina, on duty as adjutant-driver and responsible with driver GRANDE.

Labourer NOCERA Giuseppe B.24529, from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro M. on duty as adjutant-driver and responsible with driver NISCO.

Guard FUDA Domenico (256037) from the Depot of Roccella, responsible with the engine-crews for the recuperation of 8 minutes between Settignano and Catanzaro Sala.

At Reggio C. on October 30th 1944

For the Movement Dept.

sgd. Sayo

For the Traction Dept.

sgd. Oliva 1843

Remarks: The representative of the Movement Dept. is of the opinion that the Master COSCO be in lower degree responsible than the engine-crews of train 8533, because had they not unduly recuperated the 8 minutes, the accident would not have probably occurred. At any rate, the

The delay in the request for the break-down van was due to the necessity to look after the injured and to the difficulty to carry out above rescue-work on account of the darkness and of the lack of artificial lights.

Here are the responsibilities:

Station Master II cl. COSCO Giuseppe (251505) of Catanzaro Sala Station, responsible for not having subjected to his approval the departure from Settingiano of train 8533 and for not having taken necessary measures.

Driver GRANDE Ugo (304504) from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro, on duty on assistant-engine 625314, responsible for having unduly recuperated 8 minutes between Settingiano and Catanzaro Sala and for having neglected the prescribed carefulness when entering Catanzaro Sala.

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At Reggio C. on October 30th 1944

For the Movement Dept.

sgd. Sayo

For the Traction Dept.

sgd. Oliva 1871

Remarks: The representative of the Movement Dept. is of the opinion that the Master COSCO be in lower degree responsible than the engine-crews of train 8533, because had they not unduly recuperated the 8 minutes, the accident would not have probably occurred. At any rate, the fact that the prescriptions of carefulness when entering the station were not observed had a decisive influence on the consequences of the accident, while if said prescriptions had been observed, the fault of Station Master COSCO would have remained ineffective.

sgd. Sayo

The representative of the Traction Dept. confirms the order of precedence of the responsibilities as above indicated and he points out that if Station Master COSCO had closed switch 14 towards IIRd line, after having completed the shuntings of train 4755 bis, or if he had protected the station with a hand signal, since the main signal was ^{to be considered as} set at "off" the accident would not have occurred and the fault of the engine-crew would have remained ineffective.

Since Station Master COSCO did not take above measures, he is responsible for having accepted the train on an occupied line, what must be considered the principal cause of the accident.

On the other hand the same judgement has been expressed by Traction Dept. of Rome with letter PAG/T/Per.9 of 18.9.44.


sgd. Oliva

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On the other hand the same judgement has been expressed by
Traction Dept. of Rome with letter PAC/T/Per.9 of 18.9.44.

sgd. Oliva

1870

**MINISTERO DELLE COMUNICAZIONI**
FERROVIE DELLO STATO

Tipo 5

COMPARTIMENTO DI _____

N. CC.E.33.5.286

Reggio Cal. 30 ottobre 1944 - A. _____

al N. _____ del _____

OGGETTO: Investimento tr.8533 contro tr.4755 bis
il 17/8/944 a Catanzaro Sala.Sig. Maggiore Blair
Sovrintendente Servizio Ferroviario
Alleato.Reggio Cal

In ottemperanza alla richiesta della S.V. rimetto
una copia della relazione d'inchiesta circa l'investimento del
treno 4755 bis da parte del tr.8533 verificatosi a Catanzaro S.
il 17 agosto u.s.

per IL CAPO COMPARTIMENTO

1869

RELAZIONE DELL'INGEGNERE L. MARCONI SULLA INVESTIGAZIONE DEL TRENO 4755 BIS DA

PARTE TRENO 85333 RIENTRO A CATANZARO SALA IL 17/8/1944.

Alle ore 22,10 del 17/8 u.s. il treno merci 8533, composto di due locomotive 8.625 e di sei carri, del peso complessivo di tonn. 74, investiva sul III° binio della stazione di Catanzaro Sala il treno 4755 bis (effettuato per via esiliatori in luogo del normale, utilizzato per automotrine conto Autoripa) alla lente) ivi stazionante in attesa della partenza.

In conseguenza dell'urto si ebbero a deplorare tre morti (Serg. Cianfrone Francesco di Domusio, classe 1921, da Amato; Cabrini Mario di IV di 1909 da Savelli, Buccini Salvatore fu Antonio di anni 40 da Nicastro (assediato in Cepedale) tre feriti gravi (Simonesti Rosco di anni 26 da Gioiosa, giudicato guaribile in 60 g.s.c. per frattura femore destro; Furfaro Acostino di Domusio di anni 39, giudicato guaribile entro 30 g.s.c. per frattura omero destro; Schirripa Cosimo di anni 19 da Gioiosa, giudicato con guarigione in 15 g.s.c. per frattura femore sinistro, e contusioni varie) e sette feriti leggeri, dichiarati guaribili entro il decimo giorno, fra cui due appartenenti al personale ferroviario.

Il treno ebbe a verificarsi lo scontro del bagagliaio 85334 in composizione al treno 4755 bis, con l'asse anteriore e della locomotiva di doppia trazione del treno 8533, con tutti gli assi.

I danni al materiale furono valutati approssimativamente a L. 5000.

Il capo attrezzi, chiesto al Deposito Loc. ve di Catanzaro Mar. alle ore 23,30, giunse sul posto alle ore 1,15 del 18. Il treno 4755 bis ripartì da Catanzaro Sala alle ore 2,05 con 343 m.r. Il treno 8533 venne appressato.

Il treno 4755 bis era giunto a Catanzaro S. alle ore 21,41. Il giunto di caso venne, del dirigente di servizio, S. S. III di C. Cosco Giuseppe, trasmesso al D.U. alle ore 21,47. In tale circostanza il D.U. ebbe a far presente al dirigente stesso che il treno 8533 era partito da Marcellinara alle ore 21,44.

Alle ore 22 circa, ultimate le manovre di testa e di coda al treno 4755 bis per lo scontro di cinque carri che furono depositati in I° binario (la manovra richiese non meno di quindici minuti) (mette del deviatore Trocchi Luigi venti minuti) essendosi manovrato con estrema precauzione a causa dell'assoluta oscurità e dell'insufficienza di lanterne da segnalamento (ne esisteva una sola), il Cosco si accinse a licenziare il treno, ma dovette astenersi per una divergenza sorta fra C. Sano e C. Merco, circa la mancanza di alcuni colli da scaricare, per cui si rese necessaria la spunta degli stessi. Non prevedendosi la durata delle suddette operazioni e considerato che il III° binario, unico disponibile al ricevimento dei treni, era ingombro poiché la locomotiva di coda del treno 4755 bis, ne ingegnavo (sia pure di poco) la traversa limite e che, d'altra parte, il treno 8533 aveva avuto prescrizione di entrare a Catanzaro S. con precauzione per segnale di protezione diaposto a via impedita, il Cosco avrebbe dovuto vincolare, tempestivamente, e suo mul-

la cosa le partenza del treno 8533 da S. Catanzaro. Egli non curò di farlo. Ne risulta che lo abbia tentato benché egli sostenga il contrario, affermando, cioè, di avere avuto intenzione di farlo.

In conseguenza dell'urto si ebbero a deplorare tre morti (Serg. Giannone, Francesco di Domenico, classe 1921, da Amato; Cabrini Mario di NY 21.1909 da Savelli, Buccini Salvatore fu Antonio di anni 40 da Nicastro (decaduto in ospedale, tre feriti gravi (Simionetti Cosco di anni 26 da Cicala, giudicato guaribile in 60 g.e.d. per frattura femore destro; Turfano Agostino di Domenico di anni 30, giudicato guaribile entro 30 g.e.d. per frattura osso destro; Schirripa Luigi di anni 19 da Cicala, giudicato con frattura alla servente per albero alto inferiore destro, frattura femore sinistro, e contusioni varie) e sette feriti leggeri, dichiarati guaribili entro il decimo giorno, fra cui due appartenenti al personale ferroviario.

Inoltre ebbe a verificarsi lo scontro del Mugugno 3534 in composizione di treno 4755 bis, con l'asse anteriore e della locomotiva di coppia trazione del treno 8533, con tutti gli assi.

I danni al materiale furono valutati approssimativamente a L. 3500.

Il caso attese, chiesto al Deposito Loc. ve di Catanzaro Mar. Alle ore 23,36, giunse sul posto alle ore 1,15 del 18.11 treno 4755 bis ripartì da Catanzaro Mare alle ore 2,05 con 343 m.r. Il treno 8533 venne soppresso.

Il treno 4755 bis era giunto a Catanzaro S. alla ore 21,41. Il giunto di esso venne, del dirigente di servizio, C.S. II ed. Cosco Giuseppe, tradusse al D.U. alle ore 21,47. In tale circostanza il D.U. ebbe a far presente al dirigente stesso che il treno 8533 era partito da Mercallinara alle ore 21,44.

Alle ore 22 circa, ultimata la manovra di testa e di coda al treno 4755 bis per lo scarto di cinque carri che furono depositati in rovinario (la manovra richiese non meno di quindici minuti) (sette del deviatore Procopi Luigi ventimila) essendosi manovrato con estrema precauzione a causa dell'esistenza assoluta oscurità e dell'inefficienza di lanterne da segnalamento (ne esisteva una sola), il Cosco si accinse a licenziare il treno, ma dovette auto-nersi per una divergenza sorta fra O. Caro e G. Menci, circa la mancanza di alcuni colli da scaricare, per cui si rese necessaria la spunta degli stessi. Non prevedendosi la durata delle suddette operazioni e considerato che il tiro barriera, unico disponibile al ricevimento dei treni, era ingombrato poiché la locomotiva di coda del treno 4755 bis, ne impegnava (sia pure di poco) la traversa limite e che, d'altra parte, il treno 8533 aveva avuto prescrizione di entrare a Catanzaro S. con precauzione per segnale di protezione disposto a via impedita, il Cosco avrebbe dovuto vincolare, tempestivamente, a sua volta la coda la partenza del treno 8533 da Settingiano.

Egli non curò di farlo. Né risulta che lo abbia tentato benché egli sostenga il contrario, affermando, cioè, di averne avuta intenzione in seguito al contratto che gli impedì di licenziare il treno 4755 bis, ma ^{18.11.58} essersi astenuto, avendo certito, non appena avvicinato il microfono del telefono DN all'orecchio, l'assuntore di Settingiano trasmettere, alle ore 21,59, il segnale relativo partenza treno 8533. Aggiunge il Cosco, che sua preoccupazione fu, quindi, quella di licenziare ad ogni costo il treno 4755 bis, anche rinunciando al completamento della spunta, tralasciando di far proteggere la coda del tr. 4755 bis, in considerazione che il segnale di arresto a mano non sarebbe stato facilmente visto dal personale di macchina a causa del denso fumo rimasto in galleria e lasciato dalle locomotive del treno stesso.

quando inoltre la possibilità di essere ucciso con un colpo di pistola, per mancanza di questi.

Le dichiarazioni del Cosco non sembrano, del tutto, attendibili. Infatti a prescindere dal fatto che le manovre, alle ore 21,59, non erano probabilmente ultimate, egli non ha fatto noto nel suo primo interrogatorio in data 3/8, né nel suo rapporto in data 17/8, la circostanza di essere venuto a conoscenza (direttamente) che il treno 8533 era partito da Settegiano alle ore 21,58. Inoltre, se egli veramente aveva deciso di intercettare il treno, non si spiega come mai non lo fece nell'intervallo fra le ore 21,59 e le ore 22,10.

Si ritiene che il Cosco non abbia dato soverchia importanza alla marcia del treno 8533, non prendendo le dovute misure precauzionali (agambere immediato del III° binario, rovesciamento per lo stesso dello scambie V.13, e protezione mediante segnali a mano del treno fermo in stazione).

Circa l'ora di arrivo a Sala del treno 8533, vi sono alcune discrepanze. Il Cosco nel suo rapporto ha dichiarato che il treno 8533 giunse a Catanzaro S. alle ore 22,10; nel suo secondo interrogatorio ha detto che l'arrivo si verificò alle ore 22,08. Il C. Capo del treno 8533, seguiti sul foglio di corsa ore 22,22. A detta del deviatore Fontana G. Battista il treno giunse alle ore 22,10. La stessa ora cita nel suo rapporto il C. Capo Seriale Giuseppe, che viaggiava con funzioni di Controllore sul tr. 4735 via. Anche la stessa ora è stata segnalata nel suo rapporto dal Controllore di Catanzaro S. J. S. Tucci Guarino. Le locomotive dei treni 4735 bis e 8533 erano sorvegliate di tachimetro per questo ai, medesimi e quindi non si può con sicurezza stabilire l'ora di arrivo a Sala del treno 8533.

Stando, però alla maggioranza delle dichiarazioni, è prestato fede alle parti non in causa e soprattutto al Controllore, conosciuto da tutti per persona coscientissima ed obiettiva, si deve ritenere che l'ora di arrivo al vero via 22,10. Del resto, ciò è molto probabile, poiché i treni in buone condizioni di locomotive, possono effettivamente impiegare 12 minuti nel percorso da Settegiano a Sala, quando non devono osservare fermata a Corace. Si dunque, può far rilevare che nessuna contestazione neanche verbale venne al riguardo messa al personale di macchina e di scorta del treno 8533 da parte del personale di stazione. Ciò, probabilmente, per la preoccupazione sorta in tutti in seguito alla conseguenza verificata.

Il treno 8533, partito, come già detto, alle ore 21,58, da Settegiano, avrebbe potuto giungere a Catanzaro S. alle ore 22,18, tenendo presente che la percorrenza d'orario da Settegiano a Catanzaro S. è di minuti 24 compreso il rallentamento a 20 Km/h esistente fra i Km 6900 e 37530 e che il recupero massimo emesso nella tratta Corace-Sala (da Settegiano a Corace) è vietato il recupero) è di minuti 4 (velocità massima consentita. Al Km 33' si verificò il rallentamento, appena 74 torn. e in d.t.).

Risultano, quindi, recuperati inabitabilmente 8 minuti. Il D.U. di servizio, S. S. il C. Controllore Francesco, dopo la partenza del treno 8533 da Settegiano, ebbe a chiamare più volte la stazione di Catanzaro S. per avere notizie circa la partenza del tr. 4735 bis, onde essere comunicato, alla volta, alla stazione di Catanzaro S. che ne aveva fatto

treno, non si spiega come mai non lo fece nell'intervallo fra le ore 21,59 e le ore 22,10.

Si ritiene che il C. loco non abbia dato sufficiente importanza alla marcia del treno 8533, non prendendo le dovute misure precauzionali (avanzamento del treno 8533, movimento per lo stesso dello scartamento 1.14, e protezione mediante segnali a mano del treno fermo in stazione).

Quasi l'ora di arrivo a Sala del treno 8533, vi sono alcune discordanze. Il C. loco nel suo rapporto ha dichiarato che il treno 8533 giunse a Catanzaro S. alle ore 22,10; nel suo secondo interrogatorio ha detto che l'arrivo si verificò alle ore 22,08. Il C. loco del treno 8533, segnò, sul foglio di corsa con 22,22. A detta del deviatore Pontano G. battista il treno giunse alle ore 22,10. La stessa ora cita nel suo rapporto il C. loco come tale che giunse a Sala del treno 8533, vi sono alcune discordanze. Anche la stessa ora è stata segnalata nel suo rapporto del deviatore di Catanzaro S. 3.8 Traci Marino. Le locomotive del treno 4755 bis e 8533 erano approvviate da Catanzaro per questo si, adesso si, quindi non si può con sicurezza stabilire l'ora di arrivo a Sala del treno 8533.

Stando, però alla maggioranza delle dichiarazioni, e prestando fede alle parole non in causa e soprattutto al titolare, conosciuto da tutti per persona concienzosa ed esattiva, si deve ritenere che l'ora più vicina al vero sia 22,10. Del resto, ciò è molto probabile, poiché i treni in buone condizioni di locomotive, possono effettivamente impiegare 14 minuti nel percorso da Catanzaro a Sala, quando non devono osservare fermata a Corace. E' d'uopo, però, far rilevare che nessuna contestazione neanche verbale venne al riguardo messa al personale di macchina e di scorta del treno 8533 da parte del personale di stazione. Ciò, probabilmente, per la preoccupazione e per tutti in seguito alle conseguenze verificatesi.

Il treno 8533, partito, come già detto, alle ore 21,58, da Settimo, avrebbe potuto giungere a Catanzaro S. alle ore 22,18, tenendo presente che la percorrenza d'orario da Settimo a Catanzaro S. è di minuti 24 come preso il rallentamento a 20 Km/h esistente fra i Km 3880 e 37530 e che il recupero massimo ammesso nella tratta Corace-Sala (da Settimo a Corace è vietato il recupero) è di minuti 4 (velocità massima consentita di 30 Km/h, appena 74 tonnellate e in d.t.).

Risultano, quindi, recuperati indubbiamente 3 minuti.

Il D.U. di servizio, C.S. Il 21. Garofalo Francesco, dopo la partenza del treno 8533 da Settimo, ebbe a chiamare più volte la stazione di Catanzaro S. per avere notizie circa la partenza del treno 8533, onde comunicarle, senza volte, alla stazione di Catanzaro S. che ne aveva fatto richiesta. Dopo reiterate chiamate, gli venne risposto dal deviatore Procopi che, al quale, dopo fatto delle dimostrazioni per le marcate difese alle sue chiamate, chiese informazioni circa il ritardo in partenza da parte del tr. 4755 bis, facendo, perimenti, presente che doveva ritenersi imminente l'arrivo del tr. 8533. Il Procopi consigliò al D.U. di fermare il treno a Corace, ma questi gli fece notare che il treno doveva essere di già transitato da Corace e che comunque non avrebbe potuto fermarlo, essendo l'assuntoria disabilitata ed impronunciata e non avendo in essa fermata il treno.

Ultimata la comunicazione telefonica, il Procopi stava dirigendosi verso

Il diligente, che si trovava sul piazzale intento a collocare col solitario a trillo l'incendio, momento, per metterlo a ovante di quanto aveva saputo del S.U. allorché non provenisse dalla galleria il treno del tr. 3533. Intuendo il pericolo, immediatamente disse ordine al macchinista Visconti Giuseppe, di accendere con la lanterna verso il treno 3533 e contemporaneamente egli si portò verso la locomotiva di testa del tr. 4755 che si stava a farla mettere in moto.

Ma anche i tentativi riuscirono infruttuosi, poiché il treno 3533, sbucato dalla galleria, percorse i 106 metri, circa, che lo separavano dalla coda del treno 4755 bis, prima che il Visconti fosse giunto in posizione opportuna per essere visto dal personale di macchina e prima che il treno 4755 raggiungesse la locomotiva di testa del treno fermo. Anche tardivo riuscì il tentativo fatto dal macchinista di coda del 4755 bis, di mettere in moto con appene una lieve trilla di cillare fatte dal personale di stazione.

L'urto fu altrettanto violento. Le conseguenze citate nel "fatto" stanno a comprovare che il personale di macchina non ebbe a rispettare la prescritta dovuta precauzione nell'ingresso in stazione, nonostante la scarsissima consistenza di visibilità per l'assoluta oscurità e per la presenza di fumo. Invero il personale di macchina dovette ritenere che la fermata a Settignano fosse stata mantenuta appositamente per attendere la via libera di Catanzaro S. e, pertanto, convinto che tutto fosse stato predisposto per l'arrivo del treno, non si preoccupò della prescrizione di entrare con precauzione, giudicando che questa avesse un valore relativo e formale, tanto più che era stata praticata dalla stazione di S. Eufemia I., origine di corsa.

L'ovvio che, se il personale di macchina si fosse attenuto alla prescrizione, molto probabilmente, non si sarebbero verificati la conseguenza citata nel "fatto".

Non è fuor di luogo, infine, far rilevare che nell'occorrenza del segnale, guasto da lungo tempo, dichiarato irreperibile dall'U.S. per mancanza dei materiali necessari (vedi nota N. 3/3551, April 25, 8/44) e la inefficienza dei fusi di testa e di coda dei treni per mancanza di lamotri, calze, colline, combustibile (vedi nota N. 4/42 del 10/10/1944 del C.R. o Riparto Trazione di Catanzaro S.), conseguenza degli eventi bellici, hanno notevolmente e principalmente, anzi, contribuito al verificarsi dell'incidente. Si è profondamente convinti che ove queste circostanze non fossero esistite, l'inconveniente non avrebbe avuto luogo.

Si è altresì importante far notare che i morti ed i feriti gravi, per come è stato rilevato, si ebbero a verificarsi fra i numerosi viaggiatori che, sfortunatamente, si erano aggregati all'esterno delle vetture (sui respingenti, pedane, imperiali) per mancanza di posto, mentre fra i viaggiatori regolari, in conseguenza di un incidente si ebbero lievi danni.

L'inefficienza dei treni viaggiatori e delle vetture o carri adibiti per tale servizio, situazione anche questa conseguenza degli eventi bellici, ha costituito certamente elemento di aggravio nell'incidente.

Le responsabilità incontrate, dai vari agenti nell'occorrenza, vanno pertanto, in relazione alle citate eccezionali condizioni del momento, giudicate con tutte le attenuanti.

Il ritardo nella richiesta del carro attrezzi, dove trovare i suoi e l'azione nel fatto, che subito dopo verificatosi l'incidente il personale

adatto alla locomotiva 625314, R.T., del tr. 8533, responsabile di aver im-

mediatamente recuperato in tutti nella tratta Setti. Milano-Catanzaro S.

e di non aver generato la dovuta prescrizione nell'ingrosso

S. Catanzaro S.

Macch. Nisco Giuseppe (304510) del Deposito Loc.ve di Catanzaro S., addet-

to alla locomotiva 625413, titolare del tr. 8533, responsabile come al

primo.

Manov. Ferrarini Natale, a.s. ff. macch. del Deposito Loc.ve di Catanzaro S.,

corresponsabile col macchinista Grande.

Manov. Nisco Giuseppe, S. 24529, ff. S. macch. del Deposito Loc.ve di Catanzaro

S. S. corresponsabile col macchinista Nisco.

S. 2450 Paul Domenico (255017) del Deposito P.V. di Rocelle, corresponsa-

bile col personale di macchina per l'indebito recupero degli otto minu-

ti nella tratta Settingiano-Catanzaro S.

Reggio Cal. in 30/ottobre 1944.

PER LA SEZIONE MOVIMENTO

PER LA SEZIONE TRAMONTE

Haye

Chilly

T.3.
 Il rappresentante dell'Unione Nazionale ritiene doverci considerare
 la minore entità la responsabilità incontrata dal dirigente, C.S. II el.
 capo Giuseppe, in confronto di quella che il capo si prefigge di
 macchine, poiché ove non si fosse verificato l'incidento nessuno dei
 cento con ogni probabilità (il Cocco aveva già emesso dei fischietti nel
 fischietto a traliccio) non avrebbe avuto luogo. A suo parere, in ogni caso
 l'incorrevenza della presunta colpa di omissione nell'ingressare in
 stazione ha avuto un peso decisivo sulle conseguenze dell'incidente,
 mentre il resto di esso avrebbe dovuto far rimanere senza effetto la
 mancanza del dirigente.

F.to Scyò

Il Rappresentante della Sezione Unione conferma l'ordine delle respon-
 sabilità su indicate, e fa presente che se il C.S. Cocco avesse disposto
 lo scambio N.14 per il terzo binario dopo l'ultima la manovra di testa
 e da coda del treno 4735-015), o avesse disposto per un segnale a mano
 di protezione della stazione, dato che il segnale fisso di protezione era
 da considerarsi e via libera, l'incidente non si sarebbe verificato e
 la mancanza del personale di macchina sarebbe rimasta senza effetto.

Non essendosi il C.S. Cocco comportato come sopra detto egli è respon-
 sabile di aver provocato il treno su binario anomalo, ciò che è stata la
 causa prima dell'incidente.

Del resto ciò è confermato dal parere esplicito espresso dall'Ufficio
 Trazione di Roma con note P.13.1/Per.9 del 18.9.1944.

F.to Oliva

/fd

TRANSLATION

MINISTRY OF COMMUNICATIONS
I.S.R.

Ref. CC.E. 33. 5. 286

Reggio Calabria - Oct. 30th 1944

To : Maj. Blair

Div. Supt. Tn. S/C.

Subject : Collision of train 8533 against train 4755 bis
at Catanzaro Sala on Aug. 17th 1944

In compliance with your request; we beg to send
herewith enclosed copy of the report concerning the collision
between trains 8533 and 4755 bis, which occurred at Catanzaro
Sala on Aug. 17th 1944

for the Chief of the Compartment
sgd. (illegible)

1863

/id

TRANSMISSIONPRELIMINARY REPORT CONCERNING THE COLLISION BETWEEN TRAINS
8533 AND 4755 BIS, WHICH OCCURRED AT CATANZARO SALA ON AUG.

17TH 1944

On Aug. 17th 1944 at 22.10 hrs, freight-train 8533 (two locos and 6 cars, total weight 74 tons) collided with passenger train 4755 bis, staying on IInd line, in the station of Catanzaro Sala. (Train 4755 bis had been operated in replacement of corresponding regular train which had been employed as Diesel-train on Allied Authorities' behalf).

In consequence of above collision 3 persons were killed (Sgt. CIANFLORE Francesco of Domenico, class 1921 from Amato; Mr. CABRINI Mario of NN, class 1909 from Savelli; BUCCINAI Salvatore of late Antonio, 40 years old from Nicastro, deceased on account of his wounds), 3 were seriously injured (Simonetti Rocco, 26, from Gioiosa, diagnosed to be well in 60 days unless complications set in, on account of fracture of the right thigh-bone; Furfaro Agostino of late Domenico, 39, diagnosed to be well in 30 days unless complications set in, on account of fracture of the right shoulder, Schirripa Cosimo of Rocco, 19, from Gioiosa, with prognosis uncertain on account of total crushing of the right leg, fracture of the left thigh-bone and several bruises) and 7 were slightly injured and diagnosed to be well in 10 days; 2 of this seven persons were I.S.R.'s employees.

As for the material the luggage car No. 96614 belonging to train 4755 bis had its front axle derailed and the assistant engine of train 8533 had its axles derailed.

The damages to the material were estimated at 5.000 Lire.

The break-down van, requested to Loco-Depot of Catanzaro Mar. at 2336 hrs, arrived on the place of the accident at 0115 hrs of Aug. 18th. Train 4755 bis left Catanzaro Sala at 0205 hrs with 345 minutes retardation and train 8533 was cancelled.

Train 4755 bis had arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 2141 hrs. The station master on duty, Capo Stazione II Cl. COSCO Giuseppe, acknowledged receipt of it to the Dirigente Unico (sole train's director) at 2147 hrs and he was then informed by said D.U. that train 8533 had left Marcellinara at 2144 hrs. At nearly 2200hrs, having completed head and tail shuntings of train 4755 bis, in order to detach five cars which were left on 1st line (above shunting required at least 15 minutes and, according to point-man PROGOPI Luigi, even

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As it was not possible to establish beforehand how long time above shuntings would have required and having considered that III line, the only one available to receive other trains, was not clear since the tail-loco of train 4755 bis was, even slightly beyond the clearance indicator (traversa limite) and that, on the other hand, train 8533 had been instructed to enter Catanzaro-Sala with carefulness, having set at "stop" the protection signal, Station Master COSCO's duty should have been to subject to his approval the departure of train 8533 from Settingiano.

But S.M. COSCO did not do anything neither did he attempt anything in spite of his assertion that he intended to do that when he was hindered from despatching train 4755 bis by the discussion between the Guard and the Chief of parcel staff, but he refrained from carrying out his intention as soon as, having picked up the telephone, he heard, at 2159 hrs, the Chief master of Settingiano informing the sole trains director that train 8533 had already left that Station. The COSCO says that his sole care was then to despatch train 4755 bis at any price even without having completed the control of the parcels to be unloaded at Catanzaro Sala, and that he did not protect the tail of train 4755 bis because the hand stop-signal could not have been easily seen by the engine crew of arriving train on account of the smoke which would have filled the tunnel and no fog-signals were available.

Above explanations of Mr. COSCO do not appear quite to be attended to. As a matter of fact, and even without considering that at 2159 hrs the shuntings had not probably been completed, COSCO did not point out, either during his examination on Sept. 3rd or in his report of Aug. 17th, that he was directly aware of the fact that train 8533 had left Settingiano at 2158 hrs. And besides, if he had really decided to despatch train 4755 bis, why did he not carry-out his decision between 2159 and 2210 hrs?

It is undersigned's opinion that COSCO did not pay much attention to the fact that the train 8533 was already running and therefore he did not take the necessary measures i.e.: to immediately clear IIIrd line and to close the switch No. 14 or to protect the tail of train 4755 bis with hand-signals.

As for the exact time of arrival at Catanzaro Sala of train 8533, there are some discrepancies.

COSCO wrote on his report that above train arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 2210 hrs, in COSCO's second examination he said that the train arrived at 2208 hrs. The Guard of train 8533 marked upon his register 2222 hrs; according to point-man FORTANA G.B. the train arrived at 2210 hrs. The same time has been recorded in Guard GENTILE's report, who travelled with train 4755 bis as ticket-examiner. Also Station Master TUCCI Guarino, titular of Catanzaro Marina's states 2210 in his report. The locos of both trains 8533 and 4755 bis did not carry any

But S.W. COSCO did not do anything neither did he attempt anything in spite of his assertion that he intended to do that when he was hindered from despatching train 4755 bis by the discussion between the Guard and the Chief of parcel staff, but he refrained from carrying out his intention as soon as, having picked up the telephone, he heard, at 2159 hrs, the Chief master of Settingiano informing the sole trains director that train 8533 had already left that Station. The COSCO says that his sole care was then to despatch train 4755 bis at any price even without having completed the control of the parcels to be unloaded at Catanzaro Sala, and that he did not protect the tail of train 4755 bis because the hand stop-signal could not have been easily seen by the engine crew of arriving train on account of the smoke which would have filled the tunnel and no fog-signals were available.

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Train 8533, which left Settingiano at 1158 hrs, could have arrived at Catanzaro Sala at 2218 hrs, bearing in mind that, according to the schedule, the distance between a/m stations ought to be covered in 24 minutes, having included the slowing-up to 20 Km/hr between Km. 36800 and 37530, and that the max. recuperation allowed between Corace and Catanzaro Sala (no recuperation is allowed between Settingiano and Corace) is 4 minutes (at the max. speed of 60 Km/hr being a light train with double engine). It results therefore that 8 minutes have been underly recuperated.

The sole train Director on duty, Station Master Lindol GAROFALO Francesco, as soon as train 8533 had left Settingiano, called again and again Catanzaro Sala over the phone in order to get informations concerning train 4755 bis, to be forwarded to Catanzaro M. which had asked for them. After several attempts, he finally succeeded in getting a reply from pointman PROCOPI Luigi whom he asked for explanations on the delayed departure of train 4755 bis, pointing out that train 8533 had to be expected at any minute. PROCOPI advised him to stop train 8533 at Corace but D.U. GAROFALO replied that this was no longer possible as train 8533 had already by passed Corace by that time and, besides, PROCOPI's suggestion could not have been carried out because the train does not stop at that station which is moreover not qualified and without station-master.

Having thus conferred with D.U. GAROFALO, PROCOPI was going towards station Master COSCO, still on the platform hurrying up the entrainment of the passengers, when he heard from the tunnel the approaching of train 8533. Having seen the impending danger, he instructed the labourer VISCONTI Giuseppe to run towards train 8533 with the signal-lamp, while he himself hurried towards the head-loco of train 4755 bis to give the order of movement.

But both attempts did not succeed because 8533 covered the abt 100 meters between the exit of the tunnel and the tail of train 4755 bis, before VISCONTI could be able to arrive so far as to be seen by train 8533's engine-crew and before PROCOPI could be able to warn the engine-crew of train 4755 bis. Also the attempt of the driver of tail-loco of train 4755 bis, to somehow push-on, did not succeed.

The collision was rather strong. The consequences prove that the engine-crew of train 8533 did not observe the prescriptions concerning the carefulness when entering a station, on account of both pitch-darkness and smoke. The engine-crew was probably convinced that their train had been kept at Settingiano in order to clear the line at Catanzaro Sala and being thus sure that everything had been prearranged to accept their train, they took no heed of above prescriptions judging that those prescriptions' value was more formal than actual, in as much as said prescriptions had been enforced at S. Eufemia L. where the train had started from. It is obvious that, had the engine-crew strictly observed above prescriptions, the accident would not probably have had so serious consequences.

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The sole train Director on duty, Station Master and Garofalo Francesco, as soon as train 8533 had left Settingiano, called again and again Catanzaro Sala over the phone in order to get information concerning train 4755 bis, to be forwarded to Catanzaro M. which had asked for them. After several attempts, he finally succeeded in getting a reply from pointman PROCOPI Luigi whom he asked for explanations on the delayed departure of train 4755 bis, pointing out that train 8533 had to be expected at any minute. PROCOPI advised him to stop train 8533 at Corace but D.U. GAROFALO replied that this was no longer possible as train 8533 had already by passed Corace by that time and, besides, PROCOPI's suggestion could not have been carried out because the train does not stop at that station which is moreover not qualified and without station-master.

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It cannot be neglected the great importance of following deficiencies of equipment, which are a direct consequence of the war; the inefficiency of the signal, out of order for a long time and judged by IES as unfit for repair on account of lack of necessary materials (see memo II 3/5561/AC of 26-6-44) and the inefficiency of both head and tail lights on account of lack of fuel, lamps, wicks (see memo W.R/442 of 13-10-44 of the Chief of Traction Sept. of Catanzaro M.).

Both undersigned are deeply persuaded that, should not have occurred above deficiencies, the accident would have been prevented.

It is important to point-out also that all casualties had be numbered among the passengers who had abusively clamored on buffe s, running boards and roofs, while the passengers inside the coaches suffered only slight injuries.

The scarcity of both passenger trains and cars reserved for passenger service (be they coaches or passenger box-cars) had certainly a great part in above accident.

The responsibilities of the employees must therefore be judged, owing to above related exceptional circumstances, with all extenuating circumstances.

The delay in the request for the break-down van was due to the necessity to look after the injured and to the difficulty to carry out above rescue-work on account of the darkness and of the lack of artificial lights.

Here are the responsables:

Station Master II cl. COSCO Giuseppe (251505) of Catanzaro Sala Station, responsible for not having subjected to his approval the departure from Settingiano of train 8533 and for not having taken necessary measures.

Driver GRANDE Ugo (304504) from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro, on duty on adjutant engine 625314, corresponding for having unduly recuperated 8 minutes between Settingiano and Catanzaro Sala and for having neglected the prescribed carefulness when entering Catanzaro Sala.

Driver MISCO Giuseppe (304510) from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro M., on duty on loco 625413, titular for train 8533, corresponding with preceeding driver.

Labourer FERRARI Natale from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro Marina, on duty as adjutant-driver and corresponding with driver GRANDE.

Labourer NOCERA Giuseppe S.24529, from Loco-Depot of Catanzaro M. on duty as adjutant-driver and corresponding with driver MISCO.

Guard FUDA Domenico (256037) from the Depot of Roccella, corresponding with the engine-crews for the recuperation of 8 minutes between Settingiano and Catanzaro Sala.

At Reggio C. on October 30th 1944

For the Movement Dept.

sgd. Sayo

For the Traction Dept.

18.9

sgd. Oliva

Remarks: The representative of the Movement Dept. is of the opinion that the Master COSCO be in lower degree responsible than the engine-crews of train 8533, because had they not unduly recuperated the 8 minutes, the accident would not have occurred.

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For the Movement Dept.

sgd. Sayo

For the Traction Dept.

sgd. Olive

Remarks: The representative of the Movement Dept. is of the opinion that the Master COSCO be in lower degree responsible than the engine-crews of train 8533, because had they not unduly recuperated the 8 minutes, the accident would not have probably occurred. At any rate, the fact that the prescriptions of carefulness when entering the station were not observed had a decisive influence on the consequences of the accident, while if said prescriptions had been observed, the fault of Station Master COSCO would have remained ineffective.

sgd. Sayo

The representative of the Traction Dept. confirms the order of precedence of the responsibilities as above indicated and he points out that if Station Master COSCO had closed switch 14 towards IIRd line, after having completed the shuntings of train 4755 bis, or if he had protected the station with a hand signal, since the main signal was set at "off" the accident would not have occurred and the fault of the engine-crew would have remained ineffective.

Since Station Master COSCO did not take above measures, he is responsible for having accepted the train on an occupied line, what must be considered the principal cause of the accident.

On the other hand the same judgement has been expressed by Traction Dept. of Rome with letter PAC/T/Per.9 of 18.9.44.

sgd. Oliva

1001

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On the other hand the same judgement has been expressed by Traction Dept. of Rome with letter PAC/T/Per.9 of 18.3.44.

sgd. Oliva

1878

- 5 -

Copy

From : N° 3 Base Personnel Depot, R.A.F., C.M.F.
TO : A.C.C., C.M.F.
Date : 20th October 1944
Ref : 3BPD/702/1/PI.

Collision between R.A.F. vehicle N°91022645 (Dodge)
and Electric Train

Attached herewith is a copy of Police report regarding a collision between one of this Unit's vehicles and an Electric Train at the level crossing in the Corso Armando Diaz, Bellavista, Portici on 19th October 1944.

It appears that no blame can be attached to any R.A.F. personnel. The barrier attendant gave no sign of any approaching train and the responsibility must rest with the Railway Company.

While in this particular case, the accident caused little damage and no injuries, it may have been extremely serious, and there could easily have been heavy loss of life.

It is pointed out that owing to the nature of this Unit, men are constantly being conveyed over this level crossing and it is imperative that the Railway Company take the necessary precautions to ensure against any accidents at the level crossing.

It is also pointed out that there have been other accidents previously and it will be appreciated that this negligence cannot be tolerated.

It is therefore requested that you take matter up with the Railway Company and that immediate steps are taken by them to adequately safeguard all level crossing against accidents.

signed Group Captain Command
N° 3 Base Personnel Depot
Royal Air Force

Copy

Report

To: The officer Commanding, N° 3 B.P.D., R.A.F., C.M.F?
Subject: Collision between R.A.F. vehicle N°91022645 (Dodge)
and Electric Train.

Sir,

I have to submit for your information the following report.

At N°3 B.P.D? on the 19.10.44 at approx 15.10 hrs. I was called to the scene of a collision between an R.A.F. vehicle and an electric train at the level crossing in the Corso Armando Diaz.

On arriving at the level crossing I saw an R.A.F. vehicle N°91022645 standing stationary outside the transit Officers' Mess, (Billet N°4) The vehicle was facing in the direction of S.H. ., N°3B.P.D. The train was gone. N° 933727 LAC. Hackshaw, the driver of the vehicle stated that he had brought some personnel to the Reception Office, N°3B.P.D? where he had received instructions to take the personnel to the Villa Giulia N°2 which is situated over the Autostrada.

As his vehicle was facing in the direction of the level crossing, Hackshaw decided to drive to the crossing and turn the vehicle round. Hackshaw drove his vehicle over the level crossing, then he stopped and started to back the vehicle over the crossing into the little side street that runs beside the White House (Billet N°3).

The Italian barrier attendant at the level crossing saw the vehicle backing over the level crossing and he waved the driver on which his green flag. When the vehicle was about halfway over the level crossing, Hackshaw saw the Italian barrier attendant run off the crossing, and the next moment an electric train coming from the direction of Pompei struck the centre offside of his vehicle, knocking the vehicle on to one of the tram barriers and damaging it. There were no barriers down at the time of the collision and no-one gave Hackshaw any signal to tell him that a train was coming. No service personnel or civilians were injured in the collision. The vehicle sustained a slight dent in the tool-box which is situated on the centre offside of the vehicle.

The steel upright which supports the tram barrier is badly bent so as to make this barrier unserviceable.

1876

N° 921791 Cpl Riddick, L. who was on the vehicle at the time stated, that as the vehicle was backing over the level crossing he saw a train come from around the bend in the railway. He shouted to the occupants of the vehicle, who all jumped out of the vehicle.

Cpl. Riddick stated that there were no barriers down at the level crossing.

-2-

633914, LAC Bennett, W., stated that he was standing by the level crossing when he saw an R.A.F. vehicle backing over the crossing. The barrier attendant was waving the driver of this vehicle on with his green flag. When the vehicle was about half way over the crossing, he saw a train coming towards the crossing from the direction of Pompei. The personnel riding in the vehicle jumped out and a moment afterwards the train struck the centre offside of the vehicle knocking the vehicle against one of the barriers which was formerly used to warn trains of an oncoming train. LAC Bennett further stated that the Italian barrier attendant gave the driver of the vehicle no indication that a train was approaching the level crossing.

Amarca Adolpho, the barrier attendant at the level crossing stated that at approx 15.05 hours, 19/10/44 he was on duty at the crossing when he saw an R.A.F. vehicle starting to back over the level crossing. Amarca went and stood in the centre of the crossing, and waved the driver of the vehicle on with his green flag.

When the vehicle was halfway across the crossing, he saw a train come around the bend in the railway from the direction of Pompei.


As the train was going fairly fast and he had no opportunity to either stop the train or warn the driver of the vehicle, he had no other alternative but to get clear of the railway.


The train struck the side of the vehicle and knocked it against the unused tram barrier. Amarca further stated that he did not know that a train was due at this time, as the train service is very unreliable.

There is a decided curve in the railway about 80 yards from the level crossing, and therefore any trains coming from the direction of Pompei are unsighted to the barrier attendants until they are practically on the level crossing.

It would appear that the barrier attendant was decidedly at fault. A sketch plan of the collision is attached.

signed H.C. Morley Cpl. N°3B.P.D.





ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION

NAPLES ZONE

(PROVINCES OF NAPLES, AVELLINO, BENEVENTO)

PREFETTURA, NAPLES

File

41

28 October 1944

Subject:

Accidents.

To:

Major Bowers, Rail Transportation. Southern Region A.C.C.

Herewith RAF report of accident at Bellavista,
and preliminary report of rail accident at
Castellamare.

Further details when available will be
sent to you.

F. Scalf

Francis Scalf
Capt. C.L.
Public Safety Officer

CopySubject : Train Crash - Castellammare

Ref. PRO 424/I

To : APM 56 Area

About 2220 hrs on Monday 23 Oct. 44 a runaway train, consisting of Engine, two Carriages and two Box waggons, crashed at high speed into the terminus station of Castellammare. The Engine mounted the platform and ploughed through four rooms. The sole occupant of the train was a civilian woman who received the injuries. Of the four rooms wrecked, one was the RTC's office which contained a British Cpl. and three other members of the RTC's staff. A sleeping room of the station Italian Guard, which contained twelve Italian Military personnel, and two other rooms, one of which was occupied by an Italian youth, and the other vacant.

Total casualties were :-

British Cpl Killed.

3 ORs injured (not seriously)

Italians 6 killed 7 injured (1 seriously)

All casualties have been extricated from the wreckage. Preliminary enquiries reveal that this train commenced its run at Gragnano, about five Kms from CASTELLAMMARE a few minutes before the accident. Information so far obtained indicates that at about 2205 hrs a civilian fireman, who was attending to the engine at Gragnano was assaulted by two or three service personnel under the influence of drink, who removed him from the engine, and set it in motion. One man said to be wearing an RAF greatcoat, was seen to get off the engine footplate as the train left the station and abscond. A complete search of the railway line between GRAGNANO and CASTELLAMMARE was effected. The result was negative. There are indication that GRAGNANO station was the scene of much drunkenness during the evening of 23rd instant, damage was done to one of the station rooms, and the train in question was used for the purpose of prostitution.

Extensive enquiries are being made in conjunction with RAF SIB and Civil Police. Full reports will be submitted in due course through DAFM 61 Sec SIB.

(Sgd) 187777 Capt.

DAFM (SIB)

HQ 3 District

24 Oct.

HPC/GP

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
HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Transportation Sub-Commission
APO 394

Our reference: ACC Tn/258/1/3
Date : 21 August 1944

TO : Major Blair
ACC Div. Supt.
c/o Mov. Reggio

SUBJECT : Accident at Catanzaro Sala. 17 August 1944

1. Reference your signal dated 18 August with regard to collision between passenger train 4755 and freight train 8533 at Catanzaro Sala on 17 August.
2. As Capo Compartimento will be holding a joint enquiry with representatives of his departments concerned, please send report as to the findings and action taken.
3. Details of the evidence will not be necessary.


D.S. ADAMS
Colonel, C.E.
Tn. Sub-Comm.

1852

Tel.: 478701

EWD/lr

HEADQUARTERS
ALLIED CONTROL COMMISSION
Transportation Sub-Commission
APO 394

File

Our reference: ACC Tn/258/1/2/
Date : 21 August 1944


TO : Major Baister
ACC Tn. Sub-Comm.
c/o Director General Military Railway Services
Rome

SUBJECT : Accident at Catanzaro Sala. 17 August 1944.

1. Hereunder is copy of Signal received from Major Blair, Reggio, with regard to a train accident on 17 August:

"ACCIDENT AT CATANZARO SALA 2210 HRS 17TH PSGR TRAIN 4755 SAN EUFEMIA - CATANZARO MAR WAS STANDING IN NO 2 TRACK AT CATANZARO SALA AND 8533 FREIGHT TRAIN SAN EUFEMIA - CATANZARO MAR RAN INTO REAR OF 4755. LOCO ON 8533 DAMAGED ALSO ONE PSGR COACH AND ONE BRAKE VAN ON 4755. TWO PEOPLE KILLED 11 INJURED. LINE CLEAR 0430 HRS 18TH."

2. Major Blair is being asked to obtain report as to the findings of the joint enquiry and action taken.



D.S. ADAMS
Colonel, C.E.
Tn. Sub-Comm.

1851

ALLIE CONTROL COMMISSION
INCOMING MESSAGE

TO: DGERS ACC MAIN FOR ADAM 3331
FROM: BLAIR REGGIO SIGNAL MESSAGE CENTER No: 83/18
REFERENCE No: CLASSIFICATION: NONE
DATE AND TIME OF ORIGIN: AUG 18 1040B PRECEDENCE: IMMEDIATE
OFFICE OF ORIGIN:

ACCIDENT AT CATANZARO SALA 2210 HRS 17TH PSGR TRAIN 4755 SAN
EUFEMIA - CATANZARO MAR WAS STANDING IN NO 2 TRACK AT CATANZARO SALA
AND 8533 FREIGHT TRAIN SAN EUFEMIA - CATANZARO MAR RAN INTO REAR OF
4755. LOCO ON 8533 DAMAGED ALSO ONE PSGR COACH AND ONE BRAKE VAN ON
4755. TWO PEOPLE KILLED 11 INJURED. LINE CLEAR 0430 HRS 18TH.

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ACTION - TN SC (2)
INFO - A/CC
ECON SEC
FILE
FLOAT (2)



1870

DATE and Time of RECEIPT AUG 18 2200B

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